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ABSTRACT	  
 
 
This thesis explores EU-Brazil relations and answers the question of why these two 
actors have failed to use the bilateral level of their cooperation as a platform to 
enhance their coordination in multilateral arenas. The thesis develops a framework to 
explain the linkage between levels of cooperation within a particular bilateral 
relationship that focuses on both agents and issues. The argument of “level-linkage” 
is empirically tested in three case-studies: climate change, trade, and human rights. 
The thesis finds that the greater the openness of a regime to influences from other 
levels of cooperation, the more likely level-linkage is to occur. However, level-
linkage is restricted to where the approaches of the two partners towards 
multilateralism are compatible. Preferences for partners were also not the main 
constraint to the promotion of an EU-Brazil strategic partnership in multilateral 
arenas. Instead, as this thesis reveals, the degree of coordination in national foreign 
policy-making institutions is the key determinant of level-linkage. These findings 
support the argument that the dynamics between agents and the specificities of issues 
do matter in explaining the relation between bilateral and multilateral levels of 
cooperation. In this light, this thesis contributes to the analysis of bilateral 
relationships within a multi-level structure, ultimately advancing academic research 
in international cooperation. It also contributes to the literature on foreign policy 
analysis and to an emerging body of scholarship in EU-Brazil relations.  
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CHAPTER	  1	  
Introduction:	  
	  Level-­‐Linkage	  in	  International	  Cooperation	  
 
 
1.1	  Summary	  
 
Cooperation at both the bilateral and the multilateral level are elements which are 
commonly integrated into the framework of a bilateral relationship. When the parties 
of an international regime meet in the multilateral arena, they already have pre-
established relations with most of the players. This connection, however, does not 
necessarily imply a correlation between the two levels. As this thesis will reveal, the 
development of cooperation at the bilateral and the multilateral level can occur in 
isolation. One level may not necessarily have an impact on the other.  
 Despite the fact that most bilateral relationships are defined by “multilevel” 
cooperation, mainstream literature on international cooperation fails to provide a 
systematic account of this. The literature on coalitions predominantly addresses the 
multilateral arena, missing the consistent link between the bilateral and multilateral 
levels. Academic research addressing the bilateralism vs. multilateralism debate does 
provide interesting insights into the characteristics of the two modalities of 
cooperation and how they can be interrelated. The problem, however, is that these 
analyses consider bilateralism and multilateralism as two separated, often competing, 
forms of cooperation and not as levels of a bilateral relationship. Thus, the existing 
literature on types of agreement fails to provide insights useful to understand the 
dynamics of a relationship between two actors. Emerging literature on EU strategic 
partnerships tend to analyse EU relations with third countries considering in from a 
“multi-level” perspective. However, as this section later explains, these researches 
explain the linkage between dialogue at the bilateral level and bilateral cooperation at 
the multilateral level and the multilateral essentially from the compatibility of the 
partners’ agendas. As this thesis reveals, this type of approach over simplify the 
issue, ignoring other important factors that are crucial in shaping the outcome of the 
dynamics between different levels of cooperation. Addressing these gaps in the 
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literature, this thesis develops an analytical framework for better understanding the 
conditions and processes by which the development of dialogue at the bilateral 
level for cooperation at the multilateral arena (DBLCM) affects bilateral 
cooperation at the multilateral level (BCML) within the context of a particular 
bilateral relationship. I postulate the concept of level-linkage, defined as the 
correlation between two or more levels of cooperation in the framework of a 
particular relationship. Focusing on the appraisal of the impact of the bilateral level 
on the multilateral level of cooperation, this research argues that level-linkage is 
determined by a set of four intervening variables that underpin the four hypotheses. 
These are: (a) the type of regime; (b) the compatibility of the actors’ approaches to 
multilateral cooperation; (c) their respective foreign policy-making processes; and 
(d) their respective preferences for partners in the multilateral arena. 
 The proposed framework is empirically tested in the case of relations 
between the European Union (EU) and Brazil. In 2007, the two actors agreed on a 
Strategic Partnership to enhance their relationship at all levels. Nevertheless, as this 
thesis shows, the EU and Brazil have not succeeded in projecting this bilateral 
partnership onto the multilateral arena. The unsuccessful strategy of the two actors to 
link the development of their cooperation on two different levels (bilateral and 
multilateral) constitutes the puzzle addressed by this thesis. Arguing that the nature 
of this process may vary across different issue areas, this thesis assesses level-
linkage in three policy-areas: climate change, trade, and human rights. The 
methodology adopts a qualitative approach that combines the use of case-studies, 
process tracing and comparative method of analysis. 
Although international cooperation is a topic broadly addressed by diverse 
theoretical approaches, most systematic analysis of the correlation between 
modalities of cooperation is grounded in rational institutionalism. Moreover, 
research on this topic focuses predominantly on trade and economic issues. Against 
this backdrop, rational institutionalist concepts and tools provide reference points for 
the development of the analytical framework used in this research. Yet, the concept 
of level-linkage, having been formulated to address this puzzle, intentionally draws 
on an eclectic theoretical framework. The result is an analytical tool that allows for 
an understanding of the interrelation between the bilateral level and the multilateral 
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level of EU-Brazil cooperation, and that can be equally applied to different issue-
areas. 
This thesis aspires to bring three main contributions to the literature. Firstly, 
it aims to contribute to the International Relations scholarship on international 
cooperation by developing a new approach to understanding the correlation between 
levels of cooperation. The analytical approach adopted here is innovative in adopting 
both agents and issues as units of analysis. Another important addition is the focus 
on the linkage between two levels of cooperation within a particular bilateral 
relationship. Secondly, the original account of EU-Brazil cooperation on climate 
change, trade and human rights adds value to studies of cooperation within these 
particular fields, providing new insights into the engagement of these two important 
actors within the three international regimes. Thirdly, this thesis contributes towards 
enhancing the profile of the EU-Brazil bilateral relationship in the fields of European 
Studies and International Relations.  
This chapter introduces level-linkage in international cooperation. The first part 
presents an overview of the literature on international cooperation, with emphasis on 
the academic research on bilateralism and multilateralism. Section two defines the 
puzzle prompting the research question of this thesis and elaborates on the concept of 
level-linkage. It also defines the units of analysis, explains the hypotheses and 
justifies the case selection. The third section addresses the methods and methodology 
used. The operationalisation is explained in the fourth section. The last part of the 
chapter maps out the sources of information accessed.  
 
1.2	  Setting	  the	  Scene:	  Addressing	  International	  Cooperation	  
 1.2.1	  Defining	  Cooperation	  and	  its	  reasons	  	  
 
The dramatic increase in cooperative arrangements among states in the 1970s 
sparked a greater interest in the study of cooperation in academia. A systemic level 
of analysis prevailed in the literature on international cooperation in the following 
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decades (Milner, 1992: 466-467). As this chapter shows, this approach is still largely 
employed by mainstream scholarship. As becomes clear in the literature addressed 
below, most researchers adopt an ‘outside-in’ perspective, positing that the behaviour 
of states is essentially shaped in accordance to the characteristics of the international 
system and the position these actors occupy within this system.1 
Elaborating on this perspective, Robert Keohane argues that “cooperation 
occurs when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preferences of 
the others, through a process of policy coordination” (Keohane, 1984: 51).2 This 
definition has been widely accepted by scholars and it is with this in mind that the 
literature explains the conditions under which cooperation occurs (Milner 1992: 
467).3 
This account of cooperation is grounded in three fundamental theoretical 
assumptions. The first, the notion that actors need to adjust their behaviour, implies a 
lack of harmony within the international system. Cooperation takes place in a context 
in which the interests of the parties are originally in conflict, but can be mutually 
complementary (Keohane and Axelrold, 1985: 226).  
However, as Kenneth Oye claims, there are gaps in this approach. Firstly, 
there are situations in which conflict is the result of mutual preferences of the actors. 
That is to say, if two players seek contrasting goals and have the freedom to pursue 
their objectives, there would be no reason for them to cooperate. Secondly, even if 
the players focus primarily on self-interests and demonstrate no interest in 
cooperation, their interests can be naturally compatible. Mutual gains would then 
occur without the need to forge a formal cooperation (Oye 1985: 6). 
 The second theoretical assumption entailed by Keohane’s classic definition 
of cooperation is the rational perception that cooperation occurs when it offers 
potential gains for the parties. Furthermore, the statement that actors “anticipate 
                                                
1The appraisal of systematic interaction between actors is commonly cast in terms of game theory models that can 
2Drawing on Keohane’s concept, Grieco (1990:22) points out the elements that characterise cooperation. First, it 
needs to be voluntary, and the states should be entitled to choose not to cooperate. Secondly, there must be a 
minimum of one common objective around which states’ interests converge. Thirdly, cooperation comprises a 
long-term engagement between two or more partners, and not a single interaction between isolated actors. 
3 Despite this consensual view, Robert Keohane himself emphasises that cooperation “is a contested concept” 
(Keohane 1988: 360).  
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preferences of the others” suggests that actors cooperate whilst being primarily 
motivated by self-interests. The promotion of a public good or a concern with 
assisting the other party can also be considered as drivers of cooperation, but they are 
secondary reasons (Milner 1992: 468). The third assumption is the argument that 
international actors are not completely autonomous and independent. On the 
contrary, the current international order is characterised by a high level of 
interdependence that binds actors together, hence the importance of a process of 
policy coordination.4 Under this liberal approach, states are perceived of as rational 
actors, with rigid interests and identities, and the drivers for cooperation are 
essentially material gains.  
Constructivists tend to disagree, arguing that interests and identities are 
shaped by factors such as the role of non-state actors, transnational norms and ideas. 
From this perspective, constructivists posit: “cooperation comprises iterated 
processes which continue beyond initial agreements and result in the complex and 
enduring governance orders and potential social change” (O’Neill et. al.2004: 151). 
Their emphasis on norms and ideas does not deny the importance of power and 
interests in explaining an actor’s behaviour within the international system. Yet, as 
Alexander Wendt claims, in opposition to “materialists”, “idealists” (or 
constructivists) believe that power and interest are constituted more by ideas than by 
material forces (Wendt 1999:135).  
The debate on the factors prompting actors to cooperate is broad and 
complex, but for the purpose of this thesis it is sufficient to consider both material 
and cognitive variables as drivers of cooperation. In addressing EU-Brazil 
cooperation, this thesis incorporates both elements into its analysis.  
                                                
4The notion of interdependence, understood as “both a process and a condition”, is a key element of the systemic 
level of analysis (Sterling-Folker: 2002: 38). In Power and Interdependence Keohane and Nye (2001:7-8) further 
develop the idea, claiming that interdependence means mutual dependence connected by reciprocal costs and 
benefits for the parties. However, as the authors emphasise, being interdependent does not imply that cooperation 
is inevitable, as interdependence can occur in a context of mutual threat. Yet, if reciprocal benefits are not an 
essential feature of interdependence, there are always costs involved. These costs can be imposed by the other 
party or can be necessary in order to ensure the maintenance of the system. Another important characteristic of 
interdependence is that it entails a loss of autonomy.  
 
  
 
20 
Cognitive elements and material interests may determine the internal forces 
that prompt actors to cooperate. Yet in order to analyse cooperation (or its absence), 
it is also important to pay attention to the external environment within which it takes 
place. Three contextual aspects may influence an actor’s decision to cooperate or to 
defect: (a) payoff structure; (b) the shadow of the future; and (c) the number of actors 
(Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 228-235, Oye 1985: 3-4). 
“Payoff structure” refers to the compatibility of the actors’ interests. As 
Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod explain, when there are shared interests, or a 
balanced exchange of possible gains, cooperative outcomes are more likely to occur. 
Yet, whereas the pay-off structure is often shaped by external factors, the mutuality 
of interests established by this structure depends on subjective factors, such as the 
perception actors have of their own interests. Interestingly, cognitive elements are 
also taken into account by this analytical framework, as shifts in perceptions of 
interests and preferences are considered to impact on possible pay-off structures 
(Keohane 1985: 228-229).  
The “shadow of the future” relates to the perception of cooperation as either 
an isolated event or a repetitive game. Within this line of thought, the expectation (or 
absence thereof) of future interactions between the same players influences the 
likelihood that they will cooperate. In the absence of an authority which might 
enforce an agreement, cooperation is more vulnerable to infringement if it occurs in 
isolation. Conversely, cooperation is more likely to occur when actors perceive their 
engagement as being part of a broader and interactive game. By adopting strategies 
of reciprocity, or conditionality, international actors can establish a direct link 
between existing and expected cooperation. Influencing the conditions that 
encourage cooperation is another strategy by which to increase the prospects of a 
more durable process. The instruments used for this purpose include the clarifying of 
norms and conditions of an agreement, the setting up of strong mechanisms of 
surveillance and enforcement, and the linking of contents of one agreement to 
cooperation in another area. Yet, if the “shadow of the future” is helpful for 
elucidating perspectives on future cooperation, it is restricted by several conditions. 
Firstly, it assumes that actors are interested in further and deeper cooperation with 
each other, and that they attribute great importance to their future cooperation. 
Secondly, the unexpected outcome of a particular case of cooperation can alter the 
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pay-off structure of future interactions. Therefore, the “shadow of the future” 
accounts for the pattern of cooperation only when future outcomes are somewhat 
predictable (Oye 1985: 12-17).   
The “number of players” argument considers that the likelihood of 
cooperation depends on the number of actors engaging in that process, as well as on 
the relationship between these actors (Axelrod & Keohane 1985: 234). This 
argument is grounded in the assumption that the prospects for cooperation diminish 
as the number of players increases. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, 
identifying mutual benefits that justify the choice for cooperation is a more complex 
exercise when there are more actors involved. Secondly, larger membership of 
multilateral arrangements entails higher transaction costs and raises more concerns 
over issues of compliance and defection. Thirdly, the strategic use of reciprocity to 
assure compliance is riskier, as there are more possibilities for points of rupture to 
emerge within the cooperative arrangement. The greater the number of players, and 
the greater the risk of one actor defecting, the more likely it is that other parties will 
lose confidence in cooperation and opt to free-ride (Oye 1985: 19-20).  
The rationale behind the “number of player” view may lead to the assumption 
that cooperation works better with a small number of players. Yet, Kenneth Oye 
advocates the advantages of multilateralism, claiming that this mode of cooperation 
can generate more gains than bilateral or regional cooperation. Moreover, states can 
create mechanisms, such as international regimes, with which to overcome the 
uncertainties associated with multilateral cooperation (Oye 1985: 20-21). Further 
elaborating upon these arguments, Helen Milner claims that, when there are more 
players involved in cooperation, there are more opportunities for side payments to 
take place. The achievement of relative gains is also facilitated by an increase in the 
number of players, essentially because interacting with more actors enhances the 
likelihood of one party benefitting from the offer of at least another actor. 
Additionally, the number of actors is neither a structural nor an absolute condition. In 
many multilateral negotiations the parties tend to join coalitions representing the 
interests of several players through a common position. That being the case, the 
number of players tends to be smaller than the number of the parties formally 
engaged in cooperation, as it can be largely defined in terms of these negotiation 
groups (Milner 1992: 473-474). 
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Breaking up cooperation into a three-element structure (pay-off, shadow of 
the future, and number of players) makes it possible to better understand the external 
factors that influence an actor’s decision to engage in a cooperative scheme. To a 
certain extent, the assumptions underlying these three elements can be applied in the 
understanding of level-linkage. This thesis argues that the level-linkage process is 
affected principally by the compatibility of the parties (pay-off) and the preferences 
for partners in the multilateral arena (influenced by “the number of players”). Also, 
to a certain extent, level-linkage can be understood as a measure used to minimise 
the “shadow of the future”. These arguments are discussed again in the next section, 
when level-linkage is explained. 
The understanding of cooperation as a process of policy coordination leaves 
room for wide interpretation of the different forms that cooperation can take. The 
literature addresses this issue from two different angles, focusing on either the 
process or the number of players engaged in cooperation. 
Taking processes as the unit of analysis, Helen Milner proposes a typology of 
modalities of cooperation that distinguishes between tacit, negotiated and imposed 
forms of cooperation. Tacit cooperation occurs in the absence of any form of 
institutionalisation or agreement, resulting from a convergence of expectations. 
Negotiated cooperation is explicit and therefore easier to identify. Cooperation can 
alternatively be imposed, when the most powerful actor induces or even enforces 
other parties to change their policy (Milner 1992:469).5 
Another method of interpreting different forms of cooperation adopts the 
number of actors as the unit of analysis. Since the early 1990s, there has been a 
significant amount of theoretical and empirical work on cooperation that addresses 
bilateral, regional and multilateral forms of cooperation (Krugman 1989; Keohane 
1990; Ruggie 1992, 1993; Hurrell 1995). Attempts to define and distinguish between 
these forms of cooperation tend to underestimate the complexity of the issue. Taking 
multilateralism as a reference point for analysis, the literature fails to provide a 
definition of bilateralism. As Rixen and Rohlfing stress, “cooperation theory has as 
                                                
5  Helen Milner’s typology draws on Oran Young’s work, in which international regimes are classified as (a) self-
generated or spontaneous arrangements; (b) negotiated institutional arrangements; or (c) imposed arrangements 
(Young 1989: 84-88). 
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inherent analytical bias towards multilateralism and generally disregards the antipode 
to this institutional form, namely bilateralism” (2007: 390). 
From this perspective, Robert Keohane defines multilateralism as “the 
practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states, through 
ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” (Keohane 1990: 731). By default, 
this definition implies that bilateralism can be understood as coordination between 
two players. As Richard Samuels describes, bilateralism is a “foreign policy strategy 
in which a sovereign state chooses to pursue its international interests and goals in 
concert with one other sovereign state” (Samuels 2005: 72). In negotiated 
cooperation, policy coordination is normally formalised through the conclusion of an 
agreement. From an international law perspective, Gabrielle Blum claims that, 
whereas bilateral agreements are exclusively between two parties without the 
possibility of including more players, multilateral agreements “invite the 
international community at large to join them, and thus, at least in aspiration, aim at 
universal participation” (Blum 2008: 329).  
This notion of universality alludes to the idea that multilateralism is more 
inclusive and, therefore, a strategy which is capable of delivering greater public 
good. In this sense, the number of parties is not the only factor taken into account in 
order to define multilateralism. As John Ruggie writes, “what distinguishes the 
multilateral form from other forms is that it coordinates behaviour among three or 
more states, on the basis of principles of conduct” (Ruggie 1992: 574). Implicit in 
this statement is the notion that other forms of cooperation lack these principles. 
Moreover, it suggests an inclination towards favouring multilateralism over other 
strategies. 
These principles of conduct have largely been addressed by the literature. 
Reciprocity, non-discrimination and indivisibility are commonly evoked as the 
characteristics of multilateralism that make it an appealing strategy of cooperation 
(Ruggie 1992: 571; Bagwell and Staiger 1998: 1162). Conversely, bilateralism is by 
nature discriminatory and exclusive (Ruggie 1992:571-572).  
Differences between bilateralism and multilateralism go beyond issues of 
membership. Multilateralism provides more long-term benefits than bilateralism, in 
exchange for some loss of flexibility in decision-making. It creates a stable forum for 
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cooperation and increases stability, all with lower-transaction costs. Additionally, the 
inclusion of a large number of members reduces the risk that disagreements may 
pose to the maintaining of cooperation. If bilateral agreements can be easily 
terminated by a conflict of interests between the parties, in multilateral agreements 
these differences are more likely to be accommodated for (Martin 1992: 783-786).6 
On the other hand, bilateral agreements tend to be more durable, as they are more 
likely to satisfy the interests of all parties, but also because there is more control over 
possible infringements; retaliation measures are more easily enforced. Consequently, 
bilateral cooperation tends to be more credible than multilateral schemes, as they run 
less risk of defection (Boun My et al. 2009: 908). 
As this thesis argues, actors can strategically opt for more than one form of 
cooperation with which to frame their relationship. This is clearly the case in the EU-
Brazil relationship. The strategy of developing cooperation on many parallel levels 
suggests that the EU and Brazil consider the interaction between multilateralism and 
bilateralism as positively impacting on the overall framework of their relations. 
Consequently, in the case at hand, bilateralism and multilateralism are 
complementary strategies. But how does the literature treat the correlation between 
these two forms of cooperation? 
 1.2.2	  Does	  bilateralism	  help	  or	  hinder	  multilateralism?	  
 
The impact of bilateralism on multilateralism is an open question within the 
literature. Most empirical work on the compatibility of different instruments of 
cooperation focuses on trade issues, in particular on regionalism and preferential 
trade agreements (PTAs). Moreover, the existing literature addresses bilateralism and 
multilateralism as modalities of agreements, not as levels of cooperation within the 
framework of a specific bilateral relationship. 
                                                
6 The characteristics of multilateralism are discussed in further detail in this chapter, when the conceptual and 
theoretical tools of this thesis are presented. 
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In this sense, discussion on the effects of preferential agreements and their 
compatibility with multilateralism dates back to Jacob Viner’s pioneering work 
entitled The Customs Union Issue (1950). Analysing the world trading system, Viner 
articulates a distinction between trade diversion and trade creation. According to the 
author, a union creates trade when the low-cost of production in one country replaces 
the high-cost production of a partner. In this case, welfare is promoted for those 
involved and, generally speaking, for the world. However, when a customs union 
replaces cheaper supply from a non-member country with more expensive products 
from a state that is party to the agreement, the result is a trade diversion (Lahiri, 
1998: 1126). 
In the 1980s, the stagnation of trade liberalisation under the multilateral 
structure of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the beginning 
of a second wave of regionalism sparked a renewed debate over the two modalities 
of cooperation. Adding to this discussion, Paul Krugman asked: is bilateralism bad? 
Exploring this question, he came to the conclusion that “it might be”. Whether or not 
bilateralism (or regionalism) has a negative impact on world welfares is determined 
by the consequences it has on states that are not part of the agreement. (Krugman 
1989:21). 
Another important contribution to the understanding of the relationship 
between preferential agreements (bilateral or regional) and multilateralism is the 
work of  Jagdish Bhagwati (1991, 1993). Criticising Viner’s approach as being static, 
and focusing on the immediate effect of a PTA, Bhagwati (1991:77) asserts that 
PTAs could be either “building blocks” or “stumbling blocks” on the way to 
multilateral cooperation, an argument that has dominated the debate on bilateralism 
vs. multilateralism.  
In a similar vein, Lisa Martin advocates that bilateralism be used as an 
intermediate stage to achieve multilateralism (Martin 1992). According to her, this 
strategy consists of forging bilateral agreements and, once norms are agreed upon, 
converting these agreements into those of a multilateral nature, whilst incorporating 
new partners. This has been the process adopted on many occasions in order to 
promote multilateral cooperation on issues where interests conflict, such as trade, 
and has provided a potential answer to the problem of collaboration. Addressing this 
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problem, Thomas Wright declares: “states should work to convert their strongest 
bilateral relationships into multilateral arrangements” (Wright 2009: 164). 
In exploring this aspect of open membership under what he calls the 
“dynamic of the time-path question”, Bhagwati explains that, in order to allow for 
further expansion, a customs union needs certain incentive structures in place. The 
most important components of this structure are political, and not economic, 
incentives (Bhagwati 1993: 38). In this sense, PTAs can create an interaction 
between different levels of diplomatic cooperation, stimulating multilateral 
engagement. However, the impact of bilateralism on multilateralism can move in the 
opposite direction. Depending on the case, PTAs might undermine incentives for a 
multilateral scheme of cooperation. This outcome is most likely to occur during 
negotiations on sensitive issues, such as trade in some agriculture goods (Heydon 
and Woolcock 2009). 
The literature presented suggests that there is no consensus amongst 
International Relations scholars as to an answer to the “help or hinder” dilemma. 
Yet, as stressed in the outset of this section, theoretical and empirical analyses of this 
issue address bilateralism and multilateralism as different/opposing modalities of 
cooperation. Thus, by focusing on type of agreements, the existing literature on 
international cooperation that addresses the bilateralism vs. multilateralism debate 
explores a different question than the one proposed by this thesis.  The inadequacy of 
the applicability of these arguments to the study of the correlation between levels of 
cooperation within the framework of bilateral relationships reveals a gap in the 
literature.  
 1.2.3	  Bilateralism	  for	  Multilateralism:	  A	  Foreign	  Policy	  Strategy	  
 
Despite the lack of consensus amongst scholars on the linkage between the two 
levels of cooperation, at the policy level this correlation is not questioned at same 
degree. Policy-makers tend to assume that the linkage between bilateralism and 
multilateralism not only exists, but can be strategically manipulated. The EU policy 
of forging bilateral “strategic partnerships” with key global players to promote 
  
 
27 
“effective multilateralism” is great example of a foreign policy grounded on the idea 
of level-linkage. 
 As Thomas Renard points out, although the EU first used the expression 
“strategic partner” when defining its relationship with Russia in the late 1990s, the 
idea of “strategic partnerships” on the way they are currently conceive was 
developed as a core pillar of the 2003 European Security Strategy – ESS (Renard 
2010: 7- 9). 
 Adopted by the European Council in December 2003, the ESS can be 
considered as the first comprehensive document to outline specific areas for EU 
external action, breaking the almost exclusive power of EU member states on the 
security dimension of the EU foreign policy (Biscop 2005: 15).  
Identifying a changing security environment, the ESS proposes three 
strategies to effectively address new security treats: a) enhance internal capability; b) 
strengthen cooperation with the neighbourhood; and c) promote partnership for 
effective multilateralism. It is then on this third recommendation that the pursuit of 
special relations with a range of “key global actors” is introduced as a central 
element of the ESS. Elaborating on the potential scope of these “strategic 
partnerships”, the EU evoked the US as “the key partner for Europe”. Nevertheless, 
the document also praised enhanced cooperation with Brazil, Canada, Japan, 
Norway, South Africa and Switzerland, pointing out the prospects for the 
strengthening of EU-India bilateral cooperation (Council of the European Union 
2003).7 
 Linking “strategic partnerships” with the pursuit of “effective 
multilateralism” suggests that the ultimate goal of the strengthening of bilateral 
relations with third parties is not the enhancement of dialogue at the bilateral level, 
but the projection of these partnerships at the multilateral arena. As the EES states,  
                                                
7 For more on the ESS see Duke (2004), Kammel and Algieri (2009) and Solana (2004). 
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there are few if any problems we [the EU] can deal with on our own. The 
threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest 
partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our 
objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations 
and through partnerships with key actors (Council of the European Union 
2003). 
 
Thus, bilateralism is considered as an element of the EU’s approach towards 
multilateralism, a policy strategy that matches the concept of level-linkage explored 
in this thesis.  
 As a “strategy”, the ESS offers a “vision” of EU external actions, but 
intentionally omits the instruments that assure its implementation. Thus, the 
execution of the recommendations outlined in the ESS requires the adoption of 
specific policies. Although there is no EU guideline on how to pursue strategic 
partnerships, the EU has adopted a rather standardised process to reframe of its 
bilateral ties with “rising powers”. As Renard explains, following the adoption of the 
ESS, the European Commission drafted various “Communications from the 
Commission to the Council and the Parliament” stressing the relevance of bilateral 
relations with specific countries. Following internal debate triggered by the 
launching of internal communications, the establishment of strategic partnerships are 
formalised through the adoption of “Joint Statements” issued in the conclusion of 
high-level bilateral summits between the EU and “key actors”. “Joint Action Plans” 
often follow these statements, formalising the terms of new bilateral partnership 
(Renard 2011: 10). 
 By the end 2011 the EU had established strategic partnerships with ten 
countries. Namely with: Brazil, Canada, China, India, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South 
Africa, South Korea and the United States. 
 The variety of this “selective group” suggests the complexity behind the idea 
of “strategic partnerships” and has awakened great interest amongst academics, but, 
above all, amongst policy analysis. The body of the literature on EU strategic 
partnership can be broadly divided into two approaches. The first way to analyse this 
issue is looking at the political feasibility and implications of this strategy to EU 
foreign policy, broadly speaking. Balfour (2010) Biscop, Grevi (2008), Gratius 
(2011), Husar et. al. (2010),Renard (2011, 2012), Renard and Biscop (2012), have all 
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contributed extensively to this literature. Another approach is country-studies, 
exploring EU’s partnership with specific partners.  Namely, EU partnership with 
China (Rees 2009 Sautenet 2007, Taneja 2010, Vogt 2012), Russia (Haukkala 2010, 
Krozser 2012, Lavrov 2013,Lynch), Africa (Mangala 2013), India (Bava 2010, Jain 
2007, Sachdeva 2008), and Mexico (Franco Hijuelos 2010). Brazil has also been at 
the core of the debate on EU strategic partnership (Emerson et al. 2013, Gratius 
2012, Grevi & Renard 2012, Grevi & Vasconcelos 2008, Poletti 2007, Ribeiro- 
Hoffmann 2007, Whitman & Rodt 2012, Znojek 2012). 
 In common, these analyses are all very critical on their assessment of the 
success of EU strategic partnerships to project eventual enhanced bilateral relations 
to the multilateral level. Moreover, the literature above mentioned on specific 
partners adopts a similar analytical approach to the question of the future of the 
partnerships with the EU, focusing on the limited compatibility of agendas between 
these countries and the EU.  
 Renard developed a comprehensive analysis of “the lack of strategy behind 
the partnerships”. Analysing EU policy on the strategic partnership, and the content 
of these arrangements with the ten EU partners, Renard identifies four core problems 
with strategic partnerships. These are: a) not all partners are strategic on the same 
degree; b) the agenda of cooperation in global issues is limited to some areas;  c) 
strategic partnerships have not had a significant impact on the framework of bilateral 
cooperation with the EU not at the EU institutional organisation; and d) the EU is not 
always perceived as a strong international actor, an element that impacts on the 
interest of its partners in projecting a partnership to the multilateral arena (Renard 
2010: 21-31). 
 Overall, despite the various approaches to analyse strategic partnership, the 
literature on this topic addresses the compatibility between bilateralism and 
multilateralism from a foreign policy perspective. Adopting “agents” as unit of 
analysis, they link the bilateral level with the multilateral level of cooperation 
depends essentially on the political choice of the two partners. This approach is in 
clear contrast with the focus on “issues” and on type of agreement adopted by the 
scholarship on international cooperation. There is then a mismatch between policy-
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oriented and academic research addressing the correlation between two levels of 
cooperation. 
Against this literary backdrop, the next section identifies the two puzzles 
addressed in this research.  
 
1.3	  Analytical	  Framework	  
 
1.3.1	  Mind	  the	  “Gap”:	  Identifying	  the	  Puzzles	  
 
Mainstream literature on international cooperation is grounded in the assumption that 
there is an almost unavoidable correlation between bilateralism and multilateralism. 
Analyses predominantly address the quality of this linkage.. Another characteristic of 
the literature reviewed is its fragmentation of analysis in terms of issue-areas studied, 
with a focus on issues and regimes, rather than on the agents involved in the process 
of cooperation. There is, as such, an assumption of a “natural” linkage between 
levels of cooperation. This assumption is also shared by the literature on strategic 
partnerships that considers the problem of the correlation between bilateral and 
multilateral levels of cooperation as a matter of foreign policy choice. 
 Applying these theoretical assumptions to the study of EU-Brazil relations, it 
would be assumed that the processes of their cooperation at the bilateral and the 
multilateral levels would be linked, with one impacting on the other. Yet, 
contradicting the mainstream literature, this thesis reveals that there is no spillover 
from enhanced EU-Brazildialogue at the bilateral level for cooperation at the 
multilateral arena (DBLCM) to their bilateral cooperation at the multilateral 
level(BCML). This mismatch between theory and empirical findings is the first 
puzzle identified and addressed by this research.  
Beyond theory, the EU and Brazil embraced the argument that developments 
in one level of cooperation can actually have an impact on cooperation at other 
levels. Forging a Strategic Partnership in 2007, the two actors decided to promote 
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this positive linkage. In other words, they induced bilateralism in order to foster 
multilateralism. Ever since, the two partners have employed significant political 
capital to project enhancedDBLCM into the multilateral arena, applying this strategy 
to a wide range of issues, including climate change, trade, and human rights.  
As the next section explains in detail, this thesis works with the assumption 
that the linkage (or its absence) between levels of cooperation is not a permanent, 
fixed, condition. International actors can indeed influence this process, but not 
determine it entirely. Thus, the EU and Brazil could, in theory, manipulate some of 
the variables that shape the impact ofDBLCM onBCML. Nevertheless, despite all 
efforts, the EU and Brazil have failed to link the development of their cooperation on 
both levels in the three cases analysed. The failure of this strategy represents the 
second puzzle addressed by this thesis. 
The theoretical and policy puzzles raised prompt the research question answered 
by this thesis: 
Why the EU and Brazil were not able to use their dialogue at the bilateral level as 
a platform to enhance their cooperation at the multilateral arena? In other words, how 
can this lack of level-linkage be explained? 
 1.3.2	   Addressing	   the	   Gap:	   Introducing	   Level-­‐Linkage	   to	  International	  Cooperation	  
 
Given the drawbacks of current approaches in explaining the interplay between the 
different levels of cooperation, in this thesis I propose and use a new concept: level –
linkage. Simply put, level–linkage refers to the correlation between two or more 
levels of cooperation within the framework of a particular relationship.  
The rationale behind this concept is grounded in four assumptions. Firstly, 
the departure point for the analysis should be the scrutiny of the question of whether 
or not there is a correlation between bilateralism and multilateralism. The relevance 
of the assessment of the quality of this linkage depends on the answer to the first 
problematic. 
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Secondly, the outcome of this linkage varies according to the agents engaged 
in the process. The reason for this is that, when international actors engage at the 
multilateral level, they have pre-established bilateral ties with a large number of 
parties. Given this scenario, this thesis claims that the interaction between these 
players in the multilateral arena is influenced by the degree of priority invested in a 
given bilateral relationship. Consequently, the linkage between levels of cooperation 
depends on who the agents are and how their relationship is framed.  
Thirdly, level-linkage varies according to the issue at stake. Nevertheless, as 
bilateral relationships normally encompass a wide range of issues, the appraisal of 
level-linkage across different areas must be developed under the same analytical 
framework. This approach allows for cross-case comparisons and provides a 
comprehensive understanding of the correlation between levels of cooperation within 
the framework of bilateral relations. 
Fourthly, although the process of level-linkage can develop in any direction 
(i.e. any level of cooperation can influence any other level), this thesis explores one 
particular direction of correlation: the impact of the bilateral level (BL) on the 
multilateral level (ML). The choice to analyse this particular level-linkage is 
grounded in theoretical and policy reasons. Firstly, as presented in the section above, 
the literature on bilateralism vs. multilateralism investigates the impact of the first on 
the latter. As this research aims to address the gaps in this academic debate, it should 
explore the same units and levels of analysis. Secondly, as chapter two explains in 
detail, EU-Brazil relations have recently been framed in terms of a Strategic 
Partnership that aims at cooperation spilling over from the bilateral to the multilateral 
level. 
 Based on four premises, this thesis argues that level- linkage occurs when 
there is a correlation between the two levels of cooperation, so that changes on one 
level impact on the other. Conversely, a lack of level-linkage implies that 
cooperation at the two levels has developed in isolation from each other. The 
analytical framework I propose for the assessment of level-linkage claims that 
linkage between the development of cooperation at the bilateral and the multilateral 
levels depends on four elements: (a) regime type; (b) compatibility of approaches; (c) 
foreign policy-making processes; and (d) preferences for partners. This process can 
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be summarised as follows: 
Figure 1 Level-Linkage 
 
 
Drawing on this analytical framework, a set of hypotheses is formulated and 
applied to the analysis of level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on climate change, 
trade and human rights conducted by this thesis. As exposed in the figure above, the 
four hypotheses are divided into two categories: primary and secondary. This 
classification follows the different degrees of impact and relevance of each of these 
hypotheses in the process of level-linkage, as demonstrated in the three case studies 
addressed by the thesis.   
The four hypotheses are: 
H1 (Primary Hypothesis) - “Regime Type”-The greater the openness of a 
regime to influences from other levels of cooperation, the more likely level-linkage is 
to occur. 
This hypothesis is grounded in the idea that the degree to which the bilateral level of 
cooperation can be employed as a platform for facilitating the enhancement of 
cooperation between two partners at the multilateral level depends on the type of 
international regime in which they are operating. Arguably, international regimes 
with a higher level of institutionalisation and more complex sets of rules and 
procedures are less prone to being influenced by other levels of cooperation. The 
main reason for this is that such regimes have very specific dynamics of negotiations 
and practices. These tend to isolate the process of developing multilateral 
cooperation within their domain from that of development on other levels. 
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H2 (Secondary Hypothesis) - “Compatibility of Approaches”-The greater 
the compatibility of approaches of the EU and Brazil at the multilateral level, the 
greater the incentives and the prospects for level-linkage. 
As presented in the discussion of the literature, international actors engage in 
cooperation when motivated by the opportunity to enhance relative gains and 
promote their interests in the international arena. The promotion of a spillover of 
DBLCM to the multilateral level depends on the extent to which actors have similar 
approaches within the multilateral arena, both in terms of their views as to the 
structure and scope of an international regime and their agendas in multilateral 
negotiations. 
 H3 (Primary Hypothesis) - “Foreign Policy-Making”-The more integrated 
the foreign policy-making processes of the two actors’ bilateral and multilateral 
policies, the more likely level-linkage is to occur. 
Considering foreign policy agencies as “procedural organizations” with strong 
bureaucratic structures (Wilson 1989:164), this hypothesis is grounded in the 
argument that the potential for enhanced cooperation on multilateral issues at the 
bilateral level to strengthen the engagement between the two actors within the 
multilateral arena is constrained by the degree to which policy-making processes 
addressing each of the two levels are coordinated.  
The ideal institutional arrangement for positive level-linkage sees decision-
making on bilateral and multilateral policies integrated within the same organisation, 
operationalised by the same agents. Moreover, in this perfect scenario, there would 
be no hierarchical treatment given to the agenda of the two levels; bilateral relations 
and multilateral negotiations would be equally important to policy makers. In 
practice, however, policy-making processes for each of the two levels tend to be 
fragmented and the agents handling bilateral relations are not the same responsible 
for an actor’s engagement in the multilateral arena. As the thesis argues, 
understanding the policy-making process of each actor makes it possible to identify 
the institutional setting that may limit or enhance the prospects of level-linkage. 
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H4 (Secondary Hypothesis) - “Preference for Partners” –Level-linkage 
occurs if the EU and Brazil also consider each other to be preferential partners at 
the multilateral level. 
Giving preference to a certain partner does not necessarily imply the exclusivity of 
that bilateral alliance, as the two actors might still either engage in the same 
negotiation group or form coalitions with other parties. If the two actors join 
different groups in negotiations or act unilaterally, they would create an obstacle for 
linkage between their two levels of cooperation, undermining the prospects of a 
cooperative spillover from the bilateral to the multilateral level. It is important to 
clarify that, whereas the compatibility of approaches can be tacit or indirect, the 
preference for partners is defined by the same criteria John Odell adopts for 
coalitions, i.e. when actors explicitly decide to adopt a common position in 
negotiations (Odell 2006: 13). 
 This thesis considers that there are two possible outcomes of the impact of 
each of the four variables (presented in the form of the hypotheses) on level-linkage: 
(a) impact or (b) no impact. Simply put, the first outcome implies that the variable at 
stake (i.e., regime type, approach, policy-making, or preference for partners) plays a 
role in the level-linkage process, helping or hindering the correlation between the 
two levels of cooperation. The second outcome is obtained when the variable does 
not interfere with level-linkage at all. 
 The dependent variable is level-linkage (the impact of Dialogue at the 
bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral arena on multilateral level 
cooperation) and the independent variables are: (a) regime type; (b) compatibility of 
approaches; (c) foreign policy-making processes; and (d) preference for partners.8 
The proposed analytical framework is applied to the assessment of level-linkage 
on EU-Brazil cooperation on climate change, trade, and human rights and answers 
the research question leading this thesis: Why the EU and Brazil were not able to use 
their dialogue at the bilateral level as a platform to enhance their cooperation at the 
multilateral arena? In other words, how can this lack of level-linkage be explained? 
                                                
8The operationalisation of these variables is explained in detail in the section that follows later in this chapter. 
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1.3.3	  Theoretical	  and	  Conceptual	  Tools	  
 
The four hypotheses that underpin the concept of level-linkage are grounded on a 
plurality of theoretical and conceptual elements. This section presented the main 
“conceptual tools” applied to each hypothesis. 
 
Regime Type (Hypothesis 1- Primary) 
In 1982 Krasner coined what is often referred as the consensus definition of 
international regimes (Diez et. al. 2011: 115), understood as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 
1982:186). Principles are defined as beliefs, thus a subjective term. Norms, on the 
other hand, are more objective, considered “as standards of behaviour defined in 
terms of rights and obligations”. Considered as central characteristics of a regime, 
when principles and norms change there is a shift of regime. Rules prescribe actions 
and decision-making establishes the process for the implementation of pre-
established norms and principles; changes in rules and decision-making are shifts 
within a regime (Krasner 1982: 187-188). 
This distinction is important for the analysis of level-linkage because any 
dissimilarity in terms of the understanding between the EU and Brazil of the norms 
and principles of a regime suggest that the two actors have different conceptions of 
regime for an issue-area. In the absence of agreement on how to conceive of a 
regime, the prospects of an enhancement of the EU-Brazil BCML are not very likely, 
even if their cooperation strengthens at the bilateral level.  
 Although academics tend to agree with Krasner’s definition, the analysis of 
international regimes does not follow a single and linear approach. Different schools 
of thought analyse regimes through a plurality of lenses. Exploring how the literature 
in international relations addresses the question of the relevance of international 
regimes, Krasner identifies three approaches to the issue. The first,“conventional 
structural view”, is grounded on realism and questions the existence of regimes, 
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considering that they claim the importance of power as the key driver to the 
organisation of international relations. Regimes, when acknowledged, as treated as 
epiphenomenal. “Modified structural views”, the second approach, perceive regimes 
as mechanisms to coordinate the behaviour of international actors, ultimately 
promoting concrete (material) gains within an issue-area, in line rational 
institutionalism theory. Contrasting with the two structural views, “Grotian 
perspectives” place great emphasis on the relevance of regimes. Claiming that they 
are inherent parts of the international system, regimes are a characteristic not only of 
inter-state relations but of human interactions as well (Krasner 1992: 190-194). On a 
similar note, Hasenclever et al. (1997: 1-2) present three approaches to the analysis 
of the relevance of international regimes, associating each of them to a school of 
thought. “Power-based” approach relates to realism, “interest-based approach” can 
be linked to neoliberalism, whereas “knowledge based approaches” are grounded on 
cognitive theories (Hasenclever et al. 1997: 1-2).9 
 The analytical depth of these different approaches is however limited by the 
lack of precision in Krasner’s formulation. Thus, the academic literature on 
international regimes presents an interesting paradox. While there is a consensus and 
widespread use of the definition coined by Krasner (1982), scholars equally criticise 
his conceptualisation (Haggard and Simmons 1987, Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 
Milner 1993).There were few attempts to refine the concept, still employed by 
literature, but at the end of the 1980s scholars began to refer to “regimes” as 
“institutions” (Simmons and Martin 2001:194) without further problematisation,10 
probably because “even strong proponents of the [regime] concept admit[ted] the 
difficulty in defining it” (Milner 1993:493).11 
                                                
9 See Haggard and Simmons (1987) for a critic of Krasner’s definition and more on theories of international 
regimes. 
10 Building on Krasner’s concept, for example, Hasenclever et. al. (2000) defined regime as “deliberately 
constructed, partial international orders on either a regional or a global scale, which are intended to remove 
specific- issue areas or international politics from thesphere of self-help behavior. By creating shared 
expectations about appropriate behaviour and by upgrading the level of transparency in the issue-area, regimes 
help states (and other actors) to cooperate with a view to reaping joint gains in the form of additional welfare or 
security”. 
11 For a constructivist analysis of regimes, see Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986). 
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  International institutions (IIs) can be understood as “a set of rules that 
stipulates the ways in which states should cooperate and compete with each other”.12 
Based on a broad and general understanding of a common “standard of behaviours 
defined in terms of rights and obligations”, the parties mutually agree on these rules, 
often incorporated in international agreements and organisations (Mearsheimer 1995: 
8-9).  
 Three are the advantages of this definition of “institution” over the concept of 
“regime” that partially explain its use. Firstly, elements of this conceptualisation are 
restricted to “rules”, encompassing both decision-making procedures. Secondly, 
“institutions” are understood within a rational and objective approach, leaving 
behind “standards of behaviour” from its analysis. Similarly, this being a third 
advantage, Mearsheimer’s concept of “institutions” does not enter the debate on the 
“quality” of rules, leaving room for different interpretations on their social 
construction (Simmons and Martin 2001:194).  
In another interpretation, Mearsheimer’s definition of IIs could be considered 
rather incomplete, as it does not state anything about the nature and characteristics of 
the rules and processes defining institutions. Addressing these issues, Koremenos et 
al. (2001: 762-763) argue that institutions are “explicit arrangements, negotiated 
among international actors, that prescribe, proscribe, and/or authorize behaviour”. 
This definition includes explicit arrangements that “have no formal bureaucracy or 
enforcement mechanisms but are fundamental to the conduct of international 
affairs”, like diplomatic immunity and formal organisations. Yet the nature and the 
scope of these explicit and formal arrangements can widely vary; consequently, each 
international institution has specific characteristics that make it unique.  
The systematic appraisal of these differences should consider five core 
elements: a) membership; b) scope of issue covered; c) centralisation of tasks; d) 
rules of controlling institutions; and e) flexibility of arrangements (defining how 
institutional rules and procedures adapt to different circumstances) (Koremenos et al. 
                                                
12 Unlike the regimes, the concept of IIs does not mention their jurisdiction in terms of issue. Thus, in 
Mearsheimer’s definition implies that an institution can address different areas of internal relations.  
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2001: 762-763).13These characteristics allude to the scope and the structure of 
international institutions, creating a well-defined context in which actors 
systematically cooperate. Together, they suggest that, rather than occasional 
arrangements, institutions (and regimes) tend to be long-lasting. Emphasising this 
element of “durability", Duffield posits that international institutions are “relatively 
stable sets of related constitutive, regulative, and procedural norms and rules that 
pertain to the international system, the actors in the system (including states as well 
as non-state entities), and their activities” (Duffield 2007: 7).  
As “stable” arrangements, institutions are ultimately formalised through the 
creation of international organisations (IOs).14 Understood as “formal, continuous 
structures established by agreement between members (governmental and/non-
governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the 
common interest of membership” (Archer 2001: 33), they are “physical entities 
possessing offices, personnel, equipment [and] budgets” (Young 1986: 108). Thus, 
IOs are a constitutive part of international institutions and regimes. Nevertheless, 
“institutions” and “organisations” have been used interchangeably in a significant 
share of the literature in international relations. In these cases, as Archer points out, 
the use of “institution” is often “to refer to the detailed structure of an organisation” 
or simply as “a synonym for organisation”(Archer 1992: 2).  
Unlike regimes and institutions, international law recognises the legal 
personality of international organisations granting them the status of actors. 
However, their capacity to perform as independent entities in global politics depends 
on social recognition; the role of IOs as actors is a subjective concept (Hurd 2011: 
17-18). The question of their autonomy has been explored from different theoretical 
angles, ranging from constructivism (Barnett and Finnemore 1999) to rational choice 
theories (Pollack 1997; Lake 1996; Vaubel 1991). 
 Under a rational/functional perspective, IOs are treated as instruments or 
resources for the promotion of the interests of members of the organisation in the 
international arena. In particular, they “could help to focus expectations on 
                                                
13See Young (1992) and Hasenclever et. al (1997), for the an analysis on the effectiveness of regimes and 
institutions. 
14 See Reinalda (2009), “The history of IOs from 1815 to the present day”.  
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cooperative solution, reduce transaction costs, and provide a greater degree of 
transparency” (Martin and Simmons 2013: 331). Constructivists, however, claim that 
IOs “cannot be treated as simply exogenous or purely objects of choice”. On the 
contrary, they argue, IOs and international institutions “create, reflect and diffuse 
intersubjective normative understandings” (Martin and Simmons 2013: 335).15 
These different approaches concur on the view that “IO operations also 
significantly influence the capabilities, understandings, and interests of states. This is 
most apparent with outputs such as information and rules. But it also true of more 
material activities like technical assistance and joint production” (Abott and Snidal 
1998:13).  
The point on which these theories diverge is on the sources and importance of 
these norms and rules. Whereas rationalists consider these elements essentially as a 
reflex of the preferences of the members of an organisation, constructivists argue 
that, as organisations evolve, they become active players in international relations, 
with autonomy and capacity to set new standards of behaviours and norms. 
Norms, structures and the capacity of IOs to influence international relations 
vary, depending on the organisation. As Abbott and Snidal (1998: 9) posit, two 
characteristics define IOs: independence and centralisation. Independence relates to 
the ability of an IO to be influence international relations as with autonomy, ensuring 
the effectiveness of the process of inter-governmental cooperation. The most 
influential organisations often have a high-level of institutionalisation, with 
bureaucratic machinery sophisticated enough to impact multilateral negotiations, 
either taking an important role as mediator or proposing specific issues to be 
included in the agenda. Independence also affects monitoring and implementation.  
The second characteristic, centralisation refers to the physical structure and 
the centralised administration of an organisation. More effective IOs tend to be more 
institutionalised, facilitating the interaction of the parties. In addition, formal 
organisations have clear rules for membership and decision-making, establishing the 
“rules of the game” for cooperation.  Thus, “the acts of independent IOs may be 
accorded special legitimacy and they affect the legitimacy of member’s actions. 
                                                
15 See Wendt and Duvall (1989). 
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Even, centralization, seemingly more mechanical, can alter states’ perceptions and 
the context of their interactions” (Abbott and Snidal 1998: 9).  
If regimes and institutions can constrain – even if with limitations- the 
behaviour of the parties and influence their preferences and foreign policies, it is 
expected that they would impact level-linkage. The extent to which regimes and 
institutions influence the prospects of a linkage between the bilateral and the 
multilateral level of the EU-Brazil cooperation varies from according to the scope, 
structure, and normative content of each regime/ organisation. Regimes with highly 
institutionalised organisations, I claim, provide international actors with a complex 
arena for multilateral cooperation that has its very own dynamics. Arguably, in this 
context, international actors have fewer incentives to link the levels in which they 
cooperate with each other, as it is less likely that bilateralism will impact on 
multilateralism in this scenario. Under this same rationale, I claim that the less 
institutionalised multilateral cooperation is, the more favourable the external 
environment for level-linkage is. That is because decisions and proposals taken at the 
bilateral level can be more easily incorporated in the agenda of multilateral 
institutions when they operate on the grounds of general norms and rules and within 
a structure not highly complex. In this sense, regimes with low degree of 
institutionalisation, also called “under construction” or “open-ended” are more open 
to level-linkage.16 
 
Approach towards Multilateralism (Hypothesis 2- Secondary) 
The first hypothesis of the thesis (“Type of Regime”) argues that regimes and IOs 
influence level-linkage by constraining the engagement of the parties to rules and 
procedures depending on their degree of institutionalisation. Inverting this approach, 
in the second hypothesis I place the EU and Brazil as the units of analysis in the 
assessment of the relationship between their cooperation and the regimes/IOs in 
which they engage.  
                                                
16  As chapter three discusses, those are characteristics of the climate change regime, for example. Considered as 
a regime “still under construction” (Luterbacher and Sprinz 2001: 297) or climate change is also defined as “an 
open-ended regime that contemplates an evolutionary process” (Bodansky and Diringer 2010: 13). 
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As previously discussed, the creation of a regime demands a minimum 
common understanding by the parties on the norms and principles that should 
provide the basis for the institutionalisation of cooperation. Within this logic, I claim 
that level-linkage can only occur if the EU and Brazil both have an interest in 
multilateralism. As a subjective concept, there are, however, different interpretations 
of multilateralism. Hence, in this second hypothesis I argue that the degree of 
compatibility of approaches of the EU and Brazil towards multilateralism impacts 
level-linkage.  
 As presented earlier in this chapter, one of the most recurrent definitions 
understands multilateralism as policy coordination amongst more than two players 
(Keohane 1990: 731). This process of coordination, however, implies a certain 
compatibility of approaches. Thus, rather than being defined merely by the number 
of the parties, multilateralism is “an ideology ‘designed’ to promote multilateral 
activity. It combines normative principles with advocacy and existential belief” 
(Caporaso 1992:603). In other words, multilateralism results from a shared 
understanding of how to best organise international relations. It incorporates 
individual preferences and is the common denominator of the expectations and 
values of a certain group of actors. Consequently, depending on the players involved, 
multilateralism can stand for different norms and principles, taking distinct forms.  
As an “ideology”, multilateralism is often considered as the most efficient 
instrument to promote equality amongst international actors. That is because power 
asymmetries tend to be overcome when the same principles of conduct apply 
indiscriminately to all parties. Another argument in favour of multilateralism is that 
generalised principles result from the agreement of all the parties, rather than 
mirroring the exclusive preferences of the most powerful actors. Multilateralism is 
then perceived as the “fairest” and the most democratic principle (Finnemore 2005: 
196). This attribution of legitimacy to multilateralism alludes to its understanding an 
international institution grounded on three well-defined: a) indivisibility, b) non-
discrimination and, c) diffused reciprocity (Ruggie 1992: 572-573). 
When empirically analysed, however, this alleged legitimacy is not very 
straightforward. In some circumstances, multilateralism serves as mean to legitimate 
an actor’s norms and behaviours based on self- interests, rather than being a pursuit 
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to promote collective gains. In fact, in some occasions, it is a disguised mechanism 
for the promotion of unilateral interests, instead of balancing the preferences of all 
the parties. Moreover, international actors can employ multilateralism strategically to 
legitimise actions or ideas, which may be contested if introduced from a domestic 
level (Keohane 2006: 73-75). Another issue emerges in the contradiction between 
multilateralism’s alleged capability to reflect a collective identity and the belief that 
its legitimacy is unconditional. In order to be a legitimate principle, multilateralism 
depends on whether the international norms promoted are congruent with domestic 
values of all the parties involved; and that is not always the case. This argument has 
an interesting implication for understanding “multilateralism’s aspiration to 
universality” (Kahler 1992:681).  
The increased relevance of multilateralism has then been directly linked to the 
exponential creation of multilateral organisations. As Keohane affirms, 
since the end of World War II, multilateralism has become increasingly 
important in world politics, as manifest in the proliferation of multinational 
conferences on a bewildering variety of themes and an increase in the number 
of multilateral intergovernmental organizations (Keohane 1990: 731).  
 
These organisations of multilateralism operate “as an agent of norm 
displacement and transformation, involving some of the very same principles [they] 
once helped institutionalize” (Acharya 2006: 96). This argument suggests that, like 
the understanding of multilateralism as a principle, intergovernmental organisations 
are the outcome of a particular shared perception on how to best structure 
international relations. In this sense, an IOs needs to operate on the basis of the same 
principles that underpin multilateralism to be considered a “multilateral 
organisation”.  
As Ikenberry stresses, joining these organisations entail a high price: the 
“reduction of autonomy” for their members. The political choice then entails a 
cost/benefit analysis, whose outcome depends on the weight of the different variables 
(understood as incentives to multilateralism) that influence this equation. The first 
element is structural and refers to the current characteristics of the international 
system, more cooperative and interdependent than in previous times. Secondly, 
incentives may come from inside a multilateral institution, pressuring actors to 
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undertake multilateral commitment in other realms. Thirdly, peer influence appears 
also to be important, when other parties impose political constraints over an actor’s 
choice. A fourth source of motivation to join multilateralism is domestically defined 
and can be triggered by tradition or national identity, but also by the preferences of 
single actors, such as political leaders and groups of interests (Ikenberry 2003: 534-
535).  Thus, the engagement of an actor with multilateralism (and multilateral 
cooperation) is grounded on normative and material incentives, varying in quality 
and type depending on the actors and the regime at stake. 
 Based on these considerations, the second hypothesis of the thesis considers 
that the prospects for two actors to project their bilateral partnership to the 
multilateral level is limited by their compatibility of approaches towards 
multilateralism. The first precondition is, therefore, the shared understanding that 
international relations should be based on the principle of multilateralism. Achieving 
the fulfillment of this criterion, however, is not enough for level-linkage. Actors need 
to have a convergent view on how to shape this multilateralism, agreeing on the 
content of its norms and rules, even if their motivations to support multilateral 
cooperation may differ. The way to assess this convergence is to break down the 
discussion on “support to multilateralism” into different regimes. That is because the 
same degree of compatibility of approaches may not apply to all areas. Addressing 
this issue, this thesis analyses how the EU and Brazil perceive multilateralism in the 
specific case of climate change, trade and human rights. In order to do so, it takes 
into account the support of each actor to multilateralism in broad terms, but also 
looks at the principles and norms they support within the three regimes, including 
their agendas for negotiations 
 
Foreign Policy-Making Process (Hypothesis 3-Primary) 
Despite considering the EU and Brazil as unitary actors when they engage in 
international relations, the foreign policy-making processes hypothesis emerges from 
the notion that foreign policy is the outcome of a bureaucratic process that entails 
bargaining and coordination between different agencies and agents.  
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The influence of bureaucratic structures and organisational process on foreign 
policy-making was central in the research agenda of the first period of Foreign 
Policy Analysis (FPA) scholarship (1954-1993). The theoretical and conceptual 
assumptions of bureaucratic politics in FPA are grounded in a broader discussion of 
bureaucracy in politics promoted by sociologists and political scientists, largely 
influenced by the groundbreaking work of Max Weber, The Theory of Social and 
Economic Organisations (1924) (Hudson 2007:19).  
Looking at the forms in which authority is legitimised, Weber argued that, 
whereas the first forms of political organisations determined authority on the basis of 
tradition or charisma, modern society is structure around a “legal-rational” 
framework: bureaucratic organisation. The legitimisation of this type of authority 
derives from the belief in norms and rules that delegate responsibility to bureaucrats, 
at the same time constraining their action in a normative structure. Three are the 
features of Weber’s bureaucracy:  a) hierarchical structure; b) division of labour, and 
c) impersonal rules (Peters 2001: 71). As Weber explains, the principle of hierarchy 
establishes an uneven distribution of power in which one actor (or office) has more 
authority over other agents. This principle however, does not imply centralisation of 
competences in the hands of the “superior” authority. On the contrary, the principle 
of jurisdiction ensures that the responsibilities entailed in the bureaucratic 
organisation are distributed amongst a plurality of agents with distinct hierarchical 
roles. Finally, the bureaucratic activities follow legal norms and isolate the “official” 
and public role of a bureaucrat from his/her personal life. Acting as a “servant of the 
state”, these agents should obey to the principles of impersonality and functionality 
(Weber 1924: 956-959). 
Weber criticised the tendency of this type of political authority to overtake 
the role of society, constraining policy-makers to an “iron cage”. Nevertheless, 
Weber praised the role of bureaucracy in ensuring impartiality in decision-making, 
considering that final objective of this type of organisation is to ensure efficiency 
(Lune 2010: 27).17 
                                                
17 See Kalberg (2001). 
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 Weber’s analysis of bureaucracy addressed economic and political 
organisations of modern society, covering public and private entities within domestic 
jurisdiction. Yet, despite the applicability of Weber’s theory to the study the 
bureaucratic type of organisations in foreign policy, it was just in the 1960s that 
academics began to analyse the role of bureaucracy in international politics (Hudson 
2007: 19). 
 In Strategic Planning and the Political Process (1960), Huntington opened 
the “black box” of decision making in the US military programme. Differentiating 
domestic politics from “strategic programmes”, Huntington argues that, whereas the 
legislative power controls the policy-making process of the former, the latter falls 
under the competences of the executive power. Three are the characteristics that 
define a policy-making process in the executive: a) hierarchical organisation of the 
different participating units; b) “fundamental goals and values are not at issue”; and 
c) “the range of possible choice is limited”. Questioning the arguably rationality 
attributed to this process, Huntington posits that “strategic programs (…) are the 
product of controversy, negotiation and bargaining among different groups with 
different interests and perspectives” (Huntington 1960: 289). Despite raising 
important elements of reflection on the political process in US foreign policy, 
Huntington compared the role of the legislative and the executive in policy-making 
but without providing a systematic framework of analysis.18 
 Addressing this gap, Graham Allison proposed three models to explain 
organisation processes and bureaucratic politics within foreign policy, a theory 
developed in the Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1971). 
As David Welch explains, Allison’s objective was to challenge the rationalist 
interpretation of foreign policy-making as a centralised and controlled process. 
Bureaucratic (or governmental) decision making is one of the “models” proposed by 
Allison to analyse foreign-policy in considering this as a process grounded on a 
complex interaction of a pool of actors with rational, albeit different, perceptions. 
                                                
18 See Bendor and Hammond (1992). 
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Under this approach, policy is the outcome of bargaining amongst agents distributed 
in a hierarchical institutional arrangement (Welch 1992: 118).  
 Bureaucratic Politics Model (BPM) considers foreign policy-making as 
grounded on two core elements. The first is the “conglomerate of bureaucratic 
organisations” which sets the structure wherein policy-makers operate. Standard 
operating procedures (SOPs), information and political options bureaucracies 
provide to the governments are all determined by their structure. Bureaucracies often 
develop “common attitudes” or images that influence the perception of an issue by 
policy-makers, affecting their decisions. Political actors are the second element of 
BPM’s explanation of foreign policy. Actors (or bureaucracies) have their 
preferences and agendas, determined in accordance to their roles in the “division of 
labour” and their position in the hierarchical structure of power. The actions of these 
agents are not always driven by the pursuit of the “national interests”, as the 
behaviour of political actors may be motivated also by seizing of opportunity to 
enhance their importance within domestic politics and defend specific interests of 
their units (Alden and Aran 2012: 33). In this line of thought, foreign policy could be 
considered as the outcome of the bargaining and negotiation process amongst a 
plurality of actors with different interests and power, taking place within the 
organisational arrangement and normative settings established by the bureaucratic 
structure of the political organisation.  
 Reacting with strong criticism to BPM, in Are Bureaucracies important? (Or 
Allison Wonderland) (1972), Krasner recognised that “the bureaucratic interpretation 
of foreign policy has become the conventional wisdom”, and expressed concerned 
with a vision considered “misleading, dangerous, and compelling” (Krasner 1972: 
160). Elaborating on these three elements, Krasner explained:  
Misleading because it [bureaucratic politics] obscures the power of the 
President; dangerous because it undermines the assumptions of democratic 
politics by relieving high officials of responsibility; and compelling because it 
offers leaders an excuse for their failures and scholars an opportunity for 
innumerable reinterpretations and publications (Krasner 1972: 160). 
 
 In addition to the focus on the role of bureaucrats, another source of criticism 
to the BPM is the rationality of its approach. The omission of the relevance of 
cognitive elements, such as ideas and values of both individuals and organisations, 
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has been pointed out as a flaw in the BPM as proposed by Allison (Freedman 1976: 
435; Smith 1980: 30).19 
What seems to be a clash of bureaucratic interest and stands can often be more 
fruitfully viewed as a clash among values that are widely held in both the 
society and the decision-maker’s own minds (…) we have no grounds for 
claiming that a different constellation of bureaucratic interests and forces would 
have produced a different result (Jervis 1976: 28). 
 
Despite the criticism to Allison’s (and Halperin’s) work, literature in 
International Relations and FPA has not addressed the conceptual and 
methodological deficiencies of the first models developed to analyse bureaucratic 
politics. The tendency amongst academics remains “to treat bureaucratic politics 
exclusively as an independent variable explaining policy outcomes” (Preston and ‘t 
Hart 1999: 52).20 
While recognising the limitations of the BPM, this thesis draws largely from 
this approach to explore the impact of the foreign policy-making process on level-
linkage (Hypothesis 3). This choice can be justified by the specific interest in 
assessing how (and if) the structure and procedures of the foreign policies of Brazil 
and the EU determine the policy-making of bilateral and multilateral policies, 
ultimately conditioning the coordination between the two processes. Thus, the 
starting point to explore this issue is the assessment of the policy-making of the two 
actors in terms of the “hierarchy” and “division of labour”, as postulated by Weber, 
to then analyse the “complex interaction” amongst agents and agencies part of the 
bureaucratic organisation” of the EU’s and Brazil’s foreign policies. 
 
Preferences for Partners (Hypothesis 4-Secondary) 
The fourth hypothesis of this thesis argues that level-linkage depends on the 
preferences for partners of the EU and Brazil at the multilateral level. In assessing 
                                                
19 See Drezner (2000) for a discussion bridging “ideas” and “bureaucratic politics” in foreign policy. 
20 See Rosenthal and ‘t Hart (1998). 
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these preferences, this thesis considers formal and informal coalitions forged by the 
EU and Brazil with one or more players at the multilateral arena.  
 Whereas bilateral cooperation is limited to two actors that play the game of 
bargaining and negotiations alone, many are the parties engaging in multilateral 
negotiations. The large number of players adds to the wide range of issues often 
included in the multilateral agenda. Together, these two elements bring to 
multilateralism a distinctive degree of complexity. Within this scenario, coalitions 
emerge as strategy actors employ to increase their power and enhance the prospects 
of gains from multilateral negotiations (Dupont 1994:148).  
Broadly defined as “sets of governments that defend a common position in a 
negotiation by explicit coordination” (Odell 2006: 13), coalitions have the objective 
to simplify bargaining process by reducing the number of players negotiating. At the 
same time, they are important to compensate asymmetries in the distribution of 
power within the multilateral regime, not only facilitating an agreement but also 
enhancing the legitimacy of a multilateral outcome (Hampson and Hart 1995: 40).21 
In this sense, the objectives of a coalition may vary according to the type of 
negotiations and the issues at stake. Moreover, the negotiation of a “common 
position” of a specific group can be motivated by power considerations or affinity of 
interests and values (Dupont 1994: 149-150). As it becomes clear in the preferences 
for partners manifested by the EU and Brazil in the multilateral negotiations covered 
in this thesis, coalitions can be restricted to an issue-specific or to a broader agenda.  
Constructing a typology of coalitions, Narlikar (2003, 2005) distinguishes 
coalitions between “blocs” and “alliances”. “Blocs” are defined as a group of like-
minded actors, bound together by shared values and ideology, with emphasis on a 
collective identity that “go beyond the immediately instrumental” (Narlikar 2005: 6). 
Blocs tend to have a more political agenda and often address a wide range of issues. 
Pooling bargaining resources, this type of coalition is motivated by the interest of the 
parties in counter-weighting the balance of power within a multilateral negotiation 
(Narlikar 2003: 14-15). “Alliances”, on the other hand, are coalitions formed “among 
self-interested actors as opposed to collective identities”. They are driven by 
                                                
21 See Dupont (1996). 
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instrumental reasons and focus on a specific issue or threat (Narlikar 2003: 31).  
The differentiation between the two types of coalitions, however, does not 
prevent the adoption of a mixed- model of cooperation. Elements from “alliance” 
and “blocs” are often combined, and, in practice, international actors tend to operate 
through a “hybrid” form of coalition (Rolland 2007: 486). 
On a qualitative approach, another typology classifies coalitions in terms of 
their impact on multilateralism, considering that they can be either building blocks or 
stumbling blocks to multilateral negotiations. “Blocking coalitions” may engage with 
negotiations determinate to hijack of any agreement that do not meet their agendas. 
In order to have such influence, this type of coalition if often formed by actors with 
privileged positions of power, as their participation is essential to the celebration or 
the entry into force of an agreement. When decisions are taken by consensus, then 
coalitions formed by “weaker” players can have the same blocking effect. The 
opposite type, “crosscutting coalitions”, is the outcome of a side agreement between 
some actors around a common position that accommodates their originally 
conflicting interests. This process of “bridging” can occur through a trade-off 
between different issues, when the negotiations entail a plural agenda, or through the 
identification of an alternative position that the parties had not considered before 
(Hampson and Hart 1995: 29-42).  
Traditionally, coalitions take part in multilateral negotiation through 
representation. The delegation of authority to a specific group of negotiators within 
the coalition can occur on the basis of three criteria: a) diplomatic bargaining skills 
of the diplomats of a specific government; b) technical expertise; and c) power 
relationship. In order to be effective, a representative should not be only the 
spokesperson for group. Rather, it has to articulate a common position with its 
constituency, have the authority to negotiate in behalf of its coalition, at the same 
time being capable to ensure respect and space in the multilateral arena to bargain 
with third parties in favour of the agenda of the group it represents (Hampson and 
Hart 1995: 42). Internal decision-making varies according to the degree of 
coordination and institutionalisation of a coalition. Whereas some groups operate on 
the basis of exchange of views, others have more formal and regular meetings in 
which the objective is to articulate a common position (Patel 2007:7). 
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Empirical analyses on coalitions in the literature in International Relations 
focus largely on multilateral trade negotiations. Within this domain, there is a 
consensus amongst scholars on the argument that the most enduring coalitions in the 
WTO are those forged amongst developing countries.22 Analyses converge on the 
view that rules of multilateral institutions and the outcome of agreement have been 
historically determinate by a minority of the parties, essentially developed 
economies. Within this context, coalitions have offered developing countries the 
possibility to enhance their bargaining power against “traditional” relevant players, 
changing the dynamics of negotiations (Habeeb 1988, Hamilton and Whalley 1989, 
Higgott and Cooper 1990, Kahler and Odell 1989, Narlikar 2003, Tussie and Glover 
1993). 
 Based on the literature on coalition presented, this thesis explores 
opportunities in which Brazil and the EU joined a group of players, advocating a 
“common position”, as an indicator of their preferences for partners at the 
multilateral arena. Without qualifying the scope of these groups, this thesis adopts a 
rather loose interpretation of “coalition”, intentionally using the concept 
interchangeably with the terms “alliance” and “bloc”, as they are both indicators of 
preference for partners. Furthermore, whereas international relations scholars treat 
“coalitions” as a group of more than two players, the EU’s and Brazil’s “preferences 
for partners” can manifest through the strategic choice for coordination with only 
another party. A bilateral alliance thus qualifies as a “preference for partner” when 
analysing the performance of the EU and Brazil in the three multilateral regimes 
addressed by the thesis. 
 
 
 
                                                
22 These coalitions fit in the “bloc” type of Narlikar (2003, 2005), as a driven by shared identity and values, 
encompassing a broad agenda. Despite the focus on this type of coalitions, academics have also expressed an 
interest in exploring issue-specific coalitions, or “alliances”. See for, example, Higgott and Cooper (1990) for an 
analysis on the Cairns group of the WTO. 
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1.3.4	  Case	  Selection	  
 
Agents Selection 
The choice to study the EU and Brazil is justified by their high relevance as 
international actors and the increasing profile of their bilateral cooperation within 
their foreign policies. Over the past 15 years, extensive literature has been produced 
to discuss the characteristics and the limits of the EU’s capacity to be and to perform 
as an international actor in the different issue-areas. The different interpretations of 
the matter have converged on the opinion that the EU is, unquestionably, a major 
global player (Bretherton & Vogler 1999, Ginsberg 1999, Hill & Smith 2011, 
Jørgensen 2009,Jørgensen & Laatikainen 2013, Meunier & Nicolaidis 2006, Orbie, 
2008, Smith 2003). Brazil, on the other hand, has only enhanced its profile as an 
emerging power over the past decade. Attracting the interest of scholars, there has 
been a “boom” of academic work recently published addressing the “rise of Brazil” 
(Amorim 2011, Cervo 2010, Dauvergene & Farias 2012, Fortunato Biato 2008, 
Hurrell 2010, Malamud 2011, Roett 2010, Rohter 2012, Soares de Lima & Hirst 
2006, Sotero 2010). In investigating EU-Brazil cooperation, this thesis analyses the 
manner in which these two players pursue bilateral relations and approach the 
multilateral system, contributing to current academic debates on the role of Brazil 
and the EU as international actors. 
Additionally, although EU-Brazil relations date back to 1960, there is a lack 
of literature on this topic. Traditionally, cooperation between the two partners has 
been largely addressed through the study of EU- Latin America or EU-MERCOSUR 
relations (Barahona de Brito 2000, Doctor 2005, 2007, Jaguaribe & Vasconcelos 
2003, Klom 2003, Page 1999, Ruano 2013, Sanchez Bajo 1999, Santander 2005, 
Youngs 2002). The emergence of Brazil as a global player, and the re-framing of 
European foreign policy promoted by the European Security Strategy (2003), led to 
the establishment of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership. The enhanced profile of 
EU-Brazil relations that has ensued has been observed with curiosity by academics 
and policy analysts alike. Over the past few years, some journal articles, but 
predominantly “think-tank” publications have addressed the topic (Emerson et al. 
2013, Gratius 2012, Grevi & Renard 2012, Grevi & Vasconcelos 2008, Poletti 2007, 
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Ribeiro- Hoffmann 2007, Whitman & Rodt 2012, Znojek 2012). This thesis thus 
makes an important contribution to the academic literature on this issue too. 
 
Issue Selection 
This research explores level-linkage in three areas of EU-Brazil cooperation: climate 
change, trade, and human rights. The choice to undertake these case-studies is 
anchored in methodological, theoretical, and policy reasons.  
There is a relative consensus amongst international cooperation theorists that 
economic and environmental issues are characterised by high levels of 
interdependence. Consequently, these issues are the best to study in order to gain an 
understanding of the pursuit of cooperation as a strategy for achieving mutual gains 
(Sterling-Folker 2002: 48-49). As becomes clear during the case-studies, cooperation 
is prompted by the combination of both material and cognitive incentives in the case 
of both climate change and trade. Nevertheless, the diverse nature of the two issues 
demands distinct responses by international actors to interdependence within these 
realms. Robert Keohane and David Victor posit that climate change is a global issue 
that can only be tackled through the cooperation of a large number of parties (i.e 
multilateralism); unilateral efforts or collective action by a small group of actors does 
not suffice. Moreover, as climate change is an escalating problem, the gains from 
cooperation to tackle it are only perceived as being long-term (Keohane & Victor 
2010: 9). Where trade is concerned, the opposite is true. Grounded in the principle of 
liberalisation, cooperation on trade implies the replacement of protectionism by 
market opening strategies that have an immediate impact on the economic policies of 
actors. Gains from cooperation are measurable and identifiable in the short-term. 
Additionally, liberalisation can be promoted through a number of different strategies 
(Yarbrought & Yarbrough 1987: 2-3). In fact, the large proliferation of bilateral and 
regional trade agreements demonstrates that international actors have indeed 
diversified their approach to cooperation on trade. There are, as such, differences in 
the nature of the issue and the corresponding projection of gains from cooperation 
that make climate change and trade interesting cases to compare.   
  
 
54 
Considering the two criteria (nature of issue and strategies of cooperation), 
human rights is the case that differs the most from the issue-areas studied. As Jack 
Donnelly highlights, the human rights regime does not meet a demand created by 
“material interdependence”. Rather, cooperation on human rights derives from 
“moral interests”, and is, therefore, “less tangible” and political. Like trade, human 
rights are widely addressed by bilateral and multilateral agreements. In contrast to 
climate change, and trade to a certain extent, human rights are global concerns, but 
not international issues. Human rights are national matters as they concern the 
applicability of international norms to a domestic jurisdiction and depend on national 
political action (Donnelly 1986: 616). Despite the implications that the violation of 
universal human rights taking place within a particular jurisdiction may have for 
international relations, the gains from cooperation in this area are predominantly 
unilateral, as the final beneficiary is the country – and, subsequently, population - 
that adopts and implements international agreements. 
 The specificities that define climate change, trade, and human rights as 
distinct issue-areas are reflected by the development of different processes of 
international cooperation in all three areas, and have led to the establishment of three 
regimes with unique characteristics. As this thesis argues that level-linkage varies 
according to the issue-area at stake, the analysis of these three particular regimes 
brings to light elements that are important for the successful identification of existing 
or potential level-linkage within different issue-areas. 
 Additionally, the choice to analyse three regimes, and for the international 
organisations investigated, is suited to the objective of testing the four hypotheses of 
the thesis. In terms of the first primary hypothesis, “regime type” (H1), the three 
cases feature variant structure, scope, criteria for membership, decision-making 
processes, and understanding of the responsibility of the parties. The “compatibility 
of approaches” (H2) is largely shaped by the type of interests that underpin the 
approaches of the parties towards international cooperation. In the case of “foreign 
policy-making” (H3), the second primary hypothesis, one can  distinguish between 
integrated and fragmented processes, depending on the level of coordination between 
agencies and agents responsible for the framing of policies at the bilateral level and 
the multilateral level. Where the EU is concerned, there are also variances in the 
formal, legal competences attributed to its formulation of a common external policy 
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within the three issue-areas. “Preferences for partners” (H4) are determined by the 
agendas of the two actors, but are also influenced by the responsibilities attributed to 
them and the distribution of the EU and Brazil within the formal groupings of the 
regime at stake.  The table below (table 1) summarises some of the indicative 
differences between the three cases, with regards to the issues addressed in each 
hypothesis: 
TABLE	  1	   INDICATIVE	  DIFFERENCES	  AMONGST	  THE	  THREE	  CASE-­‐	  STUDIES	  
 Climate Change 
(UNFCCC/ Kyoto) 
Trade 
(WTO) 
Human Rights (HRC) 
Maturity of Regime New Well-established Well-established 
Interests Material/ Normative Material/ Normative Normative 
Membership States + REIOs States + REIOs States 
Resp. of the Parties23 Different Equal Equal 
EU Competences Shared Exclusive None 
Decision-Making Consensus Consensus Majority/ No vote 
Policy-Making 
(EU & Brazil) 
Fragmented 
No permanent 
representation 
Fragmented 
Permanent 
representation (WTO) 
Fragmented 
Permanent 
representation (UN) 
Formal grouping Different Different Different 
 
 
From a policy point of view, these three areas are at the core of EU-Brazil 
relations. Cooperation on trade was established in the 1970s and has strengthened 
ever since, as the flux of bilateral trade and investment between the two partners 
provides important incentives for cooperation. Cooperation on climate change and 
human rights was institutionalised in 1992 and is grounded in a more normative 
basis, due to the nature of the issues. In terms of scope, whereas the agenda on trade 
remains centred on bilateral issues, EU-Brazil bilateral engagement on climate and 
human rights has shifted from a strict “local” focus in the 1990s, to the promotion of 
dialogue on “multilateral issues” as well. 
 The relevance of the three areas to EU-Brazil relations has been stressed in the 
several documents that provide the basis for the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, 
launched in 2007. Under this new framework, the two partners have endorsed the 
promotion of a spillover of cooperation from the bilateral level to the multilateral 
                                                
23  By responsibilities of the parties, I mean the applicability of the rules, norms and commitments that apply to 
the members of an international organisation. As the table shows, in trade and human rights, responsibilities are 
equally applied to all members. In the case of climate change, however, the commitment of the parties varies 
according to economic criteria. 
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level. As outlined in the two Joint Action Plans of the Strategic Partnership adopted 
thus far, the EU and Brazil have committed to strengthening their collaboration 
within the three international regimes addressed by this research. The scrutiny of 
cooperation on climate change, trade and human rights provides important insight 
into level-linkage, and allows for an educated assessment of the prospects for both 
actors inducing higher correlation between the two levels of cooperation. 
 
Timeframe Selection 
Although the EU and Brazil have long engaged in different levels of cooperation (see 
chapter two), it was in 2007 Strategic Partnership that the two actors decided to 
promote linkage between the bilateral level and the multilateral level of their 
cooperation. Thus, this thesis adopts 2007 as a reference point for analysing level-
linkage in EU-Brazil relations, looking at cooperation prior to and after the 
agreement of the Strategic Partnership. The precise timeframe varies according to the 
issue addressed.  In all three cases - climate change, trade, and human rights – this 
thesis looks at DBLCM since initial institutionalisation of the relevant regime, but 
places an emphasis on developments made over the last decade. The period covered 
in the analysis of BCML depends on the dynamics and agendas of the international 
regimes, as well as the multilateral negotiations being explored.  
On climate change, the thesis explores EU-Brazil engagement since the adoption 
of the Kyoto Protocol, signed in 1997, up until the Conference of the Parties in 
Copenhagen in 2009. This choice is justified by the fact that a new phase of the 
climate regime began in 2010, focusing on the negotiation of a post-Kyoto period. 
The second case-study, on trade, looks at the negotiations of an agreement on 
agriculture since they were first launched, in 1999, until 2010, when the Doha Round 
came to a halt. The analysis of level-linkage on human rights scrutinises EU-Brazil 
engagement in the regular and special sessions of the Human Rights Council (HRC) 
from 2006 to 2011. This period spans from the first year of HRC activity, up until the 
end of the third consecutive membership of Brazil to the HRC, when the country left 
the institution, returning again in 2012. 
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1.4	  Methodology	  and	  Methods	  
 
This thesis adopts a qualitative approach that combines case-study, process tracing 
and comparative methods of analysis. It proposes the study of a small ‘N’ problem, 
comparing cases that belong to the same unit of analysis (EU-Brazil relations), but 
that are dissimilar as far as their explanatory variables are concerned (the four 
independent variables).  
 Qualitative research aims at answering questions that “require explanation or 
understanding of the social phenomena and their context” (Ritchie and Lewis 2003: 
5). Moreover, it implies “a process of examining and interpreting in order to elicit 
meaning, gaining understanding, and developing empirical knowledge” (Corbin and 
Strauss 2008: 1). As the objective of this thesis is to qualify and not quantify the 
correlation between the bilateral level and multilateral level of the EU-Brazil 
cooperation, it adopts a qualitative approach. 
 Additionally, in postulating its own framework for the appraisal of this 
correlation, this thesis provides theoretical contributions that would advance the 
literature on international cooperation. The hypotheses proposed here are tested in a 
small “N” of areas, to allow for the prioritising of an in-depth understanding of each 
individual case in all its complexity. The preference for a “case-based approach” is 
justified by the fact that this model allows one “to see which case aspects are 
relevant to the question at hand and how these aspects fit together.24 This 
understanding may be used to construct new theory, revise existing theory, thus 
generating new hypothesis for future testing” (Ragin and Rubinson 2009: 14). Such 
an approach is therefore more likely to enhance prospects for the arguments of this 
thesis being generalised, allowing the concept of level-linkage to be applied to other 
bilateral relations/issue-areas in future research. 
 In order to control the variables and hypotheses, this research opts for a 
comparative method. There are two reasons for this choice. Firstly, the analysis of 
only three case-studies does not allow for the application of a statistical model, as the 
                                                
24The research design in a case-based approach is framed around (a) low 'N' of cases (generally paradigmatic 
ones) and (b) a large number of variables covering several aspects of the phenomena and exhibiting a good 
knowledge of the cases (Della Porta 2008: 207-208).  
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validity of the generalisations generated from such an approach would be highly 
questionable. Secondly, as Donatella Della Porta argues, the comparative method is 
the most appropriate for understanding elements such as preferences, motivations 
and contexts and how they explain the phenomenon investigated (2008: 201-202). 
The case-studies employ a process-tracing method in order to identify the 
eventual changes in the pattern of EU-Brazil cooperation at the two levels during the 
period analysed. As David Collier summarises, this method can be understood as: 
The systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in 
light of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator. Process- 
tracing can contribute decisively both to describing political and social 
phenomena and to evaluating causal claims (Collier 2011: 823). 
 
Alexander George and Andrew Bennett identify the instruments and the 
objectives of this type of analysis, claiming that: 
In process- tracing the researcher examines histories, archival documents, 
interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process of a 
theory hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and 
values of the intervening variable in that case (George & Bennett 2005:06) 
 
This exercise is applied in the second and third stage of each case study, 
where primary and secondary sources provide information that identifies different 
pieces of “the history”. A single narrative is then built up, explaining the 
development of DBLCM and at the multilateral level. The employment of “process-
tracing” is particularly important for identifying EU-Brazil engagement in the 
multilateral arena, as no literature was found providing a detailed account of 
cooperation between the two partners at this level covering more than a particular 
year of multilateral negotiations. Additionally, the “process- tracing” of cooperation 
was conducted considering the hypotheses of the thesis. This, as such, allows for an 
understanding of the process of cooperation, but also for the locating of relevant 
independent variables within a broad constellation of issues. Consequently, these 
analyses draw attention to the elements that underpin the concept of “level-linkage”. 
It becomes possible to understand not only the outcome of the linkage between the 
two levels of cooperation, but also the process of “level-linkage”, as the last section 
of each case-study records.  
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The next section provides details on how these different methods are 
combined into a single model to operationalise this research.  
 
1.5	  Operationalisation	  
 1.5.1	  Operational	  Model	  
 
The comparative analysis of these three areas of EU-Brazil cooperation is based on 
an operational model similar to that proposed by Robert Yin for multiple case studies 
under a replication approach (Yin 1994: 49). The analysis entails three stages: 
1) Define & Design- The first step is to develop the argument and hypotheses, 
select cases, design a data section protocol and contextualise the issues 
addressed by the thesis in the literature and in international affairs. 
2) Prepare, Collect & Analyse – In the second stage, the three case studies are 
conducted separately. Following the analysis, an individual case report is 
produced (a conclusion) to allow for later comparisons between the cases. 
3) Analyse & Conclude – The third and last step consists of crossing the results 
of the three case-studies, structured around the four hypotheses of the thesis. 
The main findings are summarised, providing answers to the puzzles that 
underpin the research question. The contributions of this thesis to the 
literature and policy-making are stressed, and the path for future research 
pointed out.  
 1.5.2	  Organisation	  of	  the	  Thesis	  and	  Case-­‐Studies	  Process	  
 
In line with this model, this first chapter presents the theoretical and methodological 
approach of this research. The following chapter (chapter two) presents the overall 
framework of EU-Brazil cooperation, providing a backdrop for the analysis of the 
two specific levels of cooperation that it proposes to explore (bilateral and 
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multilateral).  Chapters three, four and five are dedicated to the three case-studies. 
The results of the analyses are compared in the conclusion, where the main findings 
of the thesis are presented.  
The scrutiny of each case-study is conducted in four stages that can be 
summarised as follows: 
1) Setting the scene: This part briefly contextualises the case within the specific 
regime in which cooperation takes place. It describes the main characteristics 
of the regime (and the international organisation in question), including its 
structure, decision-making processes, agenda, membership and groupings.  
 
2) Cooperation at the Bilateral Level: Entering the domain of EU-Brazil 
relations, this section looks at the initial institutionalisation of cooperation 
between the actors, with an emphasis on the latest developments. It assesses 
their agenda, instruments of dialogue/cooperation and the scope and 
importance attributed by the parties to collaborating on that specific matter. 
The main objective is to identify the pattern of EU-Brazil engagement at the 
bilateral level. 
 
3) Cooperation at the Multilateral Level: In the process-tracing of 
negotiations/sessions, the analysis aims to identify patterns of EU-Brazil 
engagement at the multilateral level. To this end, this third section assesses 
the compatibility of their agendas, their preferences for coalitions, positions 
in negotiations and cases of EU-Brazil joint proposals. 
 
4) Assessing Level-Linkage: The crossing of the findings of the two levels of 
cooperation investigated allows for the development of a conclusion on the 
outcome of level-linkage. This last part of each case-study explains this 
result, breaking the analysis up into each of the four hypotheses of the thesis. 
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1.5.3	  Possible	  outcomes	  
 
Exploring one particular direction of level-linkage, this thesis claims that cooperation 
at the BL has an impact on the ML when changes in the first are matched by changes 
in the latter. Conversely, there is no level-linkage when the developments at the BL 
do not correspond to the development of cooperation at the ML. Additionally, as the 
table below (table 2) summarises, this correlation does not necessarily evolve  
according to the same trend; enhanced dialogue at the bilateral level for 
cooperation at the multilateral arena (DBLCM) (+) can correspond to more (+) or 
less (-) bilateral cooperation at the multilateral level (BCML). The opposite scenario 
also comprises level-linkage, as decreased BL cooperation can correlate to either 
enhanced or suppressed ML cooperation.  
TABLE	  2	   	   	   OUTCOMES	  OF	  LEVEL-­‐LINKAGE	  
(Bilateralism         Multilateralism) 
 
DBLCM BCML Level- Linkage 
+ + Yes 
+ - Yes 
+ = No 
- + Yes 
- _ Yes 
- = No 
 
 1.5.4	  Categories,	  Typologies	  &	  Definitions	  
 
As this research focuses on trends of cooperation and the impact of certain factors on 
level-linkage, it develops qualitative criteria with which to “measure” these issues, 
avoiding quantifying them. In order to define changes in cooperation over the period 
analysed, this thesis covers three potential patterns of changes at the bilateral level, 
namely (a) enhancement; (b) decrease; and (c) continuity. The criteria for the 
categories are presented in the table below: 
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TABLE	  3	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  CHANGES	  IN	  DBLCM	  
 
 Enhancement Decrease Continuity 
Political Dialogue More Less Unchanged 
Agreements/ Deals More Less Unchanged 
Scope Broadened Narrowed Unchanged 
Institutionalisation Stronger Weaker Unchanged 
 
 The same “typology” of changes in cooperation is applied to the multilateral 
level, yet the criteria are slightly different: 
TABLE	  4	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  CHANGES	  IN	  BCML	  
 Enhancement Decrease Continuity 
Political Dialogue More Less Unchanged 
Joint Proposals More Less Unchanged 
Joint Alliances More Less Unchanged 
Mutual Support More Less Unchanged 
 
When testing the hypotheses, the thesis claims that each of the four intervening 
variables affect level-linkage in three possible ways: (a) hinder; (b) constrain; (c) 
favour. Criteria for these typologies were presented previously, when explaining the 
argument and hypotheses of the thesis (see table 5). 
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TABLE	  5	   	   TYPOLOGY	  OF	  IMPACT	  ON	  LEVEL-­‐	  LINKAGE	  
Regime Type 
Closed Open 
Highly institutionalised Regime; 
Complex / Technical Agenda; 
Membership restricted to States; 
Restriction in number of parties; 
Decision making by simple majority of votes; 
Formal grouping structure; 
Different responsibilities to all members. 
Weak institutionalised Regime; 
Political Agenda; 
Membership open to States and Regional 
Organisations; 
No restrictions in number of parties; 
Decision making by consensus; 
Flexible grouping structure; 
Same responsibilities to members. 
Mixed Combines elements from the two categories (open/closed) substantially. 
 
Compatibility of Approaches 
Low High 
Diverse interest in multilateral order 
Diverse interest in stronger regime 
Diverse interest in engaging with the regime 
Diverse understanding of multilateral norms/ 
principles 
Diverse agenda for  negotiations 
Diverse strategies for engaging with negotiations. 
Shared interest in multilateral order 
Shared interest in stronger regime 
Shared interest in engaging with the regime 
Similar understanding of multilateral norms/ 
principles 
Similar agenda for negotiations 
Similar strategies for engaging with negotiations 
Mixed Combines elements from the two categories (high/low) substantially. 
 
Foreign Policy-Making 
Fragmented Coordinated 
Hierarchical structure 
Top-down structure 
Different agents for each level 
Different agencies for each level; 
No/ poor coordination amongst agencies; 
No/ poor coordination amongst agents. 
Horizontal structure 
Bottom-up structure 
Same agents for both level 
Same agencies for both level; 
Good coordination amongst agencies; 
Good coordination amongst agents. 
Mixed Combines elements from the two categories (fragmented/coordinated) substantially. 
 
Preference for Partners 
Diverse Reciprocal 
Different proposals 
Diverse negotiation groups 
Lack of support for other’s proposal 
Different coalitions/alliances. 
Joint Proposals/ Declarations 
Speak on behalf of each other 
Same negotiations groups 
Support for each other’s proposals 
Same coalitions/ alliances. 
Mixed Combines elements from the two categories (diverse/reciprocal) substantially. 
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1.6	  Sources	  
 1.6.1	  Primary	  sources	  
 
Interviews 
A total of 51 interviews were conducted between July 2010 and August 2013, in 
Brasilia, Brussels and London. Particular attention was paid to maintaining a 
balanced pool of sources, which featured officials from the Brazilian government and 
the European Union. On the EU’s side, interviews were conducted with members of 
staff from different Directorate-Generals of the European Commission, the European 
External Action Service and the EU Delegation in Brasilia. Covering the Brazilian 
perspective, interviews were conducted with diplomats from the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (Itamaraty), both in Brasilia and at the Brazilian Mission to the EU, in 
Brussels. Interviews were conducted directly, in English, Portuguese or Italian, 
depending on the interviewee. 
 Interviews started with open-ended questions, prepared in advance according 
to the expertise of the interviewee and the issue being addressed.  Based on the 
answers given, and on the development of the discussion, new questions were 
formulated. In keeping with this same structure, the method employed to register 
information changed over the course of the fieldwork. Initially, the objective was 
purely to record the meeting and transcribe the material it generated, incorporating 
this data into the analysis of the thesis. Ensuring the confidentiality of the 
information shared was also an ethical concern. References in the chapters to the 
interviewees do not include any personal data that might reveal their identities. The 
annex of this thesis includes a list of the organisations employing the interviewees, as 
well as the place and date of the interviews, but keeps their names anonymous.  
 The objective of pursuing interviews was also reconsidered. Originally, the 
intention was to gain access to documents not available to the public. Also, it was 
expected that the interviews would help in the detailed reconstruction of the history 
of EU-Brazil relations. Additionally, there was an expectation that interviewees 
would reveal information crucial to the process-tracing of multilateral negotiations 
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over time. The major problem encountered was the changing of staff. None of the 
government officials interviewed occupied the same position over the entire period 
addressed by the thesis. Consequently, even if the members of staff had a good, 
broad understanding of EU-Brazil relations, as was expected, their contribution of 
elements including perceptions, anecdotes, unofficial events and particularities of a 
given period is limited to the timeframe in which they were exercising a certain 
function. Moreover, these members of staff did not seem to have easy access to the 
documents requested. One example of these absent documents, recurrent in a number 
of interviews with both Brazilian and European officials, was the agenda of the 
meetings of the EC-Brazil Committee (Comista). Held since 1982, some of these 
agendas are available online with the aid of a random Google search. Yet, none of 
the staff interviewed claimed to have a copy of all the minutes/agendas of these 
meetings. The same was true for a great deal of other information requested.  
 
Official Documents 
In addition to interviews, the thesis relied heavily on official documents from the 
European Union, the Brazilian government, and international organisations. In order 
to present the historical background on EU-Brazil relations (chapter two), and to 
explain the development of DBLCM in each issue-area, I analysed agreements, joint 
statements, memorandums of understanding, action plans, agendas and minutes of 
meetings, internal communications, country strategy papers and other instruments of 
EU-Brazil cooperation. These sources were also consulted in order to better 
understand how multilateral issues have been introduced into their bilateral agenda, 
and how the partners have framed their Strategic Partnership. 
For background information on the structure of the international regimes 
analysed, I consulted international treaties, conventions and protocols of the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, WTO and HRC. I also 
consulted official reports from negotiations published by these international 
organisations to aid in the process-tracing of EU-Brazil engagement at the 
multilateral level.  In the case of human rights, the reports of the special and regular 
sessions of the HRC were a vital source of information for identifying the voting 
positions and the statements delivered by the two actors on these occasions. The 
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organogram of the European institutions and the Brazilian ministries provided data 
useful to understanding their foreign policy-making processes.  
The problems encountered when gathering information from these primary 
sources two-fold. Firstly, information available on the websites of the European 
Union and the Brazilian government is very limited and not presented in an 
organised way, especially in the case of sources from Brazil.  In addition, data is not 
displayed consistently. Within a series of documents of the same type (such as 
agendas), many of them are simply not available. Moreover, apart from key 
agreements and documents related to the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership, several 
primary sources were only accessible through arbitrary “Google searches”. 
 1.6.2	  Secondary	  Sources	  
 
To map out the current debate on international cooperation, identify the puzzles 
addressed by this research and postulate its argument and hypotheses, this thesis 
consulted academic literature on international cooperation, 
bilateralism/multilateralism, regimes, policy-making and coalitions. I utilised the 
work produced by think-tanks on strategic partnerships. Literature on EU-Latin 
America/Brazil relations, European foreign policy and Brazilian foreign policy also 
provided important sources for understanding cooperation at the two levels, the 
partners’ approaches to multilateral negotiations, their policy-making and their 
preferences for partners. Reports from the “Earth Negotiation Bulletin” provided 
crucial data for the analysis of EU-Brazil engagement in multilateral climate 
negotiations. To understand their cooperation during the international negotiations of 
a new agreement on agriculture under the Doha agenda, the “Bridges Weekly News 
Digest” of the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development was a 
valuable source. Press articles were also consulted in the case-study on trade.  
 The limitations in terms of secondary sources were the lack of literature 
addressing the correlation between two levels of cooperation in the context of a 
particular bilateral relationship, the limited nature of academic work produced on 
EU-Brazil relations and the absence of a comprehensive account of EU-Brazil 
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engagement at the multilateral level. Nevertheless, whilst these deficiencies posed an 
obstacle to this research, once overcome, they highlighted the contribution of the 
thesis to the literature. 
 
1.6	  Conclusion	  
 
This chapter contextualised this thesis within the literature on international 
cooperation, pointed out the gaps in the approach currently adopted by academic 
research to address the relationship between two levels of cooperation. It introduced 
the concept of level-linkage and the analytical approach adopted in this thesis in 
order to answer the question: Why the EU and Brazil were not able to use their 
dialogue at the bilateral level as a platform to enhance their cooperation at the 
multilateral arena?  
The next chapter (chapter two) provides an overview of EU-Brazil relations, 
setting the scene for the empirical analysis of level-linkage in the cases of climate 
change, trade, and human rights (chapters three, four and five). 
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CHAPTER	  2	  
European	  Union-­‐Brazil	  Relations:	  An	  Overview	  
 
 
2.1	  Introduction	  
 
The first chapter provided a theoretical and conceptual discussion of the interaction 
between bilateralism and multilateralism. It also formulated the idea of level-linkage, 
grounding the hypotheses of the thesis in the broad literature in International 
Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis. Against this background, the thesis now 
enters the domain of the relationship between its two protagonists: the European 
Union (EU) and Brazil.  
Relations between the two actors date back to the early days of European 
integration. Brazil was the first Latin American country to establish diplomatic ties 
with the European Communities,25 in May 1960.26 The following year, Brazil 
founded a diplomatic mission to the European Economic Community in Brussels, 
extending its domain to the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1963  (Brazilian Mission to the 
European Communities 2010).  Ever since, relations between the two partners have 
developed along an irregular path that combines moments of stagnation with periods 
of significant improvement. As a complex process, over the past five decades, the 
scope of cooperation evolved from being narrowly focused on a few areas to a broad 
agenda. The profile of their bilateral relationship has enhanced significantly, with the 
EU and Brazil currently defining their engagement as a “strategic partnership”.  
Aiming at the strengthening of bilateral cooperation on a wide-range of issues, 
                                                
25 The titles European Communities,European Community (EC) and European Union (EU) are used in 
accordance with appropriate usage in each of the periods discussed. The expression European Communities 
relates to the three Communities originating from the European integration process: European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) and the European Economic Community 
(EEC). In 1967, the institutional framework of the three Communities merged. From that period onwards, the 
term ‘European Community’ applies, until 1993, when the Treaty of Maastricht came into force, creating the 
European Union. 26 In 1960,the Brazilian Ambassador held an official meeting with the Commissioner in charge of External 
Relations, Jean Rey, formalising diplomatic relations between the European Communities and Brazil. 
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perhaps one of the most puzzling elements of this new framework is the strategy to 
promote a linkage between the development of EU-Brazil cooperation at the bilateral 
level and the other levels on which they engage. Particular emphasis has been placed 
on linking the bilateral and multilateral levels. Yet, as the case-studies that follow 
demonstrate, this process is not very straightforward. However, before assessing the 
success of this strategy, it is important to contextualise level-linkage in the 
framework of EU-Brazil relations.   
 With this in mind, this chapter offers a historical account of the development 
of this bilateral relationship, on a multi-level basis, providing key insights into the 
dynamic between the bilateral and multilateral levels of EU-Brazil cooperation.  For 
this purpose, this chapter is divided into four sections and a conclusion. Section one 
addresses the early stages of bilateral relations, conducted predominantly at the inter-
regional level of EU-Latin America and Caribbean cooperation, back in the 1960s. 
The second part of the chapter analyses the strengthening of cooperation at the 
bilateral level in the 1970s. Section three focuses on the sub-regional level, 
established with the creation of the Common Market of the Southern Cone 
(MERCOSUR) in 1991. The last section explores the current status of EU-Brazil 
relations, framed around the “strategic partnership”. The conclusion discusses the 
overall pattern of bilateral relations, on the basis of the four-level structure proposed 
in this chapter. It reveals a current trend towards the emphasis on cooperation at the 
bilateral level and at the multilateral level, supporting the choice of this thesis to 
explore level-linkage between these two levels of EU-Brazil engagement. 
 
2.2	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Relations:	  A	  Multilevel	  Framework	  
 2.2.1	  Setting	  the	  Scene:	  The	  structure	  of	  EU-­‐Brazil	  relations	  	  
 
As previously mentioned, the historical account of EU-Brazil relations that follows is 
structured around one of its interesting characteristics: a multi-level framework 
(figure 2). The analysis of this structure identifies four levels in which they 
  
 
70 
cooperate: 1) bilateral level; 2) sub-regional level; 3) inter-regional level; and 4) 
multilateral level.  The bilateral level is defined as being the direct relationship 
between the two actors, developed in isolation from any other structure. Cooperation 
at sub-regional level occurs in the “bloc-to-bloc” framework of EU-MERCOSUR 
relations. At this level, there is an indirect interaction between the EU and Brazil, as 
Brazilian interests are represented through MERCOSUR. The inter-regional level is 
framed under the EU-Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) cooperation. Although 
LAC countries tend to coordinate their approaches when engaging with the EU, each 
state of the region has autonomy to take part in this process individually. Thus, at the 
regional level, there is a direct interaction between the EU and Brazil, despite the 
large number of players. The fourth domain of cooperation, the multilateral level, 
comprises direct EU-Brazil bilateral engagement in multilateral institutions/fora, 
amidst a constellation of other parties. 
 FIGURE	  2	   EU-­‐BRAZIL	  BILATERAL	  RELATIONS	  –	  MULTILEVEL	  FRAMEWORK	  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
As figure 2 illustrates, these four levels could be considered “pieces of a 
puzzle” that, together, represent the overall framework of EU-Brazil relations. Yet 
the fact that cooperation at each level takes place concomitantly does not imply they 
are necessarily linked. Arguably, cooperation at these levels may occur in parallel, 
but in isolation from each other. Alternatively, they may be so intrinsically connected 
that development at one level has a direct impact on other levels. The scrutiny of the 
correlation between the different levels of cooperation provides important insight 
into understanding EU-Brazil relations in all of their complexity.  
BR EU 
Multilateral Level 
(Multilateral arena) 
 
Bilateral Level 
(one to one) 
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2.2.2	  The	  beginning:	  A	  Regional	  approach	  
 
The first European policies towards cooperation with Latin America and the 
Caribbean date back to the 1960s and were structured around a “one-size fits all” 
approach. Establishing contact groups and diplomatic ties in the continent, the 
interest of the European Communities (EC) was limited to forging a single, inter-
regional framework for engaging with all countries in the region (Ribeiro-Hoffman 
2004: 3). The lack of substantial achievement in cooperation that characterised the 
first decade of EU-LAC relations can be largely attributed to an almost-negligible 
interest in the region on the part of the EC.  
When the EC first established a common policy towards developing 
countries, they focused primarily on the African continent.27 This preference 
reflected the interests of some member states, particularly France and later also the 
UK, in pursuing closer ties with their former colonies.28 Moreover, Latin America 
was considered the “backyard” of the United States; the European Communities did 
not want to be perceived as interfering in the “sphere of influence” of its ally. 
Economic reasons also account for the EC’s weak interest in the region. During the 
1960s, Latin America already displayed a medium level of development. Thus, it 
was not considered underdeveloped enough to be the focus of European aid 
programmes, but it was also not sufficiently developed to be an interesting partner 
(Hoste 1999:1) In the 1960s, Latin America was in a political vacuum and, by 
default, European relations with Brazil were too.   
As this chapter makes clear, from this early stage, the relationship between 
the United States and Latin America played a pivotal role in shaping EU-LAC 
cooperation. And this was not a characteristic exclusive to European foreign policy; 
                                                
27   Relations between the EC and Africa were institutionalised by Yaoundé Conventions (1963 and 1969) agreed 
between the six EC member states and the group of Associated African States and Madagascar. These agreements 
were succeeded by the Lomé Convention (1975) signed between the EC and 46 Associated Countries, this time 
from three regions: Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (the ACP Countries). Renegotiated four times, the Lomé 
Convetion was replaced by the Cotonou Agreement (2000), into force until 2020 (Chisholm 2009: 10-
17)..Interestingly, Latin American and some Asian developing countries were left out of this framework and 
granted a status of ‘non-associated’ states (Piening: 1997: 120).  
28See Lister (1997) for a background on the early developments of EU relations with the South.  
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Brazil also oriented its foreign policy towards Europe on the basis of its engagement 
with the US.29  
Back in the 1960s, Brazil considered cooperation with Europe a matter of 
secondary importance. As Fagundes Vizentini argues, during the first half of the 20th 
century, the relationship with the United States was at the core of Brazilian foreign 
policy.  Politically, relations between Brasilia and Washington were never linear and 
responded to the ideological orientation of the different Brazilian governments. 
Internal political instability was reflected in different approaches towards the US, 
varying from passive dependence, to the pursuit of an alliance in equal terms, to a 
brief period of independence. Nevertheless, these different policies were grounded in 
the perception of economic gains from cooperation with the US that were vital to 
Brazilian development. Moreover, the establishment of a military regime in Brazil 
(1964-1985), arguably supported by the US, undermined the prospects of an 
“independent foreign policy” that emerged in the 1950s, subsequently elevating the 
prospects of the Brazil-USA alliance by the time relations with the European 
Community were established in 1960 (Fagundes Vizentini 2000).  
The decline of relations with the United States caused dissatisfaction amongst 
Latin American countries and exposed the weakness of their engagement with 
Europe. Yet, the distancing of the region from the US actually created political 
momentum for a rapprochement between Latin America and Europe. Nevertheless, 
the strengthening of this inter-regional level of EU-Brazil cooperation did not occur 
until the late 1960s.  
The main reason for the isolation of Latin America was that neither the US or 
Europe had a coherent strategy towards the region. During the Kennedy 
administration, the US government implemented the Alliance for Progress, aimed at 
promoting social and economic development in Latin America. With a strong 
political agenda, the project did not succeed. The defeat of the US’ plan was 
followed by the diminishing of financial aid and trade flows between Europe and 
Latin America.  
                                                
29 For a background on US-Brazil relations see Bandeira 2006, Hirst 2013a, Pecequilo 2012, and Smith 2010. 
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Concerned with the impact of eroding relations with the US on its economic 
development, Latin American governments united to change the course of this trend. 
In 1969, leaders of the region called a meeting of the Special Latin American Co-
ordinating Committee (CECLA) to discuss cooperation with the United States. The 
final declaration of the summit, the Viña del Mar Consensus, included an explicit 
request for President Richard Nixon to redefine US relations with the region. 
The Latin American initiative to strengthen ties with the US awoke the 
interest of Europe in the region. In July 1969, the European Commission sent an 
internal report to the Council of the European Community, expressing concerns with 
the development of relations with Latin America. Perceiving this movement as an 
opportunity, members of CECLA gathered again in 1970, this time to discuss 
external relations with the European Community. The outcome of the meeting, the 
Buenos Aires Declaration, documented the dissatisfaction of Latin American 
governments over their disadvantageous position vis-a-vis other regions in European 
trade policy and the precarious status of inter-regional relations. In reaction to both 
the European Commission’s report and Buenos Aires Declaration, the European 
Council agreed on the adoption of a permanent mechanism of cooperation with the 
region in 1970,the “Brussels Dialogue” (Muniz 1980: 57-58). 
During the 1970s, the key European strategy continued to be a platform for 
inter-regional dialogue. The meetings of the “Brussels Dialogue”, attended by the 
European Community and the Group of Latin American Ambassadors in Brussels 
(GRULAC), became more regular. Additionally, an inter-parliamentary dialogue 
between the two regions was established, in 1974. Nevertheless, not all European 
states considered the enhancement of political dialogue as a sufficient strategy for 
cooperation with the region. Responding to internal pressure from certain members, 
in particular Germany and Italy, with a growing interest in particular countries in the 
region, the “one size fits all” policy had to be rethought. The European Community 
accordingly developed a “selective approach” to its bilateral relations, favouring 
bilateral agreements with countries that were either major trade partners of the US, or 
which European countries had long-standing relations with (Muniz 1980: 59). 
From the Brazilian perspective, the 1970s also witnessed increased interest in 
cooperation with the European Community. The first strong sign of a turning point in 
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that direction was the adoption of a foreign policy known as “responsible 
pragmatism”, in 1974.30 The rationale behind this strategy consisted of pursuing the 
enhancement of Brazil’s profile in international politics and the promotion of rapid 
economic development. Becoming more flexible in regards to international 
alignments, Brazil opted for positions that it considered “less ideologically 
motivated”. In the quest for autonomy and development, the economic recovery in 
Europe and the strengthening of bilateral relations with some European states were 
perceived as an opportunity for Brazil to diversify its external trade relations. 
Moreover, from this point onwards, Brazil understood that the strengthening of 
cooperation with the European Community offered bargaining power in its 
engagement with the US. As this chapter demonstrates, Brazil has employed the 
“European card” on several occasions when negotiating with the US.31 
In light of this, the foreign policies of Brazil and the EU both converged 
around the strategic interest of the parties in fostering their cooperation. As a result, 
bilateral relations between the EC and Brazil improved dramatically in the 1970s. 
 2.2.3	  Going	  bilaterally,	  but	  not	  only	  	  
 
The combining of the interest of the parties in strengthening their bilateral 
relationship and the pursuit of new external economic opportunities placed trade and 
economic issues as the high priority for EC/EU-Brazil relations.32 Adopted in 1974, 
the first bilateral commercial agreement addressed mainly the agricultural sector, 
especially on trade of cocoa butter and soluble coffee. Four years later, the EC and 
                                                
30 For more on responsible pragmatism in the Brazilian Foreign Policy, see Ligiéro (2011) and Prado Mendonça 
& Miyamoto (2011). 
31 Relations with the US remain highly important to Brazil until the present time.  For a comprehensive overview 
of Brazil-US cooperation from the end of the Cold War until the first term of Lula’s government, see Hirst 
(2013).  For an American view on this relationship see Meyer (2010). For a general discussion on US-Brazil, also 
see Bandeira (2006). 
32The first agreement between Brazil and the European Communities is the Cooperation Agreement on Peaceful 
Application of Nuclear Energy, signed with the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), in 1961. 
Yet, this was an isolated initiative. For nearly 15 years, bilateral relations lacked instruments of cooperation 
between the partners in any other area. 
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Brazil reached a textile agreement in 1978 (European Commission 1982). Aiming 
essentially at regulating bilateral trade in these goods, the two accords were 
associated with multilateral trade rules. The textile agreement, for instance, was 
negotiated in connection with the process of renewal of the Multi-fibre Arrangement 
within the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT). This is evidence that, 
from the beginning, there were signs that the EU and Brazil had tried to develop the 
bilateral level of their cooperation in coordination with the multilateral level. Yet, as 
this chapter demonstrates, the correlation between the two levels only became a 
central point in EU-Brazil relations several decades later. 
 Moreover, the fact that bilateral cooperation was mainly restricted to trade 
suggests that the strengthening of the bilateral level of EU-Brazil relations in the 
1970s was largely motivated by material interests. At that time, Brazil was already 
the biggest market in Latin America for European trade and investments. Europe, on 
the other hand, was the main destination for Brazilian exports and the biggest foreign 
investor in the country, as indicated in the tables below:  
TABLE	  6	   EUROPEAN	  COMMUNITY	  (EC9)	  TRADE	  WITH	  BRAZIL	  (MI	  ECU)	  
Year 1974 1976 1978 1980 
Imports 1978 2275 3048 4134 
Exports 1447 2617 2117 2535 
Balance -531 +342 -931 -1599 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1982) 
 TABLE	  7	   FOREIGN	  DIRECT	  INVESTMENT	  AND	  REINVESTMENT	  IN	  BRAZIL	  (MI	  USD)	  
Year 1961-70 1971-75 1980 
EC 768 1490 559 
Japan 109 830 111 
Switzerland 257 614 280 
USA 692 1596 436 
Source: Commission of the European Communities (1982) 
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Thus interested in broadening the scope of trade cooperation, the EC and Brazil 
opened negotiations on a replacement to the 1974 Trade Agreement in 1980. The 
New Framework Agreement for Cooperation was launched in 1982. As a 
comprehensive instrument, the new accord established that commercial and 
economic cooperation between the partners should be grounded on three core pillars: 
a) an emphasis on technological cooperation; b) the commitment of both parties to 
make an effort to reduce their non-tariff barriers; and c) the creation of a joint 
committee to follow the development of this cooperation. 
 Despite further institutionalisation, in the early 1980s the level of EC-Brazil 
financial and trade exchanges plummeted, compromising the future of bilateral 
relations between the two partners. This contraction was registered in all economic 
relations between the EC and Latin America and was caused by internal crises in 
both European and Latin American countries. 
 In the case of Brazil, the main reason for the weakening of cooperation on 
trade and investments with the EC was the end of the period known as the “economic 
miracle” that extended from 1969 to 1979. As Almeida points out, the first economic 
policy of the military regime (1964-1985) aimed at promoting rapid internal 
economic growth. Despite surprising success in the first years of its implementation, 
the national development programme proved unsustainable in the long term and 
vulnerable to externalities (Almeida 2007). Adding to the poor domestic policy, the 
world economy’s recession that followed the oil crises in the 1970s created a 
breaking point for Latin America, Brazil was not an exception. The increase in the 
world’s interest rates and the decline of Brazil’s external trade flows reflected in the 
balance of payments and significantly raised the foreign debt. As a result, the 
Brazilian economy collapsed. The country went into deep recession, confronting a 
long period of inflationary pressure and financial crisis known as the “lost decade” 
(Paiva de Abreu 2004).  
While Brazil was undergoing a major economic crisis, the European 
Community was facing political challenges, partially as a repercussion of the 1970s 
international crisis. Facing rampant unemployment, rising inflation and stagnant 
growth, the weakening economy forced member states to act together in addressing 
the crisis (Dinan 2004: 7). Internal EC policies were under review and there was 
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pressure from member states for structural reforms in the institutions and instruments 
of regional cooperation. Domestic policies were at the top of the European agenda 
(Saraiva 2004: 8). Moreover, in the 1980s European foreign policy reversed its 
progressive course of engagement with Latin America. The Falklands war between 
the UK and Argentina (1982) had severe implications for EC-Latin American 
relations. Whereas the EC supported Britain on the adoption of economic sanctions 
against its rival, Latin American countries supported Argentina. Political tensions 
between the two regions were such that meetings of the Brussels Dialogue were even 
suspended (Hoste 1999: 2). Furthermore, with the fall of the Berlin Wall, Central and 
Eastern Europe became the key priority of European foreign policy. If cooperation 
with Latin America had never been a main concern, the crisis in the region and the 
new priorities of the EC were sufficient to classify Latin America as a matter of 
“secondary external importance” for Europe (Saraiva 2004:8).  
Together, the economic crisis in Brazil and the political distancing of the EC 
from Latin America were responsible for the fading EC- Brazil bilateral relationship.  
 2.2.4	  Combining	  bilateral	  and	  regional	  cooperation	  
 
The renewed European interest in the region by the end of the 1980s was motivated 
by both political and economic reasons. Diminishing tensions in the Cold War 
allowed Europe to play a greater political role in the region that had thus far been 
considered mainly a domain of US foreign policy. The EC engaged in further 
political dialogue and development assistance programmes in LAC, directly 
contributing to the resolution of conflicts in Central America through the San José 
Process, in 1984 (Bretherton and Vogler 2003: 130). 33 
The EC strategy to use instruments of political and economic assistance to 
resolve the crisis, especially in Nicaragua, contrasted with the US interest in a 
                                                
33 In 1984 the European Commission institutionalised an interregional political dialogue with the Contadora 
Group (constituted of Latin American countries, mainly from Central America) to deal with political crises within 
the region and in 1987 a political dialogue with the Rio Group was also formalised (Ribeiro-Hoffman, 2004:5-6). 
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military intervention and was essential to guarantee a peaceful resolution to the 
conflict. This success resulted in the reorientation of the European foreign policy 
towards the whole region (Smith 1995: 106). 
The revitalization of relations between the two regions was formalized with 
the Declaration of Rome between the Rio Group and the EC, in 1990. Aiming at 
political stability in Latin America, the document represents the shared commitment 
to the respect of democracy and the rule of law. The Declaration also stated the EC’s 
support for regional integration processes in Latin America, thus bringing a new 
element to EC- LAC political dialogue.  
The concern in engaging with the region could be perceived as part of the 
EC’s interest in acquiring international prestige as an “interest-free” interlocutor. The 
crises in Central America were also an opportunity for the EC to exercise its capacity 
to forge a common policy for a conflict zone.34 Moreover, as Hostle concludes, 
“there was nothing to lose; there was a lot to gain since Central America could 
become a gateway for the entire Latin American continent...and it did” (Hoste 
1999:4).  
Another important political reason, and perhaps the most important one, was 
the accession of Portugal and Spain to the European Community in 1986. When the 
two countries joined the EC it was expected that they would request the same 
treatment for their former colonies as France and the UK had done. In fact, their 
Accession Treaty was complemented with a declaration of intention from the 
European Community regarding further development of European relations with 
Latin America (Santander 2001: 526).  
Economic factors were also relevant. Latin America was already a large 
market for consumer goods with significant growth forecast, therefore a great 
destination for European exports of manufactured products. Additionally, the region 
also had a consolidated role as a global supplier of mineral goods. More imports for 
Europe would benefit the trade balance of Latin American countries, while at the 
                                                
34 According to Piening (1997:126)“The San Jose process remains one of the earliest and most successful 
instances of European Political Cooperation and is all the more noteworthy for having preceded by almost two 
years the subsequent institutionalization of the EPC in 1986 under Title III of the Single European Act”.  
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same time representing an alternative to the EC’s deep dependence on African 
supplies (Hoste 1999: 2).   
The EC/EU’s approach towards Latin American countries, including Brazil, 
could also be considered an attempt to promote Europe’s role as a “civilian power” 
(Freres 2000: 64). From this perspective, strategies to promote regional stability and 
consolidate democracy can be seen as instruments to disseminate European values to 
the world (Carranza 2004: 8). In the words of Grugel (2002), “the EU has used Latin 
America to demonstrate variously its “civilian power” status, as a platform of market 
expansion, and to strengthen its role as an international actor”. Young (2002: 111-
112) believes that the scope and the effectiveness of European foreign policy towards 
the region represents a chance to assess the EU’s capacity to exert global influence, 
going far beyond its borders. 
Saraiva (2004: 16) argues that the pursuit of formal inter-regional cooperation 
with Latin America fits in with a European strategy to enhance its actorness. This 
explains, at least in part, the motivation to increase political dialogue with the region 
even when there was no clear European foreign policy towards Latin America. 
Moreover, such strategy denotes the perception of shifts in world politics towards 
multipolarity. The EU then considered it important to engage with actors that were 
gaining prominence in international affairs.  
As Almeida (2007: 5-8) notes, after the re-democratization process that ended 
a twenty year military regime (1964-1985), Brazil continued to pursue its aspiration 
to become a global player. The country maintained the strategy of promoting its 
interests through multilateral mechanisms. Following the trends in international 
politics, this strategy was then reconciled with engagement in a regional integration 
process. Interested in enhancing cooperation with other countries in the region, 
Brazil concluded several agreements and protocols with its neighbours. The 
objective was not only to strengthen bilateral ties but also to advance forms of 
regional cooperation. For this purpose, in 1988, Brazil celebrated a bilateral 
agreement with Argentina in which the parties agreed to establish a single market in 
the region within ten years.  
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During the 1990s Brazil promoted structural changes mainly in the economic 
realm. The “import substitution” model that had so far protected Brazil’s domestic 
industry from international competition was replaced by a market-opening strategy. 
Grounded on the guidelines of the Washington Consensus, the new political 
orientation promoted economic reforms based on privatizations, market liberalisation 
and the diminishing role of the State in the economy (Almeida 2007:5-8).   
As a democracy again, Brazilian foreign policy kept the focus in promoting 
more trade and investment opportunities for its market, in order to achieve national 
economic development (Hirst and Pinheiro 1995: 6-7). Brazil continued to pursue its 
longstanding goal of projecting its identity as a “global player”.35In order to achieve 
this goal, it was important to disassociate the country with its image as merely a 
regional player. Thus, Brazil considered it crucial to foster its relationship with 
partners from other regions, including Europe. The new opportunities created 
byeconomic and market liberalisation in Brazil were appealing to the European 
Union.    
As a result of their mutual interest in strengthening bilateral ties, in 1992 the 
European Commission and Brazil signed a new Framework Agreement for 
Cooperation, replacing the 1982 Agreement. The document extended bilateral 
cooperation to areas beyond trade, also covering energy, mining, environment, 
intellectual property, industry, investments and economic and social policies. 
Additionally, it institutionalised an EC-Brazil joint committee to ensure the 
coordination of the development of cooperation in all these realms. Considered a 
“third generation agreement”, in EU jargon, the accord included clauses on the 
observance of democratic principles and a future development clause, the latter 
allowing for the parties to mutually agree on extending the level of cooperation 
                                                
35 The main foreign policy goal of the Collor de Mello government (1990-92), was to promote Brazil to the “first 
world” and grant it the status of a “developed country” (Almeida 2007) and the end of the Cold War was seen as 
an opportunity to enhance North-South cooperation (Hirst and Pinheiro 1995: 6-7). Involved in a corruption 
scheme, Collor resigned only two years after the beginning of his term, to avoid being impeached. The following 
government of Franco (1992-1994) saw continuity in two key elements of the previous administration: the 
implementation of liberal reforms and engagement in regional integration. Hence, this time Brazil made a clear 
choice to privilege its relations with South America. The objective of strengthening its ties in the region was 
pursued as a way to establish a sphere of influence in South America, in order to increase its international role 
and reduce the sphere of influence of the US.  It was with scepticism that Franco agreed on the opening of 
negotiations for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), in contrast with the interest of many other countries, 
especially Argentina (Mello 2002: 39). 
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through the creation of new instruments or the broadening of its scope.36 The 
Framework Agreement came into force in 1995 and remains one of the preeminent 
legal bases for EU-Brazilian cooperation.  2.2.5	   The	   emergence	   of	   MERCOSUR:	   the	   sub-­‐regional	   level	   of	  cooperation	  
 
Overcoming political rivalry, Argentina and Brazil agreed to revitalise their relations, 
embarking on a process of economic integration in the late 1980s. The idea spread to 
other neighbours in the region, namely Paraguay and Uruguay.  The four countries 
agreed to establish the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), 
signing the Treaty of Asunción, in March 1991.37 Three year later, the Protocol of 
Ouro Preto granted legal personality and institutional arrangement to the bloc 
(Malamud 2005: 1-2).38 The creation of MERCOSUR set up a new platform for EU-
Brazil cooperation: the sub-regional level. 
 As expected, the EU closely followed the birth of regional integration in 
South America. Yet, its interest in MERCOSUR was shared by the United States. In 
1990, the US launched the Enterprise for Americas Initiative (EAI), aimed at 
reinforcing relations with Latin America. As a development of the EAI, the US 
proposed the Rose Garden Agreement to MERCOSUR, signed in June 1991. 
Creating new economic opportunities for both partners, the “4+1 Agreement”, as it is 
known, established mechanisms of consultation on trade and defined guarantees to 
foreign direct investments (Santander 2001: 528). 
 Similarly to on previous occasions, the deepening of US relations with Latin 
America, and especially with MERCOSUR, reflected in the EU’s engagement with 
                                                
36 The list of other ‘third generation agreements’ concluded by the EU with third parties is wide and includes: 
Argentina and Bolivia (1990), Chile (1990, 1996 and 2002), Mexico (1991 and 1997), Venezuela and Uruguay 
(1991) and Paraguay (1992), amongst others (Ribeiro-Hoffman 2004:7). 
37 The Treaty also established the four elements that would constitute the basis of this process:  1) free circulation 
of goods, services and factors of production; 2) a common tariff and trade policy; 3) macroeconomic and sectoral 
policies, and 4)  harmonised domestic legislation (Malamud 2005:1). 
38 In spite of its institutionalisation and the granting of its legal personality, the objective to create a single market 
was not accomplished. MERCOSURis still only a customs union (Malamud 2005:2).  
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the region.  In April 1991, leaders of MERCOSUR met with the European 
Commission for the first time to discuss the prospects of an agreement between the 
two regional groups. After nearly one year of negotiations, the MERCOSUR Council 
and the European Commission signed the Inter-Institutional Cooperation Agreement, 
in May 1992. The deal aimed to promote technical and institutional assistance from 
the EU in the development of the integration process in South America. Furthermore, 
the Agreement paved the way to the adoption of joint programmes and the discussion 
of inter-regional cooperation in several fields. Nevertheless, with an emphasis on 
political cooperation, the EU and MERCOSUR still required an instrument with 
which to foster their economic relations.  
 In order for this sub-regional level of cooperation to develop, the EU needed 
the support of its member states. Thus, in 1994, the European Commission delivered 
a Communication to the Council and the European Parliament (EP) stressing the 
importance of the strengthening relations with MERCOSUR as a foreign policy 
priority (European Commission 1994). The Communication argued that this was the 
case for both economic and political reasons. By 1994, the European Community 
was already the main trading partner of MERCOSUR, whereas the four members of 
the regional organisation accounted for around 70% of all European foreign direct 
investment in Latin America. Furthermore, MERCOSUR represented a market with 
great potential for growth. The promising futures of the economies within the bloc 
created opportunities for European businesses. On this basis, the European 
Commission argued to the Council and the EP that a trade agreement with 
MERCOSUR could consolidate EU’s position as the major supplier of industrial and 
capital goods to the region. Political motivations given for the development of these 
sub-regional relations were essentially threefold. Firstly, engaging with 
MERCOSUR would be part of the EU’s longstanding support for democratic 
systems. Secondly, in sharing experiences of regional integration processes, the EU 
would be setting an example to MERCOSUR, disseminating its own model of 
integration to the world. Finally, closer relations with the bloc would meet “the 
desire of these countries to maintain a balance in their relations with the United 
States and Europe” (European Commission 1994).  
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The European Commission’s justification of this last political reason is, at 
least, interesting. The discourse endorsed in the Communication opted to frame the 
need for further engagement with MERCOSUR as (almost) an act of solidarity that 
would hinder the prospects of a hegemonic US presence in the region. Yet, what the 
document did not emphasise were the risks that enhanced MERCOSUR-US 
economic ties posed to the bloc’s accessing of the European market. 
Nevertheless, the economic and political arguments raised by the European 
Commission seemed compelling. The Council of the European Union responded to 
the Communication, authorising the launching of a new deal with the regional bloc. 
Concluded in 1995, the EC-MERCOSUR agreement came into force four years later, 
in 1999. With emphasis on trade and economic issues, the accord created a 
consultation mechanism, envisaging the reciprocal liberalisation of trade between the 
two markets. In addition, the new instrument of cooperation aimed at enhancing 
political dialogue between the partners. 
Meunier and Nicolaidis posit that the pursuit of a commercial agreement with 
MERCOSUR was an expression of the EU’s “trade power” (Meunier and Nicolaidis 
2006: 910-912). Under this approach, trade relations could be considered an 
instrument used by the EU to promote non-trade related goals, such as geopolitical 
power for example. Additionally, in establishing trade agreements with third parties, 
the EU would be disseminating its own norms to the world, creating an international 
environment more favourable for the promotion of its interests. In the same line of 
thought, Carranza claims that “a successful EU-MERCOSUR free trade area would 
demonstrate that the EU can have a common foreign policy as a global player” 
(Carranza 2004:15). Thus, there were both material and normative incentives for the 
EU to strengthen its cooperation with the bloc. 
More critical interpretations consider that the interest in counterweighing the 
US’ dominance over Latin America is another factor involved in the push for closer 
relations between the two regions. As Karen Smith argues, “the EU’s support for 
regional groupings in Latin America must be seen in the light of US policy in Latin 
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America and its proposal for a free-trade agreement of the Americas [FTAA]” 
(2003:80).39 
From the viewpoint of MERCOSUR, an association agreement with the EU 
was important for many reasons. Firstly, the two regions have undeniable historical 
and cultural ties (Grugel 2007: 48). Secondly, the EU is the main trading partner of 
MERCOSUR and the biggest investor in the region.  
TABLE	  8	   	   	   EU	  TRADE	  WITH	  MERCOSUR	  (MI	  ECU/EURO)	  
 1980 1990 2001 
 Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports 
Volume 7,728 5,944 14,083 5,715 24,320 24,177 
Trade Balance -1,784 -8,368 -143 
Share of EU total 2.8 % 2.8% 3.2% 1.4% 2.4% 2.5% 
Share of MERCOSUR 
total 
28% 28.3% 56% 15.8% 24.2% 25.9% 
Source: European Commission (2001) 
 
Thirdly, the European regional integration process was considered a model of 
success. MERCOSUR was very interested in learning from Europe’s experience and 
acquiring the EU’s contribution to its own institutional and political framework 
(Bajo 1999: 929-933). Finally, an alliance with Europe would increase 
MERCOSUR’s bargaining power in negotiations with the United States (Klom 2003: 
352). 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy to observe that, as Carranza stresses, 
MERCOSUR’s cooperation with the EU was envisaged as counterweight to the US’s 
presence in the region, rather than as an opportunity for the eventual break-up of 
their special relations with Washington. Therefore, the bloc engaged in a double 
strategy, concurrently negotiating free trade agreements with both the US and the 
EU, using the “European card” to gain concessions at FTAA negotiations on many 
occasions(Carranza 2004: 7).  
                                                
39 See Roett (1999). 
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Formally, this strategy translated into the development of two parallel 
processes of negotiations with the US and the EU. However, as Bajo argues, inside 
the bloc opinions diverged over which agreement should be prioritised. A “division 
of labour” to follow negotiations indicated individual preferences of the parties. 
Whereas Argentina had a key role in the negotiations with the US, Brazil was the 
lead in talks with the EU (Bajo 1999:933). 
As this chapter has stressed, Brazilian foreign policy has long been geared 
towards the United States; the establishment of a sub-regional level of cooperation 
with the EU through MERCOSUR represented a change in this pattern. According to 
Calgagnotto, Brazil perceived relations with the US as either a stumbling block or a 
building block in its aspirations to become a global power. In the case of negotiations 
of the FTAA, Brazil feared that a deal could lead to a hegemonic presence of the US 
in the region. Moreover, there were concerns over the conclusion of an unbalanced 
agreement that would favour the US market. The EU-MERCOSUR accord was 
considered as an alternative solution, which would enhance the profile of the bloc in 
international affairs whilst posing fewer risks to Brazil’s affluence as an emerging 
power. Nevertheless, it soon became very clear that reaching a EU-MERCOSUR 
free trade agreement would not be a smooth process (Calgagnotto 2008:114).  
As Andy Klom describes, a pre-negotiation period took place from 1996 to 
1999, consisting of two phases. Lasting for two years, the first phase focused on the 
detailed assessment of the content and impact of an agreement between the EU and 
MERCOSUR. The second phase was dedicated to internal debate on the agenda of 
each partner. Negotiations were formally launched in the margins of the European 
Union, Latin America and the Caribbean Summit (EU-LAC) Summit in Rio de 
Janeiro, in 1999(Klom 2003). According to Arenas, in the same year, the 
Cooperation Council, created to discuss the implementation of the 1995 Agreement 
at ministerial level, established the Bi-regional Negotiation Committee. The body 
was responsible for defining the steps and a schedule for the negotiations of the 
Inter-regional Association Agreement (Arenas 2002:6). The Committee had a very 
broad agenda and an intense schedule of activities. Between 1999 and 2003, ten 
meetings on economic issues were held. Yet there were no substantial achievements 
  
 
86 
made (Saraiva 2004: 13). From 2004 onwards, the pace of negotiations on an 
agreement between the two blocs dramatically faltered. 
The failure to reach an agreement had many causes. According to Mahrurk 
Doctor, since the negotiations of the Free Trade Area of the Americas finished 
without an agreement, there was no longer a “threat” of US hegemonic dominance 
over the Latin America (Doctor 2007: 290-293). As such, the European Union 
gained time in which to rethink its market access strategy in the region. Similarly for 
MERCOSUR, a deal with the EU was no longer an instrument of bargaining power 
with the US. For both sides, the geopolitical dimension of the EU-MERCOSUR 
trade agreement lost some importance.  
From an economic perspective, the partners faced internal resistance from 
some interest groups which opposed an agreement. Opposition in MERCOSUR 
came from manufacturing and services sectors that feared open competition from 
European companies. In the EU, the agricultural sector condemned liberalisation in 
the European market and lobbied against an agreement. Before advancing with 
negotiations, the parties needed to reach internal compromise on an agenda for 
negotiations that would go on to be accepted by all domestic players. 
 Adding to this complexity, both regions had to consider their integration 
processes, diminishing the emphasis they placed on inter-regional cooperation. 
MERCOSUR was going through a period of instability, caused by economic crises 
and a lack of political consensus amongst its members on advancing the integration 
process, all of which had cast doubt over the future of the bloc. Meanwhile, the EU’s 
attention turned to “domestic” issues, such as the implementation of the monetary 
union and the enlargement processes.  
Interestingly, however, negotiations were never abandoned. Declaring the 
prospects of an agreement as dead would have had high political and economic costs. 
EU-MERCOSUR negotiations were developed observing WTO rules and norms, and 
in parallel with Doha Round. Progress in one level of negotiations had direct impact 
in the other. An eventual multilateral agreement would grant the EU and 
MERCOSUR more access to each other’s market. Yet, in the uncertainty of a 
successful conclusion of the Doha Round, a bi-regional agreement would be an 
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alternative, to promote similar trade opportunities for the two parties. It was 
opportune to keep EU-MERCOSUR negotiations as an option. Discussions on a deal 
were then placed on hold (Doctor 2007: 290-293). Whilst the development of 
bilateral cooperation between the EU and Brazil at a sub- regional level stagnated, a 
new strategy was needed.  
 2.2.6	  New	  Strategy:	  Bilateralism	  for	  Multilateralism	  
  
In the new millennium, EU-Brazil relations changed dramatically, both in terms of 
scope and approach. As this section demonstrates, breaking with the traditional 
model under which Europe acted primarily as the sponsor of projects in Brazil, the 
two actors reframed their engagement as an “equal partnership”. Under a new 
framework, cooperation was strengthened and extended to new areas. Enhancing the 
profile of their bilateral relations, the EU and Brazil adopted an innovative strategy 
of promoting linkages between the four arenas of their multi-level framework of 
cooperation. The bilateral level was as such conceived of as a platform for the 
promotion of enhanced relations between the EU and Brazil at other levels. Another 
defining characteristic of the current framing of bilateral relations is the emphasis on 
its multilateral dimension. Multilateralism has become a central element of EU-
Brazil relations.  
The reasons for the re-framing of EU-Brazil relations under these new terms 
were both economic and political. Prompted by domestic and international changes, 
there were material and cognitive elements to the decision of the two parties to adopt 
a more “strategic” approach to their bilateral relations. 
 The aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks led to the establishment of 
new priorities within the global agenda; security issues became the main area of 
concern. Under the presidency of George W. Bush, US foreign policy shifted from 
having a multilateral, to a unilateral, emphasis. The decision of Washington, together 
with some of its allies, to undertake a war in Iraq without the consent of the UN 
Security Council, cast a shadow on the future of multilateralism. The lack of support 
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to international organisations was not an isolated US policy.40 The resistance of some 
key actors, including the US, to ratify international agreements, such as the Kyoto 
Protocol, and even the International Criminal Court, all suggested that 
multilateralism was “under challenge” (Newman et al. 2006:2).41 The diminishing 
importance attributed to multilateralism was not consensual. There were important 
players that engaged in a sort of “rescue mission” to help restore confidence in 
multilateralism.  
Perceiving an alleged “crisis” of multilateralism, the EU and Brazil re-framed 
their foreign policies, emphasising their support for international organisations and 
other multilateral forms of cooperation. The compatibility of these approaches 
created a new opportunity for the EU and Brazil to strengthen bilateral relations 
around prospects of their joint promotion of multilateralism. Evidently, such interest 
was not spurred by pure altruistic behaviour, but from the combination of a belief in 
multilateralism as a legitimate principle by which to organise international relations 
and the perception of opportunities for both actors to increase their presence in 
international affairs. 
 For Brazil, the new international order created the conditions for the country 
to become a more active player in the multilateral arena. Even if not yet recognised 
as being a “great power”, the weight of Brazil within the global economy elevated 
the status of the country to that of an “emerging power”. This new status granted 
Brazil the respect and the political weight it needed to enhance its relevance as an 
international actor and, consequently, exercise greater influence in the international 
system (Hurrell 2010: 61).  
Changes in the international context coincided with the beginning of 
President Lula’s government (2003-2010), and marked a turning point in Brazil’s 
foreign policy. The strategy of “autonomy through participation” that characterised 
                                                
40 For an interesting discussion on the shifts in the US approach to multilateralism, see Ikenberry (2003). 
41The ICC has not been ratified by many other players, including China and Russia. Moreover, a number of 
international arms control treaties and conventions “are being eroded, including the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty 
and the Non-Proliferation Treaty” (Newman et.al. 2006:2). 
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the previous government of Cardoso (1995-2002) was replaced by the concept of 
“autonomy through diversification”, which combined enhanced bilateral relations 
with multilateral cooperation. Yet, more than simply embracing the existing model 
of multilateral governance, Brazil’s primary interest was to restructure and reinforce 
it. In contrast to Cardoso’s “moderate” approach, Lula’s administration perceived 
multilateralism as being an instrument central to the defence of national sovereignty 
and promotion of equality amongst states (Vigevani and Cepaluni 2007:8-9). 
In light of this, Brazil embraced what might be called “reciprocal 
multilateralism”, defined by two main characteristics: a) the existence of rules to 
ensure a fair and equal engagement of all the parties; and b) the contribution of all 
international actors in the agreement of these rules (Cervo 2010: 11). Since Lula, 
Brazilian foreign policy has supported the establishment of different forms of 
multilateral groupings, such as the financial G20, and has called for the reform of 
multilateral institutions to better accommodate the current balance of power (Hurrell 
2010: 62).  
Efforts to attribute a “universalist” scope to Brazilian foreign policy 
translated into fostering cooperation at all levels. Brazil turned its attention to forging 
south-south cooperation efforts and investing in old and new processes of regional 
integration (Amorim 2010: 226).  
Yet, it is important to consider that, if the new -and current -Brazilian foreign 
policy does not prioritise relations with the EU over those with other partners, 
reinforcing engagement with the EU is strategically important. In order to become 
more than a regional power, Brazil needs to be welcome amongst the key global 
players. Reinforcing relations with the EU was motivated by economic and trade 
reasons, but also suited Brazil’s interest in acquiring the internal legitimacy of its 
ascendance as a rising power. As Lima and Hirst posit, “the country has 
demonstrated a clear intention of wanting to expand the roles that it plays and the 
responsibilities that it assumes in regional politics, in Third World agendas and in 
multilateral institutions” (Lima and Hirst 2006: 21). Thus, even if bilateral 
cooperation with the EU does not appear to be a top-priority in the Brazilian foreign 
policy of the Lula government, strengthening relations with the EU at the multilateral 
level can be considered a strategic move used to achieve Brazil’s goal of reinforcing 
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its relevance in the multilateral arena.42 
Yet, whereas Brazil considers itself an important part of multilateralism, the 
EU believes itself to be a “model” of multilateral cooperation. Thus, the promotion 
of multilateralism is a way of disseminating the EU’s own “way of life” (Groom 
2009: 460), and, therefore, it is deeply rooted in European foreign policy. The degree 
to which the EU is considered an example of multilateralism varies. For John 
Ikenberry “the European Union is the most important manifestation of (this) 
sovereignty-transferring, legally binding multilateralism” (Ikenberry 2003: 535). 
These views converge on the opinion that “the EU is an organization whose 
governance structure is characterized by multilateralism. This reflects not only its 
inner European multilateral process, but its external orientation” (Kirchner 2011: 16).  
Additionally, another determining factor in the EU’s attachment to 
multilateralism is the foreign policies of its 28 member states. Largely represented, in 
several international organisations, most of the EU’s members have a long history of 
engagement with multilateralism and play a pivotal role in multilateral institutions 
and fora.43 The transposition of these individual preferences to the regional level had 
direct implications for the shaping of European foreign policy orientated towards 
multilateralism similar to that practised by EU members. 
The EU’s commitment to multilateralism has followed the development of 
European foreign policy and the outlining of its objectives. According to Karen 
Smith, back in 1988, the European Council attributed competences related to 
multilateral institutions and global governance to the Commission, including 
promoting human rights, strengthening the role of the United Nations and preserving 
international peace and security, among others. In the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, the 
spread of EU values and principles and the promotion of international cooperation 
were set out as objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. (Smith 2003: 
                                                
42 For further discussion on Brazil as an emerging power, see Almeida (2007),Herz (2011), Hurrell (2010) and 
O'Neil (2010).   
 
43For	  example,	  France	  and	  the	  UK	  are	  permanent	  members	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council.	  	  France	  Germany,	  Italy	  and	  the	  UK	  are	  also	  party	  to	  the	  G8. 
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11-13).  Moreover, norms and rules on democracy and human rights have been at the 
core of the political conditionality the EU attaches to its agreements with third 
parties (Smith 1998: 253). Yet, even if it was incorporating multilateral issues into its 
agenda and aiming at promoting “universal” values and norms, it was only from the 
2000s onwards that the term “multilateralism” was explicitly mentioned in official 
documents of the European Union. 
The alleged “crisis of multilateralism” of the early 2000s placed the EU at a 
crossroads. Failing to reach a common position amongst its members on how to 
address the Iraq war, the EU needed a plan for restoring its capacity to forge a 
European foreign policy. In addition, with “multilateralism under challenge”, the EU 
felt compelled to respond. The result of the combining of these factors was the 
launching of the European Security Strategy (ESS), in 2003. 
As a benchmark for a better defined European foreign policy, the Strategy 
adopted three objectives for European external action: (1) addressing security threats; 
(2) building security in the neighbourhood; and (3) an international order based on 
“effective multilateralism” (European Council 2003). Therefore, since the ESS, the 
promotion of “effective multilateralism” has been officially considered as a 
European goal. Interestingly, the EU attributed a new adjective to the term, but did 
not propose an innovative approach to multilateralism. Even if the expression has 
been incorporated into the official discourse and documents of the European Union, 
the term has never been formally conceptualised. The elements that define 
multilateralism as “effective” according to the EU remain unclear. 
In an attempt to unveil this issue, Biscop argued that “effective 
multilateralism” could be understood as “the development of a stronger international 
society, well-functioning international institutions and rules-based international 
order” (Biscop 2004: 27). This definition suggests that the EU is actually not 
proposing any new model of multilateralism; rather it suggests the fostering of 
current mechanisms and principles of multilateral cooperation. Lacking in detail, the 
ESS established three core actions under which the EU would disseminate “effective 
multilateralism”: (a) promote of the rule of law; (b) strengthen of the role of 
international institutions, with greater emphasis on the UN; and (c) contribute to 
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global governance. The UN system is placed at the core of EU’s “effective 
multilateralism” (European Council 2003). 
The emphasis on international organisations (IOs) is not a novelty. Over the 
past few decades, the EU has significantly increased its presence in international 
organisations. Arguably, the EU is present in all organisations of which any of its 28 
member states is part. But its direct participation is limited to a small number of 
institutions. The EU is only a full member of the World Trade Organization and 
Food and Agriculture Organization, whereas in some other cases, as in the United 
Nations, it holds the status of observer (Jørgensen 2009: 6). Even if formal 
representation (or its absence) does not define the EU’s influence within the various 
institutions, it affects the external recognition of the EU as an international actor 
operating in a multilateral context. Thus, in joining these IOs, even with observer 
status, the EU has the legitimate right to take part in their activities and eventually 
influence the shaping of these multilateral organisations, from an insider perspective. 
This has direct implications for the EU’s engagement with multilateralism, as the 
type of access the Union has to multilateral institutions can affect both its interest in 
promoting multilateralism and its strategy for doing so. 
The EU’s strong commitment to multilateralism as a principle is not in 
doubt.  But when it comes to dealing with multilateralism as a strategy, the EU has a 
more selective approach. As Jorgensen points out “given that the Union also makes 
use of bilateral and unilateral strategies, the multilateral strategy is only part of the 
Union’s foreign policy instruments and objectives” (Jørgensen 2006:32).  
In cooperating with other partners, the EU has a diverse portfolio of 
agreements. The EU’s Treaties Office Database (Europa 2013) lists 752 bilateral 
agreements, and 230 multilateral agreements between the EU and third parties. This 
is clear evidence of the fact that the EU combines multilateralism with other 
strategies. In the 2003 ESS, in addition to promoting “effective multilateralism’ as a 
European objective, the European Council emphasised the importance of enhancing 
bilateral relations with “key global players”, asserting that both multilateralism and 
bilateralism remain priorities for the EU. This policy strategy was further 
institutionalised, and acquired a legal status when incorporated among the legal 
provisions of the Lisbon treaty, of which Article 21 states that: 
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The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with 
third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which 
share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote 
multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the 
framework of the United Nations (TEU). 
 
According to Grevi, the European approach of pursing its multilateral 
interests by building stronger ties with certain international actors stems from a 
perception that the behaviour of key global players has a direct impact on global 
governance. Consequently, EU bilateral relations with some countries have been 
considered a precondition for the establishment of a multilateral model of 
governance, acquiring the status of “strategic” (Grevi 2008:10). 
It was evident that the European perception of a certain historical and 
structural homogeneity across Latin America was not in touch with the political and 
economic differences amongst the countries in the region (Lessa 2009:9). 	  2.2.7	  Forging	  the	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Strategic	  Partnership	  
 
The shared interest of the EU and Brazil in the promotion of a multilateral system, 
together with Brazil’s growing international role and the stagnation of negotiations 
on an agreement with MERCOSUR, were clear indicators of the need for the EU to 
vary its strategy towards Latin America. As a result, the EU has diversified its 
approach to bilateral relations with each country, taking into better account their 
singularities, but always in parallel with an ongoing intercontinental dialogue 
strategy. 
 In November 2000, the European Commissioner for External Relations, Chris 
Pattern, took the opportunity of the third round of negotiations of the EU-
MERCOSUR agreement, held in Rio de Janeiro and Santiago (Chile), to hold 
bilateral meetings with the governments of Brazil, Argentina and Chile, individually. 
On the occasion, Pattern stressed the EU’s commitment to the conclusion of an 
agreement with MERCOSUR, but also spoke of a “new strategic partnership” that 
would enhance EU relations with Latin America, attributing a distinguished role to 
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Brazil within this strategy: 
Brazil’s bilateral relations with the EU are essential to us (...) we wish to work 
closer with Brazil. Not only to develop the EU-Brazil bilateral relations and the 
MERCOSUR region-to-region links. But also, to meet objectives that were set 
at the EU-Latin American and Caribbean Summit in Rio de Janeiro (European 
Commission 2006: 5). 
 
One month after Lula came into power in 2003, the EU Trade Commissioner, 
Pascal Lamy, met the new government to discuss trade issues. In justifying the 
purpose of his visit to the country, Lamy expressed the EU’s interest in enhancing its 
partnership with Brazil in order to promote multilateral and regional goals: 
Brazil is an essential partner for the EU both in the context of the WTO as well 
as a pillar of the Mercosur. The election of President Lula has brought a 
renewed spirit to the region. I very much look forward to working with the new 
government to advance on both the regional and the multilateral trade agenda 
(European Commission 2003). 
 
In 2006, the new EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson, also visited 
Brazil with the intention of reinforcing their political ties. Interestingly, however, 
Mandelson went beyond the habitual discourse on the relevance of Brazil to the 
conclusion of a MERCOSUR-EU agreement. In his speech, he stressed the growing 
role played by the country in the world’s economy, detaching its relevance from a 
regional context. Mandelson compared Brazil with China and India, praised the 
country’s leadership of the G20 in the WTO and concluded by welcoming Brazil as a 
‘global economic power’. This shift in the tone of the EU’s discourse reflected both 
the recognition of Brazil’s role as an emerging power in world politics and the 
perception that an enhanced partnership with Brazil could be beneficial to the pursuit 
of European interests within a multilateral system, in accordance with the political 
guidelines of the ESS. 
The interest in granting their bilateral relations a new status was welcomed by 
the Brazilian government. During the first official visit to the country by the 
President of the European Commission, José Manuel Barroso, in 2006, a Joint 
Statement was launched addressing the EU-Brazil joint commitment to tackle global 
issues and reinforce the role of existing multilateral institutions, as well as to 
promote more cooperation in traditional bilateral areas (European Commission 
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2006b).  
Ever since, the agenda of EU-Brazil relations has incorporated more “global 
issues”, in an attempt to enhance their engagement at the multilateral level. The 
Country Strategy Paper 2007-2013 for Brazil, adopted by the European Commission, 
restated the convergence of the EU and Brazil’s views on global issues as well on the 
belief that “sustainable development can be better achieved in a multi-polar world” 
(European Commission 2007: 7). Meanwhile, cooperation in areas which have long 
featured in their bilateral dialogue has also been improved.   
This new approach to EU-Brazil relations rested on existing instruments of 
cooperation and the creation of new ones.  
In a “Communication to the Council and the European Parliament”, issued in 
May 2007, the Commission stressed the growing role of Brazil as global player and 
as a key interlocutor for the EU. Entitled “Towards an EU-Brazil Strategic 
Partnership”, the communication suggested that it would be opportune to use the 
upcoming first EU-Brazil Summit to agree on a Strategic Partnership with the 
country. The delivery of this Communication was followed by a declaration by the 
President of the Commission reinforcing the importance of strengthening this 
bilateral relationship:  
Brazil is an important partner for the EU. We not only share close historic and 
cultural ties, values and a strong commitment to multilateral institutions, we 
also share the capacity to make a difference in addressing many global 
challenges such as climate change, poverty, multilateralism, human rights and 
others. By proposing stronger ties, we are acknowledging Brazil’s qualification 
as a key player to join the restricted club of our strategic partners (European 
Commission, 2007b).  
 
The EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership was launched during the first EU-Brazil 
Summit, held in Lisbon in July 2007. The Joint Action Plan for the Strategic 
Partnership was agreed at the occasion of the second Summit, in Rio de Janeiro, in 
December 2008. The document establishes five main objectives for the Partnership: 
1. Promoting peace and comprehensive security through an effective 
multilateral system; 
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2. Enhancing the Economic, Social and Environmental Partnership to 
promote sustainable development; 
3. Promoting regional cooperation; 
4. Promoting science, technology and innovation; 
5. Promoting people-to-people exchanges Council of The European Union 
(2008).  
 As the instrument for the development of a comprehensive partnership, the 2008 
Joint Action Plan addresses almost all possible aspects of cooperation between the 
EU and Brazil. In addition to the wide range of issues covered, another characteristic 
of the plan is its multi-level outreach. With the partnership, the EU and Brazil 
explicitly aimed to strengthen their cooperation at all four levels on which they 
engage. The document underlined the strategy for promoting this objective: 
The relations between the EU and Brazil will be enhanced on the basis of 
annual dialogues at the highest level and regular Summits and Ministerial 
meetings. Such meetings will notably address global challenges and crises that 
threaten the stability and sustainable development of societies and economies 
around the world. Senior Official meetings and the European Community-
Brazil Joint Committee meetings will contribute to the preparation of the 
Summit and Ministerial meetings as well as to the monitoring of progress on the 
ongoing dialogues and the implementation of the Joint Action Plan Council of 
the European Union (2008) 
 
Adopted in 2011, the Second Joint Action of the EU-Brazil Strategic 
Partnership was structured under the same agenda of the first Action Plan, 
demonstrating continuity in the scope of the partnership. Ever since, the two partners 
have held annual high-level summits: 
TABLE	  9	   	   EU-­‐BRAZIL	  HIGH-­‐LEVEL	  SUMMITS	  
Summit Location and Date 
1st High Level-Summit Lisbon, 4 July 2007 
2nd High Level-Summit Rio de Janeiro, 22 December 2008* 
3rd High Level-Summit Stockholm, 6 October 2009 
4th High Level-Summit Brasília, 14 July 2010 
5th High Level-Summit Brussels, 4 October 2011** 
*Adoption of the Joint Action Plan I. 
** Adoption of the Joint Action Plan II. 
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In terms of agenda, the joint declarations of the five summits held in the 
2007-2011 period are all very alike and are divided in accordance with the five 
priorities of the Strategic Partnership set up by the Joint Action Plan I (mentioned 
before). Crossing these documents, it is interesting that not only the agenda and the 
format of the five joint declarations are similar but also the texts of many paragraphs 
are repeated. The main differences between them are in terms of updates on the latest 
developments of bilateral cooperation or the inclusion of specific issues within 
multilateral regimes on which the EU and Brazil claim to be committed to cooperate.  
There are two ways that one could interpret this observation. On the one 
hand, the repetition in the five joint declarations might be considered an exercise of 
political rhetoric, showing that the Strategic Partnership has not developed much 
from its original form. On the other hand, the fact that the documents of five years of 
summits are very similar in content and form can be considered a sign of 
consistency. It shows, to a certain extent, that the decision to forge a partnership 
addressing multilateral issues was not an isolated event; rather it has been endorsed 
by the EU and Brazil as one of the core drivers of their cooperation.  
Regardless of the outcome achieved thus far, the Strategic Partnership can be 
considered a milestone in the framework of the EU-Brazil relationship. Two core 
aspects of the Partnership justify this optimism.  Firstly, the incorporation of new 
elements in the agenda of EU-Brazil cooperation demonstrates not only the 
enhancement, but also a new conception of their relationship. This aspect is directly 
related to their perceptions of each other’s role in world politics and suggests a 
certain affinity of their values and interests. Secondly, when the EU and Brazil 
commit to act together to promote a certain model of multilateralism, with the 
reinforcement of international organisations, they are strengthening their cooperation 
on the multilateral level. This has an impact on the overall pattern of their multi-level 
cooperation and also on the legitimacy and reinforcement of multilateralism. Finally, 
until the Strategic Partnership, cooperation at the bilateral and the multilateral levels 
developed in parallel, but were never strategically linked. The success of this strategy 
is to be explored in the next three chapters of the thesis. 
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2.3	  Conclusion	  
 
As this chapter demonstrated, the development of EU-Brazil cooperation has been 
structured on a four-level model. Far from occurring in isolation, the overlaps and 
parallel developments of those levels of cooperation have been a permanent 
characteristic of EU-Brazil relations. Yet, within the past decade, the two partners 
have placed greater emphasis on the development of which, together with the 
bilateral level, constitutes the core pillar of the current framework of EU-Brazil 
cooperation. 
The 2007 Strategic Partnership signaled a new phase in this bilateral 
relationship, positioning the EU and Brazil as “equal partners”. The strategy adopted 
for promoting a spillover from cooperation at the bilateral level to the multilateral 
level suggests the understanding that the two strategies can be mutually 
complementary. Yet, as presented in the previous chapter (chapter one), there is no 
consensus amongst international cooperation theorists on the validity of this 
assumption. Therefore, EU-Brazil relations are an interesting case in which to 
empirically explore the concept of level-linkage. 
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CHAPTER	  3	  
Level-­‐	  Linkage	  in	  Climate	  Change	  
 
 
3.1	  Introduction	  
 
As detailed in chapter 1, this thesis claims that level-linkage depends essentially on 
four hypotheses: a) the type of regime; b) the compatibility of the two actors’ 
approaches; c) the foreign policy-making process of each player; and d) the 
preferences for third partners at the multilateral level. Hence, in order to understand 
whether or not the EU and Brazil have been successful in promoting a spillover from 
dialogue at the bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral arena (DBLCM) 
to the multilateral level, it is essential to assess level-linkage in different domains. 
The scrutiny of this process requires a case-by-case analysis. 
 This chapter primarily analyses level-linkage in the case of climate change. 
The focus is on three periods in the development of the international climate change 
regime. The first considers the establishment of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), in 1997; 
the second addresses the implementation process of the Protocol, from the 2001 
Marrakesh Accord to the tenth session of the Conference of Parties, (COP10) in 
2004. The last period analysed goes from the first Meeting of the Parties of the 
Kyoto Protocol (MOP), in 2005, to the Copenhagen Accord in 2009. 
 The remainder of the chapter is organised into four parts. The first part 
contextualises level-linkage in the case of climate change. For this purpose, it 
introduces the international climate change regime, with particular emphasis on the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the KP, 
and presents the formal policy-making processes of the EU’s and Brazil’s external 
climate policies. Entering the domain of EU-Brazil cooperation on climate change, 
the second section of this chapter explores the development of their dialogue at the 
bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral arena. The third part scrutinises 
EU-Brazil engagement in the multilateral arena. The last section assesses level-
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linkage on climate change, analysing how each of the four hypotheses impact on the 
outcome of this process. 
 
3.2	  Setting	  the	  Scene:	  The	  International	  Climate	  Change	  Regime	  
 3.2.1	   Explaining	   the	   “type	   of	   regime”	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Climate	  Change	  	  
The UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol: Background 
Considered to be a high profile issue on the current international agenda, 
environment and sustainable development were not part of the institutionalised forms 
of multilateral cooperation that emerged after World War II.44 These issues are not 
directly mentioned in the original text of the 1945 Charter of the United Nations, as 
they were treated essentially as local concerns.  
The first attempt to establish global environmental governance45 dates back to 
the late 1960s. Aiming at expanding the role of the UN over environmental issues, in 
1968 the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) approved a resolution calling 
for a multilateral conference on the environment. The first United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, in 1972. The high 
number of participants, 114 governments, legitimised the institutionalisation of a 
multilateral framework of cooperation under the UN umbrella. The outcome of the 
Stockholm Conference was a model of governance with a strong political agenda.  
Rather than emphasizing the role of technocrats and scientists, the current 
framework of cooperation still operates on the basis of international negotiations in 
which states are the protagonists. Further, the development of the international 
environmental regime that followed the Conference was also characterised by the 
                                                
44   Over the past two decades, there has been a significant increase in the number of academic literature on the 
environment and international relations (e.g. Harris (2009), Luterbacher and Sprinz (2001), O’ Neil (2009), Ott 
(2001), Thomas (1992), and Vogler (1995), Vogler and Imber (1996). 
45  “Defined most simply, global environmental governance consists of efforts by the international community to 
manage and solve shared environmental problems” (O’ Neill 2009:4). 
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fragmentation of the agenda into specific topics (O’ Neill 2009: 4-5), such as 
biodiversity and climate change. 
In the 1980s, scientific information drew attention to the depletion of the 
ozone layer, spurring international debate over the impact of human activity on 
global warming. Considered an essential transboundary issue, climate change was 
understood by international actors as requiring a collective response. Climate change 
was then taken to the UN level, being discussed at the UNGA in 1988. On this 
occasion, the UN members approved Resolution 43/53 on the “protection of global 
climate for present and future generations of mankind.” The document urged 
“governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations to treat 
climate change as a priority issue”, and endorsed the actions of the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (UNGA 1988).46 Published in 
1990, the first Assessment Report of the IPCC concluded that human activities had 
an impact on the rising of global temperature.  
 The Report provided the technical basis for the Second World Climate 
Conference, which concluded with a ministerial declaration calling for the agreement 
of a framework convention on climate change (Sands 2003: 358-359). In 1990, the 
UNGA created the International Negotiating Committee (INC), responsible for 
establishing the Convention. After six rounds of talks, the final text was adopted and 
opened for signatures during the Rio Summit, in June 1992. The UNFCCC entered 
into force in 1994, ratified by 155 parties (Gaan 2008: 125).  
Article 3 sets as the objective of the Convention the promotion of 
“stabilization of green gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would 
prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.” Recognising 
that the parties have different historic responsibilities and economic capacities, 
Article 3 UNFCCC establishes that: 
                                                
46  The IPCC was established in 1988 by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO) with the aim to provide scientific analysis on climate change, providing 
technical basis for international cooperation in this realm (Sands 2003: 358). 
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 Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of future and present 
generations of human kind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities. 
Accordingly, developed countries should take the lead in combating climate 
change and the adverse effects thereof (UNFCCC 1992). 
 
On this premise, the UNFCCC establishes different degrees of commitment 
of the parties, assigning the main responsibilities for tackling climate change to 
industrialised economies. The allocation of responsibilities follows the distribution of 
membership amongst three distinct groups, as defined in the Annex of the 
Convention. The list of Annex I includes Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and other economies in transition (EITs), 
whereas Annex II encompasses exclusively OECD members. All other parties, 
essentially developing countries, feature in the so-called non-Annex I list. According 
to Article 4 of the Convention, specific commitments on CO2 emission reductions 
apply exclusively to the Annex I countries. For those in the Annex II, responsibilities 
extend to providing financial and technical assistance to the non- Annex I countries, 
as well as granting technology transfer to developing economies and EITs. In 
addition, the Convention sets up commitments applicable to all parties (UNFCCC 
1992). The UNFCCC establishes that all members should adopt preventive measures 
to minimise future impact on climate change, thus establishing the precautionary 
principle as the guiding principle for global climate governance (Gaan 2008: 127). 
Overall, the UNFCCC provided the international climate change regime with 
an institutional framework for cooperation, defined in terms of principles, 
procedures, responsibilities, agenda, and organisational setting. However, given the 
plurality of interests and values of the several actors to be contemplated, reaching an 
agreement that would have “universal acceptance” implied adopting a “soft 
approach” to climate change (Oberthür and Ott 1999: 33). Negotiations that followed 
the agreement of the UNFCCC revealed the weaknesses of the “soft and gradual 
approach;” defining its specific normative content and advancing the commitment of 
the parties was an imperative need. 
Entering into force in 1995, the UNFCCC established the Conference of the 
Parties of the Convention (COP) as its primary decision-making body, responsible 
for ensuring the effective implementation of the Convention, and promoting the 
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agreement of legal instruments and commitment among the parties. The first 
challenge of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention (COP) was to reach an 
agreement on the appropriateness and the regulation of the legally binding 
commitments to the Annex I parties of the UNFCCC. Two years of intense 
negotiations resulted in the adoption of the KP, at the third COP (COP3, in 1997 
(Gaan 2008: 128). 
As a complementary instrument to the UNFCCC, the KP embraces the same 
ultimate objective and institutional framework as the Convention. Endorsing the 
“common but differentiated principle,” the KP attributes greater responsibilities to 
developed countries, but also establishes commitments by all parties. Advancing the 
terms of multilateral climate cooperation, the KP defines legally binding obligations 
to the Annex I parties (listed again in the Annex B of the Protocol), setting individual 
and joint greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction targets to be achieved by end of 
the first commitment period (2008-2012) (Gupta 2005: 147-148). In order to assist 
the fulfilment of these commitments, the Protocol created three mechanisms: (a) joint 
implementation; (b) clean development mechanism (CDM); and (c) emission trading, 
in Articles 6, 12 and 17 respectively (Kyoto Protocol 1997).  
 Again, the “soft approach” of the process of multilateral cooperation on 
climate change had direct implications for the terms of the KP. According to Farhana 
Yamin, the three mechanisms agreed by consensus were defined just in general 
terms. The parties were reluctant to launch internal ratification processes before 
clarifying the rules and procedures of these instruments, blocking the entry into force 
of the Protocol. After six years of intense negotiations, the text defining provisions 
on the three mechanisms was adopted at the seventh COP (COP7), in 2001. The 
“Marrakesh Accord,” as the final declaration of the Conference is known, paved the 
way for the ratification process of the Protocol (Yamin 2005:2). The KP entered into 
force in February 2005; currently, there are 192 parties to the UNFCCC and the 
Protocol. 
The EU signed the UNFCCC on 13 June 1993, ratifying the document on 21 
December 1993. Brazil signed the Convention on 4 June 1992 and ratified the 
UNFCCC on 28 February 1994. The KP was subjected to a longer process. The EU 
signed the agreement on 29 April 1998 and ratified it only 4 years later, on 31 May 
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2002. Similarly, Brazil signed the Protocol on the same day as the EU, but the 
ratification process was only concluded on 23 August 2002 (UNFCCC 2011). 
Nevertheless, the European Union and Brazil were amongst the first actors to adopt 
the two instruments.   
 It is important to emphasise that both the European Union and EU member 
states are signatory parties of the UNFCCC and the KP. Article 22 of the Convention 
grants Regional Economic Integration Organizations (REIOs) the right to take part in 
the multilateral climate agreements established under the UN framework. This 
formal membership gives REIOs the same rights in taking part in the process of 
approval, ratification, acceptance or accession as that of states (Article 21); the only 
difference is in terms of voting rights. Article 18 establishes that REIOs cannot vote 
when their member states are exercising voting rights, and vice-versa. Should REIOs 
vote on behalf of their members, they have the same number of votes corresponding 
to their member states party to the UNFCCC (UNFCCC 1992).  
 The EU features in Annex I of the UNFCCC and the KP, and 26 of its 
member states have a binding commitment to reduce their emission of greenhouse 
gas.47 The EU is third largest emitter after the United States and China. It accounts 
for around 13% of global GHG emissions, most deriving from energy supply, energy 
use and the transport sector.48 Occupying a central position within this regime, over 
the past decades the EU has demonstrated commitment to reducing its GHG 
emissions, but has also engaged in the development of multilateral cooperation on 
climate change (Pew Centre on Global Climate Change 2009).  
 Brazil has one of the cleanest energy matrixes in the world; hydropower and 
biofuels provide most of the energy supply to modern sectors of the economy. 
Nevertheless, the country features among the top world GHG emitters. Around 80% 
of Brazil’s GHG emissions are from deforestation and land use (Ministry of Science 
and Technology 2009: 6). As a party to the UNFCCC and the KP, Brazil has no 
legally binding responsibility to curb its GHG emissions; Brazil does feature in the 
                                                
47  Malta and Cyprus are not part of the Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.  
48In 2009 the EU-27 GHG emission was of 4,614.5 million tonnes, corresponding to 9.2 tonnes of GHG per 
capita. The three largest shares of GHG emissions by sectors are: 32.4% on energy supply, 26.7% on energy use 
(excluding transport), and 20.2% on transport (European Environmental Agency 2011). 
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Annex B list of the protocol. This rather unique profile places Brazil as an important 
(and interesting) actor in the international climate change regime. 
 
Organisational Framework and Decision-Making Process of the UNFCCC and 
the Kyoto Protocol 
The UNFCCC sets up a comprehensive organisational structure, which consists of 
the Conferences of the Parties, a Secretariat, a Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice, a Subsidiary Body for Implementation, and an interim 
financial mechanism (UNFCCC 1992). This framework promotes direct engagement 
among the parties and the United Nations bodies, and the results of this interaction 
are decisive in shaping the climate change regime. 
The KP deploys the organisational framework of the UNFCCC as its main 
structure. In addition, permanent bodies serving exclusively the KP were created, 
such as the Executive Board of the CDM, the Supervisory Committee, and the 
Compliance Committee. Further, the Protocol mandates the COP as the sessions in 
which the MOP should take place. Nevertheless, the promotion of joint COP/MOP 
sessions does not imply merging the two agendas in a single summit. Article 13 of 
the Protocol stresses that the parties of the UNFCCC that are not parties of the KP 
are granted the status of observer in the MOP, but decisions should be taken only by 
the parties of the Protocol (Kyoto Protocol 1997). 
Following the Rules of Procedures of the UNFCCC, the main decisions 
related to the Protocol are taken at the COP/MOP.49 Generally occurring on an 
annual basis, these Summits are co-chaired by the Secretariat and the “COP 
president,” the latter representing the government hosting the meeting. Together, 
they are in charge of elaborating the draft agenda and opening the summits, where 
                                                
49 The United States’ participation in these meeting is restricted to the discussions of issues referent to the 
UNFCCC. Until the country ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, it cannot take part in the negotiations of Kyoto-related 
issues (Fletcher 2007: 119). 
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the parties can propose amendments to the agenda, normally approved by 
consensus.50 
At COP/MOP, negotiations happen in different arenas, including formal and 
informal forums, bilateral and minilateral consultations. In these various 
arrangements, debate and bargaining among the parties takes place; thus, the 
negotiation process is not very linear or centred on one domain. Throughout the days 
of the Conference, the activities of these forums overlap one another, and the final 
outcomes of negotiations are discussed at the Plenary. In a nutshell, the decision-
making process of COP/MOP entails three levels. Negotiations start with informal 
consultations, sub-groups and informal working groups. They are then advanced in 
the working groups, where the parties agree on the decisions regarding different 
issues of the agenda. Finally, at the Plenary the parties wrap up the debate, adopting 
the final resolution by consensus (Yamin and Depledge 2004: 440-452). 51 
As of 2011, seventeen Conferences of the Parties had been held, the last 
seven in the joint composition of COP/MOP. 
 
 
 
 
                                                
50As the approval of the agenda traditionally requires consensus, what should be an ordinary procedural matter 
has been converted into a critical political issue. This is because managing to block an issue from the agenda 
represents avoiding its negotiation; this has been the strategy employed by the parties to enforce their own 
agendas within multilateral negotiations. But the same consensus that is needed to approve the agenda is also 
required to exclude one of its topics. To prevent disagreements over the agenda from compromising the success 
of the Conferences before they even start, the approach adopted by the Presidency and the Secretariat consists in 
holding these polemical issues in “abeyance”, in other words, they are not definitively excluded, but are not 
officially discussed in that specific session. Although a formal procedure defines that the parties should present 
their proposals in writing and in advance to allow their circulation among the parties, in practice, the dynamics of 
the COP/MOP is more informal; proposals are often made orally and without prior announcement (Yamin and 
Depledge 2004: 438-440).   
51For more on the architecture of the climate change regime under the United Nations Umbrella, see Biermann 
et.al. (2009), Breidenich et.al (1998), Depledge, and Farhana (2004), Depledge (2005), and Grubb et.al. (1999). 
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TABLE	  10	   CONFERENCES	  OF	  THE	  PARTIES	  (COP)	  AND	  MEETING	  OF	  THE	  PARTIES	  (MOP)	  FROM	  1995-­‐2011	  
Year Meeting Location Year Meeting Location 
1995 COP1 Berlin, Germany 2003 COP9 Milan, Italy 
1996 COP2 Geneva, Switzerland 2004 COP10 Buenos Aires, Argentina 
1997 COP3 Kyoto, Japan 2005 COP11/MOP1 Montreal, Canada 
1998 COP4 Buenos Aires, Argentina 2006 COP12/MOP2 Nairobi, Kenya 
1999 COP5 Bonn, Germany 2007 COP13/MOP3 Bali, Indonesia 
2000 COP6 The Hague, Netherlands 2008 COP14/MOP4 Poznan, Poland 
2001 COP6 (bis) Bonn, Germany 2009 COP15/MOP5 Copenhagen, Denmark 
2001 COP7 Marrakesh, Morocco 2010 COP16/MOP6 Cancun, Mexico 
2002 COP8 New Delhi, India 2011 COP17/MOP7 Durban, South Africa 
Source: UNFCCC (2011). 
 
At these Summits, each party is represented by a national delegation headed 
by a chief negotiator speaking on the behalf of the government. Traditionally, the 
parties form negotiating coalitions, based on UN tradition, or informal political 
alliances.52 Overall, groupings of the international climate change regime under the 
UNFCCC and KP have three distinct compositions, according to the Annex I list, 
geographic location and, what is referred to here as political affinity. From these 
three criteria, it is under the latter that the parties are more active in forming 
negotiating groups (Climate Change Secretariat 2002: 29-30). The table below 
summarises these three arrangements: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
52The term “alliance” is here used as a synonym for coalitions, defined as “set of governments that defend a 
common position in a negotiation” (Odell 2006:13). 
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TABLE	  11	   COP/	  MOP	  GROUPING	  COMPOSITIONS	  
 
Type Origin Criteria Groups 
 
List of Annex 
 
UNFCCC 
Kyoto 
Protocol 
 
Economic 
(OECD 
membership) 
1.Annex I: 41 countries and the EU; 
2.Annex II: 23 countries and the EU; 
3.Non-Annex I: Developing countries (including 
Brazil) 
 
 
Regional 
Groups 
 
 
UN 
System 
 
 
Geographical 
location 
1. Africa; 
2. Asia (and pacific); 
3.Central & Eastern Europe; 
4.GRULAC (Latin America and the Caribbean); 
5. WEOG (“Western Countries and the Others”, 
i.e., Canada, New Zealand and the United States). 
 
 
 
 
Negotiating 
Groups 
 
 
 
 
COP/MOP 
 
 
 
Political affinity 
(Formal/ 
informal 
compositions) 
 
1. G77/ China (Developing countries, including 
Brazil) 
2. BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China) 
EU 
Umbrella (non-EU developed countries); 
5. AOSIS (Alliance of Small Island States); 
6. Environmental Integrity Group (Mexico, 
Republic of Korea and Switzerland); 
7. CACAM (Central Asia, Caucasus, Albania and 
Moldova); 
8. Central Group 11 (most EIT countries included 
in the Annex I); 
9. OPEC (Organization for Petroleum Exporting 
Countries) 
Data from the UNFCCC (2012). 
. 
 
 The EU and Brazil are both members of the UNFCCC and the KP. Yet, as 
table 11 summarises, the two partners do not share membership in any kind of formal 
or informal grouping formation under which international climate negotiations are 
arranged. EU-Brazil cooperation begins at two distinct departure points.  
 Another element of the “rules of the game” that determine the conditions in 
which the EU and Brazil cooperate on trade is the foreign policy-making processes 
of the two actors.  	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3.2.3	  Foreign	  Policy-­‐Making	  Processes	  
 
Brazil  
Brazilian foreign policy-making on climate change is relatively centralised. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs is the primary institution behind bilateral relations with 
the EU and also the main body responsible for Brazilian external climate policy at 
the global level. Sharing the competence over the Brazilian external representation at 
multilateral negotiations with the Ministry of Science and Technology and the 
Ministry of the Environment, the role of chief negotiator has traditionally been 
performed by the Undersecretary-General for Environment, Energy, Science and 
Technology of the Ministry of External Relations. These three Ministries leading the 
Brazilian delegation are also in charge of defining Brazilian external climate policy. 
Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, competences in this process are primarily 
attributed to the Department of the Environment and Special issues, part of the 
Undersecretary-General for Environment (Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
2011).  
Considering that the development of global climate governance has strong 
domestic dimensions and implications, the Brazilian Presidency established the Inter-
ministerial Commission of Global Climate Change in July 1999. The objective of the 
Commission is to provide support for the Brazilian government’s position in 
international climate negotiations. Furthermore, it also helps to define the additional 
criteria for the implementation of CDM projects, engaging with civil society, and 
advising projects and legislation concerning climate change mitigation. Having 
mixed responsibilities, contributing to both external and internal policies, in addition 
to the three Ministries that form the Brazilian negotiating delegation at the 
  
 
110 
multilateral level, the Commission includes Ministries competent in domestic climate 
change policies53 (Brazilian Ministry of Science and Technology 2011).  
Diplomatic bilateral relations with international actors are the competence of 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Organising its activities in terms of geographic and 
thematic divisions, relations with the EU are primary handled by the Department of 
Europe (DoE), part of the Ministry’s headquarters in Brasilia, and the Brazilian 
Mission to the European Communities, in Brussels. On issues specific to a bilateral 
agenda, other departments of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dealing with particular 
issue-areas are involved in the foreign policy-making process. In addition, as 
explained by a Brazilian diplomat, the development of EU-Brazil cooperation 
includes the participation of other Ministries and governmental agencies.54 In the 
case of climate change, the DoE and the Brazilian Mission organise the activities of 
the bilateral dialogues and joint committees; however, the Brazilian delegation to 
these meetings commonly includes staff from the Ministry of the Environment and 
the Ministry of Science and Technology, and eventually from other bodies. The 
degree of participation of these agents varies according to the agenda and the 
location of the meetings. Nevertheless, diplomatic staff responsible for the 
development of cooperation with the EU at the bilateral level do not take part in the 
decision-making process of Brazilian climate policy addressing the multilateral 
sphere. The formal structure of Brazilian foreign climate policy can as such be 
considered fragmented.  
 
European Union 
In the case of the European Union, foreign policy is fragmented and decentralised. 
As an area of shared competence, the EU’s external representation at multilateral 
climate negotiations lacks formal and legal procedures, but has been defined in 
                                                
53 Chaired by the Ministry of Science and Technology, the current structure of the Commission is constituted by 
ten other Ministries, namely: a) Ministry of Foreign Affairs; b) Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Food 
Supply; c) Ministry of Transport; d) Ministry of Mines and Energy; e) Ministry of Planning, Budget and 
Management; f) Ministry of Environment; g) Ministry of Finances; h) Ministry of Development, Industry and 
Foreign Trade; i) Ministry of Cities; j) Civil House of the Presidency (executive office) (Brazilian Ministry of 
Science and Technology 2011). 
54  Interview n24, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
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practice.5556 Traditionally, the EU’s negotiating delegation is formed by the “troika”, 
composed of the European Commission, the Presidency of the European Council, 
and the incoming Presidency of the Council (Delreux 2011: 17-25). Originally, the 
EC played a leading role in negotiations, speaking on the behalf of the EU. However, 
the increased profile of climate issues in the agenda of national politics of EU 
member states has enhanced the participation of the Council of the European Union 
in the EU’s external climate policy, becoming the key EU interlocutor within the 
multilateral arena (Oberthür and Kelly 2008: 48). 
The Council plays a central role in defining the EU’s external climate policy, 
influencing both the agenda and the policy-making process. In preparing for a round 
of international negotiation, the meetings of the Environmental Council, composed 
of environment ministers, are the first instance in which internal discussion of the 
EU’s external position take place. It is on the basis of the conclusions of the activities 
of this group that, at the second stage, the European Commission and the EU 
member states agree on a common EU position to be taken to the multilateral level 
(Oberthür and Dupont 2011: 75).  
                                                
55  The decision-making process regarding EU external action differs from that of EU internal climate change 
policy. Whereas in the former the European Council can be considered as the most relevant institution, in the 
latter the European Commission is the core player. The European Commission has the exclusive competence to 
introduce legislative proposals that are submitted to the European Council and the European Parliament. 
Employing a co-decision procedure, the proposals are eventually approved by these two institutions. 
Implementation of this legislation is a responsibility of the member states, monitored by the Commission. The 
internal policy-making process of the European Commission has mirrored the dynamics and the multidisciplinary 
scope of climate change, understood as a policy area relatively new, and still under development. As such, 
climate change features in the jurisdiction of many Directorate- Generals (DGs) of the European Commission.  
Established in the late 1960s, DG Environment was the main pillar of the internal structure of the Commission 
regarding EU climate policy. For decades, the DG Environment worked in close coordination with other DGs 
with competences related to this realm, such as DG Energy. Recently, however, the profile of climate change 
within the EU’s agenda was enhanced. A few months before COP15 (Fifteenth Session of the Conference of 
Parties), held in Copenhagen in 2009, the President of the Commission appointed a Commissioner for Climate 
Action (Barnes 2011: 42-56).  In the next year, the DG for Climate Action was established. Among its 
competences, the DG CLIMA, as it is known, “leads international negotiations on climate, helps the EU to deal 
with the consequences of climate change and to meet its targets for 2020, as well as develops and implements the 
EU Emissions Trading System.” Structured around these objectives, unit A.1 is in charge of international and 
inter-institutional relations on climate change (DG CLIMA 2011).   
In addition to new institutional arrangements, the latest changes within the Commission also affected the EU’s 
external representation on the international climate change regime. The Lisbon Treaty established that a Vice 
President of the Commission should also perform the role of High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security. Among the competences of this new post features the responsibility to assist developing 
economies to cope with climate change.  These changes enhanced the role of the Commission in the development 
of the EU’s external climate change policy, but also the prospects of EU cooperation with other partners in this 
realm (Barnes 2011: 56-57). 
56  For more on the EU foreign policy-making and competences on climate change, see Damro (2006); Delreux 
(2011); Macrory and Hession (1996); Sbragia (1998, 2000); Sbragia and Damro (1999) and; Wurzel and Connely 
(2011). 
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The great importance of the Council of the European Union to the EU’s 
external climate policy addressing the multilateral sphere contrasts with its secondary 
participation in the development of EU-Brazil bilateral cooperation on climate 
change. The European Commission is the primary institution responsible for 
handling bilateral relations with Brazil on a daily basis.  
Within the European Commission, the internal allocation of this competence 
varies according to the issue. Until early 2011,57 competences on climate change 
were distributed among the former Directorate-General for External Relations (DG 
RELEX), Directorate-General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) and the European 
Commission Delegation to Brazil, assisted by other Directorate-Generals (DGs) 
when the issue required. Consequently, bureaucrats that have been in charge of 
bilateral dialogues and joint committees had no direct engagement with agents 
responsible for the policy-making of EU’s climate policy at the multilateral level, as 
they even belong to different EU institutions. This fragmentation of the EU’s foreign 
policy-making adds to the hierarchy between multilateral and bilateral policies, 
undermining the prospects of the agents responsible for forging cooperation with 
Brazil at the bilateral level for influencing the decisions taken by policy-makers at 
the multilateral level. 
 As this section demonstrated, the formal organisation of the EU’s and 
Brazil’s foreign policy-making is defined in terms of a bureaucratic structure that is 
relatively decentralised, and the competences of agents and agencies are divided by 
issues and levels of cooperation.  It is with this structure in mind that the 
development of EU-Brazil cooperation at the bilateral and the multilateral level 
should be understood.   
 
 
                                                
57  Established by the Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action Service (EEAS) was created in December 
2010, and has incorporated in its structure the former DG RELEX and the European Commission Delegation in 
Brasilia. However, the implications of these changes in the EU’s institutional design for the EU’s foreign policy-
making remain unclear. However, as this thesis analyses EU-Brazil cooperation from the late 1990s until 2010, 
addressing the potential impact of the creation of the EEAS on level-linkage goes beyond the scope of this 
research. 
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3.3	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Cooperation	  on	  Climate	  Change	  at	  the	  Bilateral	  
Level	  
 
Acquiring political salience in both the international arena and the domestic policies 
of the EU and Brazil, climate change issues have also been incorporated in the 
agenda of bilateral relations between the two actors.  
 Cooperation on environmental issues was first institutionalised with the 1992 
EU- Brazil Framework Cooperation Agreement. Without reference to climate 
change, the scope of cooperation in the field of the environment (Article 18) is 
explicitly associated with sustainable development. Further, the joint actions agreed 
are limited to the bilateral level of the EU-Brazil engagement. No mention of 
multilateralism or international cooperation in the field of environment is made. 
Nearly a decade later, the first Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Brazil 
compiled by DG RELEX and the European Commission Delegation to Brazil in 
2001, identified environment as one of the three focal areas for cooperation with 
Brazil. Under the National Indicative Programme (NIP) for 2002-2006 presented in 
the CSP, 9 million Euros (9% of the NIP budget) were allocated to projects in the 
area. The objective was to support “Brazilian initiatives in conservation, protection 
and sustainable development, through government and civil society partners, 
particularly in the Amazon area.” In addition, the CSP also aimed at “developing 
wider EC-Brazil cooperation on environmental issues” (European Commission 
2002). 
In the second CSP, the EC continued prioritising the development of its 
cooperation with Brazil on the environment from 2007 to 2013. Narrowing down the 
priority areas to two, the EC allocated 18.3 million Euros (30% of the indicative 
budget) for projects “promoting the environmental dimension of sustainable 
development.” The second CSP primarily endeavours to “support the efforts 
undertaken by Brazil to curb deforestation in the Amazon region and other biomes 
and to manage its natural resources in a sustainable way.” The document maintained 
the “local” scope of cooperation on environmental issues, featuring the EU as the 
donor and Brazil as the recipient country. Nevertheless, the discourse encompassed 
another dimension, when the EC recognised that “Brazil has a major role to play in 
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global environmental issues”, and declared its interest in supporting Brazil’s 
compliance with multilateral agreements, such as the UNFCCC and the KP. Further, 
the document also recommended the institutionalisation of a High Level Dialogue on 
environmental issues, comprising discussion about several subjects, including 
climate change (European Commission 2007). 
 Even if the mention of global environmental governance in the second CSP is 
restricted to discourse, it represents the beginning of the widening of scope of EU-
Brazil cooperation on the environment. Also, to a certain extent, it translates in an 
official document the partners’ aspiration, and arguably, a demand from Brazil to 
frame the relationship in terms of “equal partnership.” Certainly, the shifts in the 
pattern of their bilateral engagement regarding environmental issues mirrored major 
changes in the general terms of EU-Brazil relations, consolidated by the Strategic 
Partnership.   
 In the specific realm of the environment, there was the perception from both 
the Brazilian government and the EU institutions that restricting cooperation to the 
“donor-recipient” framework implied ignoring the new reality of Brazilian 
development. According to a member of staff of the EU Delegation in Brasilia, 
Brazil no longer desired to receive EU funds in the traditional terms agreed. The 
diminishing of interest, combined with the bureaucracy in the Brazilian government 
that renders accountability complicated, led the funds to be allocated more to civil 
society projects, than to governmental programmes.58 
The Brazilian position can be justified by the economic development 
achieved over the past two decades. As an official of the Brazilian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs stated, the financial contribution granted by the EU is now marginal 
considering the funds necessary to sponsor projects on the environment; as he 
summarised by saying, “Brazil does not need EU money. We want cooperation at the 
same level of partnership.” 59 
The understanding of the need to re-frame the terms of EU-Brazil 
cooperation is not only reflected by the structure of this engagement, but also in its 
                                                
58  Interview no 13, Brasilia, 24 June 2010. 
59  Interview n.15, Brasilia, 23 July 2010. 
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agenda. Broadening the scope of cooperation implies abandoning the almost 
exclusive focus on Brazilian issues, encompassing regional and international 
dimensions of the environment. Not only did this perception create the conditions to 
enhance bilateral dialogue on global environmental governance, it also favoured the 
development of cooperation on the specific realm of climate change. 
In light of this, the partners agreed to establish the Brazil-EC Dialogue on the 
Environmental Dimension of Sustainable Development with Emphasis on Climate 
Change, in September 2006. Aiming at providing a “structured framework for 
bilateral consultations and joint actions,” the Dialogue comprises a Senior Level 
Policy Dialogue and a Working Group on Climate Change. Held annually and 
alternatively either in Brazil or in Europe, the meetings provide the partners with an 
opportunity to exchange views and best practices, and to develop joint actions in a 
wide range of environmental issues (Docstoc 2011). 
One year later, the 2007 Strategic Partnership confirmed the high-profile 
nature of climate change in EU-Brazil relations. In the agreement, the two partners 
concur on “the need to identify and promote common strategies to tackle global 
issues.” A shared understanding of the EU and Brazil’s approach towards climate 
change is briefly presented. The partners stress their commitment to strengthening 
the multilateral climate change regime, based on the principle of common but 
differentiated responsibilities, and guided by the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC 
(Council of the European Union 2007).  
The bilateral alliance forged to address climate change on its global 
dimension was detailed in the first Joint Action Plan of the EU-Brazil Strategic 
Partnership (JAP I), launched in 2008. Endorsing their common view on global 
climate governance, the EU and Brazil added that both partners consider the need for 
developed countries to commit to ambitious emission reduction targets, whereas 
developing countries should take national mitigation actions, promoting their 
sustainable development. Furthermore, they agreed to cooperate on the basis of the 
2007 Bali Action Plan, working together to contribute to a global agreement by 2009 
that will define the prospects for multilateral cooperation in the post 2012 period of 
the KP. Joint actions supporting initiatives to reduce deforestation, as well as training 
  
 
116 
and capacity building activities for projects related to the CDM were also adopted 
(Council of the European Union 2008). 
By 2009, EU-Brazil cooperation on climate change had embraced a 
comprehensive agenda. The Joint Declaration of the third EU-Brazil Summit placed 
climate change as the first global issue it addressed, dedicating nine paragraphs to the 
terms of cooperation on this matter (Council of the European Union 2009). In 
addition to addressing general principles and reaffirming their commitment to the 
strengthening of this international regime, in Stockholm the partners stated their 
position with regards to specific issues on the multilateral agenda. Expectations that 
the EU-Brazil partnership on climate change would move from discourse to practice 
were endorsed by the agreement of the parties to hold a high level bilateral meeting 
before COP15, in Copenhagen, later that year.  
Working together ahead of negotiations was a strategy endorsed by the fourth 
EU-Brazil Summit, in 2010. In spite of the fact that only one paragraph in the Joint 
Statement of this meeting was dedicated to climate change, this did not imply 
diminishing interest in bilateral cooperation on the matter. In fact, at the fifth EU-
Brazil Summit in 2011, the partners reiterated their commitment to enhance 
cooperation on climate change at the bilateral level and at the multilateral level. For 
this purpose, a self-standing EU-Brazil Climate Change Dialogue was launched 
(Council of the European Union 2011). 
As explained by staff from DG CLIMA from the European Commission, the 
decision to separate climate change from the Brazil-EC Dialogue on the 
Environmental Dimension of Sustainable Development represents the enhanced 
importance the partners attribute to cooperation on climate change.60 These meetings 
are important as they represent the primary opportunity for discussing specific issues 
of global environmental governance at the bilateral level. True, climate change has 
featured in the agenda of all EU-Brazil Annual Summits held from 2007 to 2011. 
However, these high level meetings, co-chaired by Brazilian Heads of Government 
and the EU Troika, have a very broad political agenda. Consequently, environmental 
issues are not addressed in much depth on these occasions; hence the importance of 
                                                
60  Interview n.19, Brussels, 11 July 2011. 
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bilateral sectoral dialogues. With the changes adopted in 2011, the new EU-Brazil 
dialogues on climate change should be held on an annual basis, either in Brussels or 
Brasilia, following a similar structure to that of the Dialogue on the Environment. 
The composition of the delegation then varies according to the location, as 
the partner hosting the meeting has more representatives. The General Director 
and/or the Head of Unit of DG CLIMA, desk officers for Brazil and technical experts 
from the EU Delegation are usually joined by EU Delegation in Brasilia when 
meetings are held in that city.  The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other Ministries, 
together with diplomats and the Brazilian Mission to the European Union in Brussels 
represent Brazil in these dialogues. 
In the four editions of the EC-Brazil Dialogue on the Environment held from 
2006-2010, debate concerning climate change focused on: a) multilateral 
negotiations; b) exchange of information on climate actions taken at the domestic 
level; and c) bilateral level of cooperation (corresponding to “local” issues).  
Regarding the international climate change regime, an official of DG CLIMA 
interviewed stressed the informal nature of debate on these issues at the Dialogues. 
In the interviewee’s view, “the EU is not using the bilateral level to get something at 
a multilateral level, but to test new ideas and develop new concepts, increasing 
mutual understanding and fostering cooperation;” nonetheless, “no formal position is 
agreed and taken there”. The perspective presented by a staff member of the 
Brazilian Delegation indicated that, like the EU, Brazil does not expect that joint 
positions that are to be taken in multilateral negotiations could be agreed at bilateral 
level. Yet, since the Strategic Partnership, bilateral cooperation has been enhanced, 
and the increased sectoral dialogue at the technical level has facilitated closer 
coordination between Brazil and the EU.61 But has the strengthening of Dialogue at 
the bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral arena  impacted on the 
pattern of engagement between the two partners at the multilateral level? 
 
                                                
61Interview n.19, Brussels, 11 July 2011. 
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3.4	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Cooperation	  on	  Climate	  Change	  at	  the	  Multilateral	  
Level	  
 3.4	  1	  The	  First	  Challenge:	  The	  Agreement	  of	  the	  Kyoto	  Protocol	  	  
 
Negotiations on a complementary agreement to the UNFCCC were launched in 
Berlin in 1995. The discussions of what became the KP extended for two other 
Conferences of the Parties, and it was at the third session of the COP that the most 
important bargaining and trade-offs occurred, leading to an agreement, in 1997. 
Engaging within the negotiations of the KP since they were first launched, Brazil and 
the EU were determined not only to promote a comprehensive agreement, but also to 
affirm leadership in this process, leaving their imprints on the Protocol.  
The EU’s participation in COP3 was marked by the presenting of quite 
controversial and ambitious unilateral proposals; this approach was later 
consolidated as part of the EU’s strategy in most of the negotiation rounds. As 
Sebastian Oberthür and Marc Pallemaerts assert, the EU’s position in Kyoto was 
defined by its strong emphasis on the need to adopt rates of GHG emission 
reductions. Previously agreed among the EU member states, the proposal taken to the 
multilateral level consisted in the adoption of a 15% GHG emission reduction target 
for the Annex I parties. The EU plan was supported by the G77/China, but opposed 
by other developed countries, unwilling to undertake such a commitment. In the 
impossibility of reaching a consensus, the text tabled by the EU was not incorporated 
in the Protocol. However, the discussion of special obligations for the countries of 
Annex I was fruitful; the KP comprises legally binding commitments to the parties of 
that group. Further, the decision represented an important achievement for the EU in 
asserting its presence as a single actor on the international stage. Nonetheless, among 
the Annex I countries, it was the role played by the United States that stole the scene 
in Kyoto; the EU was not a protagonist (Oberthür and Pallemaerts 2010: 33-36).  
 Part of US influence at COP3 derived from a rather unexpected alliance with 
Brazil in defining one of the cornerstones of the KP: the Clean Development 
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Mechanism (CDM).62 An initiative from Brazil, the original proposal consisted in the 
establishment of a Clean Development Fund (CDF). The instrument would adopt 
binding emission reduction targets for developed countries based on their historical 
responsibilities, and fines would be charged should commitments not be met. As 
expected, the so-called “Brazilian proposal” was strongly opposed by developed 
countries, but supported by the developing nations. Yet, in an unusual move, the US 
sided with Brazil. Together, they modified the original text, putting forward a plan 
that would be accepted by the majority. Removing the penalties clauses, the final 
draft was defined as the CDM. Approved by the Convening Parties, the CDM was 
incorporated in the KP under Article 12 (Johnson 2001: 193-194). Interestingly, even 
if the “Brazilian proposal” could be interpreted as a step-forward to the EU’s 
proposal of binding emission target, it did not obtain the support of the EU. As the 
Earth Bulletin reported from the negotiations, the EU opposed many technical issues 
of the implementation of the CDM, and the parties could not reach an agreement on 
these specificities (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 1997).  
The incorporation of the “Brazilian proposal” as a core instrument of the KP 
was an important step towards the consolidation of Brazil’s leading role in the 
international climate change regime. In fact, the Brazilian position during the 
negotiations of the Protocol could be summarised as the combination of the interest 
to acquire a leading role within the international arena and the promotion of domestic 
interests. Moreover, Brazil had already revealed its commitment to the G77/China at 
COP3, simultaneously pursuing engagement with developed countries (Viola 2002: 
138).  
Achieving an agreement in Kyoto, however, did not guarantee its 
implementation. According to Article 23, the Protocol could only enter into force 
when ratified by at least 55 parties, accounting for a minimum of 55% of global 
production of GHG in 1990 (Kyoto Protocol 1997). Fulfilling those criteria was not a 
smooth process. Whereas signing the Protocol represented a symbolic act, ratifying it 
implied undertaking binding responsibilities and obligations. The long time span 
between the agreement of the KP and the beginning of its entry into force 
                                                
62 Cole and Liverman (2011) provide an interesting account of how the proposal of the Clean Development 
Mechanism features in the context of Brazil’s approach to environmental politics. 
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demonstrated the reluctance of many parties, especially from the Annex I group, to 
further commit to the international climate change regime. Ensuring the 
implementation of the KP was a central interest of the EU and Brazil. 
 3.4.2	   The	   Second	   Challenge:	   Implementing	   the	   Kyoto	   Protocol	  (2001-­‐2004)	  
 
In 2001, President George W. Bush announced that the US would not ratify the KP. 
The decision changed the course of US participation in the international climate 
change regime, but also threatened the entry into force of the Protocol. Without the 
US, reaching the 55% of GHG criteria would require a larger number of ratifications. 
At the same time, the shift in the US approach to multilateral cooperation in this 
realm paved the way for the EU to escalate its leadership within that international 
regime. 
 Given the uncertainty over the future of the Protocol, COP7 in 2001 was 
marked by tense discussions regarding the ratification process, in which the EU and 
Brazil were the protagonists. The alliance between the EU and Brazil was also 
extended to other issues negotiated in Marrakesh. The EU sided with developing 
countries in many of the provisions concerning the implementation of the Protocol 
under negotiation, this time even on the CDM. Originally rejected by Japan, Canada 
and Australia, the Commitment Period Reserve (CPR) of the CDM was supported by 
the G77/China and the EU. Approved, the CPR was included in the final resolution 
of the COP7, known as the “Marrakesh Accord” (Dessai and Schipper 2003:150-
151).  
 One year later, at the eighth COP (COP8), the KP still had not been 
implemented. Brazil and the EU continued to press for ratification, but in other 
issues negotiated in Delhi their engagement varied. Going against other Annex I 
parties, the EU supported the G77/China in the definitions and modalities of Land-
use, Land-Use and Change and Forest (LULUCF). However, Brazil and the EU 
disagreed on the debate of the financial mechanisms of the Climate Change Fund 
(Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2002). The mixed pattern of cooperation between the 
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EU and Brazil on technical issues was extended to politically-sensitive matters. The 
EU joined the group of developed countries, pledging the discussions of a post 2012 
commitment claiming enhanced responsibilities to the non-Annex I group. As 
expected, the G77/China opposed the proposal. Given the impasse, there is no 
mention of a post-2012 period, or of developing countries’ commitments, in the 
“Delhi Declaration” (Roberts and Parks 2007: 134).  
 Without reaching the necessary ratifications of the KP, the ninth COP 
(COP9) in 2003 focused on the functionality of technical instruments of cooperation 
that had been adopted by the “Marrakesh Accord.” In spite of the technical nature of 
most issues negotiated, in Milan the rift between the EU and the developing 
countries, Brazil included, expanded. Based on the Third Assessment Report (TAR) 
of the IPCC, the EU continued to push for the negotiations of post-2012 
commitments. As expected, the G77/China group strongly opposed that. The EU and 
Brazil also had contrasting approaches to the complementary mechanisms of the 
Special Climate Change Funds (SCCF), such as the Global Environmental Fund 
(GEF). Further, the North–South divide was stressed on the debate of the TAR of the 
IPCCC, which adopted a system of information sharing among the parties. Whereas 
for the Annex I group the instrument was rather technical, the developing countries 
perceived it as a political issue, fearing that the proposal could imply enhanced 
commitments for non-Annex I countries in the future (Dessai et. al. 2005; 110- 116).   
 The divergences between the EU and Brazil, the latter essentially represented 
by the G77/China group, over COP8 and COP9, did not undermine the two actors’ 
alliance on the ratification issue. Based on a shared interest in promoting global 
environmental governance under the UN framework, the EU and Brazil, supported 
by others parties, played a strong part at the international level by advocating the 
ratification of the Protocol. As a result of these joint efforts, and especially due to the 
EU’s role a few weeks before COP10, Russia ratified the Protocol, in 2004.63 The 
decision allowed the KP to enter into force, and signalled a major achievement for 
                                                
63  According to John Vogler, the entry into force of the KP was dependent on ratification by Russia. In a trade-
off deal, the EU agreed to support Russia’s membership to the WTO and grant the country some concessions 
regarding the access of Russian gas into the European Single Market in exchange for Russia’s ratification. EU 
economic diplomacy was fundamental in guaranteeing ratification by Russia, thus allowing the KP to be 
implemented (Vogler 2011: 29). 
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the EU’s soft power (Oberthür and Kelly 2008: 26).64 However, the partnership 
between the EU and the developing countries was rather circumstantial and restricted 
to the ratification issue, thus not representing a major shift in the pattern of EU-
Brazil cooperation.   
During COP10 in 2004, the negotiations of the post-2012 commitment period 
continued to create a major divide among the parties. Hosting the meeting, Argentina 
proposed the promotion of seminars on the future of Kyoto after the first 
commitment period. Surprisingly, an extensive debate concentrated on this matter, as 
the suggestion was directly associated with the deepening of cooperation on climate 
change and the increase in responsibilities for developing countries. The Argentinean 
proposal was backed by the EU, but opposed by other important players. The US and 
Saudi Arabia were against any attempt to deepen multilateral cooperation on climate 
change, whereas most developing countries, especially Brazil, China and India, 
rejected the initiative, considering that it would imply further responsibilities for 
non-Annex I parties. In an attempt to reach an agreement, the EU backed the text 
tabled by the US. The political manoeuvre of the EU guaranteed the approval of the 
seminars for 2005, but under a very shallow agenda and poor structure. 
Siding with the US was a characteristic of the EU approach to the tenth 
COP10 in central aspects of the negotiations. This position was grounded in the 
expectation that the EU could convert US scepticism regarding global environmental 
governance to constructive engagement. However, considering the absence of any 
indicator of the US interest in ratifying the KP, the strategy was a dangerous move; 
the EU risked isolation. Not surprisingly, the EU failed to engender a significant 
change in the US position at the multilateral level. The price paid was relatively high, 
as the strategy was decisive in distancing the EU from important developing 
countries, increasing the North-South divide (Ott et.al. 2005: 86-90).  
From 2002 to 2004, the positions of the EU and Brazil at the COPs placed the 
two parties in different sides of the negotiations, with Brazil supporting the 
G77/China and the EU aligning itself with the developed countries. Nonetheless, 
                                                
64  For more on the process of ratification of the Kyoto Protocol in Russia, see Buchner and Dall'Olio (2005) and 
Korppoo (2002).  Hovi (2012), Lisowski (2002), Shaffner (2007), Steurer (2003) analyse the ratification process 
within the United States, and von Stein (2008) provide general overview of the ratification process of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
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whereas Brazil had for long time proved to be loyal to the group of the developing 
countries, the EU’s performance in that period does not indicate a consolidated 
preference in siding with other parties in the Annex I. In the years that followed the 
entry into force of the KP, the EU continued to interchange its preferences for 
coalitions according to the issue at stake, giving new possibilities for alliances with 
Brazil. 
 3.4.3	   The	   Third	   Challenge:	   Agreeing	   on	   the	   Post-­‐2012	  Commitment	  Period	  (2005-­‐2009)	  
 
The first Meeting of the Parties (MOP1) was held in the same year the KP entered 
into force, in 2005. MOP1 was carried out jointly with the eleventh COP (COP11) of 
the UNFCCC; ever since these two meetings have always occurred simultaneously. 
On this occasion, the parties agreed on operational aspects for the implementation of 
the Protocol, reaching important decisions on further commitments for the post-2012 
period. Negotiations were marked by a shift in both the EU and Brazil’s approach. 
Contrasting with the two previous COPs, in Montreal the EU sided with the 
G77/China group in most of the provisions negotiated. Arguably this alignment was 
in part facilitated by the technical character of certain issues, but also by the 
acceptance by the developing countries, including Brazil, to discuss possible 
enhanced commitments to non-Annex I parties (Earth Negotiations Bulletin 2005). 
This trend continued at the twelfth COP (COP12), in Nairobi, in 2006. 
As Eduardo Viola stresses, contradicting its long-standing position against 
the inclusion of forest-related issues in the agenda of negotiations, at COP12 Brazil 
proposed the creation of a global fund to combat deforestation. Financed by the 
Annex I parties, the fund would be distributed in accordance with the performance of 
the countries in reducing deforestation. The proposal was widely supported by the 
G77/China and the EU. However, the opposition of some other parties, and 
fundamentally of the US, hindered the prospects for its approval. The negotiations of 
the fund extended until 2007 (Viola 2007). 
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The EU’s engagement with Brazil and other developing countries was only 
part of the EU’s performance at COP12; the EU also acted unilaterally. During the 
negotiations, the EU strongly defended the objective to keep the temperature increase 
below 2°C. The proposal had not been discussed with other developed or developing 
countries and, when tabled, the G77/China group were opposed. Without further 
attempts of persuading other parties to support the EU plan, the 2°C target was not 
adopted (Sterk at al. 2007: 140-142). 
 The necessity to reach an agreement on the post-2012 period influenced the 
agenda and the negotiations at the thirteenth COP (COP13), in 2007. In Bali, the 
parties achieved concrete results in the direction of setting a roadmap for the second 
commitment period of the KP. One of the most relevant accomplishments was the 
establishment of the Ad-Hoc Working Group on Long-Term Action under the 
Convention (AWG-LCA), aiming at enabling the implementation of the Convention 
beyond 2012. Reaching this agreement, however, required the accommodation of 
divergences among the parties.  
Together with other parties of the G77/China group, Brazil agreed on the 
creation of AWG-LCA, declaring the interest of developing countries in enhancing 
their commitments post-2012. However, they emphasised that national actions 
would be taken. Considering that as a feeble compromise, the US proposed greater 
responsibilities and more specific obligations to the non-Annex I parties. In the midst 
of this dispute, the EU changed its original position and backed the G77/China. 
Isolated, the US was compelled to withdraw its proposal, thus allowing an agreement 
(Afionis 2008: 9). The final declaration includes the establishment of “nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions by developing country parties.” The acceptance of 
these commitments represented a substantial shift in the approach of developing 
countries to multilateral cooperation on climate change. In fact, as exposed before, 
since COP12 Brazil has shown signs of change in central aspects of its long-standing 
position in the negotiations, and the openness to discuss forest issues was reaffirmed 
at COP13. 
Regarding the EU, at the same time it was in favour of relatively soft 
obligations for developing countries, it also engaged with the G77/China in 
defending the adoption of reduction emission targets of 25-40% to the Annex I group 
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by 2020. Opposed by the Umbrella group, the proposal failed to reach consensus, 
and was not included in the final text of the Bali declaration. Nonetheless, the 
achievements made at COP13 were positively relevant for the future the KP. The 
“Bali Action Plan” paved the way for the post-2012 agreement, concluded in 
Copenhagen, two years later in 2005 (Ott et. al. 2008: 91-93). 
 The alliance between the EU and Brazil on many important issues negotiated 
in Bali can be partially credited to their shared understanding that multilateral 
cooperation on climate change should be developed on the basis of the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” principle.65 In fact, this condition was decisive in 
shaping both actors’ positions regarding the discussion of enhanced responsibilities 
to the parties of the Annex I and the non-Annex I. Moreover, the EU-Brazil 
partnership forged in Bali facilitated the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, 
but also contributed to the emergence of their leadership within the international 
climate change regime. Arguably, the increasing role played by both actors and the 
enhanced compatibility of their approaches towards international negotiations could 
have led to a consolidated partnership between the EU and Brazil on climate change 
in the COPs/MOPs to come. However, that was not the case. 
At the fourteenth COP (COP14), in Poznan, the EU played a minor role due 
fundamentally to its inability to articulate a common position among its member 
states.66  On those points of the agenda where the EU had a say, its positions varied. 
The EU opposed the G77/China’s proposal of the “Technical Mechanism under the 
UNFCCC”, presenting its own plan. Divergences between the EU and the 
developing countries also emerged in the discussion of the financial mechanisms for 
the Adaptation Fund. Furthermore, regarding the CDM, the parties disputed the 
instruments to improve project assessment. In this matter, the G77/China group split; 
                                                
65 The commitment to this principle was publically expressed at COP13 by the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso 
Amorim, as he stated that: “Our responsibilities are common. Yet they are differentiated. Those historically 
responsible for greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere must stop preaching and set the example. Annex 
I countries must have new and more ambitious legally binding emission reduction targets. It is extremely 
worrying that some developed countries do not appear to be heading towards meeting their targets under the 
Kyoto Protocol even as the biggest emitter still refuses to join the Protocol” Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
(2007).   
66 The EU’s inability to exert leadership in Poznan was largely on consequence of its focus on domestic affairs, 
especially with the impact of the financial crisis. Moreover, considering the ongoing internal debate on the 
European Energy Package, it was difficult to articulate a common external position on climate change among the 
then 27 member states to be taken to the multilateral level before overcoming the deep divergences on internal 
climate and energy policy. In fact, “for many observers present in Poznan, it seems like the really important 
negotiations did not take place there, but in Brussels” (Santarius et al. 2009: 2). 
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Argentina backed the EU proposal of benchmarks, whereas the BASIC group 
(Brazil, South Africa, India and China) opposed it. In none of these issues was 
agreement reached; the achievements made in Poznan addressed “administrative” 
issues.67 Finally, given the poor role played by the EU and the Umbrella group, the 
real driving forces of the negotiations were the parties of the G77/ China group, and 
the few achievements of Poznan should be credited to them (Santarius 2009: 2-17).  
 The poor results of COP14 put pressure on the parties to advance their 
positions and overcome divergences if they wanted to reach a post-2012 agreement. 
Against this background, the EU and Brazil made significant improvements in their 
internal climate change and environment policies that were determinant in shaping 
their positions at the fifteenth COP (COP15) in 2009.  
A few months before the Conference in Copenhagen, the European Energy 
Package was launched, setting new voluntary targets for GHG emissions of EU 
member states (DG CLIMA 2011b). This internal initiative boosted the EU’s 
confidence on its capacity to articulate a common European policy on climate 
change, suggesting that the EU would be able to speak with a single voice at COP15. 
Moreover, the EU expected that Energy Package would provide evidence of its 
commitment to tackle climate change. On this basis, the EU was confident it would 
play a leading role in Copenhagen. 
According to the European Council, the EU drafted a programme on financial 
and mitigation measures addressed to developing countries to be suggested at 
COP15. In addition, during the same days of COP15, the European Council met in 
Brussels, and agreed to increase their reduction commitment from 20% to 30% by 
2020. In order to undertake this new commitment, the EU would request the 
adoption of similar initiatives by other developed countries and further collaboration 
from developing countries (European Council 2009). 
                                                
67  Rooted in the G77, the BASIC group is an informal coalition of emerging powers that combines the agenda of 
developing countries on climate change with the specific economic interests of the “rising powers”, namely 
Brazil, South Africa, India, and China. With a loose agenda for climate negotiations, the BASIC is not a tight 
group, lacking common position in many issues. What brings this group of countries together is their interest in 
playing a greater role in the international climate change regime. Nevertheless, there is no indicator that this 
shared goal is enough to ensure this informal alliance in the long-run (Hallding  et.al  2011). 
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Like the EU, Brazil also articulated an ambitious position based on voluntary 
commitments to be taken to COP15. Anticipating the Brazilian approach to 
Copenhagen, at the 64th UNGA, in September 2010, Brazilian President Lula da 
Silva declared:  
Brazil is doing its part. We will arrive in Copenhagen with precise alternatives 
and commitments. We have approved a National Climate Change Plan that 
includes an 80% cut in deforestation of the Amazon by 2020. We will reduce 
CO2 emissions by 4.8 billion tons, more than the sum-total of all developed 
country commitments. In 2009, we can already show the lowest deforestation 
rate in 20 years (President Lula, 2009). 
 
As in the case of the EU‘s proposals, the Brazilian decision to adopt 
voluntary commitments at COP15 was motivated by domestic factors. The 
diminishing of deforestation in Brazil registered from 2005 was followed by the 
adoption of policies addressing deforestation, ranging from the creation of new 
regulatory bodies and legislations to financial mechanisms to support initiatives that 
combat deforestation (Hochstetler and Viola 2011: 11). The Brazilian unilateral 
position presented at COP15 could be considered as a transposition of domestic 
changes to the international arena. 
Prepared to affirm their leadership on global climate change negotiations in 
Copenhagen, the role played by Brazil and the EU produced different outcomes.  
According to Joseph Curtin, contradicting its own expectations, at COP15 the 
EU’s role was, at most, very poor. Opting for a unilateral approach, the EU not only 
tabled the internally agreed proposals, but articulated a draft resolution jointed 
almost exclusively by the Presidency of the Conference, Denmark - not 
coincidentally a EU member state. Displeased by this unilateral move, other parties 
opposed the EU proposal of the so-called “Danish resolution.” Without a second 
strategy to be employed, the EU was sidelined by its lack of coordination, failing to 
forge new positions.  
The difficulty in reaching an agreement on post-2012 threatened the future of 
the KP. Aiming at saving Copenhagen from a complete failure, in the last moments 
of COP15, the BASIC group took the lead in drafting a final resolution. Meeting 
behind closed doors, the leaders of BASIC were later joined by the US President 
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Barack Obama. The text produced was then approved at the final meeting of all the 
parties in Copenhagen. As for the EU, “the President of the European Commission 
learned of the agreement they had reached by way of a text message on his phone. 
The EU and its Member States were presented with a text which had been agreed at a 
meeting at which they had not been present” (Curtin 2010: 6).  Featuring among the 
few parties that articulated a last-minute deal in Copenhagen, Brazil was certainly a 
protagonist at COP15. Moreover, the presentation of Brazil’s voluntary 
commitments was one of the highest moments in meeting (Tome Silva 2010: 24). 
Playing a prominent role throughout all the process of negotiations, at COP15 Brazil 
asserted its leadership in the international climate change regime. 
The contrasting roles of Brazil and the EU at COP15 hindered the prospects 
for cooperation between the two partners at the multilateral level in this stage of 
negotiations. The lack of coordination of the EU in articulating a common position 
among its member states obstructed the possibilities of the Union to employ any of 
its common strategies within the international negotiations; i.e., act unilaterally or 
forge alliances. Thus, the positions of EU and Brazil in Copenhagen did not diverge, 
but could also not converge. 
Overall, and in spite of their relatively convergent approach and interest in 
the development of the climate change regime, cooperation between the EU and 
Brazil follows a tortuous path. At least in the period covered and the issues here 
analysed, the pattern of engagement between the two partners at the multilateral level 
can be considered very irregular. The table below (table 12) summarises the 
positions of the two actors in the main points of multilateral negotiations addressed 
in this section, showing the compatibility of their approaches: 
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TABLE	  12	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  POSITIONS	  ON	  KEY	  ISSUES	  OF	  CLIMATE	  NEGOTIATIONS	  
Year Meeting Issue Brazil EU EU X BR 
 
1997 
 
COP3 
15% GHG emission reduction Favour Favour Convergence 
Clean Development Mechanism Favour Against Divergence 
2001 COP7 Commitment Period Reserve Favour Favour Convergence 
Pressure for USA ratification Favour Favour Convergence 
 
2002 
 
COP8 
LULUCF Favour Favour Convergence 
Further commitments for non-Annex I Against Favour Divergence 
Financial instruments CC Fund Against Favour Divergence 
 
2003 
 
COP9 
TAR information sharing Against Favour Divergence 
SCCF instruments (GEF) Diverged Diverged Divergence 
Further commitments for non -Annex I Against Against Divergence 
2004 COP10 Post- 2012 seminars Against Favour Divergence 
 
2005 
COP11 
MOP1 
Technical provisions Favour Favour Convergence 
Further commitments for non-Annex I Favour Favour Convergence 
2006 COP12 
MOP2 
Grants to tackle deforestations Favour Favour Convergence 
2C degrees target Against Favour Divergence 
2007 COP13 
MOP3 
Creation of the AWG- LCA Favour Favour Convergence 
 
2008 
COP14 
MOP4 
Technical mechanisms UNFCCC Favour Against Divergence 
CDM benchmarks Against Favour Divergence 
2009 COP15 
MOP5 
Negotiations on the final declaration Engaged Not 
engaged 
Divergence 
 
Thus, it is plausible to affirm that rather than allies on global climate change 
governance, the EU and Brazil are circumstantial partners. But how does the 
development of cooperation on climate change between the EU and Brazil at the 
multilateral level relate to the pattern of their engagement at the bilateral level? In 
other words, how is the process of level-linkage defined?  
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3.5	  Assessing	  Level-­‐Linkage	  in	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Cooperation	  on	  
Climate	  Change	  
 
Concurring on the need for multilateral cooperation to address climate change, Brazil 
and the EU share an interest in building an effective international regime on this 
realm. Since 2006, bilateral relations between the two partners have been framed 
around this common goal. In incorporating issues of the global agenda in the bilateral 
level of their relations, the EU and Brazil have deployed significant political efforts 
to enhance cooperation on climate change. Two primary instruments highlight the 
success of this strategy. The first refers to the incorporation of climate change in the 
high level political agenda of the EU and Brazil, especially with the establishment of 
the Strategic Partnership, in 2007. Climate change is one of the key “global issues” 
to be addressed by the two partners; a commitment later endorsed by the two Joint 
Action Plans, and evoked in the five annual EU-Brazil Summits held from 2007 to 
2011. The second is the institutionalisation of an annual dialogue on environmental 
issues. Incorporated in the framework of EU-Brazil cooperation in 2006, this 
mechanism evolved into the format of a dialogue specifically on climate change in 
2011.  
The shifts in the EU-Brazil bilateral cooperation from essentially “local” 
issues to the assimilation of the multilateral agenda, together with the creation of new 
mechanisms to foster dialogue on global climate governance demonstrate that EU-
Brazil cooperation has enhanced significantly – at the bilateral level. However, the 
pattern of engagement at this level contrasts with the lack of cooperation at the 
multilateral level. 
Crossing the positions taken by the EU and Brazil at multilateral climate 
change negotiations (see table 12), it is clear that, whereas at the bilateral level 
improvement of cooperation follows a linear and progressive pace, at the multilateral 
level; EU-Brazil cooperation is, at most, irregular. Periods of reciprocal collaboration 
and eventual alliances contrast with diverging positions embraced on other 
occasions. As a result, there was no level-linkage on climate change; enhanced 
dialogue at the bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral arena  has not 
spilled over to the multilateral level. But why has the EU-Brazil strategy to increase 
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cooperation on climate change produced a positive outcome only at the bilateral 
level? In other words, why does enhanced DBLCM not have an impact on the 
engagement between the EU and Brazil in the context of multilateral negotiations, as 
the partners expected? 	  3.5.1	  The	  Regime	  Type	  
 
One of the arguments of this thesis is that level-linkage depends on the type of 
international regime under which cooperation is framed. Considered as a regime 
“still under construction” (Luterbacher and Sprinz 2001: 297), and defined as “an 
open-ended regime that contemplates an evolutionary process” (Bodansky and 
Diringer 2010: 13), agreements on climate change are subjected to continuous 
amendment processes, and are negotiated under a “convention-protocol method.” 
According to this two-phase approach, international actors first agree on the general 
terms of cooperation, proceeding with negotiations on detailed measures and binding 
obligations only in a second stage (O’Neill 2009:79-80).  
In terms of their structure, the institutional arrangements of the UNFCCC and 
the KP are based on the direct engagement of the parties. As defined in Article 7 of 
the UNFCCC,68 the Conference of the Parties is the “supreme body of the 
Convention.” The Secretariat and other agencies operate at a technical and 
organisational level; the political agenda of the international climate change regime 
is a responsibility of the parties. This structure enhances the importance of the 
international actors in this process. 
As part of the dynamics of multilateral cooperation, the promotion of an 
actor’s interest requires persuading others to agree on the same issue. In many cases, 
this process is successful when a majority supports a given proposal. In the case of 
climate change, however, decisions are taken by consensus. According to Joanna 
                                                
68  “The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under regular review the 
implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, 
and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the 
Convention” (UNFCCC, 1992, Article 7).  
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Depledge, decision-making by consensus, in theory, attributes equal weight to the 
parties within negotiations, consequently, implying greater procedural equity. In 
practice, however, the outcome is commonly the least common denominator 
possible. Laggards in negotiations, even when a minority, manage to weaken the 
content of the agreement. Finally, consensus “raises the transaction costs of the 
negotiation process, as greater efforts are required to secure even minor decisions” 
(Depledge 2005: 95). Arriving at negotiations with a relevant number of supporters 
enhances the potential gains from cooperation, as the amount of players to be 
persuaded at the multilateral level decreases. Decisions by consensus then increase 
the importance of alliances; at the same time, unilateral behaviour is discouraged.  
The agenda of negotiations and the structure of the international climate 
regime create incentives for the EU and Brazil to play an active role in the framing of 
multilateral climate governance. In addition, the decision-making process by 
consensus enhances the inclination of the parties to join their forces, making the EU-
Brazil strategic partnership more appealing. To a certain extent, the political alliance 
forged between the two actors at the bilateral level can be credited to the recognition 
of their limited capacity to promote their interests alone. In addition, the adoption of 
such a strategy stems from the understanding that the nature of the international 
climate change regime allows for an interaction between the bilateral level and the 
multilateral level of cooperation. 
Thus, it can be inferred that the institutional design and decision-making 
process of the UN framework for cooperation on climate change and the complexity 
of the agendas of negotiations, together with the norms and the scope of the regime, 
create a multilateral context relatively open to influence by external factors, such as 
cooperation at other levels. The “regime type” is favourable for level-linkage.  
 3.5.2	  The	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  Two	  Actors’	  Approaches	  	  
 
For different reasons, the EU and Brazil share an interest in global climate 
governance. Moreover, external climate policies of both parties are grounded on the 
preference for multilateralism as the strategy to address climate issues.  
  
 
133 
As Robert Falkner argues, the EU “has come to consider the need to 
participate in multilateral environmental institutions building as a ‘good citizenship’ 
norm in international society” (Falkner 2005: 597). The EU’s interest in engaging 
within this regime is largely justified by the EU’s aspiration to enhance its relevance 
as an international actor.69 Based on a preference for a normative approach, but also 
considering its incapacity to exert coercive power over others, the EU pursues “soft 
leadership.” In employing its “soft power,” the strategy adopted in international 
climate change negotiations combines “leadership of example,” with the emphasis on 
negotiation, argumentation and persuasion. The expected outcome is to promote the 
establishment of a rule-based model of environmental global governance, exporting 
the EU’s normative preferences (Oberthürand Kelly 2008: 36-44). 
Power and actorness explain part of the EU’s interest in promoting 
multilateral cooperation on climate change; material elements are also behind this 
preference. With an energy matrix extremely dependent on external supplies of fossil 
fuels, gas and coal, the EU has employed significant efforts in adopting more non-
fossil fuel sources of energy.70 However, renewing its energy matrix requires large 
investments and political and social support, having implications for the EU’s 
international competitiveness. In proposing to tackle climate change through the 
adoption of emission reduction commitments by other developed countries, the EU is 
trying to share the burden of its own necessity; hence the emphasis on 
multilateralism (Groenleer and Van Schaik 2007: 984). 
For Brazil, “the environmental issue is articulated in the government’s 
foreign policy for the construction of a new world order, one that is sustainable, 
multilateral, less asymmetric and built on democratic institutions” (Vizentini and 
Reis da Silva 2010: 63). This claim defines the Brazilian approach to multilateral 
climate change adopted since the late 1980s; contrasting with its sceptical 
participation at the first debates on the establishment of environmental regimes, back 
in the early 1970s.  
                                                
69  Groenleer and Van Schaik (2007), and Pavese and Torney (2012) analyse EU actorness in the case of climate 
change, whereas Afionis, S. (2011), Connelly and Rüdiger (2011), Gupta and Grubb (2000), Karlsson et.al. 
(2010), Mehling and Massai (2007), Oberthür (2009), Vogler and Bretherton (2006) promote an interesting 
discussion on the EU’s leadership in the international climate regime. 
70  The EU imported 85.3% of oil and 64% of gas consumed in 2009 (European Commission 2011). 
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The shift towards a more cooperative approach is largely justified by the 
strategic interest in promoting Brazil’s image as a relevant global player in the 
international arena through its participation on global environmental governance. 
Further, domestic interests and the assimilation of the “sustainable development 
discourse” have also contributed to a change in Brazil’s participation in the 
negotiations (Viola 2002: 34). Nevertheless, even if considering that addressing 
climate issues requires effective North-South cooperation (Barros-Platiau 2006: 
261), Brazil has employed diplomatic efforts to assert its role as a strong player, and, 
above all, a leader of the developing countries within the international climate 
change.  
Like the EU, by taking strong positions and actively contributing to 
international negotiations, Brazil aims to employ a sort of “normative power.” In 
addition to influencing rules and principles that constitute the basis of the 
international climate change regime, the occasions on which Brazil assumed 
unilateral voluntary commitments could be considered as a strategy of “leadership by 
example.”71 Those similarities in terms of strategies employed at the multilateral 
level between the EU and Brazil contrast with differences regarding preferences for 
unilateral or joint positions. On this issue, the EU has adopted an independent 
approach on more occasions than Brazil, which places greater emphasis in 
coordinating its positions with other parties. 
Arguably, Brazil and the EU share the understanding that multilateralism is 
the best modality of cooperation to address climate change. Moreover, the two 
partners have similar foreign policy strategies, as multilateralism is also considered 
an instrument to enhance their relevance in the global arena. However, as this is a 
regime still in the process of definition, a EU-Brazil partnership to promote 
“effective multilateralism” on climate change can only be consolidated if the two 
parties have compatible understanding of the principles that should provide the basis 
for global climate governance, also on the agenda of negotiations. 
According to Ana Paula Barros-Platiau, the Brazilian position on climate 
change negotiations is guided by the general principles of its diplomacy, namely: 
                                                
71  For an account of Brazil’s role and engagement with multilateral climate negotiations, see Barros-Platiau 
(2010), Hochstetler and Viola (2012), Johnson (2001), and Viola (2004).  
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common but differentiated responsibilities; international cooperation; right to 
development; sovereignty; and equity and pacific solution of conflicts (Barros-
Platiau 2011: 22).   
Over time, the association of these principles has generated different political 
guidelines. In the “strong nationalist phase” of the 1970s, Brazil claimed that 
industrialised nations had the solely and historical responsibility over environmental 
concerns. Developing countries should be entitled the right to pursue their economic 
development autonomously, without any international constrains. In the shift of 
paradigms in the Brazilian standing on climate negotiations that preceded the 1992 
Rio Summit, the new and current - position has remained grounded on the principle 
of “common, but differentiated responsibilities.” The difference between the two 
phases is in the conciliation of the right to development with sustainability (Viola 
2002: 34-35). As demonstrated in the section above, throughout the negotiations 
rounds analysed, Brazil has supported legally binding obligations to Annex I, but 
also demonstrated more tolerance on enhancing the participation of developing 
countries in the aspects of mitigation, adaptation and monitoring of climate change, 
and even in the inclusion of forest issues. 
From the EU perspective, as John Vogler claims, positions taken at the 
multilateral climate negotiations have been the outcome of the combination of two 
factors: the development of EU internal climate policy, and the principle of 
“common but differentiated responsibilities” (Vogler 2011: 33). In supporting 
differentiated responsibilities to developed countries the EU has traditionally pushed 
for strong GHG reduction commitments for the Annex I. Nevertheless, the EU’s 
approach is also critical of developing countries, as the EU favours the restriction on 
the exploitation of forests and other carbon sinks (Oberthür and Kelly 2008: 36). 
These preferences indicate a rather independent approach towards multilateral 
negotiations that characterises the EU’s participation in the international climate 
change regime throughout the period analysed here. 
Different membership to the Annex I implies distinct obligations at the 
international climate change regime and could imply opposing approaches on 
international negotiations. However, in broad terms, the EU and Brazil have similar 
positions on the guiding principles and the general agenda of the regime. The 
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“principle of common but differentiated responsibilities” embraced by both partners 
implies the acceptance of uneven commitments on climate issues as a starting point 
to build up a partnership. Based on this principle, the EU and Brazil have positioned 
themselves in favour of greater responsibilities to the Annex I parties, a perspective 
that conflicts with the view of some developed countries. Thus, this shared 
understanding reinforces the choice of Brazil as the EU’s strategic partner. 
So far, the two players have supported the establishment of a regime 
grounded on ambitious legally binding GHG emission reduction targets applying 
only to the Annex I parties. Consequently, on this basis, an effective climate change 
regime requires the engagement of several developed economies, hence the interest 
of EU and Brazil in persuading other parties to ratify the KP, producing a 
multilateral framework of cooperation with a large membership. 
Regarding their own participation, the EU and Brazil have contributed 
actively to ongoing negotiations, submitting proposals and undertaking voluntary 
commitments. In an attempt to influence the others and to demonstrate its 
engagement, the EU went further than its legally binding obligations, internally 
agreeing on greater targets for emission reduction. In a similar way, Brazil adopted 
voluntary commitment to reduce its GHG emissions. The resemblances between 
these foreign policies are not only in the content of the decisions, but also on the 
strategy employed by both partners to convert the announcement of their unilateral 
positions into an opportunity to project their images as international actors in the 
regime. 
Nevertheless, it is noteworthy that the decision to undertake voluntary 
commitments to GHG emissions by no means implies a change on Brazil’s position 
towards legally binding obligations to developing countries. This view is in line with 
the concept of “common but differentiated responsibility” also observed by the EU. 
However, according to this principle, even if distinct, responsibilities should apply to 
all parties. A clash between the EU and Brazil’s approaches then emerges regarding 
the extension and the nature of the commitments of developing countries. 
On several occasions the EU has pushed for enhanced obligations to 
developing countries, firmly opposed by Brazil and other G77/China members, as 
occurred at COP8 and COP11, for example. According to Kathryn Hochstetler and 
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Eduardo Viola, Brazil and other emerging economies justify their position on Article 
4.7 of the UNFCCC, which states that the primary objective of developing countries 
is the eradication of poverty and social and economic development. In addition, the 
Article establishes that the implementation of developing countries’ commitments is 
subjected to the financial and technological assistance of developed countries as 
defined by the Convention (Hochstetler and Viola 2011: 5). Thus, in spite of 
agreeing on “differentiated responsibilities” as the golden principle of the climate 
change regime, the EU and Brazil have diverging interpretation of the degree of the 
obligations of the parties, posing an obstacle for their cooperation. 
Concerning the agenda of negotiations, a critical point that has emerged in 
many rounds of negotiations are forest-related issues. As discussed before, for 
decades Brazil refused to include these issues in the discussions, resisting the EU’s 
pressure. Hochstetler and Viola explain that Brazilian negotiators feared that taking 
forest issues to the international agenda “would eventually open Brazil to 
international liability for the high rates of deforestation in the Amazon that the 
Brazilian government evidently could not control.” New domestic policies 
implemented in the early 2000s successfully changed the course of deforestation, 
reflecting in the openness to negotiate forest matters that has characterised Brazil’s 
position in multilateral climate negotiation since 2006 (Hochstetler and Viola 2011: 
9-12). 
Interestingly enough, this shift in the Brazilian approach holds the potential to 
increase the points of convergence of interests between the two actors regarding the 
agenda of multilateral negotiations. In practice, however, the prospects of 
cooperation on this issue are limited. Reluctant to include the Amazon in the 
international agenda, Brazil is sceptical of the EU’s discourse on Brazilian forests. 
According to an official from the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the problem 
is the strong association that the EU makes between climate issues and deforestation 
when it comes to bilateral dialogues with Brazil. In his opinion, “the EU has always 
to find a mission to save the world,” behaving on the basis of its “complex of 
superiority,” trying to “teach Brazil how to deal with its forests, when the EU has 
exterminates its own primary forests.” Further, “the EU’s approach remains 
  
 
138 
associated by many Europeans with the idea of the internationalisation of the 
Amazon”.72 
This argument that the EU is in favour of an international control over the 
Amazon cannot be generalised. In the opinion of a Member of the European 
Parliament, for example, EU-Brazil cooperation on climate change and energy 
should prioritise the protection of the Amazon; “preserving it should be a universal 
responsibility. The EU should cooperate with Brazil on this matter”.73 
 Nevertheless, different interpretations have not prevented the partners from 
cooperating on forest related issues, at all levels. Bilaterally, the 2007-2013 Country 
Strategy Paper defines that, regarding the environment, “the EC’s main priority will 
be to contribute to protecting the environment - more specifically Brazilian forests - 
and to combating poverty in fragile biomes” (European Commission 2007). At the 
multilateral level, deforestation was included in the points of EU-Brazil dialogues 
concerning the agenda of climate negotiations. In JAP I, for example, the partners 
agreed to “strengthen their cooperation and support ongoing efforts to reduce 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, in accordance with decision 
2/CP.13 of the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC” (Council of the European 
Union 2008).  
 Throughout the negotiation rounds analysed, the compatibility of the two 
partners’ opinions regarding the instruments of the framework of multilateral 
cooperation varied. Conflicting views on the CDM, and on the Financial Instruments 
of the Climate Change Fund, contrast with similar positions on the CPR, and on the 
creation of the AWG-LCA, providing examples of the irregular pattern of 
convergence of the EU-Brazil approaches. It is also remarkable that on the same 
round of negotiations the compatibility of their positions has varied according to the 
instrument being discussed, demonstrating complete lack of coordination of the EU 
and Brazil understanding on technical aspects of the establishment of the 
international climate change regime. 
                                                
72Interview n24, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
73Interview n26, Brussels, 13 July 2011. 
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 Lack of coordination, however, does not mean conflicting approaches. Even 
in the points in which the EU’s and Brazil’s positions do not converge, there is still 
room for dialogue and, eventually, for cooperation. Overall, the EU and Brazil have 
similar understandings and interests in multilateral climate regime and have shaped 
their external climate policies on the basis of similar principles and strategies. These 
aspects foment the prospects of enhanced EU-Brazil cooperation on climate change. 
Further, as argued above, the structure of the climate change regime facilitates the 
spillover of cooperation from the bilateral level to the multilateral level. However, in 
the case of climate change, there was no level-linkage. To unveil this puzzle and 
fully understand this process it is necessary to scrutinise the other two hypotheses of 
this thesis: the decision-making process, and the preference for partners. 
 3.5.3	  Foreign	  Policy	  Decision-­‐Making	  Processes	  
 
Drawing from the analytical perspective of the Bureaucratic Decision-Making 
Model, this thesis considers foreign policy agencies as “procedural organizations” 
with strong bureaucratic structures (Wilson 1989: 164). This thesis claims that the 
bureaucratic model of foreign policy-making that defines the EU and Brazil’s 
approaches towards climate change negotiations is one of the determining factors 
shaping level-linkage. It argues that, in this process, foreign policy decision-making 
is influenced not only by a hierarchical structure of agents, but also in terms of the 
priority given to the different levels of cooperation.  
In the case of climate change, foreign policy addressing multilateral 
cooperation prevails over EU-Brazil bilateral relations. This “top-down” approach 
characterises the foreign policies of both partners, and has direct implications for the 
agenda and the role of the agents engaged in their bilateral relations. First, dialogue 
at the bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral arena  (DBLCM) is based 
on the agenda of multilateral negotiations. But, rather than covering the broad range 
of topics from the international climate change regime, dialogue at the bilateral level 
is selective and restricted to the issues of greater interest of the partners. As the texts 
of the many joint bilateral declarations and documents providing the basis for EU-
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Brazil cooperation on climate change suggest, their bilateral agenda addresses 
essentially points in which the two actors have similar approaches. Consequently, 
dialogues held at the bilateral level can potentially strengthen EU-Brazil cooperation 
on issues of convergence; however, they fail to lead to an agreement on matters in 
which the partners have adopted divergent positions at the multilateral level. 
Even if the strengthening of EU-Brazil relations at the bilateral level has 
limited capacity to forge new joint positions, it contributes to reducing the chances of 
conflict when they interact at the multilateral level. The reason for that is the strong 
emphasis on the “exchanging of views” in the agenda of the meetings held at the 
bilateral level. Members of the staff from both the EU and the Brazilian governments 
interviewed stressed that bilateral level provides an opportunity to exchange 
information on each partner’s position on multilateral negotiations.7475 In anticipating 
their approaches, the EU and Brazil can identify points in which their external 
climate policies converge. Having this information prior to negotiation rounds 
facilitates cooperation between the two actors at the multilateral level even if an 
alliance has not being previously agreed. The reason is because each partner has 
more time to evaluate the possibility of siding with each other in a given multilateral 
summit. Moreover, even when the outcome of the Summit does not indicate 
enhanced coordination of the two players’ positions, “exchanging views” prior to 
negotiations benefits the EU and Brazil. Having the information on the probable 
position of a third party in a multilateral negotiation affects individual calculation of 
the best strategy to increase the prospects of gain from cooperation. In other words, 
enhanced DBLCM can contribute to the strengthening of EU-Brazil engagement at 
the multilateral international climate regime, even if with limitation.  
 The detachment of multilateral and bilateral policies translates into 
institutional frameworks that isolate agents engaging in the policy- making of the 
two levels. This structure poses several organisational and procedural obstacles for 
the agents that are part of EU-Brazil bilateral cooperation to influence policy-makers 
responsible for the parties’ positions at the multilateral level. Policy-makers directly 
responsible for the development of EU-Brazil DBLCM do not participate in 
                                                
74  Interview n24, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
75  Interview n19, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
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multilateral negotiations, and vice-versa. This “division of labour” is present in the 
decision-making processes of both partners; however, it is more accentuated in the 
case of the EU.  
As explained earlier in this chapter, as an area of “shared competences”, the 
EU policy-making is characterised by a clear divide between bilateral and 
multilateral policies. Whereas the European Commission leads the development of 
bilateral cooperation with Brazil, multilateral climate policy is subjected to a more 
complex process of “multi-level governance” in which the Council of the European 
Union and the 28 EU member states play a strong role in forging EU’s approach to 
multilateral climate negotiations, in coordination with the European Commission. 
Yet, even within the European Commission, agents and divisions in charge of 
bilateral climate policy are not responsible for EU’s multilateral policy.  
In the case of Brazil, competences are relatively more centralised. Always in 
coordination with other ministries, Itamaraty is the main responsible for forging 
bilateral cooperation with the EU on climate change, at least at the political level. 
Like the EU, Brazilian multilateral climate policy-making entails a plural number of 
actors, with the Itamaraty sharing competences with other bodies from the executive 
power that have been very active in defining Brazilian climate policy, but also 
representing Brazil in multilateral climate negotiations. As explained by a Brazilian 
diplomat, agents that take part in shaping bilateral cooperation with the EU are not 
the same engaged in multilateral negotiations. Although there is coordination 
between policies addressed to the two levels, as both the bilateral and the multilateral 
policy-making processes need to be shaped in accordance with the broad guidelines 
of Brazilian external climate policy.  
To summarise, the policy-making processes of the EU and Brazil challenges 
level-linkage for two core reasons. The first is the hierarchy in terms of agenda. 
Bilateral policies are subjected to multilateral policies, therefore setting the policy-
making process in the opposite direction of level-linkage analysed in this thesis. In 
other words, the priority the EU and Brazil give to their “multilateral” climate policy 
establishes a process in which policies addressing multilateral cooperation impact 
bilateral policies, and not the contrary. Adding to this picture, the second obstacle to 
level-linkage is the decentralisation, or fragmentation, of policy-making processes. In 
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neither the EU nor Brazil agents and agencies in charge of bilateral cooperation are 
the same responsible for multilateral climate policies. Consequently, there is limited 
coordination amongst policy-makers at the two levels, hindering the possibility of 
bureaucrats in charge of bilateral policies to influence the making of “multilateral” 
climate policies significantly enough to promote level-linkage. In light of this, this 
thesis argues that foreign policy-making of the EU and Brazil play against level-
linkage on climate change.  
 3.5.4	  Preferences	  for	  Partners	  	  
 
Multilateralism entails a large number of players. The calculation of the strategic 
gains from cooperation with a given partner at the multilateral level depends on the 
evaluation of the prospects of partnership with third parties. Hence, enhanced EU-
Brazil bilateral cooperation at the multilateral level (BCML) requires a preference 
for this bilateral alliance when the two partners could opt to side with other actors, 
forming opposing negotiating coalitions. Ideally, decisions made at the bilateral level 
could best influence EU-Brazil cooperation at the multilateral arena if the strategic 
partnership is transposed to all levels, converting the two actors into great allies at 
climate negotiations. In a second ideal scenario, cooperation could be advanced 
indirectly, with each partner influencing their respective negotiating groups to 
coordinate their positions. The presence of a larger number of players at the 
multilateral level then poses a problem for a positive level-linkage when the EU and 
Brazil form different coalitions with conflicting agendas. 
In principle, the EU and Brazil have different memberships in the three 
grouping compositions at the UN framework for cooperation on climate change 
defined according to annex list, geographical location and political affinity). Part of 
the Annex I of the UNFCCC, EU member states are distributed in three geographic 
groups of the UN, namely Asia group, Eastern European group, and Western 
European and Others group. Further, the 28 EU member states form a “political 
group” within negotiations in itself.  
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At the UNFCCC, Brazil features in the list of non-Annex I countries. 
Regarding the UN geographical criteria, it belongs to the Latin America and 
Caribbean States group (GRULAC), whereas at the political level Brazil traditionally 
negotiates in coordination with the G77/China and, recently, through the BASIC 
group; this latter is formed by Brazil, South Africa, India and China. 
As the account of negotiations suggested, when opting for a partner, actors 
tend to engage with members with whom they share political affinity, rather than 
through alliances set up by geographical or annex-related factors. These political 
coalitions were formed as the outcome of the practice of negotiations, rather than 
formally being incorporated to the institutional design of the UN framework. In fact, 
throughout the negotiation rounds analysed here, Brazil revealed strong preference 
for aligning with other developing countries, especially the G77/China and the 
BASIC group. There were a few occasions on which Brazil opted for a unilateral 
approach.  
This preference for coalitions contrasts with the strategies employed by the 
EU; configuring a political group in itself, the EU’s positions within negotiations are 
the result of an alliance of forged among its 28 member states. This may explain why 
the EU has adopted an independent approach to negotiations, characterised by the 
combination of unilateral positions with alliances with either developed or 
developing countries. 
The preferences for partners produce a double effect on level-linkage, 
undermining or fostering the prospects of enhanced EU-Brazil DBLCM to spillover 
to the multilateral arena. As demonstrated before, the pattern of engagement between 
the two partners at the multilateral level is very irregular. In the same negotiation 
round, the EU and Brazil adopt converging and opposing positions, depending on the 
issue at stake. Interestingly, as Brazil is very loyal to the G77/China and the BASIC 
group, in most of the opportunities in which the EU and Brazil sided with each other 
was due to the EU strategic choice in aligning with developing countries, not the 
other way around.  
Empirical evidence of the Brazilian strategic choice for siding with 
developing countries can be found in abundance at the negotiation rounds assessed. 
With the exception of the CDF proposed unilaterally at COP3, and the 
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announcement of its voluntary commitments at COP15, Brazil’s final positions in 
major political issues negotiated have taken into consideration the perspective of 
other developing countries. On a few occasions, Brazil has aligned with developed 
countries and not with its traditional partners. The converting of the CDF proposal 
into the CDM jointly presented with the US, and the campaigning with the EU and 
other parties on the ratification of the KP are two examples of that. However, even 
on these occasions Brazil’s approach was never conflicting with that of the 
G77/China and the BASIC group. 
Concerns over reconciling its perspective with that of developing countries 
are a determining factor shaping the Brazilian position on international climate 
change negotiation. Eventually, safeguarding its key partnerships has implied 
holding back ambitious commitments that Brazil would be ready to undertake. As 
Kathryn Hochstetler and Eduardo Viola contend, “the unified position of the BASIC 
countries in Copenhagen and Cancun understated Brazil’s individual commitment to 
unilateral action” (Hochstetler and Viola 2011: 6). The choice for presenting a lower 
level of engagement that it would be individually willing to assume stemmed from a 
strategic cost-benefit analysis of joining the BASIC coalition. Arguably, in acting 
through BASIC, Brazil has contributed to enhancing the political weight of the group 
within multilateral negotiations, especially since the decisive role it played at 
COP15. 
Against this background, it is plausible to affirm that enhanced EU-Brazil 
DBLCM has not favoured changing their preferences in terms of alliances when 
considering all players engaged in international climate negotiations. When 
questioned if the EU was the key partner for Brazil at multilateral climate 
negotiations, a Brazilian diplomat was categorical: “The G77/ China and the BASIC 
group are the priority for Brazil”.76 
The EU is aware of Brazil’s preferences. As reported by a member of the 
European Commission, “Brazil will never drop its coalition with the G77/China 
group to side with the EU”.77 Thus, from both sides, there is no expectation that 
enhanced DBLCM will be translated into a strategic partnership at the multilateral 
                                                
76 Interview n31, Brussels, 31 July 2011. 
77 Interview n19, Brussels, 11 July 2011. 
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level, with the EU and Brazil prioritizing their alliance above all other possible 
partners. 
Like Brazil, the EU has not changed its foreign policy strategy as far as 
coalitions are concerned. Throughout all the period analysed, the EU’s approach has 
combined unilateral actions with eventual coordination of positions with a plural 
range of partners. There is no linearity in the EU’s choices; preferences for 
promoting its interest through alliances may take place in parallel with unilateral 
positions. Arguably, constituting a negotiating group per se, individual EU positions 
are the result of bargaining and negotiations among 28 parties of the UNFCCC and 
the KP, all EU member states. Hence, when acting unilaterally, the EU is 
representing the interest of a plurality of parties. Engaging with external partners is a 
second exercise of forming coalitions within the EU external climate policy-making. 
When negotiating partnerships with other players, the EU has to observe the position 
internally agreed upon among its member states. The preferences of EU external 
partners may vary according to the compatibility of these actors’ approaches to 
negotiations with that of the EU. This argument explains, in part, EU’s mixed pattern 
of choice for partners. 
In the absence of a strong EU-Brazil bilateral alliance at the multilateral 
level, prospects for enhanced cooperation between the two partners at international 
climate negotiations depend on the coordination of the EU’s position with that of 
coalitions Brazil belongs to. To a certain extent, the EU’s independent approach 
facilitates this process. Having an autonomous agenda, the EU’s positions are not 
conditioned to the perspective of other parties of the Annex I. In fact, in many 
situations, the EU has pushed for stronger commitments for developed economies; at 
the same time it has pressured developing countries to undertake further 
responsibilities in the regime. Thus, if an alliance with Brazil requires considering 
the perspective of other developing countries, it does not demand taking into account 
the agenda of the Annex I parties other than the EU member states.  
One of the problems of the dynamics of EU’s interactions with third parties is 
the lack of cohesion among EU member states on a common EU position. As climate 
change is an area of shared competences, internal coordination is an essential 
requirement for EU actorness within the international climate change regime. On 
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some occasions, the EU’s inability to react swiftly in negotiations has hampered the 
prospects of its leadership in the international climate change regime. Nevertheless, 
in spite of the many difficulties, the EU’s presence at the multilateral level has been 
able not only to deliver a coordinated position in many negotiation rounds, but also 
to undertake long-term commitments, contributing to shaping the international 
climate change regime on a more ambitious basis (Vogler 2011: 27-28). 
The unique profile of the EU, as the only REIO that is part of the UNFCCC 
and the KP, has implications for its performance in the climate regime and its 
partnerships. Adopting pre-established and fixed positions in negotiations, the EU 
has only one card to play in the bargaining game of international cooperation. 
Alliances with third parties are more likely to be formed when the EU’s original 
position is compatible with that of other players, like Brazil. Should this not be the 
case, another possibility of a coalition between the two partners is Brazil adapting its 
approach to the EU’s. 
In light of this, enhanced DBLCM could actually facilitate EU-Brazil BCML, 
since the “exchange of view” in bilateral dialogues could have an impact on the 
partners’ positions prepared for the negotiations. Even if joint positions do not 
emerge from these bilateral meetings, the information shared assists the partners to 
adopt compatible approaches. Here, the hierarchy between the two levels of 
cooperation poses a problem. As argued above, level-linkage on EU-Brazil 
cooperation on climate change is characterised by a hierarchical and “top-down” 
approach, in which the bilateral level of cooperation is shaped according to the 
partners’ policies at the multilateral level; never the other way around. As a result, 
the bilateral level has limited capacity to serve as a platform for strengthening EU-
Brazil engagement at the international climate change regime. 
 
3.6	  	  Conclusion	  
 
This chapter explored the linkage between the bilateral level and the multilateral 
level of EU-Brazil cooperation in the field of climate change. The primary objective 
here was to assess whether or not a change in the pattern of cooperation at the first 
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level had an impact on the latter. Furthermore, it analysed the EU-Brazil strategy of 
setting the bilateral level as a platform to strengthen their engagement at the 
multilateral arena. After contextualizing the international climate regime, the chapter 
proceeded with the scrutiny of EU-Brazil cooperation, breaking down the analysis 
into the two levels. The final part assessed the process of level-linkage. 
Overall, it can be concluded that DBLCM has changed in terms of scope and 
approach. Until the early 2000s, the bilateral agenda of EU-Brazil relations has 
addressed environmental issues under a local focus. Political discourse and projects 
funded were restricted to the regional dimension of environmental problems. 
Recently, however, elements of the multilateral agenda have been imported into the 
bilateral level of cooperation. Evolving at a progressive pace, EU-Brazil relations 
developed at the bilateral level currently address climate change under a local and 
global perspective. In terms of approach, there has been a change in the instruments 
adopted to promote cooperation in this realm. In addition to the “Country Strategy 
Paper,” the EU and Brazil have adopted new mechanisms to their framework of 
cooperation, such as sectoral dialogues, and the 2007 EU-Brazil Strategic 
Partnership, this later followed by two Joint Action Plans.  
It is noteworthy that the aim of the partners was not to address global climate 
change bilaterally, replacing multilateralism with bilateralism. Hence, the political 
effort employed by the EU and Brazil has been successful in institutionalising new 
channels of dialogue on global climate governance at the bilateral level, eventually 
contributing to the strengthening of their engagement at multilateral arena, and in 
line with the objectives of the Strategic Partnership. In light of this, it can be argued 
that cooperation on climate change at the bilateral level has increased over the period 
analysed. 
 However, the analysis of EU-Brazil BCML has reached a different 
conclusion. In spite of the enhancement of the two partners’ engagement at the 
bilateral level, the pattern of EU-Brazil BCML has not been altered, remaining 
irregular throughout the ten negotiations rounds investigated. Since changes at the 
bilateral level have had no impact on the multilateral level, there was no level-
linkage on climate change. 
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In order to explain this outcome, this thesis analysed the four hypotheses that 
might influence this process. Starting with the first primary hypothesis, the “regime 
type”, it concludes that, as a regime “under construction”, the international climate 
change regime is relatively open to influences from other levels of cooperation. 
Lacking a rigid institutional framework, and placing greater emphasis on the role of 
the parties, elements of the multilateral agenda can be transposed to the bilateral 
level and discussed at that level, as the EU and Brazil have done. But to move from 
discussion to the reaching of a common understanding, it is essential to have a shared 
approach on how to frame global climate governance. Exploring the “compatibility 
of the two actors’ approaches,” the first secondary hypothesis, it can be argued that, 
overall, the EU and Brazil have similar perspectives on the principles and norms that 
should constitute the basis for the international climate change regime. Furthermore, 
the two partners support the development of cooperation on a multilateral basis, both 
having strategic interests in that. But why there was no level-linkage? 
 The “foreign policy decision-making processes”(primary hypothesis) of the 
two actors pose a major problem to level-linkage. In case of both players, there is 
hierarchical structure that affects the agenda and the interaction among the agents. In 
a “top-down” approach, foreign policies prioritise multilateralism over bilateral 
relations. Consequently, the agenda and the positions taken at the bilateral level are 
subjected to those of the multilateral level. Regarding the agents, there is not only a 
hierarchy, but also a fragmentation in the decision-making process. Agents taking 
part in the development of DBLCM are not the same responsible for the setting of 
foreign policies addressing the multilateral level. This “division of labour” is even 
greater in the case of the EU, where decision-makers from each policy level belong 
to different EU institutions. Together, the hierarchical structure and the fragmented 
distribution of competences inhibit the prospects of decision-making at the bilateral 
level to influence the policy-making processes addressing multilateral cooperation.  
 Ideally, level-linkage would benefit from the prioritising of a EU-Brazil 
alliance at multilateral negotiations over all “preferences for partners”(secondary 
hypothesis). However, this has not been the case. Brazil’s engagement with the 
development of the international climate change regime has always been defined by 
the siding with its counterparts in the non-Annex I, especially the G77/China and the 
BASIC group. A preference that characterises Brazil’s approach towards 
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multilateralism in other areas, as the case studies on trade and human rights 
conducted in the next two chapters of this thesis demonstrate. The EU, on the other 
hand, has adopted a more independent approach, changing its partnerships between 
other parties from the Annex I or developing countries, when not acting unilaterally. 
Thus, even if a strong alliance between the two partners has not been forged, it did 
not obstruct all possibilities for their cooperation. The occasions on which the EU 
and Brazil have acted together were the coordination of the positions of the EU with 
that of negotiating groups Brazil belongs to. The different “preferences for partners” 
is an obstacle for a level-linkage only when the positions of the coalitions the two 
actors belong to are incompatible. 
 Comparing the four hypotheses, this chapter concludes that all the factors 
play a role in the process of level-linkage. Whereas the “regime type” and “the 
compatibility of approaches” facilitate a positive outcome in this process, the impact 
of the “preference for partners” may vary. Nonetheless, the “foreign policy decision-
making processes” disfavours the prospects of enhanced dialogue at the bilateral 
level for cooperation at the multilateral arena  to positively influence the pattern of 
engagement between two actors at the multilateral level. There was no level-linkage 
on EU-Brazil cooperation, arguably the “foreign policy decision-making processes” 
factor has a heavier weight in defining the outcome of level-linkage – at least in the 
case of climate change. 
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CHAPTER4	  
Level-­‐Linkage	  in	  Trade	  
 
 
4.1	  Introduction	  
 
The previous chapter (chapter three) revealed no level-linkage in EU-Brazil 
cooperation on climate change. Interestingly, throughout the period analysed there 
has been an increased dialogue at the bilateral level on issues associated with 
multilateral climate negotiations. Brazil and the EU have incorporated the 
multilateral climate agenda in their bilateral level of cooperation. However, as 
demonstrated, this has not sufficed to strengthen EU-Brazil engagement on 
multilateral climate negotiations. In other words, changes in the pattern of 
engagement at the bilateral level have not had a significant impact on bilateral 
cooperation at the multilateral level (BCML). Is this trend repeated in other issue-
areas? 
 As this thesis argues, the outcome of level-linkage varies according to the 
issue in question; generalisations based on a single case-study cannot be made. Thus, 
this chapter sets out to understand the interaction between dialogue at the bilateral 
level with cooperationat the multilateral level in the case of trade. Addressing this 
issue, this chapter focuses on the latest, and still ongoing, round of negotiations 
under the WTO framework, the Doha Round. Furthermore, given the complexity and 
the constellation of issues that constitute the current international trade agenda, the 
analysis focuses primarily on negotiations on agriculture.  
The choice of this sector is justified by the fact that agriculture is one of the 
central pillars of the Doha Agenda and arguably one of the most controversial issues 
under negotiation. It is also a core sector for EU-Brazil bilateral trade, as table 13 
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illustrates:78 
TABLE	  13	   EUROPEAN	  UNION	  (EU27)	  TRADE	  WITH	  BRAZIL	  (MILLION	  EURO)	  
 
 Imports Exports 
Year 2008 2010 2008 2010 
Total 35,855 33,238 26,302 31,466 
Agricultural products* 
(% of total) 
24,967 (69%) 23,509 (70,7%) 951 (7.9%) 1,266 (4%) 
*Food and raw materials (incl. fish)                       Source: European Commission 2012. 
 
In addition to the relevance of agriculture to EU-Brazil trade, this sector is an 
interesting case in which to assess level-linkage, as developments at the multilateral 
level have clear implications for bilateral relations, since the outcome of multilateral 
negotiations directly impacts on bilateral trade between the partners. Therefore, there 
is a direct link between the two levels of cooperation that goes beyond any strategic 
or political choice of the partners. In terms of timeframe, the period analysed covers 
the early stages of the current negotiation of a multilateral agreement on agriculture, 
from the late 1990s until when negotiations came to a halt, in 2010. 
This chapter is made up of four focal sections. The first part contextualises 
the process of level-linkage in the case of trade, presenting the main institutional 
features of the WTO and the characteristics of the foreign policy-making processes 
of the EU and Brazil. After establishing this framework, the second part of the 
chapter identifies whether, and if so how, the multilateral trade agenda has been 
addressed at the bilateral level of cooperation. Next, moving on to the multilateral 
level, the third part opens the “Pandora’s box” of the Doha Round, conducting a 
process-tracing of EU-Brazil engagement over ten years of negotiations on 
agriculture. The fourth and final section of the chapter crosses the outcome of the 
analysis of cooperation at the two levels and explains level-linkage on EU-Brazil 
relations in trade, revealing how each of the four hypotheses affect the outcome of 
this process. The main findings are summarised in the conclusion. 
                                                
78The EU is Brazil’s main global trade partner, whereas Brazil is the top supplier of agricultural goods to the EU. 
In 2011, EU’s imports from Brazil were dominated by primary goods, in particular agricultural products (41%) 
and fuels and mining products (31%) (European Commission 2012). 
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4.2	  Setting	  the	  Scene:	  Contextualising	  the	  process	  of	  Level-­‐
Linkage	  	  4.2.1	  Explaining	  the	  “type	  of	  regime”	  in	  the	  case	  of	  trade	  	  
 
WTO: Historical background 
“In the post-World-War-II era, the international trade regime has been characterized 
by significant and sustained attempts to cooperate over trade matters at a multilateral 
level through voluntary but explicit international trade agreements” (Staiger 2004: 
1). In fact, the first attempt to set up a multilateral organisation on trade dates back to 
the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference, which created the International Trade 
Organization (ITO). Simultaneously, the same actors negotiating the establishment 
of the ITO engaged in the discussions of a multilateral agreement on tariff 
reductions. As a result, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) was 
signed in 1947.  
Originally conceived of as interim deal to cover a limited range of trade 
issues until the ITO came into force, the GATT lacked legal personality and 
institutional form. The weak framework of the GATT was largely justified by its 
temporary nature, but the failure to implement the ITO changed the original plan for 
the Agreement. The GATT became the core instrument with which to promote 
international cooperation on trade. For almost 47 years, the international trade 
regime was fundamentally restricted to the limited scope of the GATT (Narlikar 
2005: 15-17). 
Created in 1995, the World Trade Organization (WTO) built on the GATT 
and was set up under a well-defined institutional arrangement and a clear set of 
legally binding rules, but addresses a wider range of issues than its predecessor. As 
an international organisation, membership is open to all states or customs territories 
with “full autonomy in the conduct of its trade policies”. By August 2012, the WTO 
had 157 members, including the European Union and Brazil, both members since 1 
January 1995 (WTO 2012). 
  
 153 
Guiding Principles of the WTO 
As stated in the Preamble to the treaty establishing the WTO, the motivation to 
create the organisation derived from the interest of the parties in engaging “into 
reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial 
reduction of tariffs and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of 
discriminatory treatment in international trade relations”. Thus, the ultimate 
objective of the WTO can be considered to be the promotion of norms and rules that 
aim at international trade liberalisation. 
According to Bernard Hoekman, the rules and procedures of the WTO are 
structured around five core principles, most of them inherited from the GATT, 
namely: a) reciprocity; b) non-discrimination; c) binding and enforceable 
commitments; d) transparency; and e) safety valves (Hoekman 2002: 42-44),. In 
terms of trade liberalisation, reciprocity means that concessions made in terms of 
internal market openings would be compensated for by increased external market 
access; in other words, reciprocity means “a balance of concessions”. The non-
discrimination principle encompasses two elements:  the concept of most-favoured 
nations (MFN), and the idea of national treatment. MFN implies that the same 
concessions granted to an international trade partner should apply to all other WTO 
members (with few exceptions). National treatment establishes that, after a foreign 
product or service has entered the internal market, it should receive the same 
treatment as domestic goods and services.  
The third principle of binding and enforceable commitments determines that 
commitments made at the WTO level are legally binding. In terms of trade in goods, 
the WTO has a list of ceiling binding tariffs, and members are not allowed to exceed 
these rates without agreeing on compensations with their partners for an eventual 
loss of trade. To enforce these commitments, the WTO’s Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism allows members to question the legality of another actor’s trade policy 
decision and ask for compensation. In order to ensure compliance, the principle of 
transparency guarantees equal and fair treatment of all parties. To this end, WTO 
operations are restricted to its headquarters in Geneva, where several committees, 
negotiation groups and councils meet frequently, allowing for the engagement of 
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members with the activities of the organisation, and providing a forum for the 
exchange of information among members. The fifth principle, safety valves, 
regulates the cases in which governments are allowed to adopt trade measures 
considered to be protectionist on a limited or temporary basis. These special 
circumstances are associated with measures that promote economic or non-economic 
objectives, as well as matters of “fair competition” (Hoekman 2002: 42-44).79 
 
Structure and Functioning 
The WTO constitutes a very complex institutional arrangement, made up of 
numerous committees, councils and working groups. The basic structure of the 
Organization consists of five bodies: at the first level there is the Ministerial 
Conference, followed by the General Council, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), 
the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB), and the Trade Negotiations Committee 
(Article IV).  
 The Ministerial Conference is the highest WTO decision-making body. 
Composed of all member states, the parties agree on all issues addressing multilateral 
trade agreements during meetings that normally occur every two years. The General 
Council is mandated by the Ministerial Conference to ensure the daily functioning of 
the WTO in Geneva. The chairperson coordinates the activities of the Council, which 
includes representatives from all WTO members. The General Council also 
administers the Trade Review Body, in charge of periodical reviews on the trade 
policies of WTO members, and convenes to discharge the responsibilities of the 
Dispute Settlement Body, which has its own chairperson. Finally, also operating 
under the General Council, the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) is responsible 
for the process of negotiations of multilateral agreements, including the negotiations 
on agriculture under the Doha Round.  
                                                
79 For details on these exceptions, see Articles 5, 8, 11, 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 23, and 28 of GATT. 
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TABLE	  14	   WTO	  MINISTERIAL	  CONFERENCES	  (1996-­‐2011)	  
Conference Location Year 
1st Singapore 1996 
2nd Geneva, Switzerland 1998 
3rd Seattle, United States 1999 
4th Doha, Qatar 2001 
5th Cancun, Mexico 2003 
6th Hong Kong, China 2005 
7th Geneva, Switzerland 2009 
8th Geneva, Switzerland 2011 
Source: WTO (2012b). 
 
Within the WTO, the parties tend to form negotiation groups, presenting a 
common position and centralising their representation. These coalitions are 
established according to geographical criterion or affinities in agenda, thus being 
organised by issues. The composition and number of these formal groups have varied 
over time. In July 2012 the WTO identified 26 active groups (WTO 2012b). To a 
certain extent, these groups play a leading role in the bargaining game of cooperation 
within the WTO. Nonetheless, the process of negotiations among coalitions 
ultimately requires a general agreement between all parties. This is because decisions 
made at the Ministerial Conferences and the General Council are reached by 
consensus. In the event of not obtaining the assent of all parties, a voting system is 
put in practice, with each member being granted one vote (Article IX).80 
 
 
 
                                                
80 For more on the legal and institutional framework of the WTO, see Barton et. al. (2006), De Meester  and 
Wouters (2007), Footer (2006), Hoekman (2002) and Narlikar (2005b).  
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TABLE	  15	   WTO	  NEGOTIATION	  GROUPS:	  MEMBERSHIP	  OF	  THE	  EU	  AND	  BRAZIL	  (2012)	  
Member Group Nature & Scope Members (n) 
 
 
 
 
Brazil 
MERCOSUR Customs union nature, general scope 4 
Cairns Group Coalition of agriculture exporters 19 
G20 Coalition of developing countries on 
agriculture 
23 
NAMA 11 Coalition of developing countries on 
NAMA 
10 
Friends of Anti-Dumping 
Negotiations (FANS) 
Coalition for more disciplines on the 
use of anti-dumping measures 
15 
 
W52 Sponsors 
Sponsors of the TN/C/W/52 
proposal for modalities on 
intellectual property (TRIPS) 
 
109 
 
EU 
EU Customs union nature, general scope 27 
Friends of NAMA Coalition for the maximising of 
tariff reduction on NAMA 
35 
Source: WTO (2012c). 
 
Constituting a group in itself, the European Union is a member of three of the 
WTO 26 formal negotiation groups, whereas Brazil is part of six groups. They share 
membership of only one coalition, the W52 Sponsors, which has a very narrow focus 
on trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPs). This picture provides 
some important insights into the EU’s and Brazil’s engagement with multilateral 
trade negotiations under the Doha Round. Yet, as the account of the roles of the two 
actors in negotiations on agriculture provided in section four reveals, formal 
membership is important, but not the determinant factor defining preferences for 
partners. The EU and Brazil can actually overcome these formal divisions and 
project their “strategic partnership” from the bilateral level to the multilateral arena.  
However, as this thesis claims, in addition to the compatibility of approaches 
to multilateralism, another condition of this process is the coordination in the 
processes by which the two actors define their bilateral and multilateral trade 
policies. Thus, when setting the scene for the process of level-linkage, it is important 
to understand not only the structure of the international trade regime, but also the 
formal arrangements of the foreign policies of the EU and Brazil that establish the 
internal institutional structure for the development of trade cooperation at the two 
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levels.  4.2.2	  Foreign	  Trade	  Policy-­‐Making	  Processes	  
 
Brazil 
Brazilian foreign trade policy-making is organised in a bureaucratic and hierarchical 
structure that encompasses different agencies of the executive power. As established 
in the 1999 constitution, the President is responsible for concluding international 
agreements and establishing diplomatic relations with third parties, including on 
trade issues. Yet, this role is rather formal. The development of bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation is a competence shared by the various Ministries of the 
federal government. Moreover, there is an internal division of labour between public 
agencies that subjects bilateral and multilateral trade policies to two different 
processes.      
For Brazil, bilateral trade relations with the EU are primarily the competence 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Ministério das Relações Exteriores – MRE, also 
known as Itamaraty). As a Brazilian diplomat interviewed explained, there is a 
certain division of labour in the foreign policy-making on trade. Within Itamaraty, 
the Department of Europe (Departamento da Europa –DEU) is responsible for 
defining the major political guidelines for cooperation with the EU.81 Regarding 
trade, this capacity falls into the domain of the Economic Department (Departamento 
Econômico – DEC), which is sub-divided into six coordinations/divisions addressing 
the following issues: intellectual property; market access; safeguard and trade 
defence; contentious issues; agriculture; and economic organisations. This 
institutional arrangement also includes the Department of International Negotiations 
(Departamento de Negociações Internacionais – DNC), in charge of dealing with 
bilateral/regional trade agreements. 
 As in other areas, the activities of Itamaraty in forging and exercising 
bilateral and multilateral trade foreign policies directly engage other Ministries. In 
                                                
81Interview n35, Brussels, 20 September 2012. 
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the case of bilateral trade relations with the EU, coordination among these 
institutions takes place in the preparation for and during bilateral meetings. Ahead 
of EU-Brazil meetings, each DEC sub-division consults the Ministries that have 
potential interests in the agenda. The list of governmental bodies involved in this 
process varies, but two permanent contributors are the Ministry of Agriculture, 
Livestock and Food Supply (Ministério da Agricultura, Pecuária e Abastecimento – 
MAPA) and the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade (Ministério 
do Desenvolvimento, Indústria e Comércio Exterior – MDIC). In the case of general 
meetings, such as EU-Brazil Summits or Joint Committees, DEC forwards its 
proposal to DEU, which, in coordination with the Brazilian Mission in Brussels, 
agrees with the EU on the agenda for the meeting. In “trade issues” sessions, and the 
consultation mechanism on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) issues, the agents in 
charge of trade portfolios at both DEC and the Mission take the lead in organising 
meetings. 
Coordination between Itamaraty and other Ministries is not restricted to 
agenda-setting; members of staff from various governmental institutions are invited 
to join the Brazilian delegation in bilateral meetings with the EU. Again, the 
participation of other Ministries varies according to the issue, as well as the location 
of the gathering. In any case, even when in Brussels, trade meetings tend to include 
representatives from MAPA and MDIC, always under the coordination of Itamaraty. 
In the case ofSPS consultations, in addition to Itamaraty and MAPA, the Brazilian 
delegation often includes the National Health Surveillance Agency (Agência 
Nacional de Vigilância Sanitária – Anvisa), and, eventually, the Ministry of 
Fisheries and Aquaculture (Ministério da Pesca e Aquicultura – MPA).82 
Brazilian foreign trade policy at the multilateral level is also the outcome of 
interaction between various Ministries. Formal responsibility for coordinating this 
process is attributed to the Chamber of Foreign Trade (Câmara de Comércio 
Exterior- CAMEX). Established in 1995, CAMEX isan inter-Ministerial 
Council,part of the Government Council of the Presidency,formed of seven 
Ministries.These are: a) MDIC; b) Ministry of Finance; c) Ministry of Foreign 
                                                
82Interview n35, Brussels, 20 September 2012. 
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Affairs;  d) Home Affairs Office; e) Ministry of Planning and Budget (Ministério do 
Planejamento, Orçamento e Gestão – MPOG); f) Ministry of Agriculture; and g) 
Ministry of Agrarian Development. Meetingmonthly in Brasilia, the members of 
CAMEX deliberate on the definition, implementation and coordination of policies 
and activities. It is on the basis of these resolutions that Itamaraty and other 
Ministries should approach multilateral trade negotiations.  
Formal arrangement, however, differs from practice. Even after the creation 
of CAMEX, Itamaraty still holds a central position in the forging of Brazilian 
foreign trade policy. As explained by a Brazilian diplomat in Brussels, the decision-
making process concerning Brazil’s standing in multilateral trade negotiations starts 
with the activities of DEC of Itamaraty, which coordinates an inter-Ministerial 
dialogue to forge a common position that considers the interests of the various 
sectors. Next, Itamaraty, MDIC and MPOG present their proposals to CAMEX. 
Assisted by external consultants, the seven Ministries gather at the monthly meeting 
of CAMEX to discuss Doha Round issues. Deliberating on the positions to be 
endorsed by Brazil at the multilateral level by consensus, the resolutions of CAMEX 
are subjected to the scrutiny of the Brazilian President. Upon obtaining presidential 
approval, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes the Brazilian position to the WTO. 
Brazil has permanent representation in Geneva mandated to negotiate on its 
behalf at the WTO. Within the Doha Round, the role of chief negotiator is performed 
by the Ambassador who serves as Permanent Representative. In the case of technical 
meetings, the Brazilian negotiation team is formed of diplomats from the trade 
sections of Itamaraty, based both in Brasilia and Geneva, and normally also includes 
staff from other Ministries. Additionally, the Foreign Minister has always played a 
key role as the leading representative of Brazil, actively engaging in the WTO 
Ministerial Conferences as well as in the meetings of informal negotiation groups, 
such as the G20, G4 and G6.83 
 
 
                                                
83Interview n35, Brussels, 20 September 2012. 
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European Union 
As an area of exclusive competence, the EU’s external trade policy (also known as 
Common Commercial Policy – CCP) has been conducted by the European 
Commission in conjunction with the Council. 
Until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, bilateral relations with Brazil fell 
almost exclusively under the domain of the European Commission. The DG for 
External Relations (DG RELEX), under the division for Latin America, was the 
agency competent for establishing the general terms of cooperation with Brazil. 
Trade relations are now a competence of the DG for Trade (DG Trade), part of the 
European Commission. Within DG Trade, bilateral relations with Brazil are in the 
portfolio of the Unit for Latin America (Unit C3). Given the multitude of issues that 
compose the EU-Brazil trade agenda, other DGs are directly involved in the framing 
of EU bilateral trade policy. In the case of agriculture, the DG for Agriculture and 
Rural Development (DG AGRI) and the DG for Health and Consumers (DG 
SANCO) are notably engaged in this process. 
Similarly to the policy-making process of Brazil, the agendas of general 
bilateral meetings (High Level Summits and Joint Committees) were traditionally 
defined by DG RELEX (a competence now delegated to the European External 
Action Service –EEAS), in coordination with the EU delegation in Brasilia and 
based on the contributions of various DGs. In the case of “trade meetings” and SPS 
consultations, DG Trade, DG SANCO and DG AGRI lead the process of agenda 
setting. At these meetings, members of staff from these three DGs form the EU’s 
delegation. 
 The European Commission has also played a pivotal role in the formulation 
and implementation of EU external trade policy at the multilateral level. Yet, even if 
it is an area of exclusive competence of the European Union, the Council is also 
engaged in this policy-making process, as Article 133 of the EC Treaty establishes: 
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Where agreements with one or more States or international organisations need 
to be negotiated, the Commission shall make recommendations to the Council, 
which shall authorise the Commission to open the necessary negotiations. The 
Council and the Commission shall be responsible for ensuring that the 
agreements negotiated are compatible with internal Community policies and 
rules (TEC Treaty). 
 
The European Commission is the sole negotiator at the WTO, acting on behalf 
of the EU and its 28 member states, with a mandate subjected to the approval of the 
Council. In this process, the Commission first presents its general trade objectives to 
the Trade Policy Committee (formerly Article 133 Committee), which is comprised 
of member states and staff from the Commission. Next, the specific negotiation 
mandate is adopted by the Foreign Affairs Council. Additionally, the European 
Parliament must approve all trade and investment treaties, by simple majority 
(Woolcock 2011:7-8). 
 DG Trade is in charge of leading negotiations, coordinating activities of the 
EU’s negotiation team under the authority of Chief Negotiator. In addition to 
officials from DG Trade responsible for a variety of portfolios, the EU delegation to 
negotiations also includes members of staff from other DGs, depending on the issues 
of the WTO agenda (European Commission 2012). In the case of agriculture, the EU 
Trade Commissioner has worked in close coordination with the EU Agriculture 
Commissioner, and, to a certain extent, with DG SANCO. 
 Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the European Commission had a delegation in 
Geneva representing the EU at international organisations. In 2011, the Commission 
delegation was converted into two new European Union representations: a) the 
delegation to the UN and other international organisations in Geneva; and b) the 
Permanent Mission of the European Union to the World Trade Organization, both 
being associated with the EEAS. 
  Among its competences, the EU Mission to the WTO is responsible for:  
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Representing the interests of the European Union and its 27 Member States in 
the area of multilateral trade, and negotiating on their behalf at the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO); coordinating the positions of the European Union and its 
27 Member States for multilateral trade negotiations; promoting the visibility 
and understanding of the European Union's trade policy through contacts, 
information activities and networking with other diplomatic missions and 
Geneva-based international organisations, bodies and agencies (European 
External Action Service 2012). 
 
Thus, after the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission lost its exclusivity in the EU’s 
external representation at the WTO. Yet, at the present date, these new institutional 
arrangements have still not revoked the pivotal role of the European Commission, 
and more specifically DG Trade, in leading negotiations on multilateral trade 
agreements. 
As this section has demonstrated, both the EU and Brazil conduct fragmented 
policy-making processes that separate bilateral trade relations from multilateral trade 
policies. The impact of these institutional arrangements on the process of level-
linkage is explored in the last section of this chapter.  
After a brief description of the formal structure of the WTO and the processes 
through which the EU and Brazil define their foreign trade policies, the next two 
sections of this chapter explore EU-Brazil cooperation at the bilateral and the 
multilateral levels. 
 
 
4.3	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Cooperation	  on	  Trade:	  The	  Bilateral	  Level	  
 
The first attempts to institutionalise cooperation on trade date back to the 1970s. In 
1973, the two partners negotiated a three-year non-preferential agreement, 
predominantly concerning the tradingof agricultural goods, in particular cocoa butter 
and soluble coffee. Complementing this framework, two other agreements on 
specific sectors were adopted, namely those on textiles (1978) and steel (1979). 
Therse first three agreements were characterised by a strong technical nature and 
exclusively addressed the bilateral dimensions of EC-Brazil trade activities in these 
sectors. 
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 Breaking down this fragmented approach to the institutionalisation of EC-
Brazil relations, the parties adopted the Framework Agreement on Trade and 
Economic Cooperation in 1980. Coming into force in 1982, with a lifespan of ten 
years, the 1980 Agreement represented the first attempt to project EU-Brazil 
cooperation onto a global context. For that purpose, and taking into account the 
activities of international organisations, the parties agreed to cooperate “bilaterally 
and multilaterally in the solution of commercial problems of common interest” 
(Article 2). However, the scope of cooperation was limited to an increased dialogue, 
without implying the formalisation of an EU-Brazil alliance at the multilateral level. 
Evidence for this claim is found in the preamble of the Agreement, which establishes 
that cooperation should be forged "between equal partners, but taking into account 
the fact that Brazil belongs to the G77” (Council of the European Communities 
1982). 
 In addition to the brief reference to BCML, another important feature of the 
Accord was the establishment of the EC-Brazil Joint Committee. Formed by 
representatives of both governments, the Committee is in charge of following the 
development of bilateral cooperation on trade and economic issues, and other aspects 
of the implementation of the Agreement. As presented in Chapter two, since its 
creation in 1982, the Joint Committee has been the central forum of debate between 
the EU and Brazil, covering a broad range of bilateral and multilateral issues, 
including the Doha Round. 
Overall, in analysing the content of the agreement and the activities of the 
first meetings of the Joint Committee, it can be concluded that cooperation on trade 
was dealt with through a pragmatic approach. The sole reason for considering EU-
Brazil engagement at both the bilateral level and the multilateral level was to 
promote and diversify their bilateral trade flows in order to overcome trade barriers 
that obstruct the improvement of their commercial relations. This trend remained 
unchanged beyond the first decade of the Committee’s existence. 
In 1992, the EU and Brazil agreed a new Framework Agreement of 
Cooperation. Providing the legal basis for EU-Brazil relations until the present day, 
the accord covers a broad range of issues, but does not mark any major 
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improvements in the terms of cooperation over multilateral trade issues. References 
to the matter appear in Article 5 (“Development of trade cooperation”), under which 
the EU and Brazil agree to hold consultations on trade disputes that may arise at the 
GATT level, as well as on tariffs, technical requirements and anti-dumping measures 
that may hinder their bilateral trade (Council of the European Union 1995). Thus, the 
association of the bilateral level of cooperation with the multilateral level remains 
limited to the impact of the activities of multilateral trade regimes on EU-Brazil 
relations.  
The strengthening of multilateralism and the promotion of the international 
trade regime did not feature in the terms of EU-Brazil relations until the early 2000s. 
Since the new millennium a conjunction of domestic and international factors 
reshaped EU-Brazil relations. 
One particularly important issue was the failure of negotiations of a EU- 
MERCOSUR agreement. As discussed in chapter two, the emergence of a regional 
integration process in the Southern Cone of Latin America in the late 1990s 
prompted the immediate interest of the EU in contributing to and benefiting from 
cooperation with MERCOSUR. From the opening of discussions on an Association 
Agreement between the two blocs in 2000, until the suspension of negotiations in 
2004, the EU and Brazil placed great emphasis on the development of their “sub-
regional level” of cooperation.84 
Despite being inconclusive, negotiations of a EU-MERCOSUR trade deal 
had implications for the bilateral and the multilateral levels of EU-Brazil relations. 
As established in the Treaty of Asunción, members of MERCOSUR must negotiate 
trade agreements with third parties as a bloc. Moreover, tariffs reductions granted by 
one of the five members to third partners must be extended to all of MERCOSUR. 
Thus, the creation of the bloc has constrained the scope of EU-Brazil bilateral trade 
relations, as the two partners cannot forge a bilateral agreement that includes tariff 
concessions.  
                                                
84Suspended in 2004, negotiations on the association agreement between the EU and MERCOSUR resumed in 
May 2010 and are still in course (European External Action Service 2013).Thus, the analysis of level-linkage on 
EU-Brazil trade cooperation conducted in this chapter largelycovers this gap, in which there were no trade 
negotiations at the sub-regional level. 
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In terms of BCML, already anticipating a trade deal between the two blocs, 
the 1995 EC-MERCOSUR Interregional Framework Cooperation Agreement 
establishes that inter-regional cooperation must observe and respect multilateral trade 
rules, as Article 4 states: 
the Parties shall undertake to forge closer relations with the aim of encouraging 
the increase and diversification of trade, preparing for subsequent gradual and 
reciprocal liberalization of trade and promoting conditions which are conducive 
to the establishment of the Interregional Association, taking into account, in 
conformity with WTO rules, the sensitivity of certain goods (Official Journal of 
the European Communities 1996). 
 
Thus, the presence of a sub-regional level of cooperation reinforced the 
impact of multilateral issues on EU-Brazil relations. In this line of thought it can be 
claimed that the failure of EU-MERCOSUR negotiations on trade exposed the need 
for new channels of debate on the multilateral agenda.  Adding to this factor, the 
emergence of Brazil as a rising power in the international scene, and the launch of 
the EU’s quest to promote “effective multilateralism,” introduced with the European 
Security Strategy (2003), prompted the enhancement of the importance attributed by 
the two players to their engagement at the multilateral level. This shift of approach 
was reflected in their instruments of bilateral cooperation. 
The 2002-2006 Brazil Country Strategy Paper (CSP), compiled by the 
European Commission in consultation with the Brazilian government, can be 
considered the first (official) attempt to reinforce the presence of multilateral trade 
issues in the partners’ bilateral agenda. Drafted in the same year that negotiations for 
a new WTO trade agreement were launched, the National Indicative Programme 
(NIP), part of the CSP, establishes that: 
 
In the particular context of the 4th WTO Ministerial Conference (Doha 
Development Agenda) and the need of developing countries to effectively 
participate in and benefit from these multilateral negotiations, the European 
Community, taking into account the Brazilian situation, could support Brazil 
with technical assistance to enhance its capacity to participate in the WTO 
negotiations and fully implement the results (European Commission 2001). 
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The inception of BCML under the stronger narrative of the CSP remained 
marginal, but to a certain extent this new approach broke the restriction of addressing 
only multilateral issues that affect bilateral trade. Nonetheless, the “offer to help” 
indicates the EU’s appreciation of the unbalanced capability to perform at the 
multilateral level that exists between the two actors, a view that a Brazilian diplomat 
from the Brazilian Mission to the EU in Brussels attested to being considered 
“patronizing and unrealistic”.85 
 As previously mentioned, in addition to bilateral dialogues held at a technical 
level on very specific issues of relevance to EU-Brazil bilateral trade, the debate on 
trade relations has always been broadly and comprehensively promoted by the Joint 
Committee. Traditionally, before the final general meeting of the Committee, trade 
experts from the two parties met on specific trade sessions. Among the many issues 
discussed, the agendas of these trade gatherings included multilateral negotiations. 
Nevertheless, considering the busy agenda of the WTO in the early 2000s, it is 
surprising to observe that there was no Joint Committee meeting between 2003 and 
2006. Without these sessions, the EU and Brazil lost their main forum of discussions 
on multilateral issues. None of the interviewees could explain this interval, and, in 
fact, most of them seemed to be unaware of this gap when questioned. Perhaps not 
by coincidence, the Committee’s activities resumed after the launch of the EU-Brazil 
Strategic Partnership in 2007.  
 Framing bilateral relations under the term “strategic” was part of the EU’s 
new approach towards handling external relations with actors it considered to be 
“key global players”. In order to implement this strategy, the European Commission 
addressed a communication to the European Parliament and the Council, arguing in 
favour of a strategic partnership with Brazil, in 2006. Emphasising the important role 
played by Brazil in global governance, the Commission named multilateral regimes 
in which the partners could pursue further cooperation. Regarding trade, the 
communication stressed the individual commitment of the parties to the trade regime, 
but without explicit reference to the enhancement of EU-Brazil cooperation at the 
WTO, in clear contrast with its recommendations for other regimes. Nevertheless, 
                                                
85.Interview n25, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
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the communication demonstrated a new European perception of the weight and 
capability of Brazil as an international actor. 
The new approach was reflected in the 2007-2013 Brazil CSP. Suggesting an 
approach to bilateral relations with Brazil on equal terms, the European Commission 
replaced the unilateral proposal to assist Brazil on multilateral trade issues for the 
promotion of dialogue: 
Since the EU is Brazil’s leading trading partner and top investor, trade is, of 
course, a key aspect of EU-Brazil relations. At bilateral level the EU aims, 
through its existing dialogue, at overcoming bilateral trade irritants, at raising 
all relevant issues that could contribute to facilitating trade flows and 
investment, and at exchanging views ahead of major WTO events. These 
objectives will be pursued through a regular EC-Brazil dialogue on trade issues 
(European Commission 2007). 
 
 Against this backdrop, the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership was launched in 
2007, aimed at enhancing bilateral cooperation between the two partners on different 
levels and issues. The joint declaration of the first EU-Brazil Summit delineated the 
terms of the Partnership, naming the areas of global governance in which the parties 
agree to cooperate. Interestingly, multilateral trade does not feature among them. 
References to the WTO appear in the section entitled “expanding and deepening 
trade and economic relations,” with the EU and Brazil simply “reaffirm[ing] their 
strong commitment to conclude promptly the Doha Development Round” (Council 
of the European Union 2007). Comments on the parties’ engagement within the 
multilateral trade regime in the document are restricted to this sentence.  
 The lack of attention paid to multilateral trade was confirmed in the Joint 
Action Plan of the Strategic Partnership (JAP I). Setting up actions to promote the 
“strategic partnership”, JAP I endorsed the “exchange of views” mechanism of the 
Joint Committee, with the parties agreeing to “keep up their contacts in the different 
domains of the WTO negotiation, so as to find solutions that promote the successful 
conclusion of the Round” (Council of the European Union 2008b). 
 The statements of subsequent EU-Brazil summits (2008, 2009, 2010 and 
2011) have all expressed concern with the lack of progress in the conclusion of the 
Doha Development Round, but on no occasion did the EU and Brazil express an 
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interest in strengthening their bilateral cooperation in the multilateral arena, in clear 
contrast to the discourse adopted regarding cooperation on climate change and 
human rights (Council of the European Union 2008b, 2009, 2010, 2011). 
Launched in 2011, the second Joint Action Plan (JAP II) stated that the EU 
and Brazil agreed to “work together on negotiations and implementation of the 
outcome of major international conferences and Summits as appropriate (…).”Again, 
there was no mention of bilateral cooperation at the WTO level, in contrast to 
detailed actions to be taken in other areas.  
JAP II came into force in 2012 and should be reviewed in 2014(Council of 
the European Union 2011). Unless an unexpected dramatic shift takes place, there is 
no indication of the parties’ willingness to improve the degree of their engagement 
within the multilateral trade regime. 
With the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership failing to promote new mechanisms 
for facilitating cooperation between the two partners within the multilateral trade 
regime, the Joint Committee remains the key bilateral instrument for reaching this 
goal. But how does the lack of a significant increase in dialogue at the bilateral level 
on multilateral issues relate to EU-Brazil bilateral cooperation at the multilateral 
level? In other words, how can level-linkage in trade be characterised?  
Addressing these questions, the next section explores the engagement 
between the EU and Brazil within the multilateral trade regime, focusing on 
agriculture negotiations under the Doha Round. 
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4.4	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Cooperation	  on	  Trade:	  The	  Multilateral	  Level	  
 4.4.1	  Paving	  the	  Way	  to	  the	  Doha	  Round:	  The	  Long	  Road	  to	  Trade	  Liberalisation	  on	  Agriculture	  
 
For decades, the GATT’s success in promoting trade liberalisation was restricted to 
industrialised products; agriculture was long subjected to protectionist practices that 
proved hard to eliminate. Negotiations on a multilateral agreement addressing 
agriculture were finally launched during the Uruguay Round in 1986. Concluded 
eight years later, the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), together with all other GATT 
agreements, was incorporated in the World Trade Organization, created in 1995 as a 
replacement for the GATT. 
The AoA was structured around three core pillars of trade liberalisation, 
namely, (i) domestic support; (ii) market access; and (iii) export subsidies. 
Establishing different responsibilities for its members, developed countries were 
constrained by strict commitments to push for liberalisation on these three fronts, 
whereas developing nations were subjected to moderate obligations and a less tight 
schedule. However, the terms of the Agreement reveal the resistance of developed 
countries to open their markets to the most sensitive agriculture products. As a result, 
the AoA contains an extensive list of products that are exempt from the new rules. 
A clear example of the unbalanced distribution of power within GATT, the 
list overwhelmingly comprises those items considered sensitive to the US and 
Europe. Furthermore, and perhaps even more interestingly, the list resulted in a 
bilateral deal reached between the US and the EU, known as the “Blair House 
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Agreement”.86 This political manoeuvre granted the two actors mechanisms with 
which to protect parts of their agriculture markets, albeit at a high cost for the 
multilateral system. 
The inclusion of this list was widely criticised by the parties left out of the 
bilateral arrangement, and especially by developing countries including Brazil. 
Nevertheless, there was still a window of opportunity for advancing liberalisation, as 
Article 20 of the AoA establishes the commitment of the parties to pursue further 
negotiations (Clapp 2006: 3-4). On this basis, preparations for a new round of 
negotiations were launched during the WTO Ministerial Summit of November 1996. 
The EU and Brazil entered this preliminary stage of discussions on a new 
multilateral agreement on opposite sides. Brazil acted from within a block, engaging 
with the WTO negotiation groups it formally belonged to: MERCOSUR and the 
Cairns group. The EU, on the other hand, adopted a more unilateral approach, 
despite its circumstantial alliance with the US. 
In 1999, Brazil delivered a communication on behalf of MERCOSUR 
expressing its concerns with the prospects of adopting a “tariff-only regime” (WTO 
1999). In the same year, Brazil joined the Cairns group in setting a new agenda for 
negotiations on agriculture. The group demanded the elimination of export subsidies, 
followed by the decrease of domestic support for producers. Additionally, the Cairns 
group asked for improvements in market access, the application of the same rules for 
industrial products and the guarantee that technical and phytosanitary requirements 
would constitute forms of non-tariff barriers (Vizentini 2006: 4). 
                                                
86 The Blair House Agreement is the result of intense negotiations between the EU and the US, a process initiated 
in 1986 and finally concluded on 20 November 1993. Addressing bilateral trade issues, the Accord also set out a 
framework for a multilateral agreement on agriculture. The two partners agreed on: “a 20% reduction in domestic 
support in terms of AMS [Aggregate Measure of Support], with 1986-88 as a base period; a 21% reduction in the 
volume of export subsidies; and a 36% reduction in the cash amount of export subsidies (…) and an exemption of 
income support to farmers from domestic support commitments” (Trebilcock and Howse 2005: 335). In addition, 
as the EU requested, the Accord includes a “peace clause” that exempts market support practices regulated by the 
agreement from being subjected to trade retaliation (Meunier 2005: 112).  
Even after the agreement was reached, there was no consensus among EU member states on 
supporting the deal; France was the prominent opposing party. For more on the EU’s internal 
negotiation leading to the accord, see Meunier (2005: 102-124). 
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In July 1999, the EU launched its own communication, positioning itself in 
favour of discussing reductions in export supports. The EU stressed the need to 
observe factors including food safety and quality, animal welfare, special treatment 
to developing countries, and the “multifunctional role of agriculture.” 
Simultaneously, the Cairns group requested an immediate lift on barriers to 
agriculture. The EU claimed that efforts to reduce obstacles to trade within the sector 
should be considered an “ongoing process resulting in fundamental reform, and not 
something which can be completed in the next round” (WTO 1999b).  
 Differences in the content of the rules and the pace for their implementation 
were an expected consequence of the divide between developing countries and 
developed economies in the negotiations; it was therefore not surprising that Brazil 
and the EU had contrasting positions. But what is interesting is the support granted 
by the US to the Cairns group’s proposal on the elimination of agriculture subsidies.  
If at first sight the US move seemed to contradict its own interests, it was 
justified by a strategic approach to the negotiations. According to Vizentini (2006: 
4), avoiding the negotiation of Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) was a 
US priority – hence the interest in inflating the debate on subsidies to ensure it would 
dominate the talks. Furthermore, being among the world’s top exporters of 
agricultural goods, the US was also motivated to increase the pressure for market 
liberalisation on major importers such as the EU (Vizentini 2006: 4).  
 The preparatory activities for negotiations on a new deal were concluded by 
the time the 3th WTO Ministerial Conference took place in Seattle, in 1999. 
Negotiations were formally launched in in 2000 and organised in the format of the 
so-called “special sessions” of the Agriculture Committee (WTO 2004).  
At this stage, the parties already disagreed over relatively simple procedural 
questions. As Alan Swinbank attests to, quarrels began before the agenda of these 
meetings was set, as the parties could not agree as to the chairman of the Sessions. 
The Brazilian Ambassador had been appointed to the post, but the EU opposed his 
nomination, arguing that a member of the Cairns group could not play such an 
important role. The General Council had to interfere, nominating the Peruvian 
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Ambassador, Jorge Voto-Bernales, to lead the Agriculture Committee (Swinbank 
2005:89). 
 4.4.2	  Cards	  on	  the	  Table,	  Doha	  Begins	  
 
The period of negotiations that preceded Doha made clear the conflicting approaches 
of the EU and Brazil towards a multilateral agreement on agriculture; it was against 
this backdrop that the two players began their engagement at the Doha Round. 
 As reported by the BBC, Brazil entered negotiations siding with other 
members of the Cairns group. Together, they defended a prompt reduction of export 
subsidies applied by developed countries, until their complete elimination. Touching 
upon the “Achilles’ heel” of many European markets, the EU reacted. Declaring its 
willingness to compromise on subsidy reduction, the EU Trade Commissioner, 
Pascal Lamy, stated that the EU would call for the introduction of environmental and 
phytosanitary norms in exchange for this concession. Lamy’s declaration prompted 
an immediate response from Brazil, accentuating diplomatic tensions between the 
two actors. Arguing that developing countries had been expecting an agreement on 
agriculture for nearly five decades, and should not be expected to make concessions 
in return, the Brazilian Minister of Agriculture, Marcus Pratini, claimed that 
developing nations “deserved an apology” (BBC 2012). 
 Within this quarrelsomesetting, talks on agriculture were conducted as part of 
the 4th WTO Round. The results of negotiations in all areas were included in a single 
final declaration. In addition, and most importantly, negotiations on agriculture were 
bound to agreements in other areas, since all issues addressed in Doha were 
subjected to a “single-undertaking clause.” This new condition implied that an 
agreement on agriculture would only come into force when talks in all other sectors 
were concluded, and vice-versa. 
 The agricultural text in the 2001 Doha Declaration stated that the parties 
agreed on the “fundamental reform encompassing strengthened rules and specific 
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commitments on support and protection in order to correct and prevent restrictions 
and distortions in world agricultural markets” (WTO 2001). In light of this goal, the 
parties concurred on improving market access, substantially reducing domestic 
support mechanisms that implied trade distortions, and diminishing export subsidies 
until their complete elimination (the three pillars of agriculture reform).87 The first 
step to be taken was defining the modalities (also known as targets) of commitments, 
and for this task a very ambitious deadline was set: 31 March 2003 (WTO 2013). 
 The fact that the Doha Round put forward an agenda explicitly addressing the 
“three pillars” was an important achievement, especially when considering that 
negotiations had to overcome the opposition of some members, notoriously the EU. 
As John Odell points out, the EU entered Doha emphatically opposing any mention 
of exports subsidies in the final declaration, repeating the position it adopted in 
Seattle. This time, however, the EU had to succumb to strong requests by other 
members, shifting its position in the final hours of the last day of negotiations (Odell 
2009).88In exchange for agreeing to phase out export subsidies, Pascal Lamy asked 
for the inclusion of environment and investment in the agenda, as he had anticipated. 
The request was accepted, in spite of the dissatisfaction of some members, including 
Brazil. 
 Following the launch of the Doha Round, negotiations on agriculture made 
progress, focusing on the issue of modalities. On 12 February 2003, the chair of the 
special session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture, Stuart Harbison, released a 
draft proposal. The US and Brazil, together with other members of the Cairns group, 
complained that the draft proposed small cuts in tariffs and trade-distorting practices, 
whereas the EU perceived the text to be unfairly in favour of exporting countries 
(ICTSD 2003: 2). Harbinson then prepared a revised version of the draft, circulated 
among the parties on 18 March 2003 (WTO 2003). The new document did not 
contain any major changes from the original, and divergences between the parties 
                                                
87 For an overview of the negotiations on agriculture under the Doha Round, see Anderson and Josling (2005), 
McMahon (2006) and Swinbank (2005). 
 
88 The decision was not consensual among EU members. France, for instance, threatened to leave 
negotiations (Odell 2009). 
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were not overcome; the 31 March 2003 deadline to agree on modalities was missed. 
 Parallel to negotiations on a multilateral agreement on agriculture, the EU 
was undergoing a critical internal process of reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP). According to Carsten Daugbjerg and Alan Swinbank, the deadlock in 
negotiations triggered mounted pressure from large export countries on the EU to 
lower domestic subsidies and eliminate import barriers on agriculture(Daugbjerg and 
Swinbank 2007: 11-12). Concessions could only be made if the EU reformed its 
common policy. The Council of Agriculture Ministers approved the CAP reform on 
26 June 2003. Considered as an important contribution by the EU to a multilateral 
agreement on agriculture, the EU Commissioner for Agriculture, Franz Fischler, 
declared: 
This reform also sends a strong message to the world. Our new policy is trade 
friendly. We are saying goodbye to the old subsidy system which significantly 
distorts international trade and harms developing countries. Today's decision 
will give Europe a strong hand in the negotiations on the Doha Development 
Agenda. The EU has done its homework, now it’s up to others to move to make 
the WTO trade talks a success. But let there be no mistake. At the Cancun 
Ministerial Meeting, the EU will be ready to use its increased negotiating 
capital only if we get something in exchange. Unilateral disarmament is not on. 
The ball is now in the camp of other countries, such as the US, whose 
agricultural policies continue to be highly trade-distorting and have even 
become increasingly so (European Commission 2003b). 
 
  The new CAP did not deliver the tariff reductions developing countries were 
asking for, and practically endorsed the EU’s position on the modalities presented 
earlier in January 2003. Yet, the “Fischler reform” allowed the EU to overcome its 
isolation within the negotiation process, reflected in its cooperation with the United 
States (van Dijck and Faber 2006). 
  By mid-2003 there was a general understanding among WTO members that 
they were unlikely to forge a draft calendar on the implementation of modalities in 
time for Cancun. In an attempt to avoid missing this deadline, the EU joined the US 
in another bilateral alliance. Released on 13 August 2003, the so-called “Joint 
framework to re-launch agriculture negotiations”, proposed the reduction of taxes 
and subsidies, but intentionally left out numbers. Praising the alliance with the US, 
Pascal Lamy declared: “the EC/US paper is just what is required to enable the WTO 
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negotiations to change gear and move into the final phase” (European Commission 
2003c).  
 The text was welcomed by the WTO. The EU-US joint paper provided the 
basis for the draft text to be adopted in Cancun, as presented by the Chairperson of 
the WTO General Council, Perez del Castillo, on 24 August 2003. Regarding 
agriculture, the “Perez del Castillo text” basically replicated many provisions 
suggested by the EU-US joint proposal; developing countries received the text with 
stark criticism (Jank and Jales: 2005: 55). 
 Eager to preclude the adoption of the US-EU proposal in Cancun, developing 
countries decided to react as a block, with Brazil leading this opposition. The 
counterattack to EU-US predominance in negotiations had begun even before the 
two powers released their joint text. In June 2003, Brazil, India and South Africa 
agreed on the Brasilia Declaration, establishing an alliance of the South to 
counterbalance the North. When the EU-US proposal was launched, the movement 
emerging from the South took on unprecedented proportions, resulting in a coalition 
of 20 countries, the so-called G20.89 As a result, the G20 presented its own proposal 
on agriculture on 3 September 2003 (WTO 2003b). Addressing the “three pillars” of 
agriculture, the G20 proposal advocated differentiated commitments by developing 
and developed countries, especially regarding market access.90The G20 also asked 
for significantly more ambitious cuts than suggested in the EU-US proposal. 
More important than highlighting differences in the agenda of these two 
blocks, the emergence of the G20 challenged the dynamics of the international trade 
regime. Since GATT, developed countries had played an almost hegemonic role in 
defining the structure and norms of the multilateral trade agreements. From Cancun 
onwards this balance of power began to shift. It became clear that an agreement 
would no longer depend solely on the will of the US and the EU, but would require 
the accommodation of preferences and interests of other players (Baynes and 
                                                
89 See Dijck and Faber (2006), Gallagher (2000), Hoekman and Martin (2001), Narlikar (2003) Odell (2006) and, 
Thomas and Trachtman (2009), for a discussion on the role of developing countries at the WTO. 
90Bouët (2005), Clapp (2006b), Hoda and Gulati (2007) analyse the agenda and the engagement of developing 
countries in the negotiations on agriculture under the Doha Agenda. 
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Woolcock 2011: 351).91 
In terms of the agenda, the EU-US joint text and the G20 proposal fostered 
the debate in preparation for the 5th Ministerial Conference, in 2003, with the parties 
also contributing their proposals. Nevertheless, negotiations at Cancun were called to 
end before an agreement could be reached. This failure was largely attributed to an 
inability to progress in discussions of the Singapore issues. As agriculture was 
subjected to the single undertaking clause, an agreement in this area had to be 
postponed (Baldwin 2006: 690). Nonetheless, the new dynamics of negotiations that 
emerged in this period reinforced the rift between the EU and Brazil. The table 
below (table 16) summarises the positions taken by the two actors over the key issues 
discussed in the negotiations promoted between 1999 and 2003, showing there was 
no convergence of approaches. 
TABLE	  16	   EU-­‐	  BRAZIL	  IN	  MULTILATERAL	  NEGOTIATIONS	  ON	  AGRICULTURE	  (1987-­‐	  2003)	  
Issue Brazil’s Position EU’s Position BR vs. EU 
Agreement on 
Agriculture (1987) 
Against list of exceptions supporter of the list of 
exceptions 
Divergence 
 
 
Launch of 
negotiations on a 
new agreement 
(1999) 
In favour of:  immediate 
elimination of export 
subsidies; reduce domestic 
support; same treatment to 
agriculture as of industrial 
goods; use of technical 
requirements as non-trade 
barriers. 
 
 
 
In favour of the gradual lift 
of export subsidies. 
 
 
 
Divergence 
 
 
Doha Agenda 
(2001) 
In favour of the inclusion of 
prompt reduction of export 
subsidies granted by 
developed economies; 
against inclusion of 
environmental and 
investment issues. 
Against the inclusion of 
prompt reduction of export 
subsidies granted by 
developed economies; in 
favour of the inclusion of 
environmental and 
investment issues. 
 
 
 
Divergence 
Proposal on 
Modalities (WTO 
text – Harbison) 
12 February 2003 
 
Considered the proposal 
poor in tariff cuts and trade-
distorting practices 
 
Considered the proposal 
unfair in favour of exporting 
countries 
 
Divergence 
 
Proposal on 
Modalities 
 
G20 Proposal 
 
 
“EU-US Joint Framework” 
 
Divergence 
 
                                                
91 Narlikar and Tussie (2004) discuss the G20 in Cancun. 
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4.4.3	   Rescuing	   the	   Agreement,	   Recovering	   from	   the	   Cancun	  Backlash	  	  
 
On 11 January 2004, the US announced a new approach to the Singapore issues, 
suggesting that investments and competition should be withdrawn from the agenda. 
Removing these controversial and sensitive elements (for developing countries)had a 
positive impact on the reinvigoration of negotiations. A flurry of consultations took 
place in the first half of 2004. Nonetheless, the US’ move did not replace the EU-US 
joint proposal on agriculture tabled by the two actors in the previous year. In fact, 
negotiations of an agreement in this sector continued to be discussed within the 
agenda proposed at Cancun.  
Brazil and the EU engaged in this process on the same terms as before, with 
no signs of change in their pattern of cooperation, or lack thereof, at the multilateral 
level. 
Still articulating its position through the G20, Brazil joined other members of 
the group in launching an official communication, considering the EU-US proposal 
as a disguised mechanism to maintain the current protectionist policy of the two 
developed economies (Khor 2004). The EU and the US countered this 
communication by affirming that they would not approve a tiered system as defended 
by the Cairns group and the G20. 
The clash between the positions taken by the EU and Brazil was consolidated 
as the pattern of their interaction at the WTO but, from 2004, two new factors 
emerged which would impact on the interaction between the two players; namely the 
rearrangements of informal negotiating groups, and the changes in the EU’s agenda. 
Traditionally the EU and the US had always been the key leading players in 
multilateral negotiations. Part of their influence was shared with Japan and Canada 
(forming the “Quad”) yet, over the next few years, new protagonists emerged. Brazil, 
India, and Australia joined the US and the EU as the most active WTO members in 
the Doha Round. Japan remained on the scene, but Canada lost its central role. 
Together, these six key actors formed exclusive negotiation groups with various 
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compositions. The EU and Brazil interacted within these selective forums, as both 
players were part of the so-called “new Quad”, the “Five interested parties (FIPs)”, 
the “Quint”, and the “G6” (WTO 2013b). Taking part in these groups, the EU and 
Brazil met in new forums of debate, enhancing the degree of and opportunities for 
their direct interaction, which might eventually facilitate closer coordination of their 
positions (ICTSD 2004). 
In addition to the establishment of new avenues for dialogue, the shift in the 
EU’s position on agriculture contributed to a change in the dynamics of interaction 
between the EU and Brazil at the multilateral level. 
Just as the US and the G20 had previously done, the EU issued a letter to all 
WTO trade ministers on 9 May 2004, detailing its perspective on an agreement on 
agriculture.92 Changing its approach dramatically, the EU announced its voluntary 
commitment to eliminate all its subsidies “if an acceptable outcome emerges on 
market access and domestic support.” The EU also recalled that it had already 
presented a limited list of products considered of interest to developing countries in 
Cancun, for which it agreed to cut subsidies (European Commission 2004). 
 The EU initiative was welcomed by a large number of parties, including 
Brazil, yet the EU’s move did not result in a change in position by the G20 (ICTSD 
2004: 2).  
The three letters issued in the first few months of 2004 provided the basis for 
informal and formal meetings between the key players of the Round.  Meeting in 
Geneva, in 2004, the parties revealed more flexibility in their standings on 
negotiations. On that occasion, Brazil argued in favour of closer cooperation between 
developing countries, the EU and the US. It then suggested that all these parties 
should work together in drafting a new formula for market access in agriculture. In 
proposing a new dynamic for negotiations, Brazil explicitly mentioned that this new 
approach should replace the traditional strategy of the G20 or Cairns group by 
                                                
92 The letter was first internally agreed upon among EU member states. On 7 May 2004, Lamy and Fischler 
presented a draft to be discussed with EU trade officials. The initiative was supported by Denmark, Finland, 
Germany, the UK, Sweden, and the Netherlands, but criticized by France, Ireland, Belgium, and Hungary, which 
questioned the legal capacity of the European Commission to negotiate a date for eliminating export subsidies 
(ICTSD 2004:2). 
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presenting a counter-proposal to the formula offered by the EU and the US.  
Reinforcing its commitments, the EU signalled that it would only agree to cut 
subsidies if the US adopted the same responsibility. However, to the dissatisfaction 
of developing countries, the EU insisted that an agreement on the three pillars of 
agriculture should include non-trade issues as well (ICTSD 2004b: 3).  The EU’s 
new position, as taken since Cancun, was then consolidated as a more unilateral one, 
breaking with its traditional bilateral alliance with the US, but without implying a 
closer coordination with Brazil or other developing countries. 
After another round of formal and informal consultations, the parties gathered 
again at another General Council meeting in Geneva in July 2004. This time, 
however, WTO members finally reached an agreement on a framework to move 
ahead with negotiations on the Doha Agenda: the “July Package” (WTO 2004). 
The July Package was a deal essentially forged by the FIPs with Brazil and 
India in close coordination with others members of the G20.  The process leading to 
the agreement showcased the common exclusion of the majority of parties from 
decision-making in Doha negotiations.Another problem with the “Package” was that 
it postponed important deadlines for the conclusion of the Doha Round. Moreover, 
the technical details of the accord regarding both domestic support and export 
subsidies, when calculated, reveal little trade liberalisation in numerical terms. The 
“Package” also contained the contentious statement that the degree of differentiated 
responsibilities applied to developing countries, on both agriculture and non-
agricultural sectors, would take into account improvements in their markets in these 
areas, paving the way for further disagreement among the parties (Narlikar 2005: 
118- 221). 
 Yet the success of the FIPs in striking a deal had direct implications for the 
dynamics of the interaction between the EU and Brazil at the WTO. Featuring among 
the protagonists, Brazil started to move from an exclusive “block approach” towards 
negotiations, simultaneously changing its perception of the prospect of more 
collaborative talks with the EU and the US, as the analysis of a Brazilian Diplomat, 
Braz Baracuhy, on the July Package illustrates:  
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The Framework Agreement of 1 August 2004 (known as the ‘July Framework’) 
represented an important substantive convergence of concepts and ambition. 
The G-20 positions and key issues of concern for developing countries were 
reflected in the draft framework for modalities in agriculture (Annex A). (…) 
The FIPs and its outreach combined with the multilateral discussions created a 
new paradigm of decision, beyond the US-EU top-down format. Just one year 
after the tabling of the EU-US joint proposal, conversations were now based on 
a text negotiated directly between developed and developing members. The July 
Framework marked the end of the duopoly in WTO decision-making (Baracuhy 
2011: 8-9). 
 
However, the Framework did not pave the way for a shift in the pattern of 
EU-Brazil BCML. 
Gathering in October 2005 to discuss possible avenues for an agreement at the 
6th Ministerial Conference in Hong Kong, the FIPs engaged in a “blame game.” The 
EU stressed the need for improvement in all areas, accusing developing countries, 
including Brazil, of not making concessions on market opening in industrial goods 
and services. The US blamed the EU, but also demanded that developing countries 
open their agricultural markets. Without forming coalitions, the US, Brazil and India 
all had similar views on the responsibilities of the EU.  
In response to this criticism, the new EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson declared that there was resistance from some EU member states, France in 
particular, to improve the EU’s offer of reducing agriculture tariffs, and insisted on 
the need to combine negotiations on agriculture with other areas. In light of these 
wide divergences, the FIPs could not reach an agreement, thus entering the 6th 
Ministerial Conference empty-handed (Khor 2005). 
Nevertheless, the expectations were that an ambitious agreement would be 
reached in Hong Kong, in December 2005. The Conference addressed all three pillars 
of agriculture, leading to limited improvements on negotiations. The parties agreed to 
phase out all export subsidies by the end of 2013, a decision largely favoured by the 
EU’s and US’s previous commitments to cut their export-subsidy programmes. Yet, 
the EU offered a smaller average cut on bound rates and a wider list of exceptions 
than proposed by the US or the G20. There was no agreement on this issue either. The 
EU insisted it had made enough concessions on agriculture and pledged more market 
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liberalisation by developing countries on Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) – 
a claim directly opposed by the Brazilian agenda. 
Commenting on the issue, the Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim, 
openly declared that there was a general consensus among the parties that the EU’s 
offer was too poor, and was thus responsible for obstructing an agreement. Amorim 
added that “everyone needs to pay a little bit for the system, but developed countries 
should pay more. (…) This is an understanding that sometimes I believe to be hard 
for EU negotiators” (Gazeta Mercantil 2006). 
Negotiations in preparation for and during Hong Kong revealed the fragility 
of the FIPs as a selective forum for discussions in the Doha Round, putting the 
spotlight on divergences between the EU’s and Brazil’s agendas for a multilateral 
deal on agriculture. At the same time, the dynamics of the FIPs have also stressed the 
importance of reaching an agreement between the two players in order to allow for 
the successful conclusion of the Round. 
According to Dilip Das, in April 2006, the EU the manifested its inclination to 
enhance market offers in agriculture if other developed economies – essentially the 
US – would undertake the same commitment. The EU position was welcomed by 
Brazil and other developed countries, encouraging the parties to engage in 
negotiations in the hope of agreeing on modalities by end of that month. However, 
the 30 April deadline was missed (Das 2008: 60-63).  
The high-level meeting held in Geneva between 29 June and 2 July 2006 
focused on modalities and on NAMA, the two core and inextricably linked issues of 
the Doha Round. Within the first days of negotiations, it was evident that no 
agreement would be reached. The US trade representative, Susan Schwab, declared: 
While the United States was prepared to do more, [the] focus on the loopholes 
in market access, on the layers of loopholes, revealed that a number of 
developed and advanced developing countries were looking for ways to be less 
ambitious, to avoid making ambitious contributions (USDA 2013). 
 
 Criticising the US position, Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim, 
declared that “it is logically wrong and morally unfair to try to reverse this equation 
  
 182 
and to try to put the burden on the developing countries. Let the developed countries 
do their bit (…), and we will correspond” (Gazeta Mercantil 2006). 
 Adopting a more conciliatory approach, the EU signalled that it would 
enhance its agriculture market access offer if the circumstances were appropriate.93 
The EU also joined Brazil and other developing countries in pressuring the US to 
increase its cuts on trade-distorting farm subsidies. Yet the EU insisted on developing 
countries opening their markets to industrialised goods in exchange for further 
concessions on agriculture, a demand that never pleased the G20, which insisted that 
this was a “development” Round (Das 2008: 65).  
 Getting the negotiations back on track was the objective of several Ministerial 
meetings of the G6 (Australia, Brazil, EU, India, Japan and the US) during June and, 
especially, July of 2006. Chairing a G6 meeting in Geneva, on 23 July 2006, Pascal 
Lamy concluded the impossibility of an agreement, informing the parties that he 
would propose the suspension of the Doha talks to all WTO Members. The formal 
decision to suspend the Doha Round indeterminately was endorsed by the General 
Council on 27 July (ICTSD 2006b: 1-2).  
 Following the decision, key actors started another finger-pointing exercise, 
trying to blame each other for the halt in negotiations. 
 In the press conference called right after the announcement of the informal 
decision taken to stop the process of negotiations, the EU Trade Commissioner Peter 
Mandelson was incisive in attributing the responsibility of the decision to the US’ 
failure to demonstrate flexibility, especially with regards to farm subsidies.94 
As expected, the open EU attack did not please the US. The US trade 
representation in Geneva issued a statement condemning the EU’s claim, warning 
that the blaming exercise could lead to the complete jeopardising of negotiations 
(ICTSD 2006b: 10).  But as much as the US tried to justify its position, criticism of 
                                                
93 This time, the criticism to the EU’s announcement came from some of its member states. France and Austria 
judged that the EU could not improve its offer without harming its internal market 
94 According to Mandelson, the problem emerged when discussions reached the question of domestic support, as 
US commitment was crucial. Claiming that no market access offer was on the table, the US was not prepared to 
offer flexibility in their offers on domestic supports (WTO 2006). 
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its stand point also came from other parties, including Brazil.  
In a more moderate tone than his European counterpart from the G6, the 
Brazilian Foreign Minister, Celso Amorim declared: 
I have to recognize though there was movement on the part of the European 
Union on the last few months to get closer to the G20 proposal. (…) it would be 
more likely to get an agreement if the European Union moved to a true G20 
proposal, not something that is near G20, but not exactly a G20. (…) for 
instance, everybody knows that the cuts in the higher bands by the European 
Union are much smaller than the ones proposed by the G20, and they come to a 
similar average by means of different products that are not of great interest for 
many of the participants (Gazeta Mercantil 2006).  
 
 Despite the fact that negotiations on the Doha Round were closer than ever to 
breaking point, this period marked a slight improvement in EU-BrazilBCML. In part, 
this movement was facilitated by the US’ stubbornness towards enhancing its offers, 
facing the criticism of both the EU and Brazil. 
 Overall, in the period between 2004 and 2006, the positions of the two actors 
converged on certain matters, in contrast to the complete divergence of their 
approaches that marked the preceding years. Nevertheless, as table 17 illustrates, the 
EU and Brazil disagreed on most of the issues being negotiated, failing to affirm a 
partnership at the multilateral level. 
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TABLE	  17	   EU-­‐	  BRAZIL	  IN	  MULTILATERAL	  NEGOTIATIONS	  ON	  AGRICULTURE	  (2004-­‐2006)	  
Issue Brazil’s Position EU’s Position BR vs. EU 
 
 
Agenda for the 
July Package 
 
 
G20 Communication against 
the EU-US Joint Framework 
Response to the G20 
opposing to tiered system 
defended by the Cairns 
Group and the G20 
 
 
Divergence 
 
 
Elimination of 
Subsidies 
In favour of the EU’s new 
commitment; keeping 
previous position on tariff 
reduction 
Voluntary Commitment to 
eliminate all subsidies 
(letter issued on May 2004) 
 
 
Convergence 
 
 
WTO GC Meeting 
May 2004 
 
Proposed closer cooperation 
with the US-EU to draft a 
new formula for market 
access 
Asked the US to negotiate 
on the US export credit 
scheme and on the US food 
aid programme; defended 
the inclusion of non-trade 
issues 
 
 
Divergence 
 
FIPs Meeting 
(October 2005) 
 
Agreement on Agriculture 
should come before progress 
in other areas 
Criticised the lack of 
concessions on market 
opening on industrial goods 
and services 
 
Divergence 
Phase out export 
subsidies by 2013 
(Hong Kong 
Conference) 
 
In favour 
 
In favour 
 
Convergence 
Caps for 
maximum tariffs 
(Hong Kong 
Conference) 
High cuts on bound rates; 
restricted list of exceptions 
Average cuts on bound rates; 
wide list of exceptions 
 
Divergence 
 
High-level meeting 
(Geneva June/July 
2006) 
 
Against distorting farm 
subsidies applied by the US 
Against distorting farm 
subsidies applied by the US 
 
Convergence 
Against opening NAMA 
market 
Pressuring for opening of 
developing countries’ 
NAMA market 
Divergence 
 
Suspension of 
Negotiations 
(July 2006) 
Blamed the lack of 
flexibility; welcomed the 
change in the EU’s position, 
but criticised specific points 
on the EU’s agenda. 
 
Blamed the US for the 
failure of negotiations 
 
Divergence 
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  4.4.	  5	  Old	  and	  New	  Alliances,	  and	  Doha’s	  Fate	  at	  Stake	  Again	  	  	  	  
Breaking eight months of silence, the G4 and the G6 gathered in Delhi on 11-12 
April 2007.95On this occasion, Brazil and the EU were relatively flexible in their 
approaches to negotiations, aiming at moving closer to an agreement. Yet, again, the 
US refused to make further concessions on agricultural domestic support, whilst 
asking other parties for greater offers on NAMA. Without any agreement, the G4 
was close to collapsing (Khor 2007). 
 After a series of unsuccessful talks, the final G4 meeting to discuss modalities 
was scheduled for 19-23 June 2007 in Potsdam. Negotiations broke down when the 
G4 split into two colliding alliances, with Brazil and India on one side, and the EU 
and US on the other. Again, the problem was the issue-linkage between agriculture 
and industrial products. Siding with the US, the EU asked developing countries to 
favourably consider their proposal for tariff cuts in NAMA. Brazil considered the 
EU’s offer unfair, with Celso Amorim, declaring: “In a way, we are having sort of a 
Cancun Act II in which the two developed countries or entities found common levels 
of comfort for them ... but keeping, of course, a very high ambition [in NAMA] for 
us.” (ICTSD 2007: 1-2).  
 Negotiations broke down in acrimony on 21 June 2007. In spite of this G4 
setback, the activities of the negotiating groups on agriculture and NAMA continued. 
After consultations with members, the chairperson of the agriculture group, Crawford 
Falconer, presented a draft text on modalities on 17 July 2007 (Grethe 2007: 199-
200).  
 Gathering at what was considered a “make-or-break” summit, trade 
negotiators met in Geneva on 21-29 July 2008. Once again, negotiations collapsed. 
                                                
95 Following the increased relevance of developing countries in the WTO after the negotiationsof Cancun in 
2003, WTO decision-making was rearranged, reflecting its new dynamics of power. The “old quad” (Canada, 
EU, Japan and the US), became the “new quad”, with Brazil and India replacing Canada and Japan. Moreover, 
new groups emerged.  Australia, Brazil, the EU, India, Japan and the US form the so-called G6 that, with the 
addition of China, is also known as G7 (Narlikar 2010: 719). 
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This time, a deadlock was reached when discussing the Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM)96 for agriculture products, although expectations were for further 
impasse when negotiations reached the other agricultural issues, NAMA and 
intellectual property rights (Fergusson 2008: 7). 
 During the meeting, talks initially focused on the proposal presented by the 
WTO Director-General Pascal Lamy, on 25 July 2008. The US and India lead 
opposition to the proposal, followed by the G33 and China. Brazil and the EU were 
more inclined to accept it.97 Without consensus among the parties, and in a second 
attempt to push for an agreement, Lamy circulated a new proposal, this time without 
any figures. However, whilst the G33 was in favour of the text, the US positioned 
itself against it.  
 To overcome the impasse, the EU tabled the proposal of a “tiered approach,” 
granting developing countries the right to adopt different duties according to the level 
of import surges. The proposal was then discussed at the “green room” meeting 
convened between Pascal Lamy and the G7. This time Brazil backed the EU, together 
with Australia, and broke its alliance with India which, like China, had some 
reservations to the EU’s proposal. But the main problem was, once more, the US’ 
opposition (ICTSD 2008: 5-6). 
 In light of this major setback, another G7 meeting was convened in Brussels 
in September 2008. Discussions broke down over the first issue of the agenda, as the 
parties could not agree on the SSM. The EU acted alone, reviewing the offer 
presented in July. Brazil joined other exporting countries, namely Australia and the 
US, in proposing a “growth factor” to calculate the trigger. Again, China and India 
                                                
96 In a nutshell, the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM) can be understood as an instrument that allows 
developing countries to temporarily increase their tariffs on agricultural goods when there is a prompt drop in 
international prices or a sudden increase in imports. Therefore, if at a first glance SSM may look like a technical 
issue, it is a very contentious and politicised matter within negotiations. Developing countries have proven to be 
very keen on ensuring the inclusion of the clause in an agreement, while the rules of the international trade 
regime still allow developed countries to apply protectionist measures, largely presented as domestic support and 
market access. 
97 The G33, also known as “Friends of Special Products”, is a coalition that defends limited market opening in 
agriculture for under-developed economies. Membership expanded from original 33 members to 42 states and 
includes: Antiguaand Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Benin, Botswana, China, Cote d’Ivoire, Congo, Cuba, 
DominicanRepublic, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Kenya, Korea, 
Mauritius,Mongolia, Montserrat, Mozambique, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, The Philippines, 
Peru,Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Tanzania,Trinidad 
and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe(IBON 2008). 
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were very reluctant to sign up for an agreement, and, in spite of the various 
contributions, no deal was reached (Khor 2007). A shift in the US position that now 
accepted a deal was not sufficient. The G7 meeting was suspended days before 
schedule, with India refusing to sign an agreement on SSM (ICTSD 2008b). 
 Despite some signs of improvement in the course of negotiations, the WTO 
Director General announced the suspension of the meeting, in a last-minute decision 
taken at the mini-ministerial meeting in December 2008. In justifying his position, 
Pascal Lamy stated that the costs of a second failure would be too high; it was 
preferable to take small steps and minimise risks (ICTSD 2008: 1). 
 Pressure for reaching an agreement increased as failed negotiations were 
accumulating. The meetings of the G8 and G20, held early in 2009, both endorsed the 
support of key governments to the conclusion of the Doha Round and pushed for the 
end of 2010 as the deadline. But political declarations, confronted with protectionist 
domestic practices, were further undermining the chances of a multilateral accord to 
promote trade liberalisation. 
 The EU and the US were leading the increase in trade-distorting policies. In 
early 2009 the EU decided to introduce domestic support to eggs, frozen poultry and 
some dairy products. A few months later, the US announced the reintroduction of 
export subsidies to dairy products. These two events represented major setbacks for 
negotiations and prompted an immediate reaction from the Cairns group and the G20, 
Brazil included. Issuing public statements, these two groups repeated the 
commitments undertaken by the US and the EU in previous negotiation rounds to 
“completely eliminate export subsidies by 2013 as part of an overall trade deal” 
(ICTSD 2009: 2).  
 So far, despite Brazil and the EU having closer positions on modalities, with 
Brazil even supporting the EU proposal back in July 2008, disagreement over export 
subsidies still hindered any possibility of an EU-Brazil alliance at the multilateral 
level. The EU decision to increase its protectionist practices only contributed to the 
widening gap between the two players. 
 The crisis engendered by the new protectionist measures adopted by the EU 
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and the US did not preclude negotiations from continuing. As reported by the Bridges 
Weekly, trade negotiators engaged in a series of meetings in Geneva in July 2009 to 
discuss technical aspects that were obstructing an accord in the so-called “process of 
scheduling commitments.” (ICTSD 2009b: 3-4). Reporting to the informal meeting of 
the Trade Negotiation Committee on 24 July 2009, Pascal Lamy expressed 
satisfaction with the course of talks, affirming that it would be possible to conclude 
the Round by the end of 2010 (WTO 2009b).   
 4.4.6	  Hitting	  the	  Wall	  with	  Still	  No	  Sign	  of	  an	  Agreement	  	  
  
The optimism in Lamy’s evaluation of the course of negotiations did not seem to 
reflect much of the reality: there was no political momentum to indicate a dramatic 
shift in the parties’ position that might lead to a successful deal on the Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA), as Rodrieck Abbott points out: 
 
In July it came to be tacitly recognized that nothing would be achieved until 
after the US Presidential election, followed by similar democratic exercises in 
2009 in India and in Germany, a new European Parliament and a new 
Commission. This was closely followed by the realization that the global 
economy was entering an unprecedented deep recession and that the financial 
sector worldwide was in need of major surgery and repair. Except for a few 
voices in Australia and Brazil, no serious negotiator expected progress in 2009; 
and even some of them have been quieter after the WTO estimated that world 
trade would fall by 10% this year (by 14% in developed countries) (Abbott 
2009: 2). 
 
With a blend of scepticism and motivation, the 7th WTO Ministerial 
Conference was (finally) held in Geneva, between 30 November and 2 December 
2009. As ICTSD reported, after four years of deadlock since Hong Kong, the 7th 
Conference excluded from its official agenda the most relevant issue in the WTO: the 
DDA. Nevertheless, the meeting was seen as an opportunity for the parties to reaffirm 
their commitment to the Round. In this spirit, the G20 and the Cairns group issued 
their own statements affirming their interest in concluding the Round in 2010 (ICTSD 
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2009b: 1). 
Expression of views on Doha also came through the speeches of individual 
WTO members at the Plenary Session, with the EU and Brazil approaching these 
occasions very differently. Speaking on behalf of the EU, Catherine Ashton 
manifested dissatisfaction with the slow pace of negotiations. Announcing it was her 
last day in the post as EU Trade Commissioner, Ashton declared that “Europe (…) is 
against any downgrading in the ambitious pro development package which is within 
sight” (Ashton 2009).  
Brazil, on the other hand, expected significant progress in negotiations. 
Speaking at the General Plenary of the first day of the 7th Conference, Celso Amorim 
called for the conclusion of negotiations by the end of 2010. Aiming to contribute to 
an agreement, Brazil advanced its proposal for agriculture, as Amorim announced: 
“by mid-2010, Brazil will grant duty-free-quota-free access for products from LDCs 
covering 80% of all tariff lines. This will increase over four years to cover all tariff 
lines. We can only hope that the developed countries will follow suit” (WTO 2009). 
Brazil’s efforts to advance negotiations were not echoed by all key players: 
with a lack of political will, there was no significant improvement in Geneva. The 
Conference was restricted to mild talks, delivering only the unanimous call by all the 
parties for the conclusion of the Doha Round by the end of 2010. 
In 2010 the parties held meetings at many different levels, all of which failed 
to significantly contribute to a DDA closure.98 Gathering in Seoul, in November 2010, 
leaders of the G20 declared that 2011 was “a critical window of opportunity, albeit 
narrow to reach a final agreement” (G20: 2010). Negotiations continued to take place 
throughout the years that followed. Up to the present date, the Doha Round remains 
unfinished business. 
                                                
98 To a certain extent, the new dynamics of thenegotiation process was a response to Pascal Lamy’s call for the 
adoption of a ‘cocktail approach’, which consisted ofa combination of bilateral meetings, multilateral processes, 
group consultations, in addition to the establishment of new channels for discussions. Even if this new format of 
discussions did not lead to concrete improvements within negotiations, it restored certain optimism among 
members, arguably enhancing the prospects of their reaching an agreement (ICTSD 2010: 2). 
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The last two phases covered by this analysis revealed the irregular compatibility 
of approaches between the EU and Brazil. The obstacles posed by the US’ positions 
created room for cooperation between the two partners. As shown in table 18, from 
2006 to 2008, the EU and Brazil supported proposals that were important to defining 
the terms of an agreement, revealing a certain convergence of approaches. 
Nevertheless, the eventual prospects of the strengthening of coordination between the 
EU and Brazil in multilateral negotiations on agriculture that emerged on these 
occasions never materialised. From 2009 onwards, the two actors (once more) took 
predominantly divergent stand points on negotiations. 
TABLE	  18	   EU-­‐	  BRAZIL	  IN	  MULTILATERAL	  NEGOTIATIONS	  ON	  AGRICULTURE	  (2007-­‐2010)	  
Issue Brazil’s Position EU’s Position BR vs. EU 
G4 & G6 Meeting 
(April 2007) 
Flexible approach; keen to 
promote an agreement. 
Flexible approach; keen to 
promote an agreement. 
Convergence 
G4 Meeting 
(June 2007) 
In favour of high 
concessions on agriculture 
and restricted commitment 
on NAMA. 
In favour of average 
concessions on agriculture 
and ambitious commitment 
on NAMA. 
 
 
Divergence 
WTO Director 
General’s 
Proposal 
(July 2008) 
In favour In favour Convergence 
EU’s proposal of 
“tiered approach” 
(Sep 2008) 
In favour Proponent (in favour) Convergence 
Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM) 
( Sept 2008) 
Adoption of “growth factor” 
to calculate the trigger 
Against the adoption of 
“growth factor” to 
calculate the trigger 
 
Divergence 
7th Ministerial 
Conference 
(Geneva 2009) 
Pushing for the conclusion 
of the Doha Round by the 
end of 2010 
Not proposing a specific 
date for the conclusion of 
the Doha Round 
Divergence 
2009- 2010 No significant progress in negotiations, no relevant issue of the agenda on 
agriculture discussed 
 
The conclusion of this section is that there was no change in the overall pattern 
of EU-Brazil BCML. A partnership between the two actors never materialised and the 
compatibility of their positions varied according to the issue at stake and the period of 
time, with no signs of a long-term EU-Brazil alliance emerging at the multilateral 
level – at least as far as the negotiations on an agreement on agriculture are 
concerned. 
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4.5	  Assessing	  Level-­‐Linkage	  
  
During the entire period analysed, there has not been any significant shift in 
the agenda or in the institutionalisation of EU-Brazil bilateral dialogues on trade. 
Revealing a rather conventional outlook on bilateral trade matters, the agenda of 
bilateral cooperation places little emphasis on multilateral issues, and has not 
evolved from an “exchange of views” approach. In terms of institutionalisation, the 
framework for cooperation remains structured around the Joint Committee created in 
1982. Furthermore, there is no specific bilateral forum in which to address 
multilateral trade issues, and these matters have been included in the broad agenda of 
the “trade experts” meeting, part of the Joint Committee. Given the lack of progress 
in enhancing cooperation on multilateral issues, the bilateral level could not be 
considered as a platform from which to eventually foster EU-Brazil coordination at 
the multilateral level.  
Interestingly, the analysis of EU-Brazil engagement over more than ten years 
of negotiations on a multilateral agreement on agriculture reveals a contrasting 
outcome. If at the dialogue at the bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral 
arena has been continuously low, at the multilateral level it displays a rather irregular 
pattern. Having clearly differentiated interests, the EU and Brazil entered the process 
of negotiations on agriculture with diverging approaches. Openly criticising each 
other’s positions, the two players had conflicting agendas that hindered any prospect 
of BCML.  
Moreover, as the previous section outlined, the period in which the EU and 
Brazil adopted their most divergent approaches in multilateral negotiations extended 
until 2004. Paradoxically, this period coincides with the negotiations of an EU-
MERCOSUR trade agreement that was subject to WTO rules and the outcome of the 
Doha Round. The disagreements between the EU and Brazil on negotiations of an 
international deal on agriculture may suggest that, although linked, there was poor 
coordination between the sub-regional and multilateral levels of EU-Brazil 
cooperation. 
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As negotiations evolved, the trend of EU-Brazil cooperation in multilateral 
negotiations shifted towards a rather mixed pattern that combined both the 
convergence and divergence of positions, varying according to the issue at stake. If 
these changes have not converted the EU and Brazil into partners at the multilateral 
level, they have potentially enhanced prospects for closer coordination between the 
two actors – an opportunity that has not been taken at the bilateral level. Thus, 
crossing the analysis of the two levels, it is evident that development in EU-Brazil 
engagement at the multilateral level has no correlation to their engagement at the 
bilateral level; there was no level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on trade. 
To explain this outcome, the third part of this chapter assesses the process of 
level-linkage, exploring how each of the four hypotheses accounts for this result. 
 4.5.1	  The	  Regime	  Type	  
 
As stated at the outset of the chapter, this thesis works with the hypothesis that the 
process of level-linkage is shaped by the “type of regime” in which cooperation takes 
place. Arguably, the more open to influences from other levels of cooperation a 
regime is, the greater the prospects for level-linkage to occur. 
The international trade regime today embodies the development of a process 
of international cooperation initiated in the post-World War II era. The first offspring 
of this process was the GATT, with a scope limited to industrial goods and a 
cumbersome institutional framework. Nonetheless, the Agreement was important in 
promoting trade liberalisation, establishing as it did a rule-based regime towards this 
end. Inheriting the structure of the GATT, the WTO advanced the scope of the 
regime and embraced further responsibilities, in addition to enhancing its rule-
making authority. In other words, the WTO became “a fully-fledged international 
organisation rather than merely an international secretariat (like the GATT)” (Gilpin 
2001: 218-219). 
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As a member-driven organisation, the parties are responsible for providing 
political guidance to the institution. Nevertheless, the WTO is anchored in a complex 
institutional arrangement formed by several working groups, committees and 
councils. Thus, despite political guidance being provided by the members of the 
organisation, the WTO administrative bodies have competences over compliance and 
enforcement. As the process-tracing of negotiations on agriculture has demonstrated, 
the Director General and the Trade Negotiation Committee have made a great 
contribution to the negotiations, not just coordinating the activities of the parties, but 
also tabling proposals on behalf of the WTO, albeit without any voting rights. 
Subsequently, the outcome of negotiations depends not only on the interactions 
between WTO members, but is also influenced by the role and the engagement of the 
parties with the high-level staff that take part in the negotiations. This feature 
attaches the bulk of negotiations to the WTO framework, diminishing the possibility 
of agreements being forged outside of this multilateral institutional setting, since they 
will go on to be transposed into the WTO domain. 
Another aspect that characterises the dynamics of the negotiation process at 
the multilateral level is that decision-making among member states operates by 
consensus. Under this rule, the promotion of a certain agenda by a particular 
international actor requires it to persuade all other parties to support the same 
position, which is not a simple process. As John Barton (2006: 18) explains: 
Reaching an agreement about rules and principles that will apply to nearly 150 
countries is not a trivial task. It requires understanding the structure of each 
constituent national political economy, and, in many cases, detailed information 
about its laws and regulatory structures. The continuous presence of negotiators 
from many WTO member countries in a single location (Geneva) greatly 
reduces the costs of obtaining that information (Barton 2006:18). 
 
In this exercise, the bilateral level could facilitate the process of multilateral 
cooperation in at least two ways. Firstly, by taking the multilateral agenda to the 
bilateral level, two actors could engage in a process of bargaining and trade-offs, 
discussing the contentious issues that may have jeopardised their BCML. In the best 
scenario, these discussions could lead to the adoption of a common position. In any 
case, this process would facilitate the engagement of the parties at the multilateral 
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level. Another possibility would be their forging an alliance at the bilateral level and 
putting in place a strategy to coordinate an eventual EU-Brazil position within the 
agenda of other WTO parties. Thus, the two partners would be increasing their 
chances to successfully promote their interests at the multilateral level. However, the 
presence of a permanent delegation of the parties at the WTO invested with a 
relatively high degree of autonomy reinforces the perception of the multilateral 
negotiation process as largely detached from other levels. In light of this, the 
international trade regime is not favourable to positive level-linkage. 
 Either way, the adoption of these strategies would require the identifying of a 
certain degree of compatibility of approaches towards multilateral negotiations, 
institutional capability in terms of foreign policy-making and a certain preference for 
a EU-Brazil partnership at the WTO. These three other criteria are analysed in the 
discussion of the other three hypotheses of the thesis that follows. 
 4.5.2	  The	  Compatibility	  of	  the	  Two	  Actors’	  Approaches	  
 
The “Council conclusions on [the] EU’s approach to trade, growth and development 
in the next decade” approved by the Council of the European Union on 16 March 
2012 endorsed the EU’s commitment to multilateralism. Emphasising the need to 
strengthen the WTO, the document stressed "the importance of the multilateral 
approach as the most important avenue to fight protectionism and resolve 
outstanding issues on the international trade agenda”. Furthermore, the Council 
recognised the EU’s critical role as the world’s largest trading power, and, on this 
basis, adopted a series of actions to be taken to promote a multilateral agenda for 
trade and development (Council of the European Union 2012).  
 According to Sophie Meunier, in the first years of the Doha Round, the EU’s 
approach to the negotiations was subjected to the “managed globalization” doctrine 
that dictated the guidelines for European external trade policy. From this perspective, 
the positions taken at the multilateral level represented the balance between trade and 
non-trade objectives. When Peter Mandelson replaced Pascal Lamy as EU Trade 
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Commissioner in 2004, there was a shift in the EU’s approach towards prioritising 
trade objectives (Meunier 2007: 906). Addressing multilateralism in a more 
pragmatic way, however, did not exclude the prospects of employing trade policy as 
an instrument of power. As Sophie Meunier and Kalypso Nicolaïdis assert, “trade 
stands perhaps as the most effective mode of action” when considering the EU’s 
“soft power.” The EU’s objective is to go beyond trade gains, disseminating values 
associated with global governance, the rule of law and democracy. Being grounded 
in a process of market liberalisation, the export of a single market model is at the 
core of the EU’s strategy to enhance its power through the dissemination of its 
values, principles and model of governance. In this sense, the EU has chosen the 
multilateral level as its prioritised arena in which to exercise its trade power. In 
projecting its own model when addressing multilateral trade regimes, the EU has a 
clear agenda for trade liberalisation consisting of promoting the European model of 
market opening (Meunier and Nicolaïdis 2006: 912-915).  
 However, the EU’s support of multilateralism embraced at the discourse 
level, even if grounded in an argument of expressing its “soft power”, is not as 
unconditional as it may seem. The European Union has several bilateral trade 
agreements with third parties. As listed in the website of DG Enterprise and Industry, 
the EU has concluded bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) with four countries 
(Chile, Mexico, South Africa and South Korea), and is currently engaged in formal 
bilateral FTAs with Canada, India, Malaysia, Singapore and Ukraine. In addition, 
negotiations of regional FTAs are also in progress with ASEAN, Andean 
Community, Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), and MERCOSUR (European 
External Action Service 2012b). Moreover, in June 2013, the Council of the 
European Union adopted a directive on a trade and investment agreement with the 
United States, paving the way for the beginning of negotiations with the US 
(European External Action Service 2013). These are just a few examples 
demonstrating that the EU may have a preference for multilateralism but does not 
give this modality of cooperation exclusivity. 
Brazil proclaims to be “a steadfast supporter of an equitable, rules based, 
market-oriented multilateral trading system” considering that “the WTO is a linchpin 
of our integration into the world economy”, according to Celso Amorim (WTO 
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2003c). Thus, the WTO is considered as “the best arena to achieve power through 
joint-actions, allowing the country to deliver its competences in the defence of 
national interests” (Lafer 2000).  Brazil has long prioritised multilateralism in 
international trade, reflecting a preference for multilateralism as a tool of global 
governance, and, at the same time, for multilateral negotiations. Brazilian diplomatic 
history has a long tradition of engagement with the multilateral trade regime, albeit 
with a rather defensive approach. 
 As is clear from the process-tracing of negotiations conducted in the 
previous section, Brazil has always been very critical of the distribution of power 
within the trade regime and has often questioned the rules and norms of multilateral 
trade agreements, arguing that they favour developed economies. Therefore, Brazil is 
a supporter of a particular model of multilateralism. As Cornelia Huelsz points out, 
according to Brazil, the multilateral trade regime should better integrate the demands 
of developing countries into its agenda. This objective has long been endorsed by the 
country, but the strategies to promote it have varied according to the historical 
context and the issue at stake. Over the past few decades, Brazil has abandoned a 
strictly defensive stand point, adopting a mixed pattern of engagement in 
negotiations. Since Doha, Brazil has been very keen to promote trade liberalisation 
on agriculture, at the same time resisting market opening in services and industrial 
goods. In defending this “offensive-defensive” approach, Brazilian policy-makers 
maintain that this strategy promoted a balance between developed economies and 
developing countries, correcting the unfairness of the regime (Huelsz 2009: 127-
128).  
Comparing the two approaches, it can be said that the EU and Brazil jointly 
support the multilateral trade regime and have framed their external trade policies 
around the promotion of multilateralism. Moreover, in both cases, the interest in 
reinforcing a multilateral model of global governance on trade is grounded in a 
combination of ideational factors and material gains. For Brazil and the EU, 
multilateralism is a view of the world; a model with which to order international 
relations, but also an instrument to increase their absolute power and trade benefits.  
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From this perspective, the compatibility of the two actors’ approaches to the 
trade regime has a mixed impact on level-linkage. On the one hand, the strong 
interest of the parties in strengthening the multilateral trade regime could lead the EU 
and Brazil to perceive each other as allies in order to achieve this goal, fostering their 
bilateral cooperation. In fact, the Strategic Partnership and its Joint Action Plans are 
the result of their endorsement of such a strategy, as the two partners have agreed to 
jointly promote effective multilateralism, addressing the trade regime, amongst 
others. On the other hand, this congruence of interests in multilateralism is limited by 
the compatibility of those models of multilateral trade regime that the players want to 
disseminate. With Brazil envisioning a regime that, arguably, represents an equal 
balancing of the interests of all parties but which would see the compensation of 
developing countries, and the EU advocating a model that follows the rules of its 
single market, it is difficult for the parties to find common ground. If Brazil and the 
EU are really committed to forging a bilateral alliance in order to promote 
multilateralism in trade, they would need to work together on the development of a 
common model to pursue. As this chapter has demonstrated, so far this discussion 
has not featured in their bilateral agenda. Thus, the incompatibility of their 
approaches towards multilateralism broadly constitutes an obstacle to level-linkage. 
In addition to their approaches towards multilateralism, the engagement of 
the parties within the international trade regime is defined by the agenda adopted 
during negotiations. Whereas the concept of the “model of multilateralism” has not 
been subjected to significant changes over the past decades, the agenda of the parties 
during negotiations have changed considerably.  
As became clear in this chapter, the EU and Brazil have different agendas for 
negotiations on agriculture, but there have been more elements of convergence in 
their negotiating positions in the past few years. In addition to differences in terms of 
economic development, Brazil and the EU are both extremely relevant actors in trade 
in agriculture, but for paradoxical reasons. Whereas Brazil is a large supplier of 
agricultural goods, the EU is the world’s top importer of them. These material 
conditions not only set the initial boundaries for the engagement of the parties, but 
also underpin their positions within the entire negotiation process.  
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Brazil’s agenda combines the emphasis on the “development” aspect of the 
Doha Round with an interest in increased gains from trade liberalisation for 
agriculture exporting countries. At the same time, Brazil has always resisted an 
ambitious agreement on NAMA, rejecting trade-offs among different issue areas 
being negotiated. For Brazil, the Doha Round is the opportunity to correct trade-
distorting practices against the interest of developing countries, as legitimised by the 
WTO.  The Brazilian position in negotiations has remained relatively unchanged 
throughout the long process of the Round and is in stark contrast with the core 
positions adopted by the EU. 
Overall, the EU has adopted defensive stances in multilateral negotiations 
whenever agriculture is concerned. So far, the EU has succeeded in safeguarding its 
internal market from the risks of international trade liberalisation; the fact that the 
AoA negotiated in the GATT is still in force until the conclusion of the Doha Round 
is evidence of that. The EU entered the Doha Round with the same “defensive” 
approach on agriculture, but with an ambitious agenda on NAMA –the exact 
opposite of Brazil’s position. As negotiations evolved, the EU re-framed its positions 
on agriculture, improving offers in the access to its internal market. The reforms of 
the CAP promoted during the 2000s allowed the EU to shift its standing in 
negotiations, albeit not completely. As evidenced, the EU’s concessions on 
agriculture are still below the expectations of agriculture exporting countries, 
including Brazil. To some extent, the structure of the EU’s domestic market, as 
sponsored by the CAP, limits the rational bargaining of the EU at the Doha Round 
and constrains the prospects of its cooperation with Brazil. Nevertheless, as stressed 
by a high-level official in the Brazilian government, Brazil accepts the current 
European offers as a starting point for negotiations, and recognises the efforts 
employed by the EU to unlock the negotiation process. In his view, the main 
stumbling block for an agreement is no longer the EU’s insistence on protecting its 
agriculture market, but the lack of cooperation demonstrated by the US.99 
                                                
99Interview n31, Brussels, 27 July 2012. 
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As an analysis of this statement clarifies, the fact that Brazil agrees to 
negotiate on the basis of the EU’s proposal is not sufficient to classify the two actors’ 
approaches as convergent. The WTO parties are still not satisfied with the offers 
tabled by some members, and an agreement on agriculture still requires a long and 
intense exercise of bargaining and trade-offs, not solely between the EU and Brazil, 
but also between a large number of players with conflicting interests. With 
negotiations progressing at a worryingly slow pace, however, the current discussions 
on Doha have centred on the future of the Round. Thus, the shared interest of the EU 
and Brazil in the successful conclusion of an agreement constitutes an important 
point of convergence in their agendas at the current stage of negotiations. There is a 
window of opportunity for the process of level-linkage, as the bilateral level of EU-
Brazil cooperation could provide the partners with an arena in which to forge a joint 
strategy for strengthening current processes of multilateral negotiations.  
Nevertheless, once negotiations resumed, the differences in their agendas would 
hinder the prospects of further cooperation. As a result, overall, the “compatibility of 
the two actors’s approaches” (or rather the lack of it) limits the chances of level-
linkage on trade. 
 4.5.3	  Foreign	  Trade	  Policy-­‐Making	  Processes	  
 
As the instruments of EU-Brazil cooperation addressed in this chapter reveal, 
multilateral rules set up under the GATT/WTO framework provide the basis for the 
engagement between the two partners at the bilateral level. Interestingly then, even 
when multilateral trade rules have a direct impact on bilateral trade activities, 
multilateral and bilateral trade policies are two relatively independent processes for 
both the EU and Brazil. This detachment has several implications for the agenda and 
the engagement of the agents involved in the development of EU-Brazil relations at 
the bilateral and the multilateral levels and consequently impacts on the prospects for 
level-linkage on trade. 
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 The first evidence of their divergence of agendas is the poor emphasis on 
multilateral trade issues in the documents supporting EU-Brazil bilateral relations. In 
contrast to other areas in which there have been significant and progressive 
improvements in the incorporation of multilateral matters into bilateral dialogue, the 
focus on trade is almost entirely restricted to bilateral and/or regional issues. It would 
be hard to imagine the Doha Round being omitted from the global concerns 
addressed by the Strategic Partnership and its two Joint Action Plans. Yet references 
to trade are almost exclusively restricted to affirming the individual interests and 
concerns of the parties in the conclusion of the Round. Thus, the strategy of setting 
the bilateral level of cooperation as a platform for the promotion of enhanced 
collaboration between the EU and Brazil over multilateral trade issues is not 
mentioned.  
 Without enhancing the attention paid to the international trade regime in the 
EU-Brazil bilateral agenda, the forums for discussions on multilateral trade issues 
have been limited to the institutional arrangements created before the establishment 
of the Strategic Partnership in 2007. The multilateral trade agenda has been 
addressed at the bilateral level through the meetings of the “trade sessions”, held in 
preparation for the Joint Committee. Within these sessions, WTO issues are raised in 
a brief “exchange of views” that generally precedes detailed discussions on around 
20 points of bilateral trade, conducted by trade experts from both sides. Additionally, 
since 2010, specific questions concerning the multilateral agenda of negotiations on 
agriculture have also been addressed by the consultation mechanism on SPS issues. 
The consensus between the parties on the fragmentation of the agendas of bilateral 
and multilateral trade policies can be credited to the “division of labour” that 
characterises the policy-making processes of the two actors. 
 According to officials from both the Brazilian government and the European 
Commission, the technical nature of SPS allows this specific sectoral bilateral 
dialogue to promote more detailed discussions over multilateral trade practices 
concerning this field. In contrast, the interviewees recognised the feeble approach to 
the international trade regime provided for by the “trade sessions”, claiming that the 
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bilateral level is not the appropriate instance either to forge new positions or discuss 
the political dimension of multilateral trade policies. 100101 
 The institutional framework of Brazilian trade foreign policy-making denotes 
a clear distribution of competences among its agents and governmental bodies, 
divided in terms of bilateral and multilateral policies. Itamaraty occupies the central 
role in the shaping and implementation of policies addressing both levels, but 
coordination within the Ministry is limited. Agents engaged in bilateral relations with 
the EU are not the same ones taking part in the decision-making process concerning 
multilateral trade policy.  
As a Brazilian Diplomat explained, within Itamaraty, the DEU is responsible 
for defining the major political guidelines for cooperation with the EU.102 Regarding 
trade, this capacity falls into the domain of the DEC. Furthermore, this institutional 
arrangement includes the Department of International Negotiations (Departamento 
de Negociações Internacionais – DNC), which is in charge of dealing with 
bilateral/regional trade agreements. 
 As in other areas, the activities of Itamaraty in forging and exercising 
bilateral and multilateral trade foreign policies directly engage other Ministries. In 
the case of bilateral trade relations with the EU, coordination among these 
institutions takes place in the preparation for and during bilateral meetings. Ahead 
of EU-Brazil meetings, each DEC sub-division consults the Ministries that have 
potential interests in the agenda. Coordination between Itamaraty and other 
Ministries is not restricted to agenda-setting; members of staff from various 
governmental institutions are invited to join the Brazilian delegation in bilateral 
meetings with the EU. 
When it comes to defining Brazil’s position in international negotiations, 
decisions are taking primary by CAMEX, an inter-Ministerial Council that engages 
six Ministries and is coordinated by MDIC. The decision-making process of Brazil’s 
                                                
100Interview n35, Brussels,12 July 2011. 
101Interview n 21, Brussels, 11 July 2011. 
102Interview n35, Brussels, 20 September 2012. 
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standing in multilateral trade negotiations starts with the activities of Itamaraty 
(DEC) in coordinating an inter-Ministerial dialogue. Brazil has permanent 
representation in Geneva mandated to negotiate at the WTO. Within the Doha 
Round, the role of chief negotiator is performed by the Ambassador who serves as 
Permanent Representative. Additionally, the Foreign Minister has always played a 
key role, as the leading representative of Brazil, actively engaging in the WTO 
Ministerial Conferences as well as in the meetings of informal negotiation groups, 
such as the G20, G4 and G6. 
Yet, as a Brazilian diplomat stressed, there is an advanced communication 
mechanism within Itamaraty, allowing for decisions made within each division to be 
shared with other departments. This way, information regarding bilateral relations is 
always shared with all agents responsible for multilateral trade policy, and vice-
versa. Nevertheless, in spite of this internal coordination of Itamaraty, the multitude 
of players involved in the policy-making of both levels reinforces the claim that 
bilateral and multilateral trade foreign policies are two independent processes. 103 
Overall, the policy-making processes of the EU’s bilateral trade relations and 
multilateral trade policy both converge on the competences of the Commission. 
Furthermore, the fact that the Common Commercial Policy is recognised as a matter 
of exclusive competence reinforces the legitimacy of the Commission in these 
processes. All these factors foment a certain degree of coherence between EU trade 
policy addressing the bilateral level and policies addressing the multilateral arena. 
Nonetheless, as in the case of Brazil, policy-making for these levels is the result of 
two separate processes.  
With the exception of bilateral trade agreements, the Council and the 
Parliament are not directly involved in the handling of EU trade relations with Brazil, 
in contrast to their engagement with EU policy on multilateral trade. Moreover, even 
when considering the activities within the Commission, there is also an internal 
“division of labour” among staff. As a functionnaire from DG Trade explained, there 
is some coordination between the two levels, as bilateral policies are guided by 
                                                
103Interview n25, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
  
 203 
multilateral policies. However, policy-makers responsible for bilateral relations do 
not interfere in the process of EU trade policy formation for the WTO, and vice-
versa.104 
In light of the policy-making processes and institutional arrangements of 
Brazil and the EU, it is clear that bilateral and multilateral trade policies are two 
fragmented processes. The degree of coordination between the two levels is not 
sufficient to facilitate closer coordination of these processes in order that the bilateral 
agenda of EU-Brazil relations could have an impact on the framing of the partners’ 
policies towards the WTO.  
 4.5.4	  Preferences	  for	  Partners	  
 
The analysis of the EU’s and Brazil’s engagement with negotiations on agriculture 
has suggested that such a choice is unrealistic, for both material and cognitive 
reasons. Firstly, as previously mentioned, conflicting interests in liberalisation on 
agriculture limit the potential for enhancing cooperation between the EU and Brazil 
in the Doha Round. Becoming strong allies at the multilateral level would require the 
two players to radically rearrange their own agendas for negotiations, thus allowing 
for a wide range of common positions to be taken. But, since external trade policies 
are bound to domestic policies and interests, the degree of flexibility of negotiators to 
adjust their positions is limited. Thus far, it would be difficult to consider the 
possibility of such a high level of compatibility between the agendas of the EU and 
Brazil in the Doha Round.  
Secondly, the choice for partners is also associated with the identity an actor 
would like to project in the international arena. As Amrita Narlikar attests to, based 
on a constructivist approach, it can be considered that “the identification of like-
minded states with each other underlies coalition formation”. This is because “states 
                                                
104Interview n23, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
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sharing similar internal features are likely to bear great trust mutually, as they find it 
harder to anticipate aggressive intentions towards them from an inherently ‘good’, 
that is similar, state” (Narlikar 2003:27). 
Perhaps more so than other issue areas, the international trade regime is 
characterised by a bipolar system, with a clear (and thick) line dividing developed 
and developing economies. Within this distribution of power, the EU and Brazil sit at 
opposite ends of the spectrum. In this context, Brazil has built up its identity as an 
international trade actor of the developing world and has been able to make strategic 
use of its externally recognised power, providing an opportunity for the country’s 
positioning as a key WTO member.  
The EU, on the other hand, does not make such political use of the North-
South divide. At least in the official EU discourse highlighted in this chapter, there is 
no suggestion that the EU is “speaking on the behalf of the developed world,” or of 
its role as a leader or interlocutor of wealthy nations, in stark contrast to the 
discourse of Brazilian leaders/negotiators. The occasions on which the EU has 
publically stressed the differences between WTO members in terms of their 
economic conditions were those addressing specific issues of the Doha Agenda. In 
these instances, sentiments such as “developing countries should make concessions” 
were recurrent in the EU’s rhetoric. Thus, it could be claimed that, whereas for 
Brazil the divide between developed and developing economies has both a pragmatic 
and ideational utility, the EU makes more pragmatic use of this distinction. 
The division of the parties in economic terms dictates part of the context for 
their engagement within the multilateral trade regime. Yet, this clear-cut division 
contrasts with the complexity of the WTO’s formal grouping arrangements. In fact, 
as previously discussed in this chapter, within the WTO domain, coalitions are 
formed according to regional and issue-based criteria. Thus, many are groups 
constituted of developed and developing countries, united by a shared agenda. In the 
case of agriculture, the Cairns group is an example of a “mixed” coalition, as 
agriculture exporters with different degrees of economic development form the 
group, with Brazil sharing membership with Australia, among others. 
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In light of this, problems posed by the economic divide that sets Brazil and 
the EU apart might be overcome if they both belonged to the same WTO group. The 
relevant point is, however, that the two players do not share membership of any of 
the formal coalitions within the Organization. In the specific case of agriculture 
negotiations, the EU is considered as a group in itself, not having formal membership 
of any other coalition. Brazil, on the other hand, has taken part in agriculture 
negotiations by engaging with the Cairns group, the G20, and, to a lesser extent, 
MERCOSUR. 
Formal membership of a group does not generate an obligation to operate 
through that specific coalition; the parties are free to break their bounds and opt for 
alternative partnerships or unilateral positions. Until the mid-2000s, the US was the 
EU’s regular choice when opting for a partner. Common were the occasions on 
which these two partners tabled joint-proposals, usually provoking strong reactions 
from other WTO members, including Brazil. Nevertheless, with the EU being a 
major agriculture importer and the US a large exporter, conflicts of interests between 
these two actors limited the extent of their collaboration. Their differences were 
especially accentuated after the two major reforms of the CAP (2003, 2006), upon 
which the EU’s positions revealed an increased degree of flexibility, whilst the US 
went in the opposite direction, becoming a stumbling-block for negotiations.  
This divergence in approaches has had a direct impact on EU-US bilateral 
cooperation. Since 2006, the two players have not tabled any joint proposals. 
Changes in the pattern of cooperation between the two players have been reflected in 
the EU’s discourse, which has become very critical of the US position on agriculture 
negotiations. All these elements point to a dramatic shift in the EU’s preference for 
partners at the multilateral level; eventually this shift created a window of 
opportunity to enhance Brazil’s profile as an EU partner. 
Drifting away from the US has not meant that the EU has been compelled to 
find a replacement for its former ally. Since 2006, the EU has essentially operated on 
a unilateral basis, tabling its own proposals. As the process-tracing of negotiations 
has highlighted, there was a slight increase in Brazil’s support of very specific 
elements of the EU’s positions, but only because they had some level of convergence 
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with Brazil’s agenda. Nevertheless, these occasions were not wholly representative 
and could not be classified as alliances between preferential partners. 
If for the EU coalitions and partnerships are approached in a rather 
circumstantial way, for Brazil they are at the core of the country’s strategy to 
addressing multilateral agriculture negotiations. In the very early stages of 
negotiations, Brazil acted through the Cairns group, and, to a lesser extent, 
MERCOSUR. Later, in leading the G20, Brazil has not sought to draw its approach 
from the combination of the two groups’ agendas, but rather has always observed its 
own interests. Thus, in terms of preferential partners within the agricultural regime, 
Brazil opts for groups rather than individual WTO members. As confirmed by a 
senior Brazilian diplomat, the G20 is Brazil’s top priority.105 
Given Brazil’s mounting trade and economic growth over the past decade, 
Brazil has been able to consolidate itself as an important international trade actor, 
beyond the leading role the country has played in the three formal WTO groups it 
belongs to. In recognition of this, Brazil has occupied a central position in the most 
selective and prominent informal negotiations forums, including the “new Quad,” 
FIPs, G4, G5 and G6, among others. 
Sharing membership of all these informal groups, Brazil and the EU are 
bound to negotiate their positions whilst among a very small number of other 
players. These occasions provide the EU and Brazil with opportunities to further 
interact with each other, without the same interference they encounter in larger 
negotiation groups. Having more chances to engage in bargaining and trade-off 
activities enhances the prospects of the EU and Brazil overcoming their divergences 
in negotiations on agriculture, at least partially. Ultimately, this process could lead to 
enhanced prospects for the EU and Brazil becoming closer partners at the 
multilateral level. Yet again, an eventual EU-Brazil alliance would be restricted to 
the compatibility of their agendas.  
The informal meetings of these small groups analysed by this thesis were 
forums of intense debate, in which Brazil and the EU compared their positions. 
                                                
105Interview n3`, Brussels, 27 July 2012. 
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Rather than incorporating differences into a proposal that accommodates the diverse 
interests of the parties, the most common result of these gatherings was the 
deepening of conflict between the key players. Thus, despite prospects for the 
participation of the EU and Brazil in these “exclusive clubs” facilitating their 
increased cooperation in multilateral agriculture negotiations, such an outcome has 
not materialised. 
Overall, the constellation of factors indicated in this section has contributed to a 
decline in divergences between the EU and Brazil’s approaches. Yet, this change has 
not sufficed to alter their preferences for partners. More than ten years after 
negotiations on an agreement on agriculture were launched; Brazil and the EU still 
are not allies at the multilateral level. 
 
4.6	  Conclusion	  
 
This chapter addressed level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on trade, with 
particular emphasis on the multilateral negotiations on agriculture still taking place 
under the Doha Round. The analysis conducted aimed to assess whether emerging 
changes in the pattern of cooperation on multilateral issues at the bilateral level have 
had any impact on the degree of EU-Brazil engagement in multilateral negotiations. 
 As the chapter demonstrated, in spite of the direct impact a multilateral 
agreement on agriculture would have on EU-Brazil bilateral trade, multilateral trade 
issues have always been dealt with rather superficially, restricted to “exchanges of 
views”. The bilateral level is not conceived of as an arena in which to promote policy 
coordination on WTO-related matters. This pattern of cooperation reveals a clear-cut 
distinction between the two levels of EU-Brazil relations on trade, which are well-
grounded in an institutional framework that isolates the agenda and policy-making 
processes of the bilateral level from that of the multilateral level, leading inevitably 
to no level-linkage on trade. 
 Arguably, with the lack of strong political will to make the bilateral level of 
EU-Brazil relations a platform from which to enhance cooperation between the two 
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partners in the multilateral arena, the poor emphasis on multilateral trade issues in 
their bilateral agenda could be considered a reflection of the low degree of 
engagement between the two parties in the Doha Round. However, analysis of the 
performances of the EU and Brazil over more than ten years of negotiations for a 
multilateral agreement on agriculture pointed to intense interactions between the two 
actors at the WTO. Furthermore, throughout the period covered, the pattern of 
engagement between the EU and Brazil at the multilateral level has changed. 
Initially, Brazil and the EU adopted extremely divergent approaches to negotiations. 
However, since 2004, the degree of compatibility and cooperation between the two 
actors has been rather irregular. Depending on the issue at stake, positions have 
converged or diverged, opening up new avenues for closer coordination. Eventually, 
these opportunities could have been addressed at the bilateral level, enhancing the 
presence of multilateral issues in the bilateral agenda of EU-Brazil cooperation, yet 
this has not been the case.  
 In order to understand this neutral outcome, the third part of this chapter 
explored each of the four hypotheses the thesis claims impact the process of level-
linkage. Assessing “the type of regime”, it is clear that trade is a highly 
institutionalised, as well as consolidated regime, reflecting the specific dynamics of 
bargaining and trade-offs in multilateral negotiations. Adding to this picture the fact 
that the Doha Round endorses the “single-undertaking clause”, which binds 
negotiations of an agreement on agriculture to those of other sectors, enhances the 
complexity of the agenda of negotiations. This scenario does not favour the 
transposing of part of the multilateral agenda to the bilateral level of cooperation.  
 In terms of the “compatibility of approaches,” with Brazil being a large 
agricultural exporter and the EU the top global importer, there is an inevitable 
difference in terms of their interests and agendas. Nonetheless, the joint interest of 
the parties in the successful conclusion of an agreement has led the EU and Brazil to 
adopt more flexible negotiation strategies, while simultaneously pushing both 
partners to play an active role in maintaining negotiations. Arguably, even if 
conflicts of interest limit the potential of EU-Brazil BCML, the two actors could still 
increase their coordination at the WTO on the basis of their shared interest in the 
conclusion of an agreement. 
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 The “foreign trade policy-making processes” of the two actors are 
characterised by a fragmented approach that divides bilateral trade relations from 
multilateral trade cooperation. Moreover, even when the same governmental body is 
involved in the process of bilateral trade policy and multilateral trade policy, the 
agents taking part in the policy-making process are not the same and do not work in 
coordination. Finally, there is a hierarchical structure in terms of the agenda, as 
bilateral trade relations are subjected to multilateral trade policies. Thus, the “foreign 
trade policy-making processes” play against level-linkage, as there is little margin 
for coordination and integration between policy-makers and institutions through 
which one level could influence the policy outcome of the other level. 
 The fourth hypothesis analysed, “preferences for partners”, also does not 
benefit level-linkage. The EU and Brazil have never been preferential partners in the 
multilateral arena, even when they adopted converging positions. Traditionally, 
Brazil has sided with other agriculture exporting countries, namely those of the 
Cairns group, but has also acted through MERCOSUR. Furthermore, in spearheading 
the formation of the G20, Brazil has come to be known as an interlocutor of 
developing economies, though it has spoken more independently over the past few 
years. The EU, on the other hand, allied itself with the US on many occasions during 
the early years of negotiations, in addition to taking unilateral positions. Later on, the 
EU distanced itself from the US, adopting a unilateral approach to negotiations. The 
accession of Brazil into “the Quad” and the establishment of “the FIPs”, G4, G5 and 
G6, all placed the EU and Brazil within the same informal negotiation groups. 
Theoretically, sharing membership in these “selective small clubs” could facilitate 
the articulation of an alliance between the two actors that goes beyond circumstantial 
collaborations, but this scenario has not materialised. 
 In conclusion, the four hypotheses proposed by this thesis have proven to 
impact on the outcome of level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on trade, but to 
different degrees. The “compatibility of approaches” and the “preferences for 
partners” both allow for some margin of coordination between the two levels of 
cooperation, albeit limited. However, “the type of regime” and the “foreign trade 
policy-making processes” undermine the prospects of level-linkage, consequently 
having greater influence on the outcome of level-linkage in the case of trade. 
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CHAPTER	  5	  
Level-­‐Linkage	  in	  Human	  Rights	  
	  
	  
5.1	  Introduction	  
 
The previous chapter (chapter five) revealed no level-linkage in EU-Brazil trade 
cooperation; the same result of the assessment of level-linkage in climate change 
(chapter four).  Yet, in comparing the two cases previously analysed, it is feasible 
to claim that the degree of interaction between the bilateral level and the 
multilateral level varies according to the issue-area of EU-Brazil cooperation. 
Multilateral climate issues enhanced the profile of the bilateral agenda of EU-Brazil 
relations over the period, yet a similar trend was not identified in the case of trade. 
At the multilateral level, the pattern of EU-Brazil engagement did not alter on 
climate change, having always been very irregular. In the case of trade, however, 
the EU and Brazil entered the Doha Round taking completely opposite standpoints. 
During the course of negotiations, the two partners shifted their approaches, 
creating more opportunity for dialogue. Nevertheless, the pattern of EU-Brazil 
cooperation remained unchanged; they were never allies in the multilateral 
negotiation on agriculture. Despite differences in terms of the characteristics and 
processes of the two cases, the outcome of level-linkage in both climate change and 
trade was the same. Is this result to be repeated in the case of human rights? 
In order to address this question, this chapter investigates EU-Brazil 
cooperation on human rights, focusing on the workings of the United Nations 
Human Rights Council (HRC). Following the same structure as the previous two 
case-studies, the chapter is organised into four sections. Setting the scene, the first 
section briefly presents the structure and functioning of the HRC and the foreign 
policy-making processes of the EU and Brazil. The second part examines their 
DBLCM, in order to accommodate for the subsequent analysis, in the third section, 
of engagement between the EU and Brazil at the multilateral level. The fourth 
section of the chapter compares the analyses of cooperation at the two levels and 
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defines the outcome of level linkage in EU-Brazil relations on human rights. To 
identify the elements that impact on the outcome of this process in the case of 
human rights, each of the four hypotheses that this thesis claims relate to level-
linkage are explored. The conclusion outlines the main findings of the chapter. 
 
5.2	  Setting	  the	  Scene:	  Contextualising	  Level-­‐Linkage	  in	  Human	  
Rights	  
 5.2.1	  The	  Human	  Rights	  Council	  	  
 Background 
Created in 2006, the HRC is modeled on its predecessor, the Commission 
on Human Rights (CHR). Established by Article 68 of the 1946 UN Charter, the 
CHR was a subsidiary body of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
responsible for forging cooperation on human rights under the UN umbrella, a task 
it shared with the Third Committee of the General Assembly.106 Originally existing 
as a small group of 18 members elected by ECOSOC, the CHR underwent a 
number of changes in terms of its scope and membership over the next six decades. 
Yet, despite some cases of success, the Commission’s credibility became 
increasingly contested due to (what was considered) its politicised approach to 
country-specific issues, and to the North-South divide that characterised the internal 
dynamics of engagement between its members (Alston 2006: 2-3; Oberleitner 
2007: 41-48; Spohr 2010: 171-174; Rosa 2013).107 
Criticism came from outside and inside the UN.108 In 2006, the UN General 
Assembly (UNGA) adopted a resolution (60/251) creating the HRC. Upgrading the 
                                                
106 Gerd Oberleitner, (2007) provides a general description of human rights institutions within the UN system. 
107 See Buergenthal (1997), Donnelly (2013) and Dunér (2002) for more on the evolution of the human rights 
regime. 
108 Leading the internal debatein March 2005, former UN SecretaryGeneral Kofi Annanpublished a report titled 
“In Larger Freedom: towards development, security and human rights for all”, calling for the replacement of 
the CHR by a Council (United Nations 2005). 
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status of the human rights body from a Commission to a Council, the new UN 
organ maintained the same subsidiary nature of the CHR, being designated as a 
body of the General Assembly. Assuming all the responsibilities of the former 
Commission, the Council was responsible for promoting “universal respect for the 
protection of all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all”, in addition to 
addressing “situations of violations of human rights” (UNGA, A/RES/60/251).109 
 
Structure and Functioning  
Like its predecessor, the Commission, the HRC is a selective club; membership is 
limited to 47 States. Members are elected individually, by an absolute majority of 
votes at the UNGA, for a three-year term, with the possibility of enjoying one 
consecutive re-election. Seats are allocated to each region. In principle, all UN 
member states can be candidates for the HRC, however, the General Assembly can 
veto the participation of states with a record of systematic human rights violations 
(HRC A/RES/5/1).  
The restriction of fully-fledged membership to states (as opposed to 
regional organisations) sets different conditions for Brazil’s and the EU’s 
participation at the HRC. Brazil joined the former CHR for the first time in 1978, 
extending its mandate almost uninterruptedly until 2006, when the Council replaced 
the CHR (OHCHR 2013).110 Elected by the General Assembly as one of the 
representatives of the Group of Latin American and Caribbean States (GRULAC), 
Brazil was in the first composition of the HRC, in 2006, and was re-elected in 2008 
and 2012. 
 The EU holds a different status. As an international organisation, the EU is 
officially an observer at the HRC, entitled to take part in meetings and deliver 
statements, but without the power to directly propose resolutions or vote. 
Additionally, in contrast to trade, for example, there is no treaty provision 
stipulating the EU’s general competences on human rights, either internally or 
                                                
109 The HRC is not spared from criticism, see Alston (2006). 
110 Brazil was a member of the CHR from 1978 to 1998, and then again from 2000 to 2006 (OHCHR 2013). 
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externally (Besson 2011: 45-46). Given these constraints, the EU acts through those 
of its member states which are part of the HRC. Nevertheless, EU member states 
have the autonomy to act individually within the human rights regime, not being 
bound to a common EU position. Yet, as will be demonstrated later, the EU has 
often been rather successful in reaching internal consensus on a common position, 
and ultimately expressing singular sentiments at the HRC. 
In addition to issues of membership, another difference in the formal 
engagement of the EU and Brazil with the HRC regards the institutional framework 
of the organisation. Unlike international organisations, states contribute directly to 
the framework of the Council, which is made up of a bureau, an advisory 
committee, a secretariat, and several working groups (UNGA A/RES/5/1). The 
institutional design of the HRC observes the principle of equitable geographical 
distribution (table 19), and not only inevitably places Brazil and EU member states 
in different formal groups, but distributes the EU’s representation across three 
groups; namely Asia, Eastern Europe, and Western Europe and Others. 
TABLE	  19	  	  	  GEOGRAPHICAL	  REPRESENTATION	  WITHIN	  THE	  UN	  HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  COUNCIL	  (N.	  OF	  SEATS)	  
Group Council Presidency Advisory 
Committee 
WG on 
Communication 
WG on 
situatio
ns 
African States 13 1 5 1 1 
Asian States 13 1 5 1 1 
Eastern European 
States 
 
6 
 
1 
 
2 
 
1 
 
1 
Latin American & 
Caribbean States 
 
8 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
Western European 
States & others 
 
7 
 
1 
 
3 
 
1 
 
1 
Total 47 5 18 5 5 
Source: UNGA/RES/5-1 
Based at the UN’s headquarters in Geneva, the activities of the HRC are 
developed on a regular basis. Major political guidelines are defined during the high-
level meetings of the Council, which should meet at least three times a year, with 
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each session lasting no less than ten weeks.111 Additionally, members of the 
Council can request special sessions, held when supported by two-thirds of the 
membership (UNGA, A/RES/60/251).112 
Regular sessions are structured around a permanent agenda of ten items, 
established by the HRC resolution 5/1 of 18 June 2007: 
TABLE	  20HUMAN	  RIGHTS	  COUNCIL-­‐	  AGENDA	  
 
Item 1 Organizational and procedural matters 
Item 2 Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
reports of the Office of the High Commissioner and the Secretary-General 
Item 3 Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social 
and cultural rights, including the right to development 
Item 4 Human rights situations that require the Council’s attention 
Item 5 Human rights bodies and mechanisms 
Item 6 Universal Periodic Review 
Item 7 Human rights situation in Palestine and other occupied Arab territories 
Item 8 Follow-up and implementation of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action 
Item 9 Racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related forms of intolerance, 
follow-up and implementation of the Durban Declaration and Programme of 
Action 
Item 10 Technical assistance and capacity-building 
Source: HRC RES/ 5/1 
 5.2.2	  Foreign	  Policy-­‐Making	  Processes	  
An understanding of the organisation of the HRC provides important information 
on the external “rules of the game” for level-linkage. Yet, before empirically 
analysing the development of EU-Brazil cooperation at the bilateral and 
multilateral levels, it is important to understand the “internal” institutional “rules” 
for the pursuit of the EU’s and Brazil’s external human rights policy. 	  
 
                                                
111 From 2006 to 2012, the UNHRC held 22 regular sessions and 19 special sessions (Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights 2013). 
112 Ramcharan (2011) presents a comprehensive overview of the institutional framework of the HRC. 
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Brazil 
The Brazilian institutional framework for human rights foreign policy is 
significantly more centralised than the EU’s. According to Brazilian Diplomats 
interviewed in Brussels and Brasilia, the Ministry of foreign affairs (Itamaraty) is 
the central agency responsible for bilateral and multilateral cooperation on human 
rights.113114 Within this institution, however, there is a division of labour. The 
internal units in charge of bilateral relations with the EU in Brasilia do not deal 
with the HRC. Adding to this picture, bilateral cooperation engages agents and 
agencies from multiple institutions of the Brazilian government, particularly when 
it comes to the development of projects. Multilateral policy-making, on the other 
hand, is essentially restricted to Itamaraty and is the result of a process of 
coordination between agents in Brasilia and the Brazilian Mission to the UN.  
In Brasilia, the policy-making of Brazil’s external human rights policy takes 
place within the same department responsible for bilateral relations with the EU; 
the General Sub-secretary Policy I (Subsecretaria-Geral Política I - SGAP I). 
However, different units are in charge of bilateral and multilateral policies. As 
explained in the previous case-studies, political bilateral dialogue with the EU is a 
competence of the Department of Europe (Departamento da Europa- DEU). 
Brazil’s external human rights policies are the responsibility of two different 
Divisions of SGAP I.  General human rights policies are developed by the Human 
Rights Division (Divisão de Direitos Humanos - DDH) of the Department of 
Human Rights and Social Themes (Departamento de Direitos Humanos e Temas 
Sociais – DHS). Multilateral policies specifically addressed to the United Nations 
lie within the remit of the UN Division (Divisão das Nações Unidas - DNU) part of 
the Department of International Organisations (Departamento de Organismos 
Internacionais- DOI).115 
                                                
113Interview n7, Brasilia, 23 June 2010. 
114Interview n27, Brussels, 15 July 2011. 
115See annex I. 
  
 216 
As with climate change and trade policy, other bodies of the executive 
engage in the making of Brazil’s external human rights policy. Thus, the Secretary 
of Human Rights of the Presidency, in particular its Department of International 
Cooperation, is involved in political decisions concerning matters addressed at the 
HRC that relate to Brazilian human rights issues. The Secretary is also involved in 
bilateral cooperation with the EU, when it comes to the execution of specific 
bilateral projects. 
Brazil also has a Delegation in Geneva which represents the country’s 
interest at the UN bodies. Leading the Brazilian delegation to the HRC, diplomats 
based in Geneva follow the daily activities of the Council and deliberate on the 
Brazilian official position, working in coordination with other units of the 
Itamaraty. According to Brazilian diplomats interviewed in Brussels and Brasilia, 
being empowered by their great autonomy, the activities of Brazilian diplomats in 
Geneva focus on the multilateral agenda of human rights; the agenda of bilateral 
cooperation does not interfere in the establishment of the Brazilian approach to the 
HRC.116117Arguably, this feature of Brazilian policy-making could represent its 
internal hierarchy, as opposed to mere fragmentation. Yet, even if bilateral policies 
do take into account the broad guidelines of Brazilian foreign policy presented at 
the HRC, there is no internal mechanism of formal consultation that would suggest 
a coordination of the two processes. 
 
European Union 
Whereas on climate change and trade the European Union has clear competences - 
be they shared or exclusive - the same does not apply to human rights. The 
responsibilities invested in the European Commission (and now also in the EEAS) 
                                                
116Interview n7, Brasilia, 23 June 2010. 
117Interview n27, Brussels, 15 July 2011. 
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do not have a well-defined legal basis, but have been defined in practice.118 This 
deficiency in the EU’s institutional framework reflects the poor boundaries that 
exist in the distribution of competences addressing internal human rights policy 
between the EU and its member states. The founding treaties of European 
integration do not mention the development of human rights policies, in contrast to 
other issues. Gradually, human rights issues emerged in the declarations and 
statements of the European institutions. Yet, it was only in the 1990s that the issue 
was associated with a common policy; specifically with the discussion to establish 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).119 
The Maastricht Treaty of the European Union come into force in 1993 and 
placed the CFSP alongside other areas of shared competences of the EU (such as 
the environment). The development and the strengthening of “democracy and rule 
of law as well as monitoring human rights and basic liberties” are identified in 
Article 11 as among the primary objectives of the CFSP. Nevertheless, a definition 
of the general competences of the EU relating to human rights remains absent from 
any EU treaty.120 
The competences and procedures of the EU’s external human rights policy 
have been defined in practice. As it constitutes a “sensitive policy area”, the 
Council of the European Union plays a strong part in the policy-making of the 
CFSP agenda. Yet, until the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European 
Commission laid claim to a large share of the competences over the EU’s foreign 
policy, a role now taken on by the EEAS.  
Within the European Commission, human rights were one of the primary 
responsibilities of DG RELEX. Within the DG, there was a clear division of labour 
separating bilateral policies from multilateral policies. Directorate “B” was 
responsible for “multilateral relations and human rights”, whilst cooperation with 
                                                
118	  The	  discussion	  of	  the	  EU’s	  competences	  and	  policies	  on	  human	  rights	  should	  not	  be	  confused	  with	  the	  European	  human	  rights	  regime,	  institutionalised	  with	  the	  establishment	  of	  The	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	   (ECHR),	   in	  1950.	   It	   is	  worth	  clarifying	   that	   the	  ECHR	  and	   its	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (ECtHR)	  are	  not	  part	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  For	  more	  on	  the	  European	  Human	  Rights	  Regime	  and	  the	  ECHR,	  see	  Moravcsik	  (2000).	  119 See Ahmed and de Jesus Butler (2006) for more on the EU, Human Rights and International law. 120 Defeis (2012) discusses the presence of human rights in EU treaties, from Maastricht to Lisbon, whilst 
Douglas-Scott (2011) assesses human rights after the Lisbon treaty. 
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the UN fell under the competences of “Unit B2”. Bilateral relations with Brazil 
were in the portfolio of Latin America (Directorate “G”), specifically in the unit 
“G4”, which dealt with the countries of MERCOSUR.121 
Since the establishment of the EEAS, bilateral relations with Brazil are 
conducted by the unit ‘V.A.4’ of the Managing Directorate (MD) V (“Americas”). 
MD VI is responsible for “Global and Multilateral issues” and unit ‘VI.A.1’ 
follows “human rights policy guidelines and multilateral cooperation”.122 
Even before human rights were introduced into the legal framework of the EU by 
the Maastricht Treaty, the Council of the European Union has been conducting 
policy-making in this realm. To this end, in 1987 the Council created the Human 
Rights Working Group (COHOM) to assist the Council (in its “foreign policy” 
composition) in keeping track of human rights issues in the EU’s external relations. 
“COHOM promotes the systematic inclusion of human rights issues in the agenda 
of expert’s meetings on thematic issues and at summits between the EU and third 
countries”. Its composition includes the European Commission and experts from 
EU member states (European External Action Service 2013b).123 A spokesperson 
for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs chairs these meetings 
(Council of the European Union 2013).  
As established in its mandate, COHOM’s main responsibilities include: a) 
coordination of the positions of EU members over human rights issues discussed at 
the international level; b) reporting on human rights situations overseas; c) 
providing recommendations on common strategies employed to address external 
human rights issues and d) reporting to the Council on the human rights policies of 
EU member states. COHOM’s mandate also determines that the working group 
should meet (at least) before scheduled sessions of the CHR (now the HRC) and the 
                                                
121 See Annex II 122 See Annex III 123 In 2003, the mandate of COHOM was extended “to include first pillar issues so as to have under purview all 
human rights aspects of the external relations of the EU. First pillar issues may be addressed only within the 
limits of the powers conferred upon the European Community by the EC Treaty and of the objectives assigned 
to it therein” (Council of the European Union 2013). 
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UNGA, on a date internally coordinated at its meetings Extraordinary meetings 
could be called upon request (Council of the European Union 2013b). 
In the distribution of competences of EU external human rights policy, there 
is a certain amount of coordination between EU institutions. As a member of staff 
from the EEAS engaged in bilateral cooperation with Brazil explained; the EEAS 
attends the COHOM meetings, taking the place of the European Commission.124 
Moreover, when forging the EU’s bilateral policies aimed at cooperation on human 
rights, the EEAS acts based upon the position of EU member states (EUMS) on 
matters related to this issue-area. The Council is also kept informed of the progress 
of bilateral relations with the EU’s partners. However, since there is no binding 
obligation forcing the 28 EU states to comply with the EU’s policy, it would be 
hard to expect that the EU’s bilateral cooperation with Brazil would hold much 
significance in the policy-making of the EU member states’ approach to the HRC.  
  Nevertheless, as Karen Smith points out, the European Commission played 
a minor role in the definition of the EU’s engagement with the UN body.125 In 
Brussels, the preparatory activities take place in the COHOM, whilst, it is in 
Geneva that the bulk of negotiations on a common EU position occur (Smith 
2011:12).  Prior to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the EU had two 
representations in Geneva: the EU Commission’s Delegation and the EU Council’s 
liaison office. The Presidency of the Council long played a leading role in 
promoting coordination between member states, but also spoke on behalf of the EU 
in the international sphere. After the changes implemented by the Treaty, these two 
bodies have been merged into one single organ, embodied by the EU Delegation.126 
According to the EEAS (2013b), the Delegation should represent the EU at the UN 
and other international bodies in Geneva, raising awareness of the EU’s policies, 
but also facilitating coordination between its member states. 
 
                                                
124	  Interview	  n.18,	  Brussels	  8	  July	  2011.	  125 The European Commission has delivered statements at the UNHRC,  briefing the Council on initiatives 
taken at the Community level in the field of human rights. It has also drafted joint texts to be presented at the 
UNHRC on behalf of the EU, when requested by the European Council (Smith 2011:12). 126 For a discussion on the EU’s representation at the HRC, see Smith (2006). 
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5.3	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Cooperation	  on	  Human	  Rights	  at	  the	  Bilateral	  
Level	  
 
Human rights debuted in the official agenda of EU-Brazil bilateral relations 32 
years after the partners first established their diplomatic ties in 1960. The long 
silence was broken when the European Community and Brazil explicitly endorsed 
the respect for human rights and democratic principles as the basis and “essential 
component” of their 1992 Framework Agreement for Cooperation. Nevertheless, of 
the 19 areas listed in the Agreement in which the two players agree to cooperate, 
none refers to human rights (Official Journal of the European Communities 1995).  
 The fact that it took the partners more than three decades to formally 
identify human rights and democracy as shared values suggests that these are 
sensitive issues within the framework of EU-Brazil relations. Arguably, the 
inception of a clause on human rights in the 1992 Agreement could be attributed to 
domestic changes within Brazil, combined with a new EU approach to the framing 
of its external relations. 
After more than two decades of a military regime (1964-1985) with severe 
records of human rights violations, Brazil was a democracy once more. This major 
shift has manifested itself in Brazilian foreign policy on human rights, both in terms 
of its engagement with multilateral regimes and its bilateral relations. The inclusion 
of Article 1 in the Framework Agreement could as such be considered a statement 
of Brazil’s commitment to democracy and human rights at the domestic level and 
its openness to addressing the issue internationally, but also as a mark of the EU’s 
recognition of Brazil’s new political reality.  
 The EU officially classified the 1992 Accord with Brazil as a “third 
generation agreement”, defined as such due to its being “based on the observance 
of democratic principles and human rights, it contains both a future developments 
clause and a review clause” (Treaties Office Database 2010). As Karen Smith 
explains (1998: 253-254), these agreements with “political conditionality” emerged 
from a broadly applied approach to the framing of EU relations with third parties, 
which linked aid and cooperation to certain political requirements (namely the 
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protection of human rights and the consolidation of democracy). The celebration of 
an agreement with Brazil that includes a clause on human rights and democracy 
featured in this context of European foreign policy-making and should not be 
considered particularly characteristic of the EU’s relations with Brazil. 
Since the 1992 Agreement, a shared support for the promotion and 
protection of human rights has often been evoked in political discourses and in 
official documents related to EU-Brazil relations. Nonetheless, partnership in this 
field has remained marginal. In fact, the first instrument to establish an attempted 
framework for cooperation on human rights was the 2001-2006 Country Strategy 
Paper (CSP I). Drafted by the European Commission in consultation with the 
Brazilian government, the CSP I identifies areas suitable for the development of 
projects in Brazil, to be financed by the EU.  
As an instrument of European foreign policy, the first part of the CSP 
provides a short account of Brazil’s political and economic scenario. In spite of its 
direct criticism of severe violations of human rights in Brazil, however, when 
detailing the implementation of cooperation, the CSP I limits its scope to certain 
human rights, incorporating these issues within “social development,” the second 
priority area included in the National Indicative Programme (NIP) of the CSP I. 
Projects financed in this area focus on gender equality; race issues and indigenous 
people’s concerns; good governance and sustainable social and economic 
development. Finally, the CSP I also draws attention to a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) on Human Rights Support to the Brazilian Police (European 
Commission 2002). 
Despite the mention of human rights in the 2001-2006 CSP I, there was no 
continuity in the EU’s approach to cooperation in the issue-area through this 
specific instrument of cooperation. Human rights were not included among the 
priorities of the 2007-2013 Country Strategy Paper (CSP II). The text recalls 
various EU documents that reinforce the EU’s commitment to the promotion of 
human rights through its external policies. In the briefing section on Brazil, the CSP 
II defines the country as a “stable democracy”, but acknowledges issues that 
undermine human rights, such as violence, corruption, the lack of specific 
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legislations, abuses of power and the complexity of the judiciary system, among 
others. However, when identifying the priority areas to receive funding from the 
NIP, neither social development nor issues related to human rights were indicated. 
In contrast to the previous CSP, the CSP II is restricted to the development of 
projects addressing (a) the strengthening of bilateral relations, and (b) the 
promotion of environmental dimensions of sustainable development. 
Rather than collaborating with the government, since the CSP II, the EU has 
opted for developing projects directly with civil society. Projects with strong social 
scope shifted from the domain of the CSP and were pursued through other EU 
instruments, including the Programme for the Environment, 7th Framework 
Programme for Research and Technological Development, Non State Actors 
Programme, Programme for the Promotion of Democracy and Human Rights and 
other thematic budgets. 
The use of new policy instruments suggests that human rights remain part of 
the EU’s external policy towards Brazil, but suffer a diminishing profile in the 
framework of its cooperation with the Brazilian government. Arguably, one of the 
reasons for this shift in approach is excessive bureaucracy. This argument is 
supported by the explicit mention in the CSP II of regulatory barriers that hampered 
the implementation of projects identified in the CSP I (European Commission 
2007). These problems were also raised in an interview with an official from the 
EU delegation in Brasilia in charge of coordinating bilateral projects with Brazil. 
According to the EU member of staff,127 in addition to dealing with the 
bureaucratic machinery of the Brazilian government, the EU has also encountered a 
problem of accountability and has given preference to developing partnerships 
directly with civil society and NGOs. Nevertheless, another argument was 
presented by a member of staff the European EEAS working in Brussels.128 When 
questioned as to why human rights did not have a strong presence in EU-Brazil 
relations, the EU official said that the EU acknowledges Brazil as being a stable 
democracy that has made significant progress in human rights. In his opinion, there 
                                                
127Interview	  n.18,	  Brussels	  8	  July	  2011. 
128 Interview n.41 Brussels, 05 March 2013. 
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is no need for the EU to act on this front.  
From the Brazilian perspective, the decrease in emphasis given to human 
rights in the framework of its cooperation with the EU responds to the country’s 
understanding that internal problems in this area are essentially domestic affairs. 
This was explained as such by a Secretary in charge of political and social affairs at 
the Brazilian Mission to the EU in Brussels.129 Elaborating further, the diplomat 
argued that a discussion on these issues at the international level would have to go 
both ways; that is to say, a bilateral dialogue would have to include human rights 
problems within Europe as well. Since that has not been the case, dialogue has 
focused on the few issues in which there is reciprocal interest, and that are directly 
related to EU-Brazil relations, such as migration.130 
Whilst human rights were suppressed from the priorities of the CSP II, the 
Joint Declaration of the 2007 EU-Brazil Summit recognises the need for common 
strategies to address global issues, explicitly mentioning human rights. Yet, 
reference to human rights does not re-occur after the preamble of the document 
(Council of the European Union 2007). A significant step towards further 
cooperation on human rights came with the first Joint Action Plan for the EU-Brazil 
Strategic Partnership, adopted in 2008. “Promoting peace and comprehensive 
security through an effective multilateral system” is identified as the first 
component of the Plan, and, within that broad thematic, “the promotion of human 
rights and democracy, and upholding international justice” is the first of eight focal 
areas to be addressed. Detailing actions to be implemented within this domain, 
Brazil and the EU agreed to hold regular consultations on bilateral and global 
human rights issues, and to establish a high-level dialogue. In addition to 
consultations, the Action Plan calls for cooperation in reinforcing the role of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC), partnerships on bilateral projects and the 
facilitation of civil society initiatives, as well as on the pursuit of triangular 
                                                
129.Interview n.13, Brasilia 24 June 2010. 
130Here it is important to recall that the political agenda of bilateral cooperation on human rights is agreed upon 
by agents and institutions representing both partners. 
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cooperation to assist developing countries address human rights issues.131 
Reference is also made to an intention to further coordinate their positions at the 
multilateral level, without naming any international organisation, or mention of 
joint positions or alliances within the realm (Council of the European Union 
2008b). 
Following the 2008 Action Plan, the first informal gathering of the High 
Level Dialogue on Human Rights took place in Brasilia in June 2009, with the first 
formal meeting held in Geneva, in September of the same year. The second formal 
session was convened in Brasilia, in May 2011. In addition to consultations on 
global issues, the actual agenda for cooperation on human rights focused on 
domestic issues. Furthermore, the first EU-Brazil human rights civil society 
seminar, promoted in Brasilia in July 2010, addressed very specific issues, namely 
human rights defenders; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender rights and public 
security. The objective was to facilitate interaction with and among civil society 
actors, creating a network that would engage with the projects developed under the 
framework of the High Level Dialogue and funded by a specific fund allocated to 
that end.  
Yet, the Dialogue still lacks official institutionalisation, as there is no 
agreement or even a memorandum establishing it. Without formalisation of this 
instrument, there is no official definition of the role of the actors engaged in this 
process; the EEAS and the EU Delegation in Brasilia, together with the Secretary 
for Human Rights of the Brazilian Presidency are those that have taken the lead in 
developing the activities of this instrument in practice (Calzado Del Llano & 
Oranje 2011: 19-21).  
In the meantime, the joint declarations of all EU-Brazil Summits held since 
2007 continued to evoke human rights as a shared value and principle, indicating 
slow but steady progress in terms of cooperation in this realm. The Joint 
                                                
131 “Triangular cooperation entails that the two partners implement complementary projects around issues of 
common interest, in agreement with the recipient country (…)Brazil has already signed a number of triangular 
cooperation agreements with a range of partners, notably Japan, as well as with the European Commission, 
Germany, Spain and the UK, launching common projects in different Africanand Latin American countries” 
(Gratius 2013: 3). 
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Declaration of the 2011 Summit devoted significantly more attention to human 
rights. In addition to general statements, the Declaration named specific 
international issues, with the EU and Brazil expressing their concerns with human 
rights situations in Libya and Syria and calling on multilateral institutions to 
address these matters. For the first time, the HRC is mentioned, with the partners 
confirming that they had discussed measures for strengthening their coordination 
within the HRC and other multilateral forums. Additionally, the EU and Brazil 
manifested interest in jointly assisting third countries with the implementation of 
the Universal Periodic Review. Finally, the Second Joint Action Plan, adopted at 
the 2011 Summit, essentially echoed the same actions outlined in the first plan, 
with the EU and Brazil agreeing to maintain the framework of cooperation adopted 
in 2008 (Council of the European Union 2011).   
In summary, being absent from the agenda of EU-Brazil relations for more 
than three decades, cooperation on human rights at the bilateral level has been 
addressed with prudence and selectiveness. Issues raised are cautiously selected, 
reflecting matters that Brazil is open to discussing, and on which the EU interested 
in cooperating. Shifts in the terms of the framework have not been significant 
within the bilateral agenda, which addresses both domestic-related issues and 
global concerns. Interestingly, even if the adoption of new instruments has 
positioned the EU and Brazil as “equal partners,” there is an unequal distribution 
regarding domestic affairs, which focuses heavily on questions related to Brazil. 
Domestic, internal EU problems do not feature in the agenda. As far as global 
issues are concerned, the two Joint Action plans adopted up until the present time 
do not set up clear strategies for fostering BCML.  
Paradoxically, whilst sources analysed here might provide little evidence of a 
strengthened partnership between the two actors at the multilateral level, the joint 
declaration of the 2013 EU-Brazil Summit suggests otherwise. The document states 
that the partners “welcomed the progress made in implementing their mutual 
commitment to further strengthening cooperation within the UN Human Rights 
Council. In particular, they hailed the joint organisation of a side-event to its 20th 
session on ‘Women Human Rights Defenders’” (Council of the European Union 
2013). But have the EU and Brazil actually consolidated their Strategic Partnership 
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at the multilateral level or is their collaboration essentially circumstantial? 
The next section answers this question, providing an account of the engagement 
of the two actors during the first six years of HRC activity (2006-2011). 
 
5.4	  EU-­‐Brazil	  Cooperation	  on	  Human	  Rights	  at	  the	  Multilateral	  
Level	  
 
The agenda of the HRC covers a constellation of issues and both the regular and 
special sessions of the institution traditionally address this wide variety of topics. 
Thus, this section focuses on the first 17 regular sessions and nine special sessions 
of the HRC held between 2006 and 2011, comparing the voting patterns of the two 
actors in all resolutions and decisions that were subjected to a vote.132 I also look133 
at all side events the EU and Brazil organised during this section, looking for 
information that might suggest cooperation between the two actors on a more 
informal level. As the ultimate objective here is to identify a pattern and any 
eventual shifts in the degree of EU-Brazil cooperation at the HRC, the analysis that 
follows is rather quantitative. Consequently, this simple, but original, account 
intentionally leaves out the explanation of the voting preferences of the two players, 
as it would fall beyond the immediate scope of this chapter. Nevertheless, the result 
reveals that the compatibility of approaches of the two actors varies over time and 
according to the issue on the agenda. Crucial information for the assessment of 
level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on human rights is gathered on the fourth 
and last part of the chapter. 
  As pointed out in the first section, the EU is not a member of the HRC on 
the same level as nation states, in clear contrast to its membership of the WTO and 
                                                
132 In this period a total of 17 special sessions were held, however as this chapter is comparing the voting 
position of the EU and Brazil in the sessions of the HRC, it only analyses the nine special sessions in which 
decisions were adopted by vote. 133As pointed out in the first section, the EU is not a member of the HRC on the same level as nation states, in 
clear contrast to its membership of the WTO and the UNFCCC. At the Council, the EU’s representation occurs 
in two forms, directly as an international organization, and indirectly through the EU member states that hold 
membership in the HRC. 
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the UNFCCC. At the Council, the EU’s representation manifests itself in two 
forms; directly, as an international organisation, and indirectly through the EU 
member states that are members of the HRC.  
 5.4.1 Year	  One:	  Getting	  Started	  –2006	  	  
In 2006, the HRC held its first three regular sessions and three special sessions. The 
agenda of its meetings addressed matters related to the institutional building of the 
organisation, horizontal themes (such as racism, economic policies and human 
rights), but also country-specific issues, including Darfur and Israel/Palestine.  
In this initial phase, Brazil and the EU both debuted in the HRC as active 
players, but driving in different directions. Elected in the first batch of members of 
the HRC, Brazil delivered numerous statements in all meetings. In the first session, 
Brazil spoke on several occasions on behalf of the GRULAC group, whilst, in the 
second and third regular sessions, Brazil only made unilateral statements. 
Furthermore, in 2006, Brazil voted in favour of all resolutions adopted in the three 
regular sessions, except for one abstention regarding the amendment to a draft 
decision on Darfur proposed by Canada and the EU (represented by Finland). 
The EU entered this first year of HRC activity holding observer status, but 
also represented by seven of its 25 member states, namely, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, and the UK. The EU made its 
voice heard on all items of the agenda of these three sessions, with Finland always 
acting as the interlocutor of the EU. Furthermore, in addition to delivering a 
message on behalf of the EU members states, Finland also spoke, on some 
occasions, for countries defined in the HRC’s documents as acceding countries 
(Bulgaria and Romania), candidate countries (Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey), 
and countries in the process of stabilisation and association process as well as 
potential candidates (Albania, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine). Although the EU member states that were Council 
members voted together in all decisions, their positions varied. From the twelve 
texts voted on in the three sessions, EUMS were in favour of only three, including a 
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joint proposal with Canada, a Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, and 
a resolution on Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (OPT).  
Regarding the three special sessions, during which decisions were made by 
vote, the two actors adopted a similar approach to that of regular sessions. Brazil 
approved the three country resolutions adopted, whereas the EU opposed them all. 
What is interesting is that, whereas the EU was in favour of a resolution on the OPT 
adopted at the regular session, its EU member states voted against another 
resolution on the same issue adopted at the third special session, potentially 
suggesting some inconsistency in the EU’s position on the matter. TABLE	  21	   	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  VOTING	  POSITIONS	  HRC	  REGULAR	  &	  SPECIAL	  SESSIONS	  2006	  
Data from the Human Rights Council Extranet (2013). 
  Resolution Brazil EU MS BR x EU 
R
E
G
U
L
A
R
 S
E
SS
IO
N
S 
1s
t  
UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples 
Favour Favour Convergence 
HR in Palestine and other occupied 
Arab Territories 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
Incitement to racial and religious 
hatred and promotion of tolerance 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
2n
d       
Amendment to draft decision L.44 Abstention Favour Divergence 
Darfur Favour Against Divergence 
Effects of economic reform policies 
and foreign debt on all human rights 
Favour Against Divergence 
Israeli settlements in the OPT Favour Favour 
 
Convergence 
HR in the Occupied Syrian Golan Favour Abstention Divergence 
Intergovernmental working group on 
the Review of Mandates 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
3r
d      
Elimination of racism, xenophobia 
 and related intolerance & the Durban 
Declaration 
Favour Against Divergence 
Preparations for the Durban Review 
Conference 
Favour Against Divergence 
HR situation in the OPT Favour Abstention Divergence 
SP
E
C
IA
L
 S
E
SS
IO
N
S 
1s
t   
Human rights situation in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory 
 
Favour 
 
Against 
 
Divergence 
2n
d  The grave situation of HR in Lebanon 
caused by Israeli military operations 
 
Favour 
 
Against 
 
Divergence 
3r
d  
HR violations emanating from Israeli 
military incursions in the OPT, 
including the recent one in northern 
Gaza and the assault on Beit Hanoun. 
 
Favour 
 
Against 
 
Divergence 
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As table 21 illustrates, in the first year of the HRC, there was no sign of 
cooperation between the EU and Brazil. Rather, the two actors adopted divergent 
approaches in all three regular sessions, with their only compatibility in votes 
registered being on the first resolution adopted on indigenous peoples. No 
convergence with votes was registered in the case of the special sessions. 
Against this non-collaborative backdrop, it would be interesting to observe 
whether or not the agreement of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership in 2007 had 
any correlation to an eventual shift in the pattern of BCML. 
 5.4.2	  Year	  Two:	  2007	  
 
In 2007, Brazil voted in favour of all resolutions, apart from a proposal of the 
African Group on racism, racial intolerance and xenophobia adopted at the sixth 
regular session. More pro-actively, the EU submitted a joint proposal (through 
Germany) with Algeria (on behalf of the African group) as a follow-up to a 
Council’s decision on Darfur, passed without a vote in the 4th session. Yet, EUMS 
were against all decisions taken to vote, with the exception of an abstention in the 
resolution of religious and cultural rights tabled by Palestine in the sixth regular 
session.  
 Upon crossing the EU’s and Brazil’s approaches, it is evident that, in spite 
of their discourse on promoting human rights as a shared value and in the interests 
of the parties in strengthening an “effective multilateralism”. Endorsed at the 
bilateral level, the engagement of the two actors at the multilateral level could not 
be more divergent; Brazil and the EUMS (part of the HRC) voted differently in all 
ten decisions of the 4th, 5th and 6th regular sessions and in the resolution adopted at 
the 6th special session. 
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TABLE	  22	   	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  VOTING	  POSITIONS	  HRC	  REGULAR	  &	  SECTION	  SESSIONS	  2007	  
 
Data from the Human Rights Council Extranet (2013). 
 5.4.3	  Year	  Three:	  2008	  
 
From 2008 onwards, the number of HRC resolutions adopted by vote increased 
significantly, denoting a shift in terms of the decision-making process of the 
organisation. With a larger number of cases analysed, there were more occasions on 
which the EU and Brazil converged, yet, during all sessions held in 2008, 
divergence prevailed in the two actors’ engagement at the multilateral level.  
 Brazil continued to be a very active member of the HRC, acting unilaterally 
for the most part, except for a few occasions on which the country spoke on behalf 
of the GRULAC. Being in favour of the largest majority of decisions, Brazil was 
  Resolution Voted Brazil EU MS BR x EU 
R
E
G
U
L
A
R
 S
E
SS
IO
N
S 
4t
h        4t
h 
Globalization and its impact on the 
full enjoyment of all HR 
Favour Against Divergence 
Strengthening of the Office of the UN 
High Commissioner for Human Rights 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
Combating defamation of religions Favour Against Divergence 
5th Regular Session – No decision adopted by voting 
6t
h                   
Elimination of intolerance based on 
religion or belief 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
A global call for concrete action 
against racism, xenophobia and 
intolerance 
Abstention Against 
 
Divergence 
Preparations for the Durban Review 
Conference 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
International complementary standards 
to the international convention on the 
elimination of all forms of racial 
discrimination 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
HR and unilateral coercive measures Favour Against Divergence 
HR and international solidarity Favour Against Divergence 
 Religious and cultural rights in the 
OPT 
Favour Abstention Divergence 
SP
E
C
IA
L
 
6t
h  
HR violations emanating from Israeli 
military attacks and incursions in the 
OTP, particularly in the Gaza Strip 
 
Favour 
 
Against 
 
Divergence 
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against an amendment to the draft resolution L. 24 on the “Mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression”, submitted by Egypt, Pakistan and Palestine at the 7th session, and 
abstained from voting on the resolution on “combating defamation of religions”, as 
proposed by Pakistan at the 8th session. A bit more proactive than in the previous 
year, Brazil presented two draft resolutions itself at the 9th session, one on human 
rights voluntary goals, and another on alternative care for children. Both were 
adopted, without a vote. 
 Having been successful at ensuring coherence amongst its member states 
that were part of the HRC, the EU drafted five resolutions that were adopted in 
2008. Together with Japan, Slovenia represented the EU in proposing a text on the 
human rights situation in North Korea, adopted by a tight majority of votes during 
the 7th regular session. Slovenia also presented a proposal on human rights in 
Myanmar on behalf of the EU; adopted without a vote at the 8th regular session. 
The other contributions of the EU during 2008 were made at the 9th regular session; 
one resolution concerning Sudan, and two addressing technical assistance and 
consultative services to Burundi and Liberia.134 All three proposals passed without 
a vote, and were tabled by France in the name of the EU. 
 Crossing the voting patterns of the two players (table 23), there were four 
cases of convergence by the EU and Brazil. Three of them are resolutions on which 
both actors voted favourably (i.e. Israel; North Korea and good governance), with 
another case being one of shared opposition (the amendment to resolution L.24). 
Interestingly, at the 7th session, the EU and Brazil co-organised a side event for the 
first time. On 20 March 2008, the EU and GRULAC promoted a public event 
entitled “European Union and GRULAC open-ended consultations on Rights of the 
Child”.  Five days later, the two groups gathered again and organised another 
public event; “Open-ended consultations on the draft resolution: “Missing 
Persons”. On both occasions, the partnership between Brazil and the EU was 
indirect, taking place via GRULAC.  
                                                
134 The joint proposals are important to level-linkage as they suggest an eventual preference for partners, as 
explored in details later on this chapter in the assessment of hypotheses 3.  
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TABLE	  23	   	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  VOTING	  POSITIONS	  HRC	  REGULAR&	  SPECIAL	  SESSIONS	  2008	  
Data from the Human Rights Council Extranet (2013). 
 
  Resolution Voted Brazil EU MS BR x EU 
R
E
G
U
L
A
R
 S
E
SS
IO
N
S 
7t
h  
HR violations from Israeli military 
attacks and incursions in the OPT 
Favour Abstention Divergence 
HR in the Occupied Syrian Golan Favour Abstention Divergence 
Israeli settlements in the OTP Favour Favour Convergence 
Mandate of the working group on 
the use of mercenaries 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
Composition of the OHCHR Favour Against Divergence 
The effects of foreign debt and 
other related international financial 
obligations HR 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
HR and international solidarity Favour Against Divergence 
From Rhetoric to Reality: a global 
call for concrete action against 
racism, xenophobia and 
intolerance 
Favour Abstention 
 
Divergence 
Combating defamation of religions Abstention Against Divergence 
The right to freedom of opinion 
and expression 
Favour Abstention Divergence 
Situation of HR in North Korea Favour Favour Convergence 
Good governance and HR Favour Favour Convergence 
Amendment to draft res. L.24 Against Against Convergence 
8t
h   
Democratic and equitable 
international order 
Favour Against Divergence 
The right of peoples to peace Favour Against Divergence 
9t
h  
HR and international solidarity Favour Against Divergence 
HR violations from Israeli military 
incursions in the OPT 
Favour Against Divergence 
HR and unilateral coercive 
measures 
Favour Against Divergence 
SP
E
C
IA
L
 S
E
SS
IO
N
S 9t
h  
Territory, particularly due to the 
recent Israeli military attacks 
against the occupied Gaza Strip 
 
Favour 
 
Against 
 
Divergence 
10
th
 The impact of the global economic 
and financial crises on HR 
 
Favour 
 
Against 
 
Divergence 
11
th
 Assistance to Sri Lanka in the 
promotion and protection of HR 
 
Favour 
 
Against 
 
Divergence 
12
th
 The human rights situation in the 
OPT, including East Jerusalem 
 
Favour 
 
Divided 
 
Divergence 
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5.4.4	  Year	  Four:	  	  10th-­‐12th	  Regular	  Sessions	  (2009)	  
 
Paradoxically, although there was no evidence of their substantial cooperation at 
the HRC from 2006 to 2008, at the bilateral level, the EU and Brazil employed 
political capital to reinforce their commitment to strengthening their engagement 
within the international human rights regime, at least at the discourse level. 
Moreover, in addition to the 2008 Joint Action Plan, the first EU-Brazil High Level 
Dialogue on human rights, promoted in 2009, is evidence of the fact that new 
instruments of political cooperation were adopted at the bilateral level, aimed at 
enhancing it. But did the progress made at that level have any correlation with the 
manner in which the EU and Brazil cooperated at the HRC from 2009 onwards?  
To answer shortly: no. In spite of some improvements, EU-Brazil 
engagement at the multilateral level remained very weak. In terms of individual 
approaches, the Brazilian performance remained characterised by broad support for 
most resolutions, with the exception of four abstentions, but without any record of 
its opposition to any decisions made. A shift was evident in the EU’s approach to 
the HRC. For the first time, EU member states voted in favour of more resolutions 
than they opposed. Nevertheless, the EU faced a problem of cohesion, with EU 
member states splitting their positions on resolutions adopted at the 10th regular 
session that condemned the human rights violations ensuing from Israeli attacks in 
the OPT. Yet, in all other cases, the EU acted as a cohesive, single block; and, 
interestingly, EUMS voted alike in other resolutions that related to Israel. No 
special session in which vote was requested to the adoption of a resolution was held 
in that year. 
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TABLE	  24	   	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  VOTING	  POSITIONS	  	  HRC	  REGULAR	  SESSIONS	  2009	  
 Data from the Human Rights Council Extranet (2013). 
 
 
  Resolution Brazil EU MS BR x EU 
R
E
G
U
L
A
R
 S
E
SS
IO
N
S 
10
th
 
Technical cooperation in Congo Favour Against Divergence 
Defamation of religions Abstention Against Divergence 
HR in Congo Favour Abstention Divergence 
HR in the Occupied Syrian Golan Favour Abstention Divergence 
Israeli settlements in the OPT Favour Favour Convergence 
Israeli attacks in the OPT Favour Divided n/a 
Convention on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
Composition of the staff of the 
OHCHR 
Favour Against Divergence 
The use of mercenaries Favour Against Convergence 
HR in DPR of Korea Abstention Favour Divergence 
Protection of HR while countering 
terrorism 
Favour Favour Convergence 
Torture and inhuman treatment or 
punishment: The role of health 
personnel 
Favour Favour Convergence 
Reports of the Sub-Commission on 
HR 
Abstention Favour Divergence 
Discrimination based on and its 
impact on the enjoyment of economic, 
social and cultural rights 
Favour Favour Convergence 
HR violations in the OPT Favour Abstention Divergence 
11
h  
The right of peoples to peace Favour Against Divergence 
The effects of foreign debt and other 
international financial obligations of 
States on HR 
Favour Against 
 
Divergence 
HR in Sudan Favour Favour Convergence 
Amendment to the text of resolution 
on Sudan 
Favour Favour Convergence 
12
th
 
HRs and international solidarity Favour Against Divergence 
Promoting HRs and traditional values 
of humankind 
Abstention Against Divergence 
HR and unilateral coercive measures Favour Against Divergence 
The right to development Favour Against Divergence 
The effect of foreign debt on HR Favour Against Divergence 
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5.4.5	  Year	  Five:	  	  13th-­‐15th	  Regular	  Sessions	  (2010)	  
 
Whilst the Strategic Partnership evolved at the bilateral level, there continued to be 
no relevant signs of a change in the pattern of EU-Brazil cooperation at the HRC. 
In 2010 the two actors did not present a single joint-proposal nor co-sponsored a 
side-event in any of the three regular sessions of the HRC. Casting even more 
shadow on the prospects of an eventual improvement on pattern of EU-Brazil 
engagement at the multilateral level, they continue adopting very different 
approaches to the resolutions voted. Not counting resolutions adopted by 
consensus, the positions of the EU and Brazil diverged on 12 of the 19 resolutions 
voted on in the three regular sessions held in 2010. Once more, in 2010, no special 
session took place at which a vote was requested. 
In terms of individual approaches, both actors delivered several statements 
on many of the points of the agenda of the meetings. The EU contributed with a 
draft proposal on Myanmar, presented by Spain, adopted without a vote at the 13th 
session. Brazil formed two unusual alliances at that session. Firstly, with Nigeria, 
which represented the African Union, Brazil tabled a text on sports and racism. 
Secondly, Brazil joined Bosnia and Herzegovina, Egypt, Germany, Nigeria, and the 
Philippines in tabling a resolution on the trafficking of persons; both proposals 
were adopted without a vote. Yet, the most interesting feature of the 13th session, 
with regards to this thesis, was the first sign of (indirect) engagement between the 
EU and Brazil in suggesting resolutions. Spain, on behalf of the EU, joined 
Uruguay, which acted for the GRULAC, in jointly proposing a resolution on 
fighting sexual violence against children. With Brazil being part of the GRULAC, 
this could be considered to be the first proposal drafted by the two actors. 
Moreover, at the 13th regular session, the EU and GRULAC co-organised a side 
event, this time being “open-ended informal consultations on draft resolution on the 
rights of the child.” 
The EU also joined Japan in tabling a text on Korea, and presented a 
proposal unilaterally, again through Spain, addressing the human rights situation in 
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Myanmar; both texts were adopted without a vote. Nevertheless, confirming that 
the incident of non-cohesion seen in 2009 was not isolated, the EUMS part of the 
HRC failed to reach a consensus on two resolutions voted on in 2010 that related to 
Israel.  
TABLE	  25	   	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  VOTING	  POSITIONS	  HRC	  REGULAR	  SESSIONS	  2010	  
Data from the Human Rights Council Extranet (2013). 
 
 
  Resolution Brazil EU MS Br x EU 
R
E
G
U
L
A
R
 S
E
SS
IO
N
S 
13
th
 
Combating defamation of Religions 
(A/HRC/13/L.1) 
Abstention Against Divergence 
HR in the occupied Syrian Golan Favour Against Divergence 
Situation of HRs in Korea Favour Favour Convergence 
Composition of staff of the OHCHR Favour Against Divergence 
Right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination 
Favour Favour Convergence 
Israeli settlements in the OPT Favour Favour Convergence 
HR violations by Israel in the OPT Favour Against Divergence 
Follow-up to the report of the UN the 
Gaza Conflict 
Favour Divided n/a 
14
th
 
Attacks by Israeli Forces Against the 
Humanitarian Boat Convoy 
Favour Divided n/a 
The right of peoples to peace Favour Against Divergence 
The effects of foreign debt on HR Favour Against Divergence 
15
th
 
HR and unilateral coercive measures Favour Against Divergence 
The right to development Favour Favour Convergence 
Working group on private military and 
security companies 
Favour Against Divergence 
The use of mercenaries as a means of 
violating HR 
Favour Against Divergence 
HRs and international solidarity Favour Against Divergence 
Follow-up resolution to the report of 
the Fact Finding Mission 
Favour Abstention Divergence 
Follow up to the report on HR Law Favour Abstention Divergence 
Amendments to Resolution 
A/HRC/15/L.3 (on Sudan) 
Favour Favour Convergence 
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5.4.6	  Year	  Six:	  	  16th-­‐17th	  Regular	  Sessions	  (2011)	  
 
Brazil participated in the first two regular sessions and the 16th special session held 
in 2011, after which its membership expired. In much the same pattern of 
engagement that defined Brazil’s participation during the five previous years, the 
country delivered statements in the meetings, unilaterally on the most part, and did 
not object to any of the resolutions adopted. Moreover, Brazil’s contribution of 
direct proposals was restricted to one resolution, on human rights in the context of 
HIV/AIDS, which was presented unilaterally and adopted without a vote at the 16th 
regular session. 
 On the other hand, 2011 was the year in which the EU contributed the most 
to the HRC. Always being represented by Hungary, the EU proposed five of the 
resolutions adopted in the regular sessions, three of which were tabled in alliance 
with other members of the HRC. Together with Japan, the EU was responsible for a 
text on Korea; whilst, with GRULAC/Uruguay, the EU drafted a proposal on the 
rights of children. Joining Canada and the US, the EU tabled a text on the 
cooperation between Tunisia and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights (OHCHR). The EU put forward an independent text on Myanmar, and 
another on freedom of religion or belief. All of these five resolutions were adopted 
at the 16th regular session without a vote, except for the text on Korea, which was 
subjected to a vote. Nevertheless, the EU still faced a problem of internal cohesion, 
with EUMS not agreeing on a common position regarding the incident of the 
humanitarian flotilla. 
 The 16th regular session was, however, the period during which the EU and 
Brazil engaged more closely. Despite the fact that they did not present any joint 
proposals, cooperation occurred within a less formal context; during the side 
events. The EU and GRULAC co-organised four events. Three meetings were 
private, informal consultations, whereas one was “informal consultations on draft 
resolution on the rights of the child”. Again, Brazil was represented by GRULAC, 
thus, its cooperation with the EU remained indirect.  
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At the 17th regular session, Brazil demonstrated the same approach, this 
time contributing one resolution, on physical and mental health, tabled along with 
India, Egypt, and South Africa, and adopted without a vote. The EU also only 
proposed one text, a document on the human rights situation in Belarus that was 
appraised as a recommendation rather than a resolution.  
 In 2011, the two partners adopted the same position for the first - and only - 
time, over a resolution adopted at the special session of the HRC. Nevertheless, the 
same pattern of EU-Brazil engagement (or lack thereof) registered in previous years 
also repeated itself during 2011. In the year during which cooperation at the HRC 
was finally made explicit, in the joint declaration of a EU-Brazil Summit, the two 
actors could actually only agree on three resolutions that were touched upon: the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict; the human rights in Syria and the right to development 
(Table 26). Brazil then left the HRC, no longer able to be considered a partner of 
the EU at the HRC. 
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TABLE	  26	   	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  VOTING	  POSITIONS	  	  HRC	  REGULAR	  SESSIONS	  2011	  
 Data from the Human Rights Council Extranet (2013). 
 
 
  Resolution Brazil EUMS BR x EU 
R
E
G
U
L
A
R
 S
E
SS
IO
N
 
16
th
 
HRs in the occupied Syrian Golan Favour Abstention Divergence 
Situation of HRs in the DPR of Korea Favour Favour Convergence 
Follow-up to the report on the incident 
of the humanitarian flotilla 
Favour Divided n/a 
Promoting HR through the 
understanding of traditional values 
Abstention Against Divergence 
Right to Development Favour Favour Convergence 
The effects of foreign debt on HR Favour Against Divergence 
Composition of staff of the OHCHR Favour Against Divergence 
HR in Iran Favour Favour Divergence 
Violations by Israel in the OPT Favour Abstention Divergence 
Right of the Palestinian people to self-
determination 
Favour Favour Convergence 
Israeli settlements in the OPT Favour Favour Convergence 
Follow-up to the report of the UN on 
the Gaza Conflict 
Favour Abstention Divergence 
The mandate of the Independent 
expert on HR 
Favour Against Divergence 
17
th
 
Independent Expert on HR and 
international solidarity 
Favour Against Divergence 
Effects of financial obligations on HR Favour Against Divergence 
Incident on the humanitarian Flotilla Favour Divided n/a 
HR, sexual orientation and gender 
identity 
Favour Favour Convergence 
Non-repatriation of funds of illicit 
origin 
Favour Abstention Divergence 
HR in Belarus Favour Favour Convergence 
Migrants and asylum seekers from 
North Africa 
Favour Against Divergence 
The right of peoples to peace Favour Against Divergence 
SP
E
C
IA
L
 
 
16
Th
 
 
The current HR situation in the Syrian 
Arab Republic in the 
context of recent events 
 
 
Favour 
 
 
Favour 
 
 
Convergence 
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5.4.7	  EU	  &	  Brazil:	  Partners	  at	  the	  HRC?	  
 
In spite of the several official statements issued and the instruments adopted at the 
bilateral level over the past decade, all reinforcing the mutual understanding of the 
promotion of human rights not only as a shared value, but also as one of the 
principles underpinning EU-Brazil cooperation, this section has provided empirical 
evidence that the discourse does not match practice, as there was no evidence of 
enhanced cooperation at the HRC. As far as the first six years of HRC activity are 
concerned, Brazil and the EU could not be considered partners in the international 
human rights regime. 
From the 113 resolutions voted on in the 17 regular sessions and nine 
special sessions analysed here, Brazil and the EU adopted the same position just 25 
times, voting differently on 85 resolutions. Brazil’s total voting over the period 
accounted for 103 votes in favour, 1 against and 9 abstentions, whereas the EU 
racked up 30 votes in favour, 62 against and 16 abstentions, whilst failing to 
achieve cohesion amongst its member states on five occasions. Upon crossing the 
two positions, as table 27 summarises, the number of divergences in EUMS-Brazil 
voting is superior to that of similar votes for almost all of the regular and special 
sessions that took place. 
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TABLE	  27	   	   EU’S	  AND	  BRAZIL’S	  VOTING	  POSITIONS	  	  HRC	  1ST-­‐17TH	  REGULAR	  SESSIONS	  (2006-­‐2011)	  
 
Regular Session N. of Resolutions 
Voted 
Convergence Divergence N/a 
1st 3 1 2 0 
2nd 6 1 5 0 
3rd 3 0 3 0 
4th 3 0 3 0 
5th - - - 0 
6th 7 0 7 0 
7th 13 4 9 0 
8th 2 0 2 0 
9th 3 0 3 0 
10th 15 5 9 1 
11th 4 2 2 0 
12th 5 0 5 0 
13th 8 3 4 1 
14th 3 0 2 1 
15th 8 2 6 0 
16th 13 4 8 1 
17th 8 2 5 1 
Total 104 24 75 5 
Special Session N. of Resolutions 
Voted 
Convergence Divergence N/a 
1st 1 0 1 0 
2nd 1 0 1 0 
3rd 1 0 1 0 
6th 1 0 1 0 
9th 1 0 1 0 
10th 1 0 1 0 
11th 1 0 1 0 
12th 1 0 0 1 
16th 1 1 0 0 
Total 9 1 8 0 
Total (R+S) 113 25 82 6 
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Interestingly, when comparing the resolutions on which the two actors 
adopted similar positions, it becomes clear that occasions of convergence cannot be 
attributed to a particular scope of the resolutions. Cases of convergence and 
divergence were registered in decisions that addressed institutional matters, 
horizontal themes and country-specific issues.  In any case, a convergence of votes 
is interpreted as a compatibility of approaches, rather than the product of 
cooperation between the two players. Thus, real evidence of a partnership at the 
multilateral level would be their submission of joint proposals. Yet, over the period 
analysed, the EU and Brazil did not present a single draft resolution together, and 
the closest the two actors got to an alliance was when the EU and GRULAC 
(represented by Uruguay) tabled a text conjointly. Moreover, in addition to being 
very heterogeneous in terms of areas of engagement, the irregularity in the 
compatibility of the two actors’ positions is also evident over the period analysed.  
The same irregular pattern of EU-GRULAC cooperation was identified 
when analysing the side events that took place in parallel to the regular sessions of 
the HRC. Despite the fact that these informal meetings take place every day of the 
three weeks of each regular session, there were only seven occasions on which 
GRULAC and the EU jointly promoted these events: 
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TABLE	  28	   	   SIDE-­‐EVENTS:	  1-­‐17	  HRC	  REGULAR	  SESSIONS	  	  (2006-­‐2011)	  
Data from the Human Rights Council Extranet (2013). 
 
These events do reveal a certain level of cooperation between the EU and 
Brazil of a more informal nature, but very limitedly, due to three core reasons. 
Firstly, despite the relevance of these events in introducing and enhancing the 
debate on certain issues within the agenda of the HRC, by no means do they hold 
the same political and legal weight as resolutions. Secondly, the participation of 
Brazil in these co-sponsored events was always indirect. One could justify this fact 
with the argument that Brazil tends to promote side events through GRULAC. Yet, 
when looking at the agendas of these events, I found out that GRULAC joined 
other parties in promoting events on only nine occasions, including the seven 
events organised with the EU. GRULAC met alone 38 times. In addition to these 
events, Brazil alone organised 45 events, and acted with other parties six times 
(excluding GRULAC and/or EU). This evidence shows that, in addition to regularly 
acting through GRULAC, Brazil is also a unilateral player. Interestingly, the EU 
adopted a similar approach, promoting 129 side events alone and only eight in 
coordination with other parties (including GRULAC). The third reason why the 
events co-organised by the EU-GRULAC are a limited indicator of EU-Brazil 
Regular
Session 
Date Organisers Subject Type 
 
 
1st 
 
20 Mar 2008 
Uruguay, the European Union 
and GRULAC 
European Union and GRULAC 
open-ended consultations on 
Rights of the Child 
 
Public 
 
25 Mar 2008 
Uruguay (on behalf of GRULAC) 
and Slovenia (on behalf of the 
European Union) 
Open-ended consultations on the 
draft resolution : “Missing 
Persons” 
 
Public 
 
12th 
 
12 Mar 2010 
Uruguay (on behalf of 
GRULAC) and the European 
Union 
Open-ended informal 
consultations on draft 
resolution on the rights of 
the child 
 
Public 
 
 
 
16th 
10 Mar 2011 European Union and 
GRULAC 
Informal consultations Private 
11 Mar 2011 European Union and 
GRULAC 
Co-sponsor meeting Private 
14 Mar 2011 European Union and 
GRULAC 
Co-sponsor meeting Private 
 
16 Mar 2011 
 
European Union and 
GRULAC 
Informal consultations on 
draft resolution on the rights 
of the child 
 
Public 
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cooperation at the HRC is that they were never directly organised by Brazil, despite 
the fact that the country has a good record of promoting events without the support 
of GRULAC. For this reason, these informal meetings are more an indication of 
partnership between the two regional groups, than between the EU and Brazil. 
Within this context, it can be concluded that the EU and Brazil cannot be 
considered partners at the HRC, but also that the efforts made at the bilateral level 
to foment cooperation in the multilateral arena have not been reflected by any 
concrete change in the degree of their engagement at the Council. In light of this, 
this thesis claims that there was no level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on 
human rights. 
In order to explain this outcome, the next section assesses the process of 
level-linkage, breaking up its analysis into the four hypotheses that underpin the 
concept of level-linkage proposed by the thesis. 
 
5.5	  Assessing	  Level-­‐Linkage	  in	  Human	  Rights 
 5.5.1	  The	  Regime	  Type	  	  
 
A spillover from DBLCM to the multilateral level depends on the degree to which 
the international human rights regime is open to influences from other levels of 
cooperation. The type of regime is the first variable this thesis claims impacts on 
the outcome of level-linkage in human rights.  
Grounded in the 1946 UN Declaration of Human Rights (Buergenthal 
1997: 704), the human rights regime that exists under the UN umbrella can be 
considered well-established. Constituted by a range of charter-based bodies that 
address cooperation within this issue-area, the regime is also highly 
institutionalised and polarised. The HRC is one of the primary platforms for EU-
Brazil interaction at the multilateral level, but not the only one. The development 
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of multilateral cooperation on human rights is not centralised within the remit of 
one core institution. This dynamic forces the HRC to operate with a certain 
amount of flexibility and openness.  
The structure of the HRC promotes the direct engagement of its members, 
not only in terms of decision-making but also through the participation of 
representatives of states in the composition of the different bodies that form the 
bureaucratic organisation of the Council. Holding significant power over the 
framing of multilateral cooperation, these international actors have more 
incentives and capacity for the implementation of strategies that combine 
approaches to cooperation at different levels, as there are few institutional 
constraints to an actor’s ability to transpose its preferences at the bilateral level to 
the multilateral level. 
The decision-making of the sessions of the HRC is mixed, as resolutions 
are adopted by a simple majority of votes, or are not subjected to voting at all. 
Another characteristic of this process is the fact that, whereas proposals can be 
tabled on the initiative of a single party, they require the support of a majority of 
members in order to be included in the agenda of the session. This structure has a 
twofold impact on the behaviour of the HRC, as members have relative freedom to 
act unilaterally, but are also forced to forge alliances with other parties in order to 
promote their own agenda and interests. This exercise of policy coordination with 
third parties can be eased if initiated at other levels, as actors would arrive at the 
multilateral arena with a certain number of allies, enhancing the prospects of gains 
from multilateral cooperation. In strengthening a relationship at the bilateral level, 
two actors willing to cooperate at the HRC would have to transpose this alliance to 
the multilateral level, rather than forging a multilateral partnership from scratch. 
Despite the existence of constraints to this spillover, there are certainly incentives 
for positive level-linkage.  
An alliance at the bilateral level that would address issues dealt with at the 
HRC would depend on whether or not the multilateral agenda could be exported to 
other levels of cooperation. Addressing a wide variety of issues, the HRC covers 
issues ranging from those that are country-specific, to cross-national global 
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problems, to institutional matters. At the organisation, these topics are dealt with 
under a political approach, as the text of the resolutions and the reports of the 
regular sessions reveal. In spite of evident references to international law and UN 
procedures, the complexity of these discussions is relatively low in respect to 
technical/institutional details. Thus, the agenda of the HRC can be more easily 
exported to other levels, as it does not require agents to have a sophisticated 
understanding of so-called technical/institutional aspects in order for them to 
discuss multilateral human rights issues. This stands in contrast with the very 
technical agenda of WTO negotiations, for instance.  
Another aspect of the international human rights regime that favours 
positive level-linkage is actually one of its weaknesses: the lack of power of 
enforcement. As Jack Donnelly defines, the human rights regime is:  
a relatively promotional regime, composed of widely accepted substantive 
norms, largely internationalized standard-setting procedures, some general 
promotional activity, but very limited international implementation, which 
rarely goes beyond information exchange and voluntarily accepted 
international assistance for the national implementation of international norms 
(Donnelly 1986: 613-614). 
 
The inability of the HRC to enforce the resolutions it adopts places, once 
again, a significant share of responsibility to promote the international human 
rights regime in the hands of states, as well as regional organisations like the EU. 
If “international action to increase domestic protection for human rights succeeds 
only when they alter the domestic calculations of governments” (Moravcsik 
1995:160), DBLCM creates more incentives for compliance with multilateral 
commitments. The reasons for that are manifold. Firstly, the bilateral agendas are 
generally based on international agreements signed at the UN level; if these 
principles and responsibilities undertaken at the UN are observed at other levels, 
there is an increase in the legitimacy of the regime. Secondly, assuming that 
bilateral cooperation aims at improving human rights situations within the 
jurisdiction of the two partners, it would contribute to the promotion of human 
rights by default, assisting the multilateral regime to meet its primary goal. Finally, 
enhancing the profile of human rights in a bilateral context increases the visibility 
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and the exposure of domestic human rights. National governments are subjected to 
greater peer pressure to be held accountable for these “internal” problems. In 
agreeing to discuss domestic issues bilaterally, actors are more prone to accept 
these discussions at the multilateral level too, leading to the increased domestic 
protection of human rights. 
Overall, all the elements analysed here suggest that the international human 
rights regime favours positive level-linkage as the institutional framework, the 
normative content and the agenda of the HRC all facilitate a projection of 
negotiations from the multilateral level to the bilateral level, simultaneously 
creating the conditions for DBLCM to successfully influence that undertaken at 
the multilateral level. Nevertheless, the “regime type” variable alone does not 
suffice to promote a positive outcome for level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation 
on human rights, as the analysis of the chapter claimed a neutral result for this 
process. Explanations for neutral level-linkage may be found in the last three 
hypotheses of the thesis.  
 5.5.2	  The	  Compatibility	  of	  Approaches	  	  
 
Since the inception of human rights in the framework of EU-Brazil relations in 
1992, the recognition of democracy and human rights as shared values between the 
two partners has been stressed in nearly all political documents and declarations 
that provide the basis for their bilateral cooperation. Furthermore, the emphasis on 
BCML has increased as the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership evolves, as the two 
partners have recently committed to work jointly for the strengthening of the HRC. 
Nevertheless, the EU and Brazil have never defined a common approach to the 
international human rights regime. Consequently, their engagement at the HRC 
remains limited to the extent to which their foreign policies at the multilateral level 
converge. Exploring this compatibility of approaches allows for understanding the 
limits to and potential for enhanced DBLCM having a positive impact on BCML, 
thus influencing the outcome of level-linkage. 
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 The EU’s approach to the HRC is defined by its interest in asserting its role 
as an international actor highly committed to and actively engaged with the 
promotion of universal human rights, as suggested by Article 21 of the TEU:  
The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and 
which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the 
universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 
respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect 
for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. 
 
In light of this, the EU supports a strong multilateral human rights regime 
that makes states accountable for their human rights violations, with impartiality 
and autonomy. Accordingly, the EU claims to pursue the development of bilateral 
and multilateral partnerships with third countries and organisations that share its 
values, particularly at the level of the UN. Yet, as this chapter has shown, the level 
of success guaranteed by this strategy can be contested.  
Like the EU, Brazil’s intrinsic interest in affirming its identity as an 
international actor committed to human rights is also grounded in a legal basis, as 
Article 4 of the 1988 Federal Constitution establishes the respect of human rights as 
one of the core principles that governs Brazilian international relations. Thus, it can 
be claimed that the EU and Brazil both consider the promotion of human rights and 
democracy to be central objectives of their foreign policies. Consequently, the 
engagement of the two partners with the HRC is grounded in a solid basis, and is 
part of a long-term strategy rather than an occasional, punctual motivation, a fact 
which favours the prospects of an EU-Brazil alliance at the HRC. Nevertheless, 
believing in the importance of a strong multilateral system to promote human rights 
globally does not imply a common understanding on the rules and norms that 
define multilateral cooperation. Having a compatible agenda is another crucial 
aspect that allows bilateral cooperation to take place in practice at the HRC. Here, 
however, the convergence between the two actors’ approaches is more limited, as 
will be demonstrated. 
As Karen Smith notes, when supporting the creation of the Council, the EU 
advocated in favour of incorporating human rights situations as one of the items on 
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the Council’s permanent agenda (Smith 2010: 227-237). This position derived from 
its support of “country-resolutions”, which was in clear contrast with the reluctance 
of developing countries (including Brazil) on the adoption of such an instrument. 
Additionally, the EU has a relatively selective approach to country-specific issues, 
which has cost the EU isolation and criticism.  
But, as was revealed in the previous section, even if EUMS have almost 
always acted on the basis of what could be considered a common EU agenda, this 
has not precluded its attempts to engage with other actors. Karen Smith observes 
that the EU’s strategy has focused on a “consensus-building approach”, which has 
proved to be effective on several occasions. Risking compromising the promotion 
of its model of regime for the sake of reaching an agreement, the EU has supported 
measures that have high chances of approval by other parties. Moreover, the EU 
has avoided submitting its proposals to voting and carefully tailors the texts of its 
draft resolutions to contemplate the demands of all members (Smith 2010: 232).  
The analysis of the EU’s positions in the resolutions voted on at the HRC 
sessions analysed here reinforces the argument of the EU’s strategic selectiveness 
when contributing proposals. In addition to the resolutions drafted by the EU that 
passed with no vote or by consensus, the small number of EU proposals that were 
subjected to the voting of member states was approved, granting the EU a full 
success rate. Yet, there seems to be no reciprocity in terms of support at the HRC. 
The evidence being that EUMS voted against the majority of the 113 resolutions 
(62 votes against) adopted at the sessions analysed. By adopting a discriminatory 
approach to proposals taken to the HRC, the EU has risked distancing itself from 
other members, which has contributed to the perception of the EU as an actor that 
obstructs the activities of the HRC.  
Brazil, on the other hand, adopted the opposite position. Voting in favour of 
most resolutions (85), however, does not imply unconditional support of an 
incisive approach to the enforcement of human rights. On the contrary, as Paulo 
Sergio Pinheiro (2000: 30-32) contents, Brazil acknowledges the universality of 
these rights but argues that they should be dealt with parsimony, observing the 
context of each country. Critical of a “North-South” divide in the agenda of 
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multilateral organisations, which has led to a politicisation of the international 
human rights regime, Brazil advocates that the most appropriate instrument for 
enforcing the promotion of human rights in domestic spheres is open dialogue with 
the parties involved (Pinheiro 2000: 30-32). In this same line of thought, Celso 
Amorim argues that Brazil defends a position of “non-indifference”, but respects 
the principles of non-intervention and the sovereignty of states. This approach is 
summarised as a “positive agenda” (Amorim 2009), an expression incorporated in 
the Brazilian diplomatic discourse which usually refers to a non-confrontational 
approach to cooperation on human rights. 
Scrutiny of Brazil’s position at the HRC suggests that this “positive agenda” 
has been practically translated as an approach that avoids obstructing the activities 
of the HRC, but that is also very careful about making direct accusations when not 
backed by the majority of members. Furthermore, the country has a poor record of 
proposing resolutions, either alone or in conjunction with other parties, suggesting 
that the prioritisation of the principle of non-interference limits Brazil’s interest in 
contributing more effectively to the HRC as far as identifying violations by 
individual states is concerned.  
To summarise, it can be said that the two actors adopt similar approaches to 
the HRC, but strongly diverge in terms of their choice of strategies. Both the EU 
and Brazil have largely been unilateral players at the HRC, and have not 
consolidated any strong alliances with other members. Also, the two actors have 
clearly defined principles that underpin their external policies on human rights. 
Yet, although both players have revealed genuine interest in the strengthening of 
the multilateral human rights regime, they diverge in terms of the principles that 
should provide the basis for international cooperation in this realm. As a result, 
their strategies diverge, with the EU being more incisive in promoting its agenda 
and revealing its preferences, whilst Brazil has been less prone to taking sides 
within the HRC. Due to these different perspectives on how to engage with the 
HRC, and their lack of a common agenda, cooperation between Brazil and the EU 
is limited to those issues which they consider able to be legitimately addressed at 
the multilateral level, but is also restricted to the occasions on which their 
strategies converge. This limitation is exemplified not only by the lack of joint EU-
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Brazil proposals of resolutions, but also by the very poor record of side-events they 
co-sponsored. In the light of this, the “compatibility of approaches” variable 
strongly impacts on level-linkage. 
 5.5.3	  Foreign	  Policy-­‐Making	  Processes	  	  
 
This thesis claims that the prospects of a connection between the bilateral 
and the multilateral levels of EU-Brazil cooperation depend on the processes and 
structures through which they develop their external human rights policies. 
Arguably, the more integrated the policy-making of the two levels, the more likely 
level-linkage is to occur. To assess this hypothesis, I analyse the bureaucratic 
organisations of the EU and Brazil, focusing on two of their defining elements: 
distribution of competences and hierarchy.  
 The first element identified is the decentralised structure of the foreign 
policy-making processes of the two actors. As on climate change and trade, the 
institutional arrangements of the EU and Brazil are both grounded in a division of 
labour that allocates competences over bilateral and multilateral human rights 
policies to different agents and agencies. In the case of Brazil, these competences 
are relatively well centralised in the Itamaraty, but distributed across its units in 
Brasilia, Brussels and Geneva. Communication between these different agencies 
ensures certain internal coordination, yet there is a clear division of labour in 
Brazilian policy-making, as those engaged in the process of forming bilateral 
polices do not take part in the development of the Brazilian approach at the HRC. 
 In the case of the EU, the conditions are even less favourable for level-
linkage. The first obstacle is the lack of definition on the legal competences of the 
EU over external human rights policy. As a result, the Council of the European 
Union has shared the human rights agenda, firstly with European Commission, and 
now with the EEAS. Between these two agencies there is a division of labour. 
Whereas the Council, predominantly through the COHOM, defines the core 
guidelines for a European approach to human rights, the EEAS is in charge of 
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incorporating these “policies” into the EU’s external relations. Until the entry into 
force of the Lisbon treaty, DG RELEX conducted EU bilateral cooperation with 
Brazil, both in Brasilia and Brussels. Currently, these tasks have been taken on by 
the EEAS offices in both capitals. The EU’s representation in Geneva was shared 
by the Council and the European Commission but, since Lisbon, it has been 
centralised by the EEAS delegation. Within this institutional framework, there is 
more internal coordination in the making of the EU’s external human rights policy 
addressing both the bilateral and the multilateral levels. More centralisation did not, 
however, bring about a change in its hierarchical nature. As a staff member from 
the EEAS in explained, EU bureaucrats dealing with bilateral relations hold 
meetings with representatives from the Council of the European Union and report 
to the EU delegation in Geneva on their activities; however, they do not have 
influence in the making of multilateral policies.135 
 The negative impact of the fragmented EU on level-linkage is enhanced 
when one considers that a EU policy is subject to the political will of all EU 
members. Whereas the EU has relatively autonomy with which to pursue bilateral 
cooperation with Brazil, at the HRC the capacity of the EU to engage with Brazil 
depends on the individual preferences of each its member states. As demonstrated 
in the previous section, the EU has a high record of internal cohesion on a “EU 
position” at the HRC. Yet, considering the fragmentation and hierarchical structure 
of EU’s foreign policy-making, projecting bilateral cooperation onto the 
multilateral level is especially challenging in the case of human rights. This is 
because conditioning a (multilateral) policy that is the outcome of bargaining and 
negotiations of EUMS to a bilateral policy, over which the EU institutions have 
more competence and autonomy to pursue would imply not only changing the 
hierarchical structure that currently conditions the bilateral level to the multilateral 
level, but also delegating the EU more responsibility over external human rights 
policy, consequently reducing the power of EUMS over this agenda. 
 The decentralised and hierarchical characteristics of the foreign policy-
making of the EU and Brazil are reflected in the agenda of their policy-makers. 
                                                
135 Interview n.08 July 2011. 
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Scrutiny of the EU-Brazil bilateral agenda on human rights suggested that few 
multilateral issues were raised at the bilateral level, though it is almost inevitable 
that the topics discussed bilaterally broadly fit the agenda of the HRC. Yet, in 
addition to the dialogue over global issues, the bulk of DBLCM focused on matters 
that are very specific to EU-Brazil relations and which were not being addressed at 
the multilateral level. Furthermore, the inception of more multilateral themes in the 
political agenda of the Strategic Partnership enhances the need for the processes of 
bilateral policies to take into better account the partners’ approaches at the HRC. 
However, given that bilateral cooperation on multilateral issues has not gone 
beyond the exchange of views, communication between policy-makers and 
agencies responsible for bilateral relations with those in charge of multilateral 
issues remains minimal in the case of both partners.  
Against this backdrop, it can be concluded that the policy-making variable 
does impact (negatively) on the outcome of level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation 
on human rights, as predicted by the third hypothesis of the thesis. 
 5.4.4	  Preference	  for	  Partners	  	  
 
The development of EU-Brazil relations over the period analysed here has led to an 
enhancement of the profile of their engagement at the bilateral level, now framed in 
terms of a Strategic Partnership. Yet, a spillover from DBLCM to the multilateral 
level requires the two actors to also consider their engagement “strategic” at the 
HRC. Preference for partners is, as such, the third element this thesis investigates 
on terms of its impact on level-linkage. 
The formal organisation of the HRC creates institutional constraints on the 
establishment of preference for partners. The allocation of membership in terms of 
regional groups induces actors to coordinate their election to the HRC with other 
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members of the same group, although not all groups operate in this way.136 With a 
restricted membership, actors need to reason with their peers as to their candidacy 
to the HRC and their representation within the bodies of the organisation. In this 
regard, the EU and Brazil enter the multilateral arena on different sides. Whereas 
Brazil joins Latin American countries in the GRULAC group, the EU is indirectly 
represented by its member states, which are distributed across three other 
geographical groups (Asia, Eastern Europe and WEOG).137 In addition, the EU has 
the status of an international organisation per se, which creates an opportunity for 
its further engagement with the HRC. The formal institutional arrangement of the 
HRC thus isolates the EU and Brazil; in order to become preferential partners, the 
two actors would have to break with this structure. Once part of the Council, 
members have no formal obligation to act in groups; preferences for partners are 
not bounded to a regional group.  
The analysis of negotiations at the HRC has revealed that the preferences of 
the EU and Brazil have not been restricted to regional groups and have varied 
according to the issue at stake. Moreover, both actors have adopted a rather 
unilateral approach to the HRC, and the number of draft proposals the EU and 
Brazil have presented alone is an evidence of this claim.  
The analysis of the official reports of the 17 first regular sessions of the 
HRC, allowed for the observation that Brazil has delivered statements expressing 
its position on the vast majority of issues addressed in these meetings. Occasionally 
speaking on the behalf of other members, Brazil represented the GRULAC group 
on some occasions, yet the majority of its statements were issued unilaterally. In 
terms of the process leading to the adoption of the resolutions voted on in these 
sessions, there were even fewer signs of a real preference for specific partners. Out 
of the few proposals drafted by Brazil, none was in conjunction with another HRC 
member.  
                                                
136 Coordination is more frequent in the case of Latin America, than in the WEOG, for example. 
137 Malta is the only EU member state to belong to the Asia group. Thus, EU presence in this regional group is 
of significantly less importance than its membership of the other two groups. 
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If there is no evidence of a choice for partners when drafting proposals, 
there is also no indicator of an inclination to favour any specific alliance when 
assessing Brazil’s support for the resolutions voted on. That is because Brazil voted 
in favour of the vast majority of texts discussed, regardless of the proponent. 
Inverting this exercise and looking at the proposals that Brazil has opposed or 
abstained on, there is also no suggestion of preferences.  In light of this, it can be 
argued that Brazil has adopted a rather independent approach at the HRC, with no 
clear partners. Arguably, this approach reflects the country’s understanding that the 
enforcement of human rights should be grounded in an open dialogue with all 
countries on a non-confrontational basis. This lack of strong preference for partners 
could potentially enhance the prospects for Brazil to pursue the strengthening of its 
collaboration with the EU at the HRC. Yet, an alliance within the multilateral arena 
would also depend on the EU’s preferences. 
Acting through its status as an international organisation, the EU has 
participated in the 17 regular sessions rather actively. Additionally, the EUMS that 
are part of the HRC have delivered statements on behalf of the EU, on almost all 
issues of the agenda of the 17 special sessions, asserting the EU’s role as a political 
group in itself. Occasionally, the EU’s position represented that of other countries, 
mostly those considered “acceding countries”, “candidate countries”, “countries in 
the process of stabilization and association process”, as well as “potential 
candidates”. This coordination suggests that the EU has articulated a common 
position with these actors over certain issues. 
The positions adopted in the voting sessions reveal that the EU also approaches 
the Council with relatively high autonomy and independence from any strong 
alliance, like Brazil. The difference between the two actors is that, whereas Brazil 
has largely favoured the resolutions proposed, the EU voted against most of them, 
regardless of the proponent. Additionally, the EU submitted more draft resolutions 
than Brazil, either unilaterally or in conjunction with other parties. The EU 
predominantly tabled proposals alone, but also joined Japan on two occasions and 
has drafted texts together with Algeria, Canada, the US, and Uruguay, the latter 
being a EU partner once as an individual member and, on another occasion, 
representing GRULAC. The heterogeneity of this range of alliances suggests that 
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the EU has no clear preference for partners when proposing resolutions. Thus, the 
EU’s approach creates the conditions for the strengthening of cooperation with 
Brazil. It is striking to observe that, in spite of the openness of the EU and Brazil to 
articulating their positions in partnership with a variety of countries with diverse 
backgrounds and plural political agendas, the EU and Brazil have not asserted any 
form of partnership at the HRC. 
As neither of the players have a preference for partners, the potential obstacle 
for a EU-Brazil alliance at the HRC is that both actors are defined as independent 
players and have adopted a largely unilateral approach at the HRC. Enhancing EU-
Brazil BCML to the point in which the two countries would work together 
systematically would require them to review the foreign policy strategies they 
individually adopt in order to engage with the HRC. The EU and Brazil would have 
to re-think their unilateralism and autonomy, becoming more prone to long-
standing alliances with any party. Once they undergo such a change, the question 
would be whether or not the EU and Brazil would still perceive their specific ties as 
preferential, favouring their bilateral relations at the HRC over prospective 
collaborations with other members. So far, it can be concluded that the “preferences 
for partners” impacts on level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on human rights, as 
neither of the two actors has opted to pursue any alliance at the HRC, including 
with each other.  
	  
5.5	  Conclusion	  
 
In order to understand level-linkage on human rights, this chapter explored the 
development of EU-Brazil DBLCM and at the multilateral level, and assessed the 
correlation between the two levels. Focusing on the sessions of the HRC held 
between 2006 and mid-2011, the first section briefly introduced the regime, 
presenting the structure of the institutions and the way in which each actor formally 
engaged with its institutional framework. Once the scene was set, the chapter 
entered the domain of EU-Brazil cooperation on human rights. The first part of this 
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section provided an account of activities at the bilateral level since human rights 
appeared in their bilateral agenda, back in 1992. Moving onto the multilateral 
arena, the analysis was centred in the HRC and explored the first 17 regular 
sessions, looking at the nine special sessions during which resolutions were adopted 
by vote. In addition, this chapter assessed a totally of 284 side events in which the 
EU and/or Brazil were involved in the organisation. Breaking the analysis up into 
the two levels of cooperation allowed for the defining of the outcome of level-
linkage on EU-Brazil cooperation on human rights. To explain this result, the last 
section of the chapter addressed this issue and explored how each of the four 
variables accounts for level-linkage in this issue-area. 
 Human rights only appeared in the framework of bilateral relations in 1992, 
more than 30 years after diplomatic ties between the two actors was established. 
Ever since, the development of DBLCM in this field can be divided into two 
phases. The first extended until the adoption of the second Country Strategy Paper, 
in 2006, and was characterised by an almost-exclusive focus on “domestic” issues 
concerning Brazil’s human rights situation. The second and current phase started 
with the re-framing of bilateral relations by the Strategic Partnership, celebrated in 
2007, and is marked by the diversifying of the bilateral agenda. Firstly, there is an 
emphasis on issues that are not only related to Brazilian problems, but that are 
relevant for both partners’ domestic human rights policies (e.g. LGBT rights), or 
that are particularly related to their relationship (e.g. migration). Secondly, the EU 
and Brazil have adopted new instruments of dialogue on human rights, and have 
placed greater emphasis on the debate over issues addressing the multilateral level. 
More recently, the two actors have stressed their commitment to jointly cooperate 
at the HRC, strengthening the role of the institution in the promotion of human 
rights. Adjusting their relationship to that of an “equal partnership” and enhancing 
the profile of human rights in the agenda of EU-Brazil relations, it would be 
expected that these changes in DBLCM would have a positive impact on BCML, 
eventually affirming an EU-Brazil partnership at the HRC. That was not the case.  
 The two actors never presented a joint proposal and largely adopted 
diverging approaches to the resolutions. With Brazil supporting the large majority 
of texts and the EU objecting to most of them, there were limited occasions on 
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which the two partners had similar positions. Furthermore, there is no consistency 
in terms of the issues they have cooperated on, in contrast to the clear definition of 
their agenda of DBLCM. Additionally, from a chronological perspective, it can be 
observed that the pattern of their cooperation remained relatively unchanged over 
the period analysed. Whereas the agreement of the EU-Brazil Strategic Partnership 
has progressively enhanced DBLCM, it has not impacted on the BCML. 
Furthermore, considering 284 side-events the EU/ Brazil sponsored, the fact that 
the two actors jointly promoted only 7 of these events is another strong indicator of 
the poor record of their cooperation at the HRC. In light of this finding, this chapter 
concluded that there was no level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on human 
rights. 
 To explain this outcome, the last part of the chapter explored each of the 
four hypotheses of the thesis. The first hypothesis explored, the “type of regime”, 
suggested that the human rights regime, and in particular the HRC, is well 
consolidated. Firstly, from a normative perspective, and as a charter-based regime, 
the HRC is grounded in international agreement and conventions that are not 
restricted to the framing of multilateral cooperation, but provide the basis for 
domestic policies and external foreign policy. Thus, DBLCM is marked by the joint 
observation of these same legal instruments, thus harmonising the normative 
content of the two levels. In terms of agenda, questions pertaining to the HRC have 
actually been transposed to the bilateral level, as the joint declarations of the EU-
Brazil summits and the documents of the Strategic Partnership have mentioned 
certain issues of the HRC agenda explicitly. Finally, the central role played by 
states within the human rights regime facilitates the exporting of the HRC agenda 
to other levels on which they cooperate. The “regime type” thus favours level-
linkage, so why did it not materialise?  
 The “compatibility of approaches” limits the prospects for BCML on 
certain issues. The EU and Brazil have a similar understanding of democracy, the 
promotion of human rights and the rule of law as being the core principles of 
international relations, having both incorporated these principles into the legal 
framework of their foreign policies. Sharing a long-standing support for the 
strengthening of the human rights regime, the EU and Brazil have pursued the 
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assertion of their identities as international actors strongly committed to the 
promotion of these rights at the global level. Concurring on the importance of 
multilateralism in this domain, however, does not imply a common strategy for 
engaging with the process of multilateral cooperation under the HRC; here is where 
divergences appear. Opting for a non-confrontational approach, Brazil claims to 
have a “positive agenda” that favours dialogue with all parties. As an expression of 
this approach, Brazil supported the vast majority of resolutions (85). The EU, on 
the other hand, advocates in favour of intervention and sanctions when necessary, 
and has tried to export its agenda to the HRC, contributing with more draft 
proposals. In terms of voting, the EU is more selective, having voted in favour of 
only 30 (out of 113) resolutions. Consequently, the two actors have adopted 
divergent approaches at the HRC, revealing different understandings of how 
multilateral cooperation on human rights should be framed. The constraint of their 
“compatibility of approaches” poses an obstacle for level-linkage.  
 The “foreign policy-making processes” of the EU and Brazil under which 
their approaches towards cooperation on human rights are framed are fragmented 
and hierarchical, both conforming to a “top down” model. There is a prioritising of 
policies addressing the multilateral level over bilateral relations. Additionally, 
agents responsible for the handling of bilateral relations are not the same engaged 
in the policy-making related to the multilateral arena, and there was no sign of 
significant collaboration between agents involved in the two processes. Foreign 
policy towards the HRC is developed in isolation from foreign policy at the 
bilateral level. In the case of the EU these differences of agents and agencies are 
accentuated by the need for cohesion amongst EUMS to ensure a common EU 
position at the HRC. The “foreign policy-making processes” impacts the outcome 
of level-linkage. 
 The scrutiny of the “preferences for partners” showed that Brazil 
occasionally joined the GRULAC group to deliver statements at the sessions, but 
predominantly spoke for itself. In addition to proposing few resolutions alone, 
Brazil co-authored draft resolutions with partners from different regions, thus 
making the country’s lack of preference for a particular partner clear. Similarly, the 
EU also delivered unilateral speeches, though on many occasions it also 
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represented other countries from the region. When tabling proposals, the EU acted 
alone or engaged with actors representing a variety of regions. Acting with 
autonomy and independence from eventual alliances means that neither of the two 
actors have a solid, established preference for partners. An EU-Brazil strategic 
partnership would not have to replace any previous coalition the players may have; 
the problem is that they show no sign of interest in adopting an approach to the 
HRC grounded in an alliance with any party. Consequently, the preference for 
partners obstructs the prospects of positive level-linkage, as the EU and Brazil 
approach negotiations unilaterally. The outcome of level-linkage can be partially 
credited to the (lack of) “preferences for partners.” 
 Upon analysing the four hypotheses, it can be concluded that the “type of 
regime” contributes to a positive level-linkage, but has not been sufficient in 
determining the outcome of this process. The “compatibility of approaches” and the 
“preference for partners” limit the prospects of enhanced DBLCM impacting on 
EU-Brazil engagement at the multilateral level, but, simultaneously, not completely 
hindering level-linkage. The “foreign policy-making processes” are the element that 
most obstructs the spillover of cooperation, thus contributing to the absence of 
level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on human rights. 
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CHAPTER	  6	  
Crossing	  the	  Cases	  
 
 
6.1	  Introduction	  
 
The scrutiny of each case allowed for the observance of an overall strengthening of 
EU-Brazil relations at the bilateral level. Since the agreement of the Strategic 
Partnership in 2007, new instruments of cooperation, mainly dialogues, have been 
institutionalised. There were also changes in terms of scope, with both partners 
endorsing the notion of reinforcing their cooperation beyond the bilateral and the 
regional level, to forge a partnership in the international arena. This strategy was 
implemented with more emphasis on climate change and human rights, whereas in 
the case of trade, dialogue at the bilateral level for cooperation at the multilateral 
arena (DBLCM) continued to predominantly address bilateral matters. Despite 
differences between the areas, the three case-studies concluded that cooperation has 
been enhanced at the bilateral level.  
Considering that the literature approaches bilateralism and multilateralism as 
correlated modalities of cooperation, and since the EU and Brazil adopted the 
strategy to promote a “positive” linkage between their engagement at different levels, 
it would be expected that the enhancement of EU-Brazil DBLCM would have an 
impact on their bilateral cooperation at the multilateral level (BCML). The question 
to be addressed would then be whether or not this enhanced DBLCM helped or 
hindered BCML. However, the findings of this thesis pointed to a rather unexpected 
outcome: there was no change in their engagement at the multilateral arena. This 
thesis concluded that EU-Brazil BCML remained very irregular and was never 
prioritised by the two partners, at least within the issues analysed. Consequently, this 
thesis provided evidence of cases in which cooperation at each of the two levels 
developed separately and independently.  
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Arguing that the scrutiny of level-linkage within a bilateral relationship 
requires a focus on both agents and issues, this thesis posits that this correlation 
depends on four elements, addressed through two primary hypotheses and two 
secondary hypotheses. These are: (a) type of regime; (b) compatibility of approaches; 
(c) foreign policy-making processes; and (d) preferences for partners.  
To empirically test the claims of this thesis, three case-studies were 
conducted. The four hypotheses were validated in the three issue-areas analysed. The 
same outcome was found in the three cases: there was no level-linkage on EU-Brazil 
cooperation on climate change, trade or human rights. Yet, the processes of linkage 
in these areas were not the same. Differences between issues pointed to a different 
weighting of the four intervenient variables in the outcome. In all three cases, the 
lack of coordination of agents and agencies responsible for the foreign policy-
making processes under which the two actors develop their policies towards the 
bilateral level and the multilateral level has been revealed to be a major stumbling-
block for level-linkage. In addition to this institutional variable, the type of regime, 
the limited compatibility of approaches and the lack of preference of the EU and 
Brazil in projecting their “partnership” onto the multilateral arena over collaboration 
with third parties had an impact on the outcome of level-linkage in the three areas, 
albeit a limited one.  
 This chapter summarises the results of the three cases and assesses the four 
hypotheses of the thesis (later discussed in the conclusion of the thesis), 
demonstrating how each of them accounted for the outcome of level-linkage in the 
three cases.  
 
6.2	  Identifying	  level-­‐linkage	  (or	  its	  absence)	  
 
This thesis set out to analyse level-linkage in EU-Brazil relations, addressing in 
particular the impact of DBLCM on BCML. Breaking the analysis down into issue-
areas, the first step of this research consisted of identifying the type of impact had by 
the bilateral level on the multilateral level. 
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 As detailed in chapter one, the analytical framework used to assess this linkage 
considers that level-linkage occurs if changes in the pattern of DBLCM are matched 
by shifts in the pattern of EU-Brazil engagement in the multilateral arena, either in 
the enhancing or decreasing of cooperation. Alternatively, a linkage can be claimed 
when DBLCM remains unchanged and this trend is matched at the multilateral level.  
In order to define the type of level-linkage in each area analysed, the case-studies 
provided an overview of the development of EU-Brazil DBLCM. The next stage 
conducted a process-tracing exercise of EU-Brazil engagement in multilateral 
negotiations over the period analysed. Understanding the pattern of EU-Brazil 
engagement at the two levels allowed for the defining of the outcome of level-
linkage in that specific issue-area.  
 The two following sections provide a summary of the pattern of EU-Brazil 
cooperation at the bilateral and the multilateral levels. 
 6.2.1	   Dialogue	   at	   the	   Bilateral	   Level	   for	   Cooperation	   at	   the	  Multilateral	  Arena(DBLCM)	  
 
Although the current framework of EU-Brazil relations is broad and includes a 
constellation of issues, bilateral cooperation was originally conceived of under a very 
narrow approach. Diplomatic ties between the two partners were established in 1960 
and the first agreement on trade dates back to 1974. For nearly 20 years cooperation 
was fundamentally centred on this area. It was just with the 1992 EC-Brazil 
framework agreement that the scope of bilateral relations was stretched to other 
fields, including human rights and environmental protection. For a long time, climate 
change was dealt with alongside other environmental issues, until 2011, when an 
independent dialogue on climate was established. There is subsequently a large gap 
in the time span of the institutionalisation of cooperation on the three issues. 
Until the mid-2000s, cooperation on climate change was framed in terms of a 
“local” approach, focusing on domestic environmental matters in Brazil. A shift in 
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the approach to cooperation over the past decade emphasised cooperation on 
multilateral issues. In this regard, the instruments of the strategic partnership and the 
agenda of the bilateral dialogue on climate change are very emphatic in claiming the 
interest of the parties lies in collaborating on multilateral issues and forging a 
partnership at the multilateral level. Showing certain policy coordination, the EU 
and Brazil agreed upon specific targets and norms that would eventually be 
incorporated into a multilateral agreement. Yet, policy-makers from both sides made 
explicitly clear that they do not consider the bilateral arena to be the appropriate 
sphere for the adoption of joint proposals to be taken onwards to the multilateral 
level. The main reason for that is the hierarchical structure of the foreign policy-
making of Brazil and the EU that subjects bilateral policies to multilateral policies, as 
discussed in detail later on in this chapter.  
 In contrast to climate change and human rights, trade has always been at the 
core of the EU-Brazil agenda, and cooperation in this realm has traditionally been 
developed through a comprehensive approach. Since bilateral commercial trade has 
plummeted in the past two decades, material incentives for deepening policy 
coordination have increased. As a result, new dialogues in specific (and often 
technical) issues were adopted and bilateral agreements signed. Moreover, 
considering that a new World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement on agriculture 
would have an immediate impact on EU-Brazil trade in the sector, this strong 
presence of multilateral issues in the bilateral agenda was to be expected. However, 
of the three areas, trade is the one in which the multilateral agenda was least 
exported to the bilateral level. Debate on the Doha round in that domain of 
cooperation was marginal. The EU and Brazil were also careful to avoid mentioning 
cooperation at the WTO. The documents of the “strategic partnership”, for example, 
express the interest of the parties in the successful conclusion of the Doha Round, 
but there is no explicit mention of an alliance at that level, in contrast to climate 
change and human rights. 
 Whereas the scope of cooperation on trade remained unaltered, EU-Brazil 
relations on human rights were subjected to change over the past few years. Initially, 
formal engagement in this field was of a narrow and selective character and 
restricted to the domestic human rights situation in Brazil. The need to re-frame 
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cooperation in terms of an “equal partnership”, largely advocated by Brazil, induced 
the two actors to rethink their collaboration on human rights. Changes in scope 
promoted over the last decade translated into a new agenda. Cooperation remains 
restricted to a few subject areas, but those are matters in which both partners 
expressed clear interest in collaboration. These issues are either directly related to 
their bilateral relationship, such as migration, or are part of the domestic political 
agenda of the two actors, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) 
rights. In this aspect, the bilateral agenda of cooperation on human rights is very 
distinct from the broad scope of cooperation on trade and climate change.  
Under this new approach, multilateral issues acquire more salience in the 
bilateral agenda. The EU and Brazil stressed the commitment to build an effective 
international regime and affirmed a common position on some international matters. 
Differently from the other two issue-areas, the EU and Brazil declared that they 
intend to enhance dialogue at the Human Rights Council (HRC). This strategy 
suggested closer coordination between the two levels of cooperation and adoption of 
the bilateral level as a platform not only to discuss multilateral issues, but also to 
define some aspects of the engagement of the parties at the international arena. Yet, 
as the next section explains in detail, despite some cases of further collaboration at 
the HRC, the EU and Brazil did not change the overall pattern of their BCML. 
TABLE	  29	   	  	  	  EU-­‐BRAZIL	  COOPERATION	  AT	  THE	  BILATERAL	  LEVEL	  
 Climate Change Trade Human Rights 
Formalising 1992/ 2011 1973 1992 
Scope Broad Broad Narrow 
Institutionalisation Weak Strong Weak 
Emphasis on Multilateralism High Low High 
Trend of EU-BR Cooperation Enhancement Enhancement Enhancement 
 
As the table above summarises, this thesis demonstrated that cooperation on 
the three issues was enhanced, but to different degrees. The decision to incorporate 
more of the multilateral agenda at the bilateral level of cooperation, thus inducing 
level-linkage, was applied to three cases, but produced different results. There was a 
change in the pattern of dialogue at the bilateral level for cooperation at the 
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multilateral arena on climate change and on human rights. Yet, cooperation on trade 
remained focussed on bilateral matters. These differences, however, did not 
influence the outcome of level-linkage. Despite efforts, the strengthening of DBLCM 
had no correlation with the EU-Brazil engagement at the multilateral level, as the 
next section demonstrates. 
 6.2.2	  Bilateral	  Cooperation	  at	  the	  Multilateral	  Level	  (BCML)	  
 
If DBLCM has enhanced in the three issue-areas, EU-Brazil engagement in the 
multilateral arena remained unaltered. The analysis of the three case-studies revealed 
a mixed trend of convergence and divergence of positions which remained relatively 
steady throughout the period analysed. The two actors did not assert a “strategic 
partnership” at the multilateral level. Nevertheless, even if they failed to forge an 
alliance within the international regimes, EU-Brazil cooperation in these domains did 
not follow the same path in all three cases.   
The table below illustrates the differences in the development of BCML in 
the three areas, but also shows that the different processes resulted in the same 
outcome: an irregular pattern of cooperation.  
TABLE	  30	   EU-­‐BRAZIL	  BILATERAL	  COOPERATION	  AT	  THE	  MULTILATERAL	  LEVEL	  	  
 
 Climate Change Trade Human Rights 
Convergence of Positions Medium Low Low 
Joint Proposals Few Few None 
Trend of EU-BR Cooperation Irregular Irregular Irregular 
 
Climate Change 
For different reasons, the EU and Brazil attribute great importance and are 
committed to the promotion of a strong climate change regime. The Strategic 
Partnership identified the strengthening of multilateralism on climate change as a 
shared EU-Brazil goal. As mentioned in the previous section, the two partners 
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worked at the bilateral level to project a partnership onto multilateral negotiations. 
However, this alliance has not materialised in the multilateral arena. The EU and 
Brazil did not build an enduring coalition on international climate negotiations, 
collaborating with each other irregularly. This thesis concluded that EU-Brazil 
cooperation within the international climate regime did not change over the period 
analysed. 
 
Trade 
As with climate change, there was no enhancement of cooperation in trade. 
Differences in terms of markets restrict the prospects for a EU-Brazil partnership at 
the WTO. Yet, the pattern of EU-Brazil engagement in negotiations of an 
international agreement on agriculture conflicted slightly less in the second half of 
the period analysed. This shift was not due to the 2007 Strategic Partnership, but 
resulted from changes in the actors’ external policies. Thus, two phases of EU-Brazil 
cooperation at the Doha Round can be identified. The first extended from the 
beginning of negotiations until the Ministerial Conference in Cancun (2003).  In this 
period, the high degree of divergence between the EU’s and Brazil’s approaches to 
negotiations hampered any prospect of collaboration at the multilateral arena. In fact, 
rather than cooperating, the two actors competed at that level. A second phase of 
cooperation ran from 2004 to 2009, during which this thesis identified more elements 
of convergence in the actors’ positions. Nevertheless, this shift in the pattern of 
engagement did not lead to the establishment of a coalition. At best, EU-Brazil 
engagement during international negotiations on agriculture became irregular, 
marked by convergences and divergences, as on climate change.  
 
 
Human Rights 
The same irregular trend featured in the case of human rights. As an area of shared 
interest and in which resolutions adopted at the multilateral level do not have an 
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impact on the domestic policies of the two actors, human rights was expected to be 
the realm in which the development of level-linkage would encounter fewer 
obstacles. Surprisingly, that was not the case. From 2006 to 2011, there was no 
coordination between the EU and Brazil’s approaches to the resolutions adopted at 
both the regular and special sessions of the HRC. The two actors never tabled a joint 
proposal and their voting positions diverged in the majority of cases. Interestingly, 
even on issues in which the players presented a common position at the bilateral 
level, such as that of Israel-Palestine, they did not always agree at the HRC. This 
aspect shows an inconsistency in the EU-Brazil relationship and a lack of 
coordination in the development of their cooperation at different levels, playing 
against level-linkage. Here it is important to restate that this thesis acknowledged 
that isolated efforts to promote the debate of a few topics, such as the side event on 
human rights, could be understood as collaboration between the two partners. 
Nevertheless, these arrangements were not a regular practice, and not relevant 
enough to determine an alliance between the EU and Brazil at the multilateral level. 
That is because the main instruments of the HRC are the resolutions adopted, in 
addition to the Universal Period Review (UPR). Consequently, an assessment of the 
progress of EU-Brazil cooperation needs to focus on the regular and special sessions. 
Comparing the approaches of the two actors towards the resolutions adopted 
subjected to vote, this thesis concluded that there was no change in EU-Brazil 
collaboration at the HRC.  
Crossing these results with the account of DBLCM, this thesis concluded that 
there was no level-linkage in any of the three areas analysed. Yet, in the same way 
that the process of DBLCM and at the multilateral level varied according to the 
issue, the reasons for the failure of the parties to promote level-linkage in their multi-
level relationship also differed from case to case. The individual analysis of each of 
the four hypotheses this thesis claims to effect level-linkage allowed for the 
identification of the specificities of cooperation in each area. These are summarised 
in the next four sections.  
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6.3	  Assessing	  the	  Hypotheses	  
 6.3.1	  Hypothesis	  1:	  Regime	  Type	  (Primary	  hypothesis)	  
 This first hypothesis is that the greater the openness of a regime to influences from 
other levels of cooperation, the more likely level-linkage is to occur. To assess the 
“openness of a regime” this research considered the degree of institutionalisation, 
agenda, decision-making and criteria for membership. Chapter one presented the 
typologies used to classify the regimes in observing these aspects. According to this 
hypothesis, an “open” regime favours level-linkage, whereas a “closed” regime 
hinders this process. A third, "mixed" type of regimeproduces constraints to level-
linkage, posing an obstacle to the successful impact of DBLCM on BCML, without 
completely obstructing it.  
 As the table below indicates (table 31), both climate change and trade 
regimes were classified under the same category (mixed) and produced the same 
impact on level-linkage (constraint). Trade revealed to be a major stumbling block in 
this process. As a closed regime, the characteristics that define the institutional 
settings and the dynamics of multilateral cooperation in that area hinder the prospects 
of other levels of cooperation for influencing negotiations with the WTO domain.  
TABLE	  31	   	   	   TYPE	  OF	  REGIME	  
 Climate Change Trade Human Rights 
“Type of Regime” Open Closed Mixed 
Chronology Recent Regime Old Regime Old Regime 
Method of Agreement Convention/Protocol Treaty Charter 
Institutionalisation Weak Strong Medium 
Agenda Political/ Technical Political/ Technical Political 
Decision-Making Consensus Consensus Simple Majority/  
Consensus 
Membership Large Large  Small  
Parties States + REIOs States+ REIOs States 
Responsibilities of the Parties Differentiated Equal Equal 
Impact on Level-Linkage Favours Hinders Constrains 
Hypothesis Validation ✓ ✓ ✓ 
  
  
 270 
The differences between the three regimes are not clear-cut. Climate change, 
trade and human rights all share some characteristics. Nevertheless, each regime has 
its own specificities and is, to a certain extent, unique.  
 
Climate Change 
Established in 1992, climate change is the most recent regime of the three case-
studies. Operating under a Convention-Protocol method, it has a low degree of 
institutionalisation, lacking the capacity to ensure compliance with and enforcement 
of the international obligations undertaken by the parties. The power invested in its 
members enhances their capacity to project decisions taken at the bilateral level onto 
the multilateral arena without facing major constraints imposed by the institutional 
framework of the regime. Furthermore, as a regime “under construction”, the agenda 
of negotiations has been polarised by the discussion of the normative framework of 
the regime and technical instruments of cooperation. At the very least, political and 
normative issues of negotiations could more easily be transposed to other levels of 
cooperation, meeting one of the criteria for assessing the “openness” of a regime. 
The fact that the EU and Brazil have heightened their dialogue on multilateral 
climate issues is evidence that the agendas of cooperation under the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol 
framework allow transposition to other levels. 
Another aspect is membership. Open to nation states and regional economic 
international organisations (REIOs), the UNFCCC currently encompasses 195 
parties. This large membership does not necessarily favour level-linkage as, with 
more actors taking part in the regime, there are more opportunities for the EU and 
Brazil to opt for alliances with other parties. Nevertheless, recognition of the EU as a 
fully-fledged member of the UNFCCC, in addition to its member states, is beneficial 
to level-linkage. This is because, under this rule of membership, the EU is able to 
cooperate with Brazil within the bilateral framework of their relations and then 
transpose this alliance to the multilateral arena without having to “change hands” in 
  
 271 
its representation. This leads to increased continuity in the coordination of 
cooperation at the two levels, hence more chances for level-linkage to occur.138 
Whereas on trade and human rights the norms of the regimes apply equally to 
all members, climate change agreements are forged on the basis of the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”. That means the allocation of Brazil and the EU to 
two different groups, or Annex lists, with distinct degrees of commitments. Different 
responsibilities have been partially reflected by the compatibility of approaches of 
the two actors in multilateral negotiations (tackled in hypothesis 2), but it does not 
undermine the prospects for cooperation between them. The fact that an agreement 
can only be approved by consensus increases the need for coordination between all 
parties. This aspect not only enhances the prospects of the EU and Brazil perceiving 
the importance of their cooperation in contributing towards the conclusion of a 
multilateral agreement, but also of their considering the prospects of common 
positions on other levels of their engagement, creating a political incentive for level-
linkage. 
 
Trade 
In many respects, trade is the opposite case to climate change. As table 31 points out, 
trade is a well-established regime, framed by a complex institutional arrangement, 
with a strong capacity for enforcement and compliance, which poses an obstacle for 
level-linkage, as demonstrated below. 
 Membership of the WTO is large (159 members) and the EU and Brazil are 
both recognised as full-fledged members of the organisation. Thus, as on climate 
change, this aspect of the regime allows for direct progression from DBLCM to 
within the multilateral arena, which is positive for level-linkage. Furthermore, the 
                                                
138 The fact that climate change is a shared competence limits the capacity of the EU to act as an independent 
actor in multilateral climate negotiations, as the forging of a common EU position still requires coordination with 
EU member states. Nevertheless, the constraints to level-linkage that emerge from such conditions are not 
imposed by the regime, rather they are a question of EU foreign policy-making. The impact of “shared 
competences” on level-linkage is considered in hypothesis 3.  
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fact that decision-making is by consensus stimulates the pursuit of alliances with a 
large number of parties, creating an incentive for the EU and Brazil to foster their 
coordination on multilateral affairs.  
As a treaty-based regime, the bulk of agreements are negotiated in the various 
“rounds”, held in different locations. However, part of these negotiations is also 
discussed at various levels within the WTO headquarters in Geneva or in other 
forums organised by the parties (such as the G20, for example). The bilateral level 
would constitute just another instance outside the domain of the WTO in which an 
international agreement could be discussed. Within this context, level-linkage would 
be expected and considered part of the dynamics of multilateral trade negotiations. 
This characteristic of the regime indicates a certain degree of “openness” to level-
linkage.  
Despite this aspect, this research still considers trade as a “closed” regime 
and claims it hinders level-linkage. This is because, although the process of 
negotiations and the membership criteria allow the EU and Brazil to forge policy 
coordination on WTO issues at the bilateral level, they have not done so, partially 
because of the complex nature of the agenda in negotiations. Although the issues 
negotiated have a political scope, they are highly technical. Negotiations on these 
items would require the EU and Brazil to deploy staff with expertise in these matters 
at the bilateral level. Problems with agenda could be overcome if it was not for the 
high degree of institutionalisation of the regime. Technical meetings, formal and 
informal gatherings all require close and direct engagement with the activities of the 
WTO on an almost daily-basis. Detailed norms and rules of the regime and the 
institutional capacities of compliance and enforcement add to the complexity of the 
regime and hinder the prospects of significant impact from other levels of 
cooperation. In fact, senior members of staff from both the Brazilian government and 
the European Commission interviewed argued that cooperation over multilateral 
issues has a very specific domain in which to be forged: the WTO. The opinion of 
the interviewees concurred on the understanding that the bilateral level has been and 
should remain a sphere in which to promote an “exchange of views” on the 
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multilateral agenda, but it is not the appropriate forum for the negotiation of EU-
Brazil common positions.139 The treatment of the trade regime as an “isolated” 
domain of cooperation supports the claim that it is a “closed regime”, thus hindering 
the prospects of level-linkage, in accordance with the first hypothesis.  
 
Human Rights  
Human rights is also a long-consolidated regime with a well-established institutional 
arrangement, although not as complex as that of the WTO. Multilateral cooperation 
on human rights under the UN umbrella is not centred on a single institution, as in 
the other two areas. Rather, the HRC is one of the various domains in which 
cooperation takes place. Grounded in a charter-based system, the HRC is relatively 
new as a body, but inherited the normative framework and part of the institutional 
organisation of its predecessor, the Commission on Human Rights. Membership is 
restricted to only 47 states, divided into regional groups. The EU holds the status of 
observer organisation, but is represented indirectly through its member states that are 
part of the Council. Unlike the other two areas, the restriction of membership to 
states hinders level-linkage, as collaboration between the EU and Brazil set upon at 
the bilateral level could only be transposed to the multilateral level if EU member 
states endorsed the same position.  
Another characteristic of this regime that plays against level-linkage is in the 
nature of decision-making. Decisions are reached by the parties, meeting in the 
regular and special sessions. Not all resolutions require voting, but when that is the 
case, a simple majority of votes suffices in order to adopt a decision. Consequently, 
actors need to collaborate with fewer players in order to pass resolutions than is 
required when decisions operate by consensus, as on climate change and trade. The 
decision-making process of the HRC induces selectiveness when the parties choose 
their allies. Yet, one feature that is positive for the integration of levels of 
cooperation is the agenda of the regime. The issues dealt with by the HRC are 
                                                
139 Interview n.25, Brussels, 12 July 2011. 
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essentially political and can be transposed to other levels of cooperation without 
requiring a high degree of technical expertise to be discussed. The type of regime 
then plays a dual role in level-linkage on human rights, creating both constraints and 
opportunities within this process. 
Overall, the three regimes are very dissimilar in terms of scope, institutional 
arrangements, and agenda. These differences result in the heterogeneous impact of 
the type of regime variable on the level-linkage process. Whereas on climate change 
the characteristics of the regime are more positive for the linking of levels of 
cooperation, the complexity of the trade regime poses an obstacle to the process. The 
impact of the type of regime on human rights is mixed, with some aspects of the 
HRC inhibiting level-linkage, whilst others actually benefit it.  
 The evidence that, in climate change and human rights, the EU and Brazil 
have been more successful in importing their multilateral agenda to the bilateral level 
of their cooperation suggests that regime type does play a role in creating conditions 
facilitating or constraining level-linkage. The evidence found in the three case-
studies validates the hypothesis that “the greater the openness of a regime to 
influences from other levels of cooperation, the more likely level-linkage is to 
occur.” 
Nevertheless, this research revealed that the type of regime is not the key 
explanatory variable accounting for the correlation between different levels of 
cooperation, as the mainstream literature believes. It is, therefore, important to 
analyse the other three hypotheses of the thesis. 	  6.3.2	   Hypothesis	   2:	   Compatibility	   of	   Approaches	   (Secondary	  Hypothesis)	  
The second hypothesis of the thesis is that the greater the compatibility of 
approaches of the EU and Brazil at the multilateral level, the more the incentives 
and the prospects for level-linkage. To assess the “approach” of the parties, the case-
studies analysed the interests of the EU and Brazil in promoting multilateralism as a 
strategy to organise international relations. The analysis also looked at how the two 
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actors believe a multilateral regime should be structured in terms of norms, agenda, 
responsibilities of the parties, and how they engage with the regimes, considering 
material interest and cognitive elements.    
 Overall, Brazil and the EU demonstrated strong convergence in terms of 
their joint support of multilateralism as a principle by which to organise 
international relations, but differed in many aspects when it came to addressing 
cooperation within the specific regimes. Again, there were differences in the three 
areas. Comparing the cases (table 32), this research concluded that the limited 
compatibility of EU/Brazil approaches to climate change and human rights 
constrains level-linkage within these areas. Yet, the high degree of divergence over 
multilateral trade issues also hinders the prospects of level-linkage. 
TABLE	  32	   	   COMPATIBILITY	  OF	  APPROACHES	  	  
 Climate Change Trade Human Rights 
Interest in Multilateralism High High High 
Responsibilities of the parties Convergence Divergence Convergence 
Agenda Mixed Divergence Mixed 
Instruments of Cooperation Convergence Convergence Divergence 
Impact on Level-Linkage Constrains Blocks Constrains 
Hypothesis Validation ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Crossing the cases, the empirical findings summarised in this section validate 
the second hypothesis of this thesis. At least in the areas analysed, the compatibility 
of approaches towards multilateralism proved to be one of the criteria for level-
linkage.  
 
Climate Change 
Brazil and the EU are considered important actors within the climate change regime 
and have been very active in their engagement with multilateral negotiations. Despite 
the fact that their allocation in distinct Annex-I groups creates different international 
commitments for the two players, they have a common understanding of the norms 
that should underpin the regime. The EU and Brazil support the “common but 
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differentiated responsibilities principle” and ambitious targets. The problem is that 
the actors have diverging positions on the degree of commitments made by the 
parties, with Brazil defending more flexibility for developing countries than the EU. 
There were also differences in their agendas. Brazil demonstrated little openness to 
the discussion of sensitive issues, such as forest management, whilst the parties could 
not coordinate their positions on key instruments for promoting multilateral 
cooperation, such as the Clean Development Mechanism. These divergences, 
however, did not fully hinder the prospects of EU-Brazil cooperation, but did limit 
the range of affairs on which the actors could forge policy coordination. As a result, 
the “compatibility of approaches” constrains the prospects of level-linkage on 
climate change. 
 
Trade 
The political discourse of Brazil and the EU endorses their support of multilateralism 
in trade almost unconditionally. Both actors are considered important players within 
the Doha Round and have been committed to maintaining negotiations until an 
agreement can be finally reached. As on climate change, dissimilar degrees of 
development place Brazil and the EU on separate sides of the regime. Yet, in the 
case of trade, the actors displayed more disparities regarding the responsibilities of 
parties than on climate. Brazil strongly supports the adoption of rules that 
compensate developing countries for decades of an unbalanced system that favoured 
developed nations, a perspective not advocated by the EU. In addition to this 
political divide, the parties have conflicting (material) interests in an agreement on 
agriculture. As an exporter of these goods, Brazil defends strong liberalisation in the 
sector. The EU, on the other hand, as an importer and rather protectionist market, has 
been more resistant to an ambitious deal. Over time, these incompatibilities have 
eased up, bolstered by a change in the EU’s internal agricultural policy that reflects 
in a more flexible external agenda. This shift in the EU’s approach paved the way for 
a more collaborative engagement with Brazil. Nevertheless, the two actors still have 
significantly divergent interests in and approaches to negotiations of a new 
agreement on agriculture, corroding incentives for level-linkage on trade. 
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Human Rights 
The EU’s and Brazil’s commitment to multilateralism is also manifest on human 
rights. Both actors have solid interests in projecting their identity as great supporters 
of an effective international regime. Recognising this shared interest, the EU and 
Brazil have declared that the respect for democracy and human rights are principles 
and values that bring the partners together. This statement is included in the 
preamble of agreements and official documents that provide the basis for bilateral 
cooperation.  
In contrast to trade, the engagement between the EU and Brazil within the 
HRC is not strongly affected by a North-South divide; neither of the actors formed 
an enduring coalition with a particular group. In fact, there were some joint 
initiatives at the multilateral level. Identifying a narrow range of issues on which 
they have an interest in cooperating with each other, the EU and Brazil produced 
some joint initiatives at the HRC, such as the side event on women’s rights. 
Nevertheless, even within these issues, the EU and Brazil did not table a single joint 
proposal for a resolution. Part of the reason for that can be credited to differences in 
terms of the strategies that the two actors adopt to engage with multilateral 
cooperation in this realm. Both partners concur on the universality of human rights, 
but disagree on the instruments used to promote these rights. Brazil supports a 
system based on dialogue between all the parties, including the violators of these 
rights. The EU, on the other hand, is more incisive on the mechanisms of 
enforcement and compliance, defending the position that interventions should be 
applied when needed. Perceiving different objectives and uses for resolutions has 
hampered the prospects of an alliance between the two actors beyond the informal 
level of the side-events organised in the margins of the regular sessions of the HRC. 
In light of this, the limited compatibility of approaches constrains prospects for 
level-linkage on human rights.  
Looking at the way that multilateral issues were addressed at the bilateral 
level, the case-studies provided evidence that on climate change and human rights 
the two partners were able to forge common positions on specific issues. This finding 
supports the claim that the compatibility of approaches of the EU and Brazil over 
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certain matters on the multilateral agenda has enabled the process of level-linkage to 
develop to a certain extent, even if the ultimate outcome was a lack of level-linkage 
in these areas. Conversely, there were vague references to multilateral trade 
negotiations at the bilateral level. Considering that the EU and Brazil have a 
preference for cooperating over multilateral issues at the WTO, if there was a 
consistent compatibility of approaches in this realm,one would expect to find 
references to these common views/positions at the bilateral level too. The fact that 
the EU and Brazil have been so careful when addressing issues of multilateral trade 
negotiations at the bilateral level reinforces the understanding of their poor 
compatibility of approaches in this realm, which undermines prospects for level-
linkage.  
To summarise, there is evidence in the three case-studies that the 
compatibility of approaches plays a role in level-linkage, validating the second 
hypothesis of this thesis. 
 6.3.3	   Hypothesis	   3:	   Foreign	   Policy-­‐Making	   Processes	   (Primary	  Hypothesis)	  
“The more coordinated the foreign-policy making processes of the two actors’ 
bilateral and multilateral policies, the more the chance there is of level-linkage 
occurring.” According to this third hypothesis, level-linkage depends on the policy-
making processes under which actors define and conduct their foreign policies. The 
ideal scenario would be the existence of one single process for bilateral and 
multilateral policy formation, with the same agencies responsible for the making of 
the EU’s and Brazil’s foreign policies. Alternatively, if policies towards each of the 
two levels of cooperation are developed through separate processes, level-linkage 
requires high coordination between agents and agencies. Additionally, considering 
the direction of level-linkage analysed in the thesis, from the bilateral to the 
multilateral level, the impact of the first on the latter requires a structure in which 
multilateral policies are influenced by bilateral policies, in a sort of “bottom-up” 
approach. 
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 Nevertheless, none of these conditions were met in any of the three cases 
analysed, undermining the prospects for level-linkage. As table 33illustrates, the 
foreign policies of Brazil and the EU are both structured by a hierarchical 
framework in which policies addressing the multilateral arena are prioritised over 
bilateral relations. Additionally, the policy-making of the two actors is characterised 
by fragmentation between agents and agencies, which are allocated according to the 
level of cooperation being catered for. These features were identified in all three 
issue-areas. The absence of level-linkage in climate change, trade and human rights 
thus matches the lack of coordination in the formation of bilateral and multilateral 
policies, validating the third hypothesis of the thesis. 
TABLE	  33	   	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  FOREIGN	  POLICY-­‐MAKING	  
 Climate Change Trade Human Rights 
Structure Hierarchical Hierarchical Hierarchical 
Direction Top-down Top-down Top-down 
Bilateral/ Multilateral Policies Fragmented Fragmented Fragmented 
Coordination Agents Poor Poor Poor 
Coordination Agencies Poor Poor Poor 
Impact on Level-Linkage Hinders Hinders Hinders 
Hypothesis Validation ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Whereas on the other three hypotheses each area of cooperation presented different 
features regarding the “type of regime”, “compatibility of approaches”, and 
“preferences for partners”, in the case of “policy-making processes” the three cases 
displayed similar characteristics and had the same impact on level-linkage (table 33). 
Yet, that does not mean that the EU and Brazil apply the same processes to their 
policy-making at the bilateral and multilateral levels in these three areas. On the 
contrary, foreign policy-making on climate change, trade, and human rights are 
unique processes. 
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Climate Change 
In Brazil, external climate policy engages different ministries and bodies from the 
executive. The Ministry of Foreign affairs (Itamaraty) is the chief agency 
coordinating bilateral cooperation with the EU, but it shares competences with other 
bodies in the case of multilateral negotiations. Operating under a certain division of 
labour, agents in charge of handling relations with the EU do not engage in the 
policy-making process addressing the multilateral arena. This division is even more 
accentuated in the case of the EU. As an area of shared competence, the European 
Commission has relative autonomy in handling bilateral cooperation with Brazil. The 
EU’s multilateral policies are the outcome of a more complex process, in which the 
Council of the European Union and the 28 EU member states all play important 
roles. The structure of the EU’s foreign policy-making on climate change poses an 
obstacle to coordination amongst agents. As the case-studies demonstrated, the 
foreign policy-making processes of both actors are a major stumbling block for 
level-linkage on climate change. 
 
Trade 
Policy-making on trade also follows a hierarchical and fragmented structure. The 
processes of both partners are characterised by the distribution of competences 
amongst agents and agencies according to the level of cooperation. Itamaraty works 
together with other ministries in forging the Brazilian external trade policy. Bilateral 
cooperation with the EU is coordinated by diplomats working in the Ministry’s 
headquarters in Brasilia and at the Brazilian mission to the EU in Brussels. 
Multilateral policy, however, is jointly executed by the ministries in Brasilia and the 
Brazilian delegation to the WTO.  
The EU has a slightly more coordinated policy-making process for trade than 
on climate change. With exclusive competence over EU’s external trade policy, 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation are the responsibility of the European 
institutions. Prior to the Lisbon Treaty, bilateral relations with Brazil were the result 
of the coordination of the various Directorate-Generals of the European Commission. 
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With the entry into force of the Treaty, these competences are now shared between 
the European Commission and the new European External Action Service (EEAS). 
Like Brazil, the EU has representation at the WTO that closely follows the activities 
of the organisation and engages with multilateral negotiations with a certain degree 
of autonomy from the capitals. Bilateral cooperation subjected to multilateral 
policies and a lack of coordination between agents and agencies engaged in the 
making of the EU’s and Brazil’s policies at the two levels renders their 
foreignpolicy-making processes  hindrances to level-linkage on trade. 
 
Human Rights 
Policy-making on human rights is subjected to a hierarchical structure similar to that 
of the other two areas. However, as bilateral cooperation does not depend on the 
outcomes of multilateral negotiations, the agendas of bilateral and multilateral 
policies have a higher degree of autonomy from each other than in the cases of 
climate change and trade. In terms of competences, Itamaraty leads the policy-
making processes of Brazil’s DBLCM and in the multilateral arena. Similarly to 
trade, the bilateral process engages the diplomatic staff in Brasilia and in Brussels, 
whereas the Permanent Mission of Brazil to the UN in Geneva follows the activities 
of the HRC. Again, there is no significant coordination between the two policy-
making processes in Brazilian human rights policy. In the case of the EU this 
“division of labour” is even more accentuated. Unlike the other two areas analysed, 
the EU has no legal competences with which to forge a European human rights 
policy. In practice, bilateral cooperation with Brazil is conducted by the EEAS, 
whereas the EU’s approach to the international regime is defined by the EEAS and 
the Council of the European Union. The lack of competences and the state-only 
membership of the HRC limit the EU’s engagement with the regime,within which it 
is an independent actor. Although the EU holds the status of observer member to the 
HRC and has a delegation in Geneva, an “EU position” in the voting of resolutions is 
represented indirectly through EU member states. Thus, the coordination of the EU 
members’ positions is the result of a successful political exercise, and not a legal 
obligation. Against this backdrop, this thesis concluded that level-linkage is 
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negatively affected by the foreign policy-making processes of the human rights 
regime. 
In all three cases, the “foreign policy-making process” hasbeen exposed as a 
major obstacle for level-linkage. Without coordination between the processes of 
policy-making at the two levels, decisions adopted at the bilateral level in order to 
strengthen EU-Brazil cooperation in the multilateral arena did not meet the 
institutional conditions needed to allow bilateral policies to influence multilateral 
ones. With the two processes fragmented and lacking in coordination between them, 
EU-Brazil cooperation on the issues analysed proved to be conducted through 
different processes that isolate the bilateral level from the multilateral, hampering the 
prospects for their correlation. 
 6.3.4	   Hypothesis	   4:	   Preferences	   for	   Partners	   (Secondary	  Hypothesis)	  
The fourth hypothesis of this thesis is that level-linkage occurs if the EU and Brazil 
also consider each other preferential partners at the multilateral level. The rationale 
behind this preposition is the idea that the DBLCM can only be transposed to the 
multilateral level if the partners consider also their relationship important in the 
multilateral arena. There are different degrees to which this preference manifests 
itself. Ideally, the EU and Brazil would consider each other “strategic partners” in 
the international regimes, favouring their alliance over any other coalition. That 
notwithstanding, the two players would still be expected to collaborate at the 
multilateral level, even if they prioritise other alliances. 
 To test this hypothesis, this thesis considered that preferences for partners 
manifest themselves in formal groupings, coalitions and alliances, or even unilateral 
approaches to negotiations. Assessing these elements in the three case-studies, this 
thesis concluded that the EU and Brazil do not consider their engagement at the 
multilateral level a “strategic partnership” and have both revealed preferences for 
other partners in multilateralism. The table below summarises these findings 
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TABLE	  34	   	   PREFERENCES	  FOR	  PARTNERS	  
 Climate Change Trade Human Rights 
Grouping Different Different Different 
Preferences for Alliances Br: Strong 
EU: weak 
Br: Strong 
EU: weak 
Br & EU: weak 
 
Preferences for 
Unilateralism 
Br: Weak 
EU: Strong 
Br: Weak 
EU: Strong 
Br: Strong 
EU: Strong 
Specific Partnerships Br: Defined allies 
EU: Mixed partners 
Br: Defined allies 
EU: Mixed partners 
Br: Mixed partners 
EU: Mixed partners 
EU-BR cooperation Medium Minimal Minimal 
Impact on Level-Linkage Constrains Constrains Constrains 
Hypothesis Validation ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Climate Change 
On climate change, Brazil demonstrated a strong preference for siding with other 
members from the non-Annex I group, in particular the G77/China coalition and the 
BASIC group. On a few occasions, the country acted unilaterally or joined the EU 
and other parties from the Annex I group. If the EU was not Brazil’s preferred 
partner, the EU also did not favour cooperation with Brazil in the multilateral arena. 
With a high record of unilateral proposals tabled at negotiations, the EU engaged 
with a diverse range of countries, depending on the issue and the period.  
 
Trade 
In the first years of the negotiations of an agreement on agriculture, Brazil and the 
EU expressed opposite preferences for partners. Brazil joined its counter parties from 
the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and headed the creation 
of a strong coalition of developing countries, the G20 group. Brazil also joined 
alliances representing large exporters of commodities. The EU was not included in 
any of these groups. As on climate change, the EU engaged with the Doha Round 
mostly as a political group in itself, acting unilaterally or forging circumstantial 
alliances. From the mid-2000s onwards, the establishment of small negotiation 
groups, such as the G4, G5, FIPS, amongst others, created new opportunities for 
direct engagement between the EU and Brazil. Changes in the external trade policies 
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of the actors also created more room for cooperation. Yet, despite some occasional 
partnerships, the EU and Brazil never prioritised their bilateral engagement over 
other coalitions at the WTO. 
 
Human Rights 
Cooperation on human rights is also defined by the lack of a strong EU-Brazil 
alliance at the HRC. The main difference from the other two regimes is that Brazil 
did not reveal a strong preference for acting through coalitions. It supported 
resolutions tabled by a large range of countries and made few proposals of its own. 
Focused on overcoming the problem of coordination amongst it member states, the 
EU acted as a political group, tabling proposals in coordination with various parties, 
but never with Brazil.  
 In all the three issue-areas analysed, the EU and Brazil did not favour their 
cooperation in the multilateral arena over other engagements with other parties. 
Without signs of a strategic partnership in this sphere, there was little scope for the 
strengthening of DBLCM to spillover to the multilateral level. Confirming the fourth 
hypothesis of the thesis, in the two areas in which the EU and Brazil displayed more 
interest in cooperating at the multilateral level, climate change and human rights, the 
process-tracing of negotiations identified few occasions on which the two players 
acted together, particularly in the case of climate negotiations. Trade, however, was 
the field within which the actors expressed less preference for engaging with each 
other and, therefore, was the case with the least record of EU-Brazil engagement at 
the multilateral level. 
 6.4.5	  Summary	  of	  the	  Hypotheses	  
 
The comparison of the three case-studies revealed differences in terms of agenda and 
degree of institutionalisation in DBLCM. Nevertheless, even if developing along 
different paths, cooperation on climate change, trade and human rights enhanced 
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over the period analysed – but only at the bilateral level. In all three areas, 
cooperation in the multilateral arena remained irregular. Cases of partnership 
between the EU and Brazil were circumstantial and did not derive from systematic 
policy coordination between the two actors. These elements supported the claim that 
there was no level-linkage in EU-Brazil cooperation on climate change, trade or 
human rights.  
The same outcome does not imply equal process. Consequently, each 
hypothesis tested had a different impact on the correlation between bilateral and 
multilateral levels of EU-Brazil cooperation. As table 35 illustrates, all four 
hypotheses of this thesis were validated by the empirical analysis of level-linkage 
within the three issue-areas analysed. 
TABLE	  35	   	   OVERALL	  IMPACT	  ON	  LEVEL-­‐	  LINKAGE	  
 Regime Type 
(H1) 
Approach 
(H2) 
Policy-Making 
(H3) 
Preferences for 
Partners (H4) 
Climate Change Constrains Constrains Blocks Constrains 
Trade Blocks Blocks Blocks Blocks 
Human Rights Constrains Constrains Blocks Constrains 
Validation ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
The “type of regime” constrains the prospects for level-linkage to occur in 
climate change and human rights, but does not hamper this process, whereas within 
the international trade regime this factor hinders prospects for level-linkage. The 
same trend was identified in the “compatibility of approaches”. The convergence 
between the approaches of the EU and Brazil in climate negotiations and the HRC 
sessions is restricted to certain issues. Thus, the scope for level-linkage in the two 
areas is constrained by the limited “compatibility of approaches”. On trade, the 
divergence in approaches overtakes the few elements of compatibility, hindering 
level-linkage.  
In terms of “foreign policy-making”, all three cases presented a fragmented 
and hierarchical structure, with poor coordination between agents and agencies 
engaged in the policy-making process of policies addressing the bilateral level and 
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those in charge of policies applied to the multilateral arena. “Foreign policy-making 
processes” hinder level-linkage in all three areas.  
“Preference for partners” constrains level-linkage for different reasons. On 
climate change, Brazil displayed a clear preference for partners other than the EU. 
Yet, the EU did not manifest strong favouritism for a particular ally. With no sign of 
a change in Brazil’s choice, the strengthening of cooperation between the two 
partners would be more likely to occur if the EU moved closer to Brazil and its 
allies. In the negotiations of an international agreement on agriculture, the 
preferences for partners of Brazil and the EU are in stark opposition, hindering level-
linkage.In the case of the HRC, the problem is that neither of the two actors revealed 
a preference for a particular alliance. The EU and Brazil forged occasional 
partnerships or acted unilaterally. In order for level-linkage to occur, the two actors 
would have to adopt an approach based on coalitions and, even then, they would 
have to choose one another.  
  
6.6	  Conclusion	  
 
Crossing the three case-studies, this thesis presented the specificities of level-linkage 
in each area. It also allowed for the understanding from a comparative perspective of 
how each of the four hypotheses impact on level-linkage. Empirical evidence 
supported the validity of the four hypotheses, but also revealed stark differences in 
the processes of level-linkage. Interestingly, despite variance across cases, in none of 
the areas analysed did any of the four elements of the hypotheses prove to have a 
positive impact on level-linkage; a finding that highlights the complexity of this 
process. 
The next section summarises the main findings of this thesis, highlights the 
contribution it brings to the literature and policy-making and points out avenues for 
future research. 
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CONCLUSION	  
 
 
7.1	  Overview	  of	  the	  Thesis	  
 
The mainstream literature on international cooperation focuses on the role of agents 
to define the concept of cooperation and elaborates on the factors that prompt actors 
to engage in a process of policy coordination. Yet, when debating the dynamics 
between the modalities of cooperation academics shift their unit of analysis from 
agents to issues. Moreover, the literature treats bilateralism and multilateralism as 
different cooperative arrangements, and not as distinct levels of the framework of a 
bilateral cooperation scheme. Against this background, academic research fails to 
provide a comprehensive account of the correlation between the bilateral level and 
the multilateral level of EU-Brazil engagement. This research aimed to solve the 
puzzle of why there was no level-linkage in EU-Brazil relations in the three cases 
analysed. 
The research framework and the hypotheses were defined on the basis of the 
literature in international cooperation. The theoretical approach of this thesis is 
intentionally eclectic. It combines elements from different theories, predominately 
from institutionalist rational choice and constructivism, to answer the question of the 
correlation between two levels of cooperation in EU-Brazil relations. Instead of 
opting for agents or issues as units of analyses, this research chose to integrate both 
elements within its framework. Claiming that level-linkage varies according to the 
issue-area and the agents at stake, this research laid out a set of four hypotheses that 
were equally applied to the three case-studies. In doing so, the analysis enabled 
understanding the process of level-linkage within the specificities of each area, at the 
same time permitting a comparison of the three cases. Furthermore, this framework 
was developed specifically to address the correlation of levels of cooperation within 
a bilateral relationship.  
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This research examined the reasons why the enhancement of EU-Brazil 
DBLCM did not have an impact on the engagement between the two actors at the 
multilateral arena. In other words, why there was no level-linkage in the cases 
analysed. To address this issue, this research studied the characteristics of the 
international regimes. It looked at the approach of the EU and Brazil to 
multilateralism and their negotiation agendas, and unveiled the foreign policy-
making processes of the two actors. Finally the thesis considered the EU’s and 
Brazil’s preferences for partners in the multilateral arena. These four elements 
constitute the intervening variables that are incorporated in the set of hypotheses of 
the thesis. 
The first chapter mapped out the literature, addressed the puzzle, and 
explained the argument, methods and operationalization of this research. The second 
chapter presented an overview of EU-Brazil relations within its multilevel structure. 
Chapters three, four and five conducted the empirical analysis of level-linkage in 
three issue-areas: climate change, trade, and human rights, respectively. Chapter six 
crossed the results of the three case studies, allowing to comprehensive 
understanding of level-linkage in EU-Brazil relations.  
This last section of this thesis presents first a summary of the main research 
findings. The following part outlines the theoretical and policy implications of the 
thesis. Limitations and potential for generalisation are summarised in the third part. 
This section concludes presenting avenues for future research. 
 
7.2	  Key	  findings	  
 
Applying the framework of level-linkage to the analysis of the correlation between 
the bilateral level and the multilateral level of EU-Brazil cooperation in three issue-
areas, this research makes the following conclusions: 
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7.2.1	  No	  level-­‐linkage	  
 
Although the literature and the policy strategy endorsed by the EU and Brazil assume 
the correlation between two levels cooperation as given, this thesis showed three 
cases in which there was no linkage between the two levels.  
 As explained in chapter 1, this thesis argues that for level-linkage to occur 
changes in the pattern of DBLCM should correspond to shifts in the pattern of 
engagement at the multilateral level. Even if these movements follow in opposite 
directions, they would suggest a correlation between the two levels, so that one 
impacts the other. Alternatively, this correlation could be observed with cooperation 
at the two levels remaining unaltered over time.  
As highlighted in the crossing of the three cases (chapter 6), the enhancement 
of DBLCM was not matched with an eventual increase of the EU-Brazil engagement 
at the multilateral arena. In this light, the thesis concluded there is lack of level-
linkage in the cases analysed. The absence of a correlation between the two levels 
does not imply complete isolation of the two processes. In approaching the EU-
Brazil relations as a multilevel structure, this thesis showed how bilateral level and 
the multilateral level are integrated parts of the framework of this bilateral 
cooperation. Even if developing through independent processes, the two levels are 
interconnected, even if indirectly. In this light, this thesis claimed that the 
understanding of the correlation between levels of cooperation within a bilateral 
relation must be contextualised and analysed in considering the characteristics of this 
particular relationship. 
 7.2.2	  Different	  regime	  arrangements	  matter	  
 
Differences amongst the regimes and the international organisation through which 
they operate indicated different external environments for level-linkage. To appraise 
this issue, the thesis considered the five characteristics of institutions developed by 
  
 
290 
Koremenos et at. (2001), namely: a) membership; b) scope; c) centralisation; d) 
rules; and e) flexibility of arrangements. The scrutiny of these elements within each 
regime was combined with the analysis of the degree of “independence” and 
“centralisation” of the international organisation addressed by the case-studies, 
following the typology of IOs postulated by Abbott and Snidal (1998:9).   
 Considering all these elements, the thesis concludes that, in the cases of 
climate change and human rights, the structure of the regimes (understood as 
institutional organisation and agenda) and the nature of the issues allowed a 
transposition of the multilateral agenda to the bilateral level. Nevertheless, the 
process in the opposite direction was not equally feasible. The defining elements of 
the two regimes constrained the prospects of “common strategies” adopted at the 
bilateral level to be transposed to the multilateral level. In the case of trade, the 
characteristics of regime, in particular of the WTO, created an environment more 
hostile to level-linkage, undermining the export of the multilateral agenda to other 
levels, thus hampering the prospects of spillover of cooperation. 
 These findings validated and emphasise the relevance of first (primary) 
hypothesis of this thesis that adopts regime as an intervening variable to the process 
of level-linkage and affirms that “the greater the openness of a regime to influences 
from other levels of cooperation, the more likely level-linkage occurs”. This 
assumption proved to be in line with the “general understanding amongst 
cooperation theorists that the prospects for international cooperation vary according 
to the structure and the nature of each issue” (Fearon 1998:269). Moreover, in 
providing evidence that “regimes matter” to level-linkage, the thesis reinforces the 
relevance of the neoliberal institutionalist assumption that “regimes (and IOs) can act 
as intervening variables mediating between states’ pursuit of self-interest and 
political outcomes” (Barnett & Finnemore 2001: 408).  
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7.2.3	  Compatibility	  of	  approaches	  determines	  the	  agenda	  of	  level-­‐linkage	  
The scope under which the EU and Brazil intended to project level-linkage was 
determined by the compatibility of their approaches towards multilateralism. In 
broad terms, the “compatibility of approach” could be interpreted as a “payoff” 
variable, to use the terminology proposed by the rational institutionalism of Axelrod 
& Keohane (1985) and Oye (1985). Yet, this thesis stretched the understanding of 
this element to encompass not only material interest, but norms and ideas. In this 
sense, this thesis approached multilateralism as both a principle and a strategy of 
cooperation.   
To understand multilateralism as a principle to organise international 
relations, this thesis drew from James Caporaso’s definition of multilateralism as “an 
ideology ‘designed’ to promote multilateral activity [that] combines normative 
principles with advocacy and existential belief” (Caporaso 1992:603). Under this 
approach, the three cases provided substantial evidence that there is a high degree of 
compatibility in the approaches of the EU and Brazil to a multilateral order. Yet, 
when addressing the institutionalisation of cooperation or the ad hoc arrangements in 
which actors forge their policy coordination, following Robert Keohane’s approach 
to multilateralism (1990:731), divergences in the agendas of the EU and Brazil were 
considerably more evident.  
Taking into account material and cognitive elements, the two partners 
expressed different positions in terms of the principles that should underpin 
multilateral agreements, the instruments of cooperation and the content of the norms 
of these agreements. The EU and Brazil agree on the principle of “common but 
differentiated responsibilities” in which the climate change regime is grounded, but 
disagreed on how to address most of the specific issues subjected to a multilateral 
agreement. In the case of trade, Brazil strongly advocates in favour of an agreement 
that compensates developing countries from the distortions of the trade regime that 
have so far benefited developed economies. The EU showed resistance to agreement 
that favoured developing economies. Moreover, material interests of the two also 
clashed. In the case of human rights, divergences between the EU and Brazil were 
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not in terms of agenda or normative framework, but on the instruments to promote 
multilateral cooperation. Whereas Brazil believes in a more “cooperative” approach, 
with emphasis on the promotion of dialogue, the EU believes the HRC should play a 
more assertive role when it comes to the enforcement of the human rights 
commitments undertaken by the parties. 
In the light of these findings, it can be argued that shared interest is a 
multipolar world creates incentives for Brazil and the EU to aim at the strengthening 
their BCML, but is not sufficient to ensure level-linkage. For this process to occur, it 
is essential that the two actors have a common understanding of how multilateralism 
should take form.  
 7.2.4	  Institutional	  variable	  is	  the	  key	  determinant	  of	  level-­‐linkage	  
As argued in the third hypothesis of the thesis, the political decision to promote 
level-linkage can only be successful if the two actors have the institutional capability 
to enable the correlation between their bilateral and multilateral policies.  
Looking at foreign policy- making through the lenses of the classical theory 
of bureaucracy first developed by Weber (1924) and the literature on Bureaucratic 
Politics Model (MPM) introduced in Foreign Policy Analysis by Allison (1972), my 
departure point to understand the making of bilateral and multilateral policies with 
Brazil and the EU was the analysis of their bureaucratic processes in terms of 
hierarchy and centralisation (or “division of labour”). 
On these grounds, I argued that the best institutional process for level-linkage 
would integrate the policy-making of the two levels within he single institutional 
arrangement and within the same agencies. Yet, as this thesis showed, that is not how 
the EU and Brazil craft their foreign policies. 
 In this case, level-linkage would require coordination amongst agencies and 
agents responsible for the policy-making of policies addressed to each of the two 
levels of cooperation. That is where the main problem to level-linkage lies. In the 
case of both the EU and Brazil, bilateral foreign policies are conducted separately 
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from multilateral foreign policies. There is little coordination amongst agents from 
the two processes. In addition to being fragmented, foreign policies of the two actors 
are hierarchical, with multilateral polices prevailing over bilateral policies. Thus, 
even if the fragmentation (or decentralisation) problem was overcome, this order 
would have to be changed, allowing bilateral policies to play a greater influence in 
the shaping of the multilateral approaches of the EU and Brazil. As the analysis of 
level-linkage revealed, that was not the case – at least in the three issues investigated. 
Yet, in the case of two protagonists of this thesis, policy-making processes 
are not centralised in a single decision maker. In the case of Brazil, Itamaraty is the 
chief agency responsible for bilateral and multilateral policies. Within the Ministry, 
however, competences are allocated by issue area and level of policy. The same 
distribution applies largely to the internal organisation of the bodies in charge of 
European foreign policy. Adding to this picture, competences over bilateral and 
multilateral policies are delegated to different European institutions, depending on 
the issue. To make this scenario even worse, the EU holds different degrees of 
competences according to the area. Therefore, there are legal and institutional factors 
accounting for the fragmentation of the policy-making of the EU’s approach to 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation.  
Indeed, that was the case in the process of level-linkage in EU-Brazil 
cooperation, where hampered the implementation of the political decision to forge 
level-linkage. Without the institutional capability, enhanced DBLCM could not 
spillover to the multilateral arena, even if there was certain compatibility of 
approaches and windows of opportunity to that within the context of the international 
regimes. For this reason, this thesis concluded that this internal institutional variable, 
explored through the second primary hypothesis, is the one that plays the greatest 
role in affecting the outcome of level-linkage. Moreover, these findings strengthened 
the relevance of bureaucratic structures of foreign policy-making in constraining the 
capacity of a government to implement its decision, ultimately shaping a 
government’s behaviour, ultimately reinforcing the relevance of BPM to FPA.  
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7.2.5	  Preferences	  for	  partners	  are	  not	  the	  main	  constrain	  to	  level-­‐linkage	  
 
As Axerold and Keohane explain, the likelihood of cooperation depends on the 
relationship between actors and the number of player involved in a cooperative 
scheme (1985: 234). The fourth hypothesis of this thesis draws from the idea that the 
number and the profile of the parties engaged in a multilateral process is directly 
related to the prospects of a partnership adopted at the bilateral to manifest at the 
multilateral arena. In other words, for level-linkage to occur, the EU and Brazil 
needed to perceive their relationship as strategic in an environment in which other 
possibilities of alliance were available.  
 To assess how the EU and Brazil approached their bilateral relationship at the 
multilateral arena, this thesis considered their participation in formal and informal 
negotiating groups. It also looked at circumstantial joint action. The definition of an 
EU-Brazil partnership adopted is similar to the definition of John Odell of coalitions, 
understood as a “set of governments that defend a common position in a negotiation 
by explicit coordination” (Odell 2006:13).  
Scrutinising cases of “explicit” coordination between the EU and Brazil that 
could be characterised as indicators of the two actors preference for their bilateral 
engagement at the multilateral level, this thesis found little evidence. In none of the 
three regimes analysed, the EU and Brazil belong to the same formal or informal 
negotiating groups. Cases of circumstantial alliance between the two partners were 
more recurrent in cooperation on climate change negotiations. The divergent 
approaches to trade negotiations limited a partnership at the multilateral level to the 
discourse in supporting the conclusion of the Doha Round, but no joint proposals 
were taken. Perhaps surprisingly, the EU and Brazil also did not present any joint 
proposal in the special and regular sessions of the Human Rights Council (HRC). At 
that domain, partnership was restricted to promoting dialogue over specific issues, 
like women’s rights.  
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Without favouring their relationship at the multilateral level, the 
strengthening of EU-Brazil BCML is certainly not the top priority of the two players. 
Consequently, even if the actors consider their engagement strategic at the bilateral 
level, the prospect for this “partnership” to increase their cooperation at the 
multilateral arena is limited by the prioritising of other relationships at that level. On 
the one hand, these findings support the rational institutionalist claim that the 
“number of players” is one of the factors that determine cooperation. On the hand, 
however, this research exposed a limitation to this argument. Whereas the “number 
of players” and their relationship affected EU-Brazil BCML, this variable did not 
have a significant impact in the case of human rights. That is because, regardless of 
the number of parties, the EU’s and Brazil’s approach to the HRC was 
predominantly marked by the lack of preferences for a particular partner. In this 
sense, “the preferences for partners” could not be considered as the key determinant 
of the outcomes of level-linkage in the three cases, although it did play an influence 
in these processes, justifying its classification as a secondary hypothesis. 
 
7.3	  Theoretical	  and	  Empirical	  Implications	  of	  this	  Research	  
 
The lack of level linkage in EU-Brazil relations identified in this thesis challenges 
the main theoretical and policy assumptions that have been applied to the appraisal 
of the dynamics between bilateralism and multilateralism. This section summarised   
main implications of this thesis to academic research and policy-making. 
 7.3.1	  Theoretical	  Implications	  
 
From a theoretical point of view, this thesis puts in evidence the inadequacy of 
polarizing the discussion on the correlation between two levels of cooperation in 
terms types of agreement developed by authors like Bagwell & Staiger 1998; 
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Bhagwati 1991, 1992; Krugman 1989; Lahiri 1998 to explain the dynamics of a 
particular bilateral relationship.  
 As presented in the conceptual framework (chapter 1), another characteristic 
of the literature in International Relations on international cooperation is its issue-
area approach.  
The academic work that assesses the engagement of the parties in multilateral 
negotiations focuses on formal and informal negotiating groups within a regime 
(Narlikar 2003; Odell 2000:13).  One of the main problems of this type of analysis is 
that they are developed in considering the specific characteristics of a given regime. 
Yet, as shown in this thesis, the normative content, institutional arrangements and 
agenda of different regimes vary widely. In adopting the same process to assess 
level-linkage on climate change, trade, and human rights, the analysis conducted 
allowed crossing the results and the process of under which this linkage may occur. 
This is particularly important because, as the thesis revealed, although the outcome 
of level-linkage is the same in the three areas, the explanations for these results 
varied. Whereas the conventional issue-area approach would not allow 
understanding the reasons for the absence of linkage in a comparative perspective, 
the framework postulated by this thesis addresses this gap. 
Moreover, the existing literature on coalitions places the emphasis on agents centres 
on the foreign policy/ agenda of the parties of a regime. Yet, as this research 
highlighted, the main obstacles for a level-linkage on EU-Brazil cooperation were 
not associated with the structure of the international regime. Furthermore, although 
the compatibility of approaches matter to this process, the key determinant to the 
outcome of level-linkage in the areas analysed is the foreign policy-making process.  
Interested in exploring the role of these agents, the level-linkage approach 
considers the preferences for partners at the two levels. Additionally, it emphasises 
the importance of the scrutiny of foreign policies agendas and policy-making 
processes. The incorporation of these elements to the proposed framework proved to 
be particularly relevant, as the results of the three case- studies revealed the strong 
impact of the domestic institutional arrangement of the partners in level-linkage. 
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Exploring the EU-Brazil relationship, this thesis showed the importance of deepening 
the analysis on the agents, contributing with new elements to the debate on strategies 
of cooperation. 
Unlocking the “black box” of the impact of policy-making in the outcome of 
level-linkage, this thesis also contributed to advancing the study of bureaucratic 
politics under a new angle. That is because empirical analysis of this issue focuses on 
the study of US foreign policy. Few are the comprehensive studies carried that have 
referenced to BPM as useful analytical model to assess foreign policy in other 
contexts (Shevchenko 1985; Gazit 1989; Andreae and Kaiser 2001). Nevertheless, 
none of these studies look into the effects of bureaucratic divisions between those 
agencies making bilateral and multilateral foreign policy. Addressing this gap, the 
analysis of agencies within the Brazilian and EU governments working on such 
policies revealed a new dimension in which bureaucratic organization interfere not 
only in the foreign policy of individual actors, but also in the relationship between 
them. 
 Highlighting the importance of policy-making process in determining the 
outcome of level-linkage, this thesis also contributes to the emerging literature on 
strategic partnerships. As stressed on chapter 1, research published in this area 
question the effectiveness of the strategy to promote these bilateral alliances to the 
multilateral arena mostly from the point of view of the compatibility of agendas 
between the EU and its partners (e.g. Lavrov 2013, Sachdeva 2008, Taneja 2010, 
Whitman and Rodt 2010).  The “policy-making” dimension of the problem appears 
through the criticism to the EU’s lack of clarity of the objectives and instruments of 
the strategic partnerships (e.g.Renard 2010, Gratius 2011, Grevi 2008). The 
comprehensive appraisal of this EU policy developed by Renard (2010), for 
example, fails to consider that the importance of having the strategic partnerships 
institutionalised by both actors – and not only by the EU.  
In shedding light on the obstacles posed by the bureaucratic organization of 
Brazil’s and the EU’s foreign policy-making to level linkage, this thesis strongly 
suggests that the analysis of strategic partnership should move beyond an “EU- 
centric” approach, and look how these partnerships fit in the foreign policy of EU’s 
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allies to fully understand the dynamics of this instrument of international 
cooperation. Moreover, this thesis revealed that the “regime type” matters, even if 
not the main determinant factor of the outcome of level-linkage. Thus, the correlation 
between the bilateral and the multilateral levels of cooperation depends on both 
“agents” and “issues”. The appraisal of strategic partnerships should focus on these 
two dimensions.  
 7.3.2	  Policy	  implications	  
 
The findings of this thesis challenge the core assumptions that underpin the foreign 
policy strategies of the EU and Brazil in conceiving their relationship. Contradicting 
the academic literature, these two actors have endorsed the idea that bilateralism and 
multilateralism can coexist. Going further, the EU and Brazil believed that different 
modalities of cooperation can be mutually reinforcing. On this basis, they employed 
significant political capital to forge a “strategic partnership” that would strengthen 
their alliance at all levels. To achieve this goal, the “partners” expected to set the 
bilateral level of their cooperation as a platform to enhance their coordination at the 
multilateral arena. Beyond rhetoric, the strategy to promote a linkage between the 
two levels has been translated into the enhancement of dialogues at the bilateral level 
on multilateral issues (Council of the European Union 2008b, 2011). This approach 
was applied to a wide range of subjects, suggesting the understanding that a linkage 
between levels of cooperation can be induced in many areas. Nonetheless, subtle 
differences in the discourse adopted at the bilateral level suggest awareness that 
cooperation was conceived differently in each area. In the cases of climate change 
and human rights the parties made explicit mention of the fostering of cooperation in 
the multilateral arena. In trade, however, the players were careful to emphasise an 
exchange of views on these matters (Council of the European Union 2010). 
Regardless of the approach, the outcomes were the same in the three issues. The EU 
and Brazil managed to enhance their engagement at the bilateral level, but not at the 
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multilateral arena. The strategy to induce level-linkage has not been successful in 
any of the three cases investigated. So what went wrong? 
 The problem was not that cooperation at two levels could not be developed in 
coordination without being mutually exclusive, as academics predict. The fact that 
the bilateral level was reinforced without any change in the EU-Brazil engagement at 
the multilateral arena is strong evidence that relationship at each of the two levels 
develops independently. The failure of the “strategic partnership” to spillover from 
the bilateral level to the multilateral level lies on the lack of appropriate internal, 
domestic conditions. Policy-makers interviewed expressed the awareness that 
different preferences for partners could pose an obstacle to level-linkage, and this 
research proved they are right. Yet, this thesis claimed that this was not the only 
factor. The hierarchical and fragmented structure of the policy-making of each actor 
and well as the poor coordination amongst agents and agencies engaged in their 
foreign policies have large share of responsibility over the failure of level-linkage. 
These elements, however, were not raised in the interviews nor addressed in the 
instruments of EU-Brazil cooperation. 
 Assessing the foreign policy-making variable, this thesis demonstrated that 
level-linkage is a process more complex than the EU and Brazil's institutions seem to 
conceive. Political will is certainly essential to begin an intentional process of 
coordination of the different levels of cooperation. Nevertheless, increasing dialogue 
over multilateral issues proved not enough, but that was how the EU and Brazil 
approached level-linkage. This thesis contested this strategy and claimed that a level-
linkage depends on three factors that rely directly in the foreign policy domains of 
the EU and Brazil, namely: a) approaches to the multilateral arena; b) policy-making; 
c) and preferences for partners. In addition to the “regime type” hypothesis, all these 
three elements proved to take part in the process of level-linkage. Yet, the two 
partners did not adopt a strategy to promote the changes necessary in these three 
aspects to promote level-linkage in their relationship. Thus, this thesis adds new 
elements to the understanding of the correlation between levels of cooperation in the 
specific case of EU-Brazil relations, stressing the complexity of this process. Going 
further, the analysis here conducted provided a comprehensive explanation to the 
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failure of the strategy endorsed by the two partners, showing the missing pieces to 
the success of this “strategic partnership”. 
This research broke the analysis of level-linkage on EU-Brazil cooperation 
into three issue-areas. The results shed light on the particularities of each case, 
showing the limitation of the EU’s and Brazil’s choice of adopting the same strategy 
to promote a linkage in all areas. This research suggests that level-linkage could best 
benefit from a strategy tailored in considering the different characteristics of 
cooperation on each realm.  
  
7.5	  Future	  Research	  Directions	  
 
The concept and the analytical framework postulated by this thesis to assess level-
linkage were tested on EU-Brazil relations. The empirical analyses of three areas of 
cooperation emphasised the relevance of the model here proposed to the 
understanding of the dynamics between different levels of cooperation within the 
context of this bilateral relationship. The core findings of this research provide 
significant intellectual stimulus to advance this research in four main ways.  
Firstly, it would be interesting to extend the analysis to other areas of EU-
Brazil cooperation in which the partners have expressed interest in further 
collaborating. The selection of new cases could start with the identifying of 
multilateral issues that feature amongst the priorities of the EU-Brazil strategic 
partnership. The analysis of security matters, for example, could provide analytical 
elements to compare the engagement of the parties in the low politics areas addressed 
by this thesis, with high politics issues.  
Secondly, the analysis of level-linkage was limited to the bilateral level and 
the multilateral level of EU-Brazil cooperation. Yet, as claimed in chapter 2, the 
relationship between the two actors is structured in a multi-level framework that 
encompasses two other domains of cooperation: the sub-regional level and the 
regional level. It would be very telling to see how level-linkage develops in other 
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levels of cooperation. The resuming of negotiations of the EU-MERCOSUR 
agreement in 2011 has enhanced the profile of the sub-regional dimension of EU-
Brazil relations. In this light, future research could test the framework proposed by 
this thesis to assess the correlation between the sub-regional level and the 
multilateral level. 
Thirdly, this study was limited to a certain timeframe. The period covered in 
the three cases varied, depending on the multilateral regime followed. In common, 
the analysis of the three areas traced DBLCM since their first establishment. 
Particular emphasis was placed on the strategic partnership. At the multilateral level, 
the studies on trade and climate change covered nearly one decade of negotiations, 
both ending in 2009. The appraisal of cooperation on human rights begun with the 
establishment of the HRC in 2006 and went until 2011, when the third consecutive 
mandate of Brazil to the Council terminated. The next step would be expanding the 
timeframe, updating this study in order to cover the development of cooperation in 
latest years. The new findings would contribute to understand if the outcome of 
level-linkage identified in this thesis changed overtime. Covering a broad period 
would also allow observing if level-linkage is vulnerable to short-term changes or if 
it is a more rigid process.   
Fourthly, although the framework proposed by this thesis was conceived to 
allow generalisation and not tailored to fit in a particular bilateral relationship, it was 
tested in the case of EU-Brazil cooperation. It would be an extremely enriching 
exercise to explore level-linkage in a bilateral relationship between two different 
actors. Many are the possibilities in selecting the cases. The engagement between 
two developing countries, for example, could raise different questions related to 
level-linkage, as they are more likely to have different degree of compatibility of 
multilateral agendas than the EU and Brazil.  Another possibility would be looking at 
countries that have different levels of commitment towards multilateralism. 
Exploring the US relations with either Brazil or the EU could be an interesting 
exercise, for example.  
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Future research along these lines would allow verifying the validity of level-
linkage as a general concept/ model. Additionally, it could point out new elements to 
contribute to further developing the arguments postulated by this thesis.  
All these avenues of future research show that this thesis raised important 
considerations on the correlation between two levels of cooperation. Rather than an 
end in itself, this thesis is a starting point to explore different approaches to the study 
of international cooperation, broadening the academic debate in this realm.
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ANNEXES	  
 
Annex I 
Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (Itamaraty): Organisation Chart 
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Annex II 
DG RELEX: Organisation Chart 
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Annex III 
EEAS: Organisation Chart 
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Annex V 
DG TRADE: Organisation Chart 
 
(continues ..) 
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Director 
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Directorate C 
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Ditte Juul-Joergensen 
Directorate G 
Trade Strategy and Market 
Access 
 
Director 
Signe Ratso 
Directorate H 
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